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Abstract
Humanity faces a formidable challenge in deciding how to respond to global
environmental issues, such as climate change and biodiversity loss. This thesis
explores the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in this context. I start in Part I by
highlighting the problems with conventional CBA, which include its treatment of
the future, and its approach to aggregating costs and benefits across individuals.
The rest of the thesis comprises empirical investigations of these two issues.
In Part II, I carry out the first rigorous statistical analysis of the economic
scenarios developed by the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change, which
have been criticised as being implausible relative to the historical data. I show that
for two of the three regions considered, the criticisms are unfounded, but for the
other, the IPCC scenarios are considerably more optimistic than is suggested by
the data. In addition, I show that economic growth is poorly described by an
exponential function, undermining conventional approaches to discounting. Next,
I use data on global and national Ecological Footprints to consider whether
environmental limits will prevent future economic growth. I find that previous
studies using this data have been biased towards pessimism by ignoring
technological progress, and I present two novel analyses that incorporate it. I find
no evidence that future economic growth will necessarily result in increasing
global Ecological Footprint.
In Part III, I carry out a partial CBA of a biodiversity conservation project to
protect the Ranomafana-Andringitra forest corridor in south-eastern Madagascar. I
begin by investigating the linkages between economic growth, urbanisation, and
forest cover change and then develop projections of deforestation and species
extinction. I show that the local opportunity costs of conservation are likely to be
positively linked to its biological urgency, and hence its global benefits. Although
the benefits of conservation strongly outweigh the costs in monetary terms, when
corrected for the diminishing marginal utility of income, the net present value of
the project is strongly negative. Therefore unless compensation is complete and
efficient, conservation will reduce social welfare, due to the extreme poverty in
the region. Because complete compensation is difficult to achieve, these results
call into question the present emphasis on directing conservation efforts towards
low-income countries.
The thesis shows that the simplifications inherent in conventional CBA can
produce misleading results when applied to complex global environmental issues.
In particular, assuming that compensation will be complete and costless could
encourage decision-makers to adopt projects that are seriously detrimental to
social welfare. CBA cannot be both value-free and decisive. I therefore outline a
generalised CBA approach that is capable of incorporating important societal
value judgments.
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1. Introduction
What should we do when scientists tell us we are changing the planet’s climate or
driving its species to extinction at an unprecedented rate (Chapin et al. 2000,
IPCC 2007)? These vital questions face humankind today. Failure to act may have
very serious consequences for the welfare of future generations. Yet even to slow
the rate of anthropogenic climate change or extinction may require considerable
sacrifices from the present generation, of which one in six are undernourished
(UNDP 2007).
These questions are a severe test of the predictive capabilities of science. The
causes and effects of climate change and biodiversity loss span continents and
centuries: the full environmental consequences of burning oil in our cars will not
be felt for many years to come, and could affect the lives of people thousands of
miles away. Any decision we make must take account of this, yet predictions of
the environmental consequences of action or inaction are clouded by large and
unquantifiable uncertainty (Grübler & Nakicenovic 2001). This uncertainty only
increases when we try to understand the implications of environmental change for
people living in different countries and generations (Solow 1999).
These issues do not just test our technical abilities, but also raise difficult moral
questions. How should we weigh our own welfare against that of the as-yet
unborn (Price 1993, Portney & Weyant 1999a)? What rights do we have to use
natural resources (Howarth 1995)? Do the rights of the poor differ from those of
the rich? How much should we sacrifice today to avoid highly uncertain
catastrophes (Arrow 1999, Weitzmann 2007)? Is it irresponsible to trust in
continued technological progress (Costanza 1995)?
Perhaps the severest test posed by global environmental issues is of our capability
to aggregate diverse information, weighing the interests of rich against poor and
generation against generation, in order to decide whether and how to act. Cost-
benefit analysis (CBA) is a procedure which aims to assist society to make
decisions about public policy and has been applied to global environmental issues
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(e.g. Balmford et al. 2002, Stern 2006). However, such analyses have been
controversial.
Some dispute the particular methods used (e.g. Dasgupta 2007c, Nordhaus 2007b,
Spash 2007b); others reject the practice of CBA itself (e.g. Collar 2003,
Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004). Certainly, global environmental issues provide a
stern test of CBA, stretching it well beyond the circumstances for which it was
originally conceived (Hanley & Spash 1993). Methodological conveniences that
may be harmless when deciding whether or not to build a bridge might, if repeated
in an analysis of climate change, lead to recommendations that would be
catastrophically detrimental to human welfare. And yet, even in these complex
issues, “the beans have to be counted” (Solow, 1999:vii). Decisions have to be
taken, and whatever method is used, the same information must either be
aggregated and weighed, or else ignored. This suggests a need to re-evaluate CBA
for application to complex issues (Sen 2001). Reappraising CBA from the
perspective of global environmental issues might pay other dividends too: many
of the issues raised relate to the fundamentals of economics - its “scope and
method” (Harrod 1938). How should economics relate to ethics (Hausman &
McPherson 2006)? Does economic science have predictive power, beyond the
minutiae of everyday life (Ormerod 1995)? How useful is economics to mankind
(Harrod 1938, Adler & Posner 2006)? Does the advice of economists deserve to
be heard by statesmen or confined to the marketplace?
Objectives and plan of the thesis
The preceding is full of big questions. These have intrigued me, and motivated
this thesis, but I can make no claims to have answered any of them. What follows
in subsequent chapters is an account of my own explorations of this extremely
important issue. The thesis is organised in four parts. The next chapter (the second
of part I) reviews the theory and practice of CBA from the perspective of global
environmental issues. The chapter has two aims: the first is to show that CBA can
make a useful contribution to decision-making in society - to defend it against its
critics; the second is to demonstrate that CBA, as currently practiced, must be
modified to be defensible. In particular, I explain the importance of making
explicit one’s assumptions about the future (including future income growth), and
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argue for a reformed approach to aggregation and compensation. The former point
underlies the work in Part II, and the latter provides the rationale for Part III.
Chapter 3 begins Part II, by investigating the controversy over the best-known
long-range economic projections, those of the Inter-governmental Panel on
Climate Change (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000). I enter the debate on the terms set
out by the protagonists (Castles & Henderson 2003a,b), asking whether the
projections are ‘reasonable’ compared with the historical data. Through these
analyses, I develop extrapolations from past income growth and income
convergence, which are used in subsequent chapters.1
Chapters 4 and 5 address another question that is always important, but especially
so in CBA of environmental issues: can income growth continue indefinitely, as
assumed in most CBAs? After reviewing the wider debate, I focus more narrowly
on empirical analyses that use Ecological Footprint to investigate this issue. After
an analytical review of these studies (Chapter 4), I carry out an analysis of the
relationship between Ecological Footprint and income per capita at the global
level (Chapter 5). Chapter 6 concludes Part II, by combining the results of the
three previous chapters to project per capita income and Ecological Footprint over
the coming century.
In Part III, I use a case study of a proposed biodiversity conservation project in
Madagascar to explore issues of aggregation and compensation in CBA. Chapter 7
introduces biodiversity conservation in general and the case study in particular,
while Chapter 8 develops projections of deforestation in the absence of
conservation action. Chapter 9 further develops this scenario, linking deforestation
to species extinctions, and asking what might be the value of avoiding these
extinctions. Chapter 10 considers the local opportunity costs of conservation, first
describing the considerable difficulties associated with measuring them and then
developing internally consistent projections. Chapter 11 concludes Part III, by
aggregating these costs and benefits of the conservation project, demonstrating the
enormous importance of adopting an appropriate approach to aggregation and
compensation. Finally Chapter 12 concludes by summarising the key findings of
1 In the appendices to this chapter, I delve deeper into this debate, investigating the internal
consistency of the purchasing power parity scenarios.
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the thesis, and making some general observations on the potential of CBA to
contribute to decisions on global environmental issues.
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2. Cost-benefit analysis for global
environmental issues: a review
“[Cost-benefit analysis] is a practice that has no theoretical
justification. The original objections to CBA have never been
rebutted”. (Adler & Posner 2006:12).
Abstract
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is an explicit valuation procedure used by economists
to inform societal decision-making. CBA was originally used to evaluate
relatively small projects whose benefits and costs were largely monetary. Now,
however, it is frequently applied to much more complex policy questions,
including those relating to global environmental issues such as climate change
and biodiversity loss. I review the literature on the theory and practice of CBA in
order to determine whether conventional approaches are able to meet the
challenges posed by these issues. I join previous authors in recommending that
economists should abandon their expectation that meaningful results can be
obtained from a value-free procedure and should reject the quasi-decisive role of
conventional CBA. Furthermore, I show that the products of conventional CBAs
(benefit-cost ratios or net present values) are uncertain in meaning, or socially
constructed, and therefore unsuitable subjects for scientific meta-analysis. I
outline a generalised CBA procedure which allows for the incorporation of
decision-maker preferences, including deontological concerns, as well as explicit
compensation mechanisms, thereby addressing the problems of the conventional
approach. I also highlight the importance of explicit income projections for inter-
temporal CBA.
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I. Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the global environmental issues facing mankind
in the 21st century, including climate change and loss of wild nature. These issues
share a number of important characteristics which make them challenging for
society to confront. They affect many different nation states, spanning numerous
cultures and systems of government, and long time periods. There are very large
disparities in wealth, information and power between the individuals affected. The
consequences of action or inaction could be serious, and costs and benefits large
relative to incomes, yet considerable uncertainty surrounds any estimates.
Faced with these challenges, society must have a way of deciding what actions
should be taken. Although elected or appointed officials will make the final
decision, experts, including economists, may assist the process. One tool
developed by economists for assisting public decision-making is cost-benefit
analysis (CBA). The aim of the chapter is to review the theory and practice of
CBA, keeping in mind the difficulties posed by global environmental issues.
What is CBA?
Sen (2001) proposed three “foundational principles” of CBA, which represent the
lowest common denominators of rival approaches, and would be expected to
command the widest support. The first is “explicit valuation”: tradeoffs are
explicitly acknowledged and measured. The second principle is “broadly
consequential evaluation”. CBA is concerned with the consequences of a project,
but Sen allows for a broad scope, in which consequences might include the
violation of rights, not just effects on income or welfare. Sen’s third principle is
“additive accounting”. The consequences of a project are rendered
commensurable and then aggregated, culminating in an ordering of the project and
status quo on the basis of their social desirability (or some aspect of it).
These principles allow for a diversity of approaches to CBA. However, what I will
term conventional CBA, which accounts for the majority of analyses, is
considerably narrower (Sen 2001). It adopts a narrowly consequentialist
perspective, tending to ignore motives and rights. With some exceptions, the
product of a CBA is usually a simple sum of the monetary valuations of project
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consequences, which may have been limited in scope. Costs and benefits
occurring in the future are normally discounted exponentially (Price 1993). This is
the CBA most often practiced and the CBA which has recently been defended by
Adler and Posner (2006) in what the authors set out at as a fundamental
reappraisal of CBA. It is also the CBA which is advocated, sometimes with some
adjustments, in most textbooks (e.g. Johansson 1993, Pearce 2006). Finally, it is
the CBA which is employed in each of the five studies identified by Balmford et
al. (2002) as being the only CBAs of nature conservation published at that time.
One aim of this chapter is to discuss what conventional CBA can tell us.
CBAs of global environmental issues, for example climate change (e.g. Stern,
2006) have been hotly debated (e.g. Nordhaus 2007b, Weitzmann 2007, Spash
2007b). This is not surprising, since the application of CBA to even relatively
simple issues has been controversial (e.g. Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004). This
controversy has probably been fiercest in the US, where CBA has been adopted
by government agencies and the courts, to a greater extent than elsewhere (Pearce
1998, Adler & Posner 2006, Hahn & Tetlock 2008).
The criticisms of CBA take many forms, and motivate this chapter. However,
before introducing the valid criticisms, it is worth dispensing with one criticism
which lacks merit. In some cases, critics of CBA reject the existence of trade-offs,
believing that their preferred policy has no costs (e.g. Ackerman & Heinzerling
2004:10). Since all government actions require at least some resources, this is
unlikely to be true. Policies without losers are rare (Just et al. 2004:14-15), and
not always desirable (Hausman & McPherson 2006). It is also inconceivable that
decision-makers2 would ever be faced with exactly one, costless, alternative to the
status quo. For a decision-maker faced with two or more options, choosing one
policy over another will always have opportunity costs (e.g. Hahn et al. 2000).
One role of CBA can be to improve a policy, even once an agency has committed
to its implementation (Hahn & Tetlock 2008). While the ubiquity of trade-offs
may be regrettable, shooting the messenger is not constructive.
2 Throughout the chapter I use “decision-maker” to refer to whoever makes the final judgment
over which if any project to implement. This might be elected representative, appointed officials,
or the electorate as a whole. It could conceivably be the members or board or any organisation
concerned with social welfare, whether public or private, or even a private citizen.
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Another, related objection to CBA is to hold that one’s preferred policy should be
implemented whatever the costs to others. A good example from conservation is
Collar (2003). Many conservationists have expressed concern that CBA may not
give the result desired, at least by conservationists (e.g. Bulte & van Kooten
2000). While it may be appropriate for conservationists to fund only those CBAs
of conservation which are likely to prove helpful to their cause, when applied to
wider society this becomes profoundly dystopian (Price unpubl.).
Once the ubiquity of trade-offs is acknowledged, and elitist disregard for other’s
preferences ruled out, all of the remaining objections to CBA, either in principle
or as currently practised, have some merit. I introduce them briefly here, and
return to them throughout the chapter.
Some critics argue that explicit, quantitative valuation of costs and benefits is
neither possible nor a helpful way to proceed (e.g. Heinzerling 1998) or that
CBAs are systematically biased because they ignore intangible benefits or
overstate the costs of regulation (e.g. Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004). Because it
focuses on welfare effects, CBA is criticised by some for ignoring the moral
validity of an action, or whether that action infringes an individual’s rights (Sen
2001). Others object to the assumption of a strictly utilitarian framework, which
assumes that benefits to one person can compensate for losses to another. Also,
CBA may give greater weight to the preferences of rich people and be indifferent
to the distribution of costs and benefits in society (Adler & Posner 2006). CBA
often appears to treat catastrophic losses in the same way as small ones, and to
ignore non-linearity and irreversibility, endangering the environment and future
generations (Edwards-Jones et al. 2000:122). Finally, the use of discounting in
CBA is held to be unfair to future generations and to lead to myopic policies (e.g.
Price 1993, Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004, Spash 2007b).
The role of CBA
Whenever decisions are taken all pertinent information has either been weighed
and aggregated or ignored, whether implicitly or explicitly. The importance of this
point cannot be overstated: howsoever society arrives at a decision, it must have
assigned relative importance to material prosperity, environmental quality, human
health, equity, property rights, individual freedoms and more else besides. CBA,
Chapter 2
9
broadly defined, represents an attempt to make explicit the various factors which
are pertinent to a decision. The question at hand is; how should CBA aid society’s
decision-making processes? Should the results of CBA be decisive? Should CBA
attempt to incorporate everything, or do some things lie beyond its scope? CBA
does not stand alone, but forms part of society’s institutions. It is not possible,
therefore, to consider what makes a good CBA method, without anticipating the
way in which it will be used. CBA cannot be designed or evaluated on theoretical
grounds alone.
Sunstein (2001) has argued that CBA should be viewed primarily as a mechanism
for countering cognitive biases present in the general public. For him, the chief
advantage of CBA is that it brings “on-screen” those costs and benefits which
might otherwise remain “off-screen”. For example, he argues that when
considering safety legislation, the public is inclined to see only the benefits
(reduced accidents) and not the costs (lower wages, higher prices), which may be
dispersed but significant.
Sunstein’s point is undoubtedly valid, but we must surely also consider the
cognitive biases and limits of at least two other groups: CB analysts, and decision-
makers. If analysts act as gatekeepers, determining what is included in a CBA, it
is possible that cognitive biases among analysts would lead to some important
considerations being omitted from the CBA. If an incomplete CBA appears
comprehensive, and therefore decisive, to the decision-maker, CBA may actually
do more harm than good. For example, Ackerman & Heinzerling (2004:7)
document cases where important benefits have been omitted from CBAs, which
have then been used to undermine the case for a particular policy. The same is
probably true of the many caveats which are, or should be, attached to
conventional CBAs: if these caveats are omitted or receive less attention than the
headline results, CBA may distort rather than inform decision-making.
If decision-makers realise that CBA is neither comprehensive nor decisive, they
must weigh up the results of the CBA against other factors which have been
excluded. If decision-makers have a tendency to over-weight numerical results
over caveats (or vice-versa), then once again, CBA as a partially explicit
procedure may do more harm than good. Heinzerling (1998) argues that decision-
makers do overweight the results of CBAs. However, the evidence reviewed by
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Hahn and Tetlock (2008) suggests the opposite: US decision-makers tend not to
accept the results of CBAs. Whether their decisions reflect a considered opinion
that omitted factors swing the result, or a simple rejection of CBA as flawed, is
difficult to tell.3
However, it is not necessary to invoke the cognitive biases of decision-makers in
order to argue that CBA could be improved. By convention, CBA leaves out a
host of important factors, which decision-makers must then weigh against its
results, and offers no guidance as to how this might be achieved. Do economists
not possess skills which could assist decision-makers in factoring in the various
“intangibles”?
In the context of global environmental issues, and in conservation in particular,
insufficient attention to issues left out of CBAs could result in society adopting
undesirable projects. For example, if conventional CBA showed that biodiversity
conservation was desirable (e.g. Balmford et al. 2002), despite the costs being
born disproportionately by poorer people (e.g. Balmford & Whitten 2003), then
inadequate attention to issues ignored by conventional CBA (e.g. rights,
compensation and distributive justice) might lead to conservation being pursued in
a way which, when properly considered, was socially undesirable compared not
only to ideal conservation, but even potentially to the status quo of no
conservation.
3 Hahn & Tetlock (2008) note the poor correlation between CBA results and the decisions taken,
but does not consider that this reflects the perceived limitations of the CBAs themselves, despite
documenting the far from perfect nature of most CBAs reviewed.
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II. Explicit valuation of project consequences
In this section I review the way in which CBA approaches the first two of Sen’s
fundamental principles; how it explicitly values the consequences of projects.
Although this is a far from trivial matter, my aim is to show how the many
criticisms can be either rebutted, dealt with, or deferred until the next stage,
additive accounting.
Sen’s (2001) foundational principles do not define which consequences CBA
should measure. A project may have consequences for the welfare 4 of an
individual and for their rights. Rights have conventionally been excluded from
CBA (Sen 2001:100), and I discuss the degree to which these can be separated
from a consideration of welfare.
The focus of CBA: welfare, utility and preferences
The meaning, measurement and moral importance of welfare have been the object
of considerable investigation and debate by economists (e.g. Sen 1982),
philosophers (e.g. Griffin 1986) and psychologists (e.g. Kahneman et al. 1999),
and no definition receives unanimous support. Against this backdrop, economics
defines welfare relative to the individual’s own preferences.5 Thus the possession
of something is defined as increasing welfare if the individual (after the fact and
with full knowledge) prefers having it to not having it. The same object or
experience may be welfare enhancing for one individual, and welfare decreasing
for another. In this, and all subsequent chapters, I use ‘utility’ to refer to this
conceptualisation of welfare. Later, it will become necessary to distinguish
between that which the individual maximises (utility), which may include
‘disinterested’ (altruistic) preferences, and a more narrow conception of welfare,
which is the focus of ‘self-interested preferences (Adler & Posner 2006). I use
welfare to refer to this more narrowly defined concept.
4I treat welfare, wellbeing and quality of life as synonymous, and use welfare throughout.
5 Economics, on the whole, does not concern itself with the origins of an individual’s preferences:
these lie within the remit of psychologists, sociologists and socio-biologists.
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Relying on the economist’s concept of utility, CBA estimates the monetary value
of projects in a very specific sense. CBA measures the amount of money which
would have to be taken from a person, following adoption of the project, such that
they consider themselves to be as well off with the project as they would have
been without it, i.e. their utility would remain unchanged. This sum of money is
the compensating variation (hereafter CV) which will be positive if the person
gains from the project. If the CV is made, the person is said to be indifferent
between the project and the status quo.
CVs can sometimes be estimated using preferences which are revealed by the
individual’s observed behaviour. However, many project effects are difficult to
value in this way, in which case stated preferences may be solicited, using
contingent valuation methods (Bateman et al. 2002). Here, respondents are asked
to choose between the status quo and a project plus a certain level of CV. Thus,
their CVs are the maximum they would be willing to pay for the project, if they
expected to gain from it, or the minimum they would be willing to accept as
compensation if they expected to lose from the project (Adler & Posner
2006:167. 6 Of course, there are many technical difficulties associated with
estimating CVs from either revealed or stated preferences (e.g. Johansson 1993,
Hanley & Spash 1993). However, I am not primarily concerned with the
techniques for estimating CVs in this chapter (issues relevant to the case study are
discussed in Chapters 9 and 10). Instead, I assume that unbiased and tolerably
precise estimates of true CVs can be obtained with sufficient effort, and the CV to
which I refer is the true, rather than estimated, CV.
Incommensurability
A recurrent objection to CBA is that some things which CBA seeks to measure
are in fact incommensurable, meaning that CBA is flawed (Ackerman &
Heinzerling 2004, Spash 2007b). In its strongest form, incommensurable can
mean that “two items cannot be compared quantitatively at all; the one is neither
greater than, nor less than, and not equal to the other … ‘incommensurable’
6 The equivalent variation (EV) of a winner is their willingness to accept (WTA) the status quo,
and of a loser, their willingness to pay (WTP) for the status quo. Thus, changing from measuring
CVs to EVs in effect reclassifies the project as the status quo, and the status quo as the project.
EVs often do not equal CVs, since WTA often differs from WTP (Adler & Posner 2006:167).
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[means that something] cannot be fitted onto any scale of measurement” (Griffin
1986:77, emphasis in the original). Yet, in the context of CBA,
incommensurability is taken to mean that society cannot (and economists should
not) measure the value of something (e.g. nature, human life) in monetary terms.
Discussion of whether this is true is best postponed to the next section. Here, it is
simply useful to identify what non-commensurability means, in the context of
individual-level estimates of CVs.
Incommensurability implies that no increase in income can compensate for a
decrease in that which is incommensurable. If this is the case, the CV cannot be
estimated. The CV might be thought of as being infinite, though, strictly, this
would imply some commensurability. In fact, true non-commensurability is
inconsistent with the existence a one dimensional quantity as utility. Any CBA in
which a CV could not be estimated for at least one project consequence and one
individual because of incommensurability, would have to address this issue.7
Compensating variations as monetary valuations
It cannot be over-emphasised that CVs monetise the consequences of projects
only in a very specific sense. They are not necessarily cardinal, nor are they
necessarily comparable between individuals, or between the same individual at
different times. A CV measures only the quantity of money which the individual
must be given or deducted in order to be rendered indifferent, in their own
judgment, between the project and the status quo. This conception of CV will be
retained throughout this section; only in the next section will I address the
question of inter-personal comparability and cardinality of CVs.
7 Note that true incommensurability cannot result simply from a refusal to state a CV, or even an
inability to state a CV, but rather from the non-existence of a CV. In other words, under true
incommensurability, a person’s welfare after the project could not be brought back up to pre-
project levels, regardless of the amount of money given to that person, or spent on that person’s
behalf. Thus, the existence of “protest responses” in contingent valuation surveys, where some
individuals refuse to state their willingness to pay or accept (e.g. Dziegielewska & Mendelsohn
2007), may be evidence of incommensurables, or it may be evidence of poor survey design,
informational or cognitive constraints, or strategic behaviour.
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Some objections to compensating variations
Perhaps not surprisingly, numerous objections have been raised against the
economist’s approach to monetising costs and benefits using compensating
variations, and here I review those I consider to be the most important.
Information
Because CBA defines utility according to the individual’s own judgment, the
individual is the principal measuring instrument used by the analyst. As with all
instruments, the measurements thus obtained are subject to error. In particular,
CBA may ask individuals to rank actions that may affect their utility, rather than
states which they will experience. The individual may misjudge the effect that a
particular action will have upon their utility. Any limits on the information
available to the individual, or on their ability to process that information, may
distort their preferences, and thus decrease the accuracy of the estimated CV
(Adler & Posner 2006). In effect, we can define any discrepancy between
preferences for certain actions revealed or stated at the time of the CBA, and
preferences for certain states when they are experienced, as being due to failures
of cognition or information. Of course, any CBA conducted with the aim of
informing a decision must be conducted ex ante, and may concern consequences
with which the individual is not familiar. A critical factor for the success of CBA
must be to minimise the distortion of preferences, and thus maximise the accuracy
with which CVs are estimated, subject to constraints (decision costs).
In order to improve the accuracy of CBA, it is desirable that the preferences which
CBA reveals or elicits are as well informed as possible. In the case of contingent
valuation studies, for example, this can be achieved by: providing survey
respondents with information which would later become available to them;8 using
preferences for states not actions, e.g. for health, not specific drugs, where
8 Information which would never become available to the individual, should not be provided
during a contingent valuation exercise. This is clear if one remembers that in most circumstances
the individual’s responses are used to derive estimates for the population as a whole, most of
whom will not have taken part in the survey. Thus, individuals who would never have found out
about a particular consequence of the project, e.g. extinction of a species, could not be affected by
its extinction, except indirectly. Informing them of this possible consequence may therefore impart
an upward bias to their estimates (Adler & Posner 2006, pp 136-138).
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individuals may poorly understand the links between the two; using ex post as
well as ex ante preferences; and allowing iterative judgments (Price unpubl.,
Hanley & Spash 1993, Sen 2001, Bateman et al. 2002). The principle of
respecting the individual’s sovereignty in judging their own utility can
nevertheless be broadly maintained, at least at the population level.
A particularly important requirement when estimating CVs is that the individual’s
conception of the project coincides with that of the analyst – that the project be
correctly and sufficiently specified. For example, if a respondent’s welfare
depends on his relative as well as absolute income level (e.g. Clark et al. 2008), a
respondent’s CV for a deterioration in environmental quality may be contingent
on the incomes of those around them remaining unchanged. If individuals state
their CVs assuming that their peers’ monetary incomes remain unchanged, and
these CVs are paid, they may prove to be insufficient. 9 A second important
example is the proper treatment of social choice options referred to by Sen
(2001:112-14).
CBAs use estimates of true CVs, and some uncertainty is inevitable (although it
should be minimised, subject to constraints on decision costs). Such uncertainty
does not fatally undermine CBA, and it ought to be possible for CVs to be
estimated in a value-free manner. However, the complexity of CV estimation
means that there is considerable scope for the analyst’s choice of method to bias
the results, and therefore for ‘observer bias’ (Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004, Price
unpubl.) This highlights the need for transparency and peer-review of valuations
intended for use in CBAs, and any CVs estimated by those who carry out the
final, often value-laden, stage of CBA (aggregation) should be treated with
caution.10
Wealth: a caveat to be retained
One of the most consistent objections to CBA is that it weights the preferences of
the rich more highly than the poor (Sen 2001, Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004).
This is because there is evidence to suggest that the marginal utility of income to
9 Similarly, Ng & Ng (2001) show how economic growth may decrease welfare, even if all
individuals are welfare maximising.
10 Including, of course, those in Chapters 9-10 of this thesis.
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an individual declines as their income increases (e.g. Stern 1977, Bailey et al.
1980, Evans 2005). If true, and if the effect holds across individuals, this would
mean that a rich person would be willing to trade a larger amount of money for a
given increase in utility, than would a poorer person. Thus, CVs will tend to be
larger, ceteris paribus, for rich people than poor people. CBAs which aggregated
CVs without considering this would favour systematically favour the preferences
of the rich over those of the poor. This problem occurs when CVs are compared
between individuals, and will be discussed in Section III.
Misunderstandings: risks, freedom of choice and coercion
Some of the fiercest criticisms of CBA relate to the way it values human life in
monetary terms (or at least appears to do so). For example, Hahn and Tetlock
(1999) use $6.6m as the value of a statistical life, when monetising the costs of
road accidents due to cell-phone use while driving. Ackerman and Heinzerling
(2004) object that lives and phone calls are not commensurable, since there is no
way that money can compensate for death.
Yet this misunderstands what CBA is actually valuing. It is valuing the welfare
loss associated with a given risk of dying, not with death itself. Contrary to
Ackerman and Heinzerling’s assertion, people do voluntarily trade off mortal risks
against monetary reward, which can be spent while still alive.11 Workers in riskier
occupations are known to demand a risk premium, in the form of higher wages, as
a condition of accepting the job. It is this, and similar, observed behaviour which
is used to derive the value of a statistical life (Viscusi & Aldy 2003).
Some critics (e.g. Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004) respond that poor people sell
their lives cheaply because they have no alternative. This introduces another
misunderstanding, over freedom of choice and coercion. Ackerman and
Heinzerling (2004) believe that poverty undermines the use of CVs, because it
compromises the freedom with which preferences are expressed.12 Yet the fact
11 Of course, this money can also be passed on to others in the event of death (bequest value), and I
discuss such disinterested preferences below.
12 Note that this goes beyond the systematic bias in CVs discussed above: the existence of
diminishing marginal utility of income alone does not undermine the validity of a poor person’s
CV, if its true meaning is kept in mind.
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that a poor man may accept a small amount of money in compensation for an
increased risk of dying doesn’t mean that he values his life less than a rich man,
but rather that he values money more. The CV still accurately describes his
preferences, when offered a free choice between two alternatives. The fact of his
poverty may be lamentable and his choice set undesirable but, if the project in
question does not affect his material poverty, but only his safety, this is morally
irrelevant to CV estimation. The objective is to estimate his CV for the choices he
actually faces (project vs. status quo). It may well be morally wrong that society
does nothing about his poverty, but that is another question. The fact that the poor
man faces an unenviable choice does not mean that he does not face a free choice,
which is the requirement for his preferences to lead to an accurate representation
of his CV.13 Coercion is a different matter. If a man was to put his daughter’s life
at risk for a hundred dollars, this would tell us nothing about her CV for greater
risk, since she did not make the decision to accept that risk (or did so under
coercion).
Utility, objective welfare and disinterested preferences
Adler and Posner (2006) list five reasons why preferences might be “distorted”. I
have discussed the implications of imperfect information, which leads individual’s
to mis-measure utility changes; and wealth differences, which do not distort CVs
as such, but impart a bias to the poor’s CVs relative to those of the rich.14 In the
case of information, the distortion is judged on the basis of the individual’s own
judgment – the individual may later regret their choice if they were ill-informed.
The remaining three distortions proposed by Adler and Posner are qualitatively
different, and rely on there being an objective and useful distinction between
utility (as defined above) and welfare, which Adler and Posner consider to be the
proper basis for CBA. Two of these distortions, “adaptive preferences” and
“objectively bad preferences” seem to me to be unhelpful, and I consider them
first. I then discuss the third, “disinterested preferences” which Adler and Posner
13 This might be considered one example of an “adaptive preference” argument (Adler & Posner
2006), which I discuss and dismiss below.
14 The distortion only enters when CVs are aggregated, see next section.
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distinguish from self-interested preferences. I argue that the distinction is difficult
to make objectively, but that there may be pragmatic reasons for trying.
Objectively bad preferences and adaptive preferences
“Objectively bad preferences” are deemed to be objectively bad for the individual,
while “adaptive preferences” result from adaptation by the individual to
circumstances which are held to be objectively bad (Adler & Posner 2006). An
example of objectively bad preferences might be the preferences of an addict for
drug consumption. An example of adaptive preferences might be an overburdened
housewife who has become adapted to her circumstances and comes to prefer the
extra work associated with carrying water from a river, rather than from a new
pump that the project would provide. 15 Note that in each case, the supposed
distortion stems not from insufficient information or impaired cognition, which
have been dealt with above. Instead, the distortion is due to the individual’s
preferences deviating from those of an observer. In other words, their self-defined
utility deviates from the observer’s definition of their welfare.
Adler and Posner (2006:188) suggest that CVs might be “laundered” removing
these distortions, though they are troubled by the practicalities. I do not believe
that these are useful categories of preference distortions, and believe instead that
any valid concerns in this area are best addressed as disinterested preferences,
below. The adaptive preference argument seems to me to be similar to the
‘poverty as coercion’ argument dismissed above. Proponents of correcting
adaptive preferences apparently disapprove of the status quo (e.g. the
overburdened housewife walking miles to a river). This is not unreasonable, but it
is irrelevant to the CBA. If a project was proposed which did change the status
quo (which in the example above would require not only the building of a pump
but changing the preferences of the housewife), this might be preferred, ex post at
least, by the individual in question. No correction is therefore necessary to the
concept of preference-based CVs as described above.
The argument that some preferences are objectively bad can be understood in two
ways. First they may represent judgments by an individual, about how other
15 This example comes from Sen (1987), quoted in Adler & Posner (2006).
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people should behave, even though the behaviour does not directly affect the
individual. For example, if I believe that drug addiction is objectively bad this is
best dealt with as a disinterested preference (or ethical concern) of mine, and
therefore relevant to my CV for a project (see below). Second, like adaptive
preferences, they may represent an attempt to distinguish an individual’s welfare,
as defined by an observer, from utility, as maximised by an individual (Adler &
Posner 2006:31). Of course, it is proper that philosophers should speculate on
what people should prefer, and on what constitutes the “good life” – this is, after
all, a central concern of ethics (Deigh 1999) and they may even succeed in
changing the preferences of others.16 However, defining welfare as something that
philosophers think that we ought to appreciate, is problematic for public policy,
raising questions about elitism and authoritarianism. A CBA using preference-
based CVs will inform a decision-maker of the likely effects of a project from the
perspective of the individuals it affects. To me, this seems far more useful than
informing them of the effect that the project would have, in the hypothetical case
where everyone else shared the preferences of a particular philosopher, when in
fact they do not.
Disinterested preferences
Adler and Posner (2006) argue that “disinterested preferences” distort CVs and
should be excluded from CBA. The example they give is “existence value” when
individuals value the mere existence of, for example, a wild species such as the
tiger, quite apart from any direct or indirect use value they gain from it (e.g.
Edwards-Jones et al. 2000:85). Disinterested preferences do pose an interesting
issue for CBA, but existence values are probably a bad example, since they could
easily be described as self-interested.17 It is surely not impossible that someone
16 It is also possible that the welfare of philosophers is negatively affected when others express
“objectively bad” preferences, but this is simply a welfare-based preference like any other, and
relates to the philosopher’s CV, not to that of the drug addict.
17 Adler & Posner (2006:136-8) make a good point about the information which analysts provide
to individuals when soliciting stated preferences about existence values. Existence value CVs
should not be solicited for entities that the individual did not know existed, and would never have
known existed. Indeed, there are many difficult issues associated with estimating CVs for such
values. But these are a question of proper survey design: the analyst must be careful not impose
their conception of the project on that of others. This point is covered within the category of
information, above, and does not merit a separate category for apparently altruistic or ethical
preferences.
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could suffer a loss of welfare as a result of knowing that the tiger had become
extinct, and furthermore be prepared to sacrifice some portion of their income to
avoid this occurring. Exactly this behaviour can be observed among a significant
proportion of the population, who donate money to international conservation
organisations in the hope of saving species that they will probably never see.
Better examples of disinterested preferences might be those that concern the rights
of fellow humans who, unlike tigers, form part of the moral community normally
considered by CBA. These might include rights to freedom of action, property,
and equality of welfare. Conventionally, CBA has ignored the first two of these
(Sen 2001), while some CBAs have addressed the latter (e.g. Tol 2001).18 This
apparent blindness of CBA to ethical concerns is a major source of criticism (Sen
2001, Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004).
However, even in relation to these preferences, Adler and Posner’s (2006)
contention that they be excluded from CBA is problematic. The problem is that it
is difficult to decide on objective grounds which components of utility should not
be included in a CBA. For example, psychological egoism argues that no
preferences are truly altruistic (Russell 1999). Even if we do not accept this
theory, it highlights the fact that many apparently altruistic acts may have at least
some self-interested component. What proportion of charitable giving is
accounted for by a selfish desire for esteem or social interactions (Mathur 1996)
and does generosity make us happier (Konow & Earley 2008)? What proportion
of an individual’s lifetime earnings are motivated by bequest values (Kopczuk
2007)? How should “warm glow” values be treated (Nunes & Schokkaert 2003)?
Adler and Posner (2006:49) admit that “no one has yet fully explained what the
difference is between “self-interested” and “disinterested” preferences”.
In principle, CVs might be estimated for the full range of preferences held by an
individual, from the prosaic and self-interested to the intangible and altruistic. For
18 Adler & Posner (2006) observe that CBAs are subject to ethical concerns, since the actions
which can be considered within a CBA are constrained by laws. This is true, up to a point, but
CBAs can also be used to assess the case for a change in the law (e.g. Hahn & Tetlock 1999) and
since the cost-benefit principle is itself used to determine what is legal (Adler & Posner 2006). In
addition, the force of law may be weaker in the context of global environmental issues, which
cross national boundaries and may involve at least some countries where institutions are poorly
developed.
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example, Corneo and Fong (2008) estimate the willingness to pay for the
redistribution of income in the US. These CVs would provide information on the
preferences of each individual in a society, and the relative intensity of those
preferences, in terms of the monetary adjustments necessary to render them
indifferent between the project and status quo. Many will instinctively revolt at
this suggestion: surely one’s concerns for rights and justice cannot be treated in
the same way as one’s preferences for food and holidays? Yet we should surely
guard against instinctive rejection, for several reasons.
First, as I will explain below, it should be appreciated that many CBAs already
aggregate ethical preferences (over the distribution of income between and across
generations) in this way (Price 1993, Portney & Weyant 1999a), and it seems
arbitrary to include some ethical preferences and not others. Second, the
alternatives; aggregating ethical preferences through the ballot box or public
consultations; do not enjoy complete support either, because they do not measure
the intensity of people’s ethical preferences, and therefore do not compare the
tangible sacrifices which people are willing to make with the material costs of
observing such preferences (see e.g. Price 1989:48, Caplan 2007). Beyond this,
some libertarians maintain that that an individual’s rights cannot be determined by
the preferences of others, whether through CBA or voting:
“Individual rights are not subject to a public vote; a majority has no
right to vote away the rights of a minority; the political function of
rights is precisely to protect minorities from oppression by majorities
(and the smallest minority on earth is the individual).” Rand
(1964[1989]:104).
This, however, raises a chicken-and-egg question of how the rights of individuals
are defined to begin with.
In principle it would be useful to include ethical concerns in CVs, in order to be
able to compare the results with other approaches, where such ethical concerns are
incorporated at a later stage, or not at all. Nevertheless, while I am sceptical that a
truly satisfactory and objective distinction can be drawn between self-interested
and disinterested preferences, it is important to note that, conventionally, CBA has
tended, somewhat arbitrarily, to exclude most disinterested preferences from CVs
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and it is possible that for practical rather than philosophical reasons, it might be
desirable to exclude certain ethical preferences from individuals’ CVs. For
example, it might be hard to obtain monetary estimates for some preferences.
Alternatively, decision-makers (if the procedure was not decisive) may not
understand that such ethical concerns were already included in the CBA, and
attempt to account for them again – which could lead to double accounting.
Ultimately, CBA can only improve decision-making if it is comprehensible to
society. For the time being, then, ethical preferences, like wealth biases, are
caveats that I will hold over until the aggregation phase, which I discuss next.
III. Aggregating consequences across individuals
The purpose of this section is to discuss how CBA aggregates information, how
decisive it is, and how helpful to the decision-maker. I start by introducing
aggregation and decisiveness, before moving on to discuss two caveats held over
from the previous section: inter-personal comparability of CVs and the treatment
of ethical concerns in CBA. I then review four existing approaches to aggregation:
the Pareto criterion; the potential compensation criteria (the sum-of-CVs); the
sum-of-corrected-CVs; and social welfare functions. In each case, the aim is to
investigate the meaning of the results, and what they leave to the decision-maker.
Aggregation and the decisiveness of CBA
To know whether to choose the project over the status quo (or which project to
choose) society must somehow aggregate all CVs, along with any other ethical
concerns, into a judgement of the project’s social desirability compared with the
status quo. There is no alternative to aggregation: howsoever the decision is made,
it implies a weight for each individual’s CV, and for each ethical concern. To
avoid the decision is merely to accept the status quo, and carries the same
implications.19 This means that anything not satisfactorily incorporated into the
CBA must be weighed against the results by the decision-maker. Similarly, if any
value judgments are incorporated into the CBA that the decision-maker believes
19 Avoiding or taking the decision also requires that a weight is implicitly put upon the decision
costs, which may not be trivial.
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to be unsatisfactory, they must be able to understand their effects, and to correct
for them.
Since all information must be weighted and aggregated, either explicitly by the
CBA or implicitly by the decision-maker, less aggregation within the CBA
implies that more aggregation is left to the decision-maker. CBA approaches can
therefore be conceptualised as lying along a spectrum, according to the amount of
post-measurement aggregation. At one end of the spectrum, some welfare
economists (e.g. Just et al. 2004:5), reject any form of aggregation, proposing that
only disaggregated data should be presented to the decision-maker. Thus, they
reject CBA altogether. Part-way along the spectrum, some authors advocate
simple summation of costs and benefits, leaving many pertinent concerns to be
weighed by the decision-maker (e.g. Kaldor 1939, Johansson 1993, Adler &
Posner 2006). At the other extreme would be a CBA which claims to aggregate
everything society considers pertinent to the decision, such that the results of the
CBA were decisive, removing the need for a decision-maker. Such a “super-
procedure” may seem implausible, yet economists sometimes appear to be
surprised when decision-makers over-rule the recommendations resulting from
CBAs (e.g. Hahn & Tetlock 2008).20 When the results of multiple CBAs are
discussed in a policy context, the headline results of CBAs are often aggregated as
if they were decisive (e.g. Balmford et al. 2002).
Two problems for aggregation
Here I return to the two issues held over from the previous section: inter-personal
comparability of CVs and the effect of income upon them, and the place of rights
and ethical judgments in CBA. Each poses special difficulties for CBA, which
will become apparent in discussing aggregation procedures, below.
The meaning and inter-personal comparability of CVs
Throughout the previous section, I kept to a very strict definition of CVs: the
amount of money which must be taken from or paid to an individual to ensure that
20 This attitude is not exclusive to economists. Goldston (2008) describes how natural scientists
involved in making policy recommendations also frequently view their recommendations as being
binding upon elected politicians and their appointees.
Chapter 2
24
they are indifferent between the project and the status quo. However, what if the
CV is not made? If CVs are not actually made when the project is adopted, then
some individuals will be better off (prefer the project) and some worse off (prefer
the status quo). But is it possible to say anything about how much better or worse
off one individual is compared to another? Whatever approach is taken to
aggregation, some answer must be found to this question, and this hinges on inter-
personal utility comparisons: can CVs be compared between individuals? Can we
add CVs together? If not, can economists summarise the results of their analyses,
or must they present the decision-maker with an incomprehensible barrage of
CVs, one for each person (or group of persons) affected by the project?
This question goes to the very heart of economic method, and its role in society. It
has a long history (e.g. Harrod 1938, Robbins 1938, Kaldor 1939) but continues to
the present day (e.g. Ng 1997, Adler & Posner 2006). Here, I present what seem
to me to be the essentials of the debate. The practical implications of the debate
will become clear below, when discussing aggregation approaches.
The sceptical position is well summed-up by Miller (1994:418-9, quoted in Ng
1997:1851):
“There is no way you or I can measure the amount of utility that a
consumer might be able to obtain from a particular good ... there can
be no accurate scientific assessment of the utility that someone might
receive by consuming a frozen dinner or movie relative to the utility
that another person might receive from that same good ... Today no
one really believes that we can actually measure utils.”
Thus, in the case of a project, for which A has a CV of +$40, and B a CV of -$20,
and no payments are made or deducted, we can say that A has gained 40 dollars’
worth of utility and B has lost 20 dollars’ worth. However, because utility is
defined relative to the individual, the units are not comparable: a dollar given to A
may bring more or less utility than a dollar does to B. Without assuming anything
more about the meaning of these units, all we can say is that, as a result of the
project, A’s utility has increased as much as if they had been given $40, and B’s
has decreased by as much as if $20 had been taken away from them. We can say
nothing about whether the project has increased A’s utility more than it has
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decreased B’s (let alone by how much), nor whether society should undertake the
project – that decision would depend on the decision-maker’s judgment about
numerous factors, including: the marginal utility of income to A and B; the rights
of A or B to their gains and losses (see below); and the relative importance to
society of each individual’s rights and utility. Note that the complexity of the
decision-maker’s task increases geometrically with the number of individual’s
affected by the project. Note also, that if the decision-maker is simply told that the
project has a net benefit of “+$20”, they cannot make any of the judgments above,
since the information is lost in the aggregation.
What, then, should CB analysts do? If one holds adamantly to the view that CVs
are not inter-personally comparable measures of utility, there are two options:
The first is to eschew any form of aggregation, thereby abandoning CBA (recall
Sen’s third foundational principle), and to present the decision-maker with
estimates of each individual’s (or homogenous group of individuals) CVs, and
leave aggregation to them. This is Just et al’s (2004) preferred option, and leaves
the analyst’s objectivity intact, but in the context of complex projects, with
multiple winners and losers, it is unlikely to be of great help to the decision-
maker, who is forced to carry out the aggregation themselves.
The second is to arithmetically aggregate CVs, without assuming that they bear
any systematic relationship to utility or welfare. This is the ‘potential
compensation criterion’, which I discuss below.
A third possibility is to assume that CVs do represent interpersonally comparable
measures of utility. This means that the marginal utility of money must be
constant across individuals. There are three reasons why this might not be the
case, and I outline them below. The first two can be accommodated within CBA.
The third requires its complete abandonment.
First, marginal utilities might vary at random across individuals. In this case, CVs
would still provide a probabilistic guide to welfare changes, and a rule which
maximised the sum of CVs, would at least maximise expected net utility. Thus,
CVs would not be expected to have an exact relationship to utility, but rather to be
probabilistically related to it. In the context of global environmental issues, many
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relationships are probabilistic, and the decision to accept CVs as a probabilistic
guide to utility changes seems to present no special difficulties.
Second, and perhaps in addition to a random component to the variation, marginal
utilities might vary systematically across individuals, on the basis of some
observable characteristic such as income, gender, or race. The most important of
these is income, because money is the numeraire (currency) used in generating
CVs. Since money is unequally distributed in the population, the use of money as
a numeraire could lead to systematic biases in CVs as a measure of utility
changes. As discussed above, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the
marginal utility of income declines as income increases. If this were the case,
projects which increased the sum of CVs might actually reduce the sum of utility.
This is a commonly recognised possibility, and sometimes corrected for within
CBAs (see the review of climate change CBAs by Tol 2005). Although this would
have serious consequences for the decisiveness of a procedure which maximised
the sum of CVs, it need not undermine the use of CV-based welfare
measurements, provided that appropriate corrections are made. Indeed, a CBA
based on uncorrected CVs can simply be regarded as a special case of a more
general, corrected-CV procedure, in which the correction factors have been set to
unity (Price 1989).21
The third possible reason why marginal utility of income may not be constant is
that individual utilities are in some fundamental respect non-comparable across
individuals. Despite opposition to this view (e.g. Ng 1997, Adler & Posner 2006),
most economists seem to have accepted it (Ng 1997). Note, however, that this is
not the same as arguing that interpersonal comparisons are either difficult or
impossible to make in practice, which is what Miller, appears to be arguing in the
quote above. This can be demonstrated by a simple thought experiment. Imagine
two individuals A and B, whose marginal utilities of income are unknown and
immeasurable, yet nevertheless exist. We wish to allocate $100 between these two
individuals, in order to maximise total utility. With no information about their
21 I prefer to use the term correction factor, rather than weight, because the purpose is to correct a
particular distortion which is in principle empirically estimable, rather than to apply a subjective
weighting. However, correction and weighting are difficult to distinguish, as I discuss below.
Chapter 2
27
marginal utilities, we would probably decide to divide the money equally between
them. This might not maximise utility, and we might never know whether we had
maximised utility (or how badly we had failed), yet it was, and would remain, the
option most likely to maximise utility. In order to dispute this conclusion it is
necessary for A and B’s marginal utilities to be not simply immeasurable, but
nonexistent. Yet for them to be non-existent, cardinal utility itself must surely be
non-existent.22 Perhaps this is possible, but if so, then there is no reason to favour
any utility-based aggregation procedure over a simple coin toss, for any Pareto
non-comparable cases (see also Ng 1997).
Thus it seems plausible that CVs (when corrected for known biases due to the
numeraire used) can be treated as cardinal and interpersonally comparable
probabilistic proxies for individual welfare.23
It seems to me that the assumption of inter-personal comparability of utilities may
not represent a positive belief that the utility value of a dollar is, probabilistically
comparable between individuals (after bias correction). Rather, it seems to imply a
normative belief that each individual’s utility should be scaled, such that no-one,
no matter how efficient they may be at converting dollars into utility, should be
able to dominate the right of another to utility.
Ethical concerns
“The exponents of the mainstream need not face much questioning
from the deontologists (who will not speak to them).” Sen (2001:116).
In Section II I noted that, conventionally, CBA has not included in an individual’s
CV the disinterested preferences they may have relating to the rights of other
members of the moral community. Yet it is of these individual disinterested
preferences that society’s ethical concerns are made. Thus, while conventional
CVs evaluate how an individual’s welfare24 changes as a result of a project, they
22 It is not sufficient for them to be zero (i.e. income has no relation to utility). In this case, the
same would apply.
23 This conclusion is similar to that reached, perhaps by different routes, by Ng (1997) and Adler
& Posner (2006). Note that if there is any reason to believe that the decision-maker will have a
better notion of the relationship between CVs and utility, this could be incorporated into the
analysis.
24 As noted above, I use welfare to refer to utility excluding ethical concerns.
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convey no information about the strength of that individual’s right to the welfare
lost or gained (and therefore to the CV which might be made). Nevertheless, the
strength of an individual’s right to CVs must be determined by society in order to
reach a judgment. If disinterested preferences are not included in an individual’s
CV they must be incorporated at some point in the decision-making process, in
the form of society’s ethical concerns. For the rest of this chapter, I will assume
that disinterested preferences have not been included in the individual’s CV, and
therefore that ethical concerns over individual’s rights will be ignored, unless
specifically incorporated at the societal level.
In the context of evaluating projects, the claims of an individual to the welfare lost
or gained due to the project might be determined by at least two broad categories
of right. First, there are rights to the property or actions which produce the welfare
gained or lost in the project case. Second, an individual may have rights to welfare
on the basis of their level of welfare relative to others. Often, the former type of
right will be in force in the status quo, while the latter will pertain to
redistribution, but in some cases the project under consideration may be intended
to strengthen property rights, possibly at the expense of equity. 25 The moral
standing of an individual may strengthen or weaken the rights they are accorded
by society, but this will not be considered further here. 26 It is important to
remember that rights may not be absolute, but rather be prima facie; even
important and apparently fundamental rights may be trumped by other rights
(Wellman 1999). As discussed above, individuals may be prepared to exchange
important rights, such as their right to life, in exchange for monetary
compensation.
25 Even a libertarian may recognise that complete enforcement of property rights is impossible, or
at least requires the infringement of other rights (right to freedom of those wrongly convicted,
property rights of those taxed to pay for law enforcement). A project may therefore aim to increase
the protection of some rights, at the expense of others, and with a positive or negative effect on
welfare.
26 For example, a criminal’s right to freedom might be taken away, not simply to prevent them
from committing further crimes, but also because of (i.e. in punishment for) previous crimes.
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Aggregation procedures
I now review conventional approaches to aggregation in CBA, from the
perspective of the issues raised above. The aim is to show what the results of a
particular aggregation method actually mean, and what it contributes to the
decision-making process.
The Pareto criterion
According to the Pareto criterion, a project is to be preferred if it makes at least
one person better off, and nobody worse off. Equivalently, either the status quo or
project are said to be Pareto optimal if nobody can be made better off without
making someone else worse off (Just et al. 2004). However, Pareto improvements
can rarely be identified in practice, unless some redistribution between winners
and losers is permitted (see below) and the criterion therefore fails to rank most
projects in relation to the status quo: both status quo and project may be Pareto
optimal. Nevertheless, Pareto improvements are generally regarded by economists
as being desirable and the conventional criteria for judging the social desirability
of projects are built on the Pareto criterion (below). Therefore, while the Pareto
criterion has never played an important direct role in CBA, it is worth considering
some issues it raises.
First, the Pareto criterion is not as value-free as it may appear (Hausman &
McPherson 2006). For any given Pareto-inefficient status quo, there will normally
be a range of Pareto-optimal worlds which can be reached through different
Pareto-improving projects. However, choosing any individual Pareto-
improvement will narrow down the range of attainable Pareto-optimal worlds.
Since the Pareto criterion cannot be used to choose among different Pareto-
optimums, and since society may not be indifferent between them, selecting any
project which meets the Pareto criterion requires a value judgment as to which
Pareto-optimum is preferred (Hausman & McPherson 2006:136-8). Second, the
Pareto criterion highlights the need to correctly specify the individual’s utility
function. A Pareto improvement is one in which at least one individual’s utility
increases, while no other’s is decreased. This is not the same as one individual’s
income increasing while others remain unchanged, unless their utility functions
are insensitive to relative income - and there is empirical evidence that they may
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not be (Clark et al. 2008). Third, if utility is defined so as to exclude ethical
concerns, the Pareto criterion provides no basis for incorporating them.
The compensation criteria
Because of the limitations of the Pareto criterion listed above, a different, but
related, approach was proposed independently by Kaldor (1939) and Hicks
(1939), and is known collectively as the compensation criteria. The Kaldor
criterion states that a project is desirable if, following its adoption, the winners
would hypothetically be able to compensate the losers such that no-one was worse
off and at least one person was better off. Similarly, Hicks proposed that a project
be considered desirable if the would-be losers were unable, again hypothetically,
to bribe the would-be winners not to undertake it (Johansson 1993:120). The
relationship of these criteria to the measures introduced in Section II is that a
positive non-zero sum of CVs ( 0 iCV ) is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for the Kaldor test to be passed, while a positive non-zero sum of
equivalent variations 27 ( 0 iEV ) is a sufficient condition for the Hicks
criterion to be passed (Johansson 1993:120).28 Unfortunately, the two tests may
produce contradictory recommendations (Boadway & Bruce 1984). However,
these distinctions are not important here, and for simplicity, in what follows I refer
to the satisfaction of the compensation criterion as a positive non-zero sum of
CVs. It is important to note that neither criterion requires that compensation
actually be paid.
If CVs were an unbiased estimator of utility changes, the sum-of-CVs would
provide the decision-maker with an indicator of the net change in utility.
However, there are two problems with this. First, it is unlikely that CVs are an
unbiased estimator of utility changes, because of the diminishing marginal utility
of income. Second, even if they were an unbiased estimator, it is unlikely that the
net change in utility is the only factor of interest to society. In addition to the sum
of net utility changes, society may also have ethical concerns about each
27 See Footnote 6, above.
28 As we will see below, this assumes that the costs of compensation are zero, which is rarely, if
ever, the case.
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individual’s rights to the utility lost or gained, yet the sum of CVs provides no
information about this. A society which did not have such concerns would be
indifferent between a world in which the rich stole effortlessly from the poor and
one in which this did not happen.
The conventional defence of the sum-of-CVs is two pronged. First it is argued
that, while ethical concerns about rights are legitimate, they do not fall within the
economist’s remit and should be incorporated by decision-makers, post-analysis.
This is unconvincing as, although ethical decisions do lie outside the remit of
economists, the sum of CVs is not value-free, nor is its meaning clear. How then
is a decision-maker to weigh ethical concerns against the sum of CVs? Secondly,
it is assumed that society has a costless and perfect means of redistributing income
among individuals, which would allow it to correct for any distortions from the
preferred state that result from choosing projects based on the sum of CVs. By
assuming this, it is possible to avoid the issues raised above, restore the decisive
role of CBA, and rescue some meaning for the sum of CVs – as the monetary
measure of the gain to society, after having costlessly and perfectly forced all
winners to compensate all losers – a sort of ‘societal CV’.
Yet this is not plausible. A project with a positive sum-of-CVs that creates unjust
distortions implicitly requires substantial redistributions, which are not costless or
simple to ensure. Assuming that they are so is no more justifiable than arbitrarily
assuming that the project’s other costs are also zero.29 It is worth remembering
that the example used by Kaldor (1939) when expositing his criterion, was the
repeal of the corn laws, which, he stated, had just a single group of losers (the
landlords) and a single group of winners (consumers). Of course, even in this case
compensation would not have been costless.
The weaker assertion that “this issue of income inequality is better tackled
through the general tax/transfer system” (Ng 1997) may be true, or it may not, and
29 In addition, I am not aware of any instances where an economist or politician has argued for the
progressivity of the tax system on the grounds that it was necessary to compensate for the
distortionary impacts of implementing decisions based on (conventional) CBA. Nor am I aware of
any systematic attempt to monitor the distortionary impacts of implementation decisions based on
conventional CBAs, which, on average, would be expected to transfer utility from poor to rich. If
the use of CBA is increasing in some countries more than others (e.g. Hahn & Tetlock 2008) one
would expect to see the progressivity of the tax systems increasing more quickly as well.
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will depend on the facts of a particular case. The tax system may well be a better
way to tackle the general problem of redistribution, but not the specific distortions
caused by a particular project. Thus, Sen (2001) notes that: “The compensation
tests are either redundant or unconvincing”.
The sum-of-corrected-CVs
One response to the problems of the sum-of-CVs approach is to propose that CBA
should calculate (and decision-makers should maximise) the sum-of-corrected-
CVs: where CVs are corrected for systematic biases due to the diminishing
marginal utility of income (see Price 1989, Johansson 1993, Pearce et al. 2006).
Since Adler and Posner (2006) advocate CBA as the procedure most likely to
maximise “overall welfare” (the sum of individual utilities), they consider
correcting CVs for the income bias. However, despite their enthusiasm for
correcting other distortions, they offer only lukewarm support for correcting CVs
for the systematic biases due to income. They note that, if CVs are corrected prior
to aggregation, CBA will favour any project which simply redistributes income
from rich to poor at low enough cost. Instead of taking this as an indictment of a
procedure based on maximising overall welfare alone, they reject corrected-CVs,
citing concerns over disincentive effects, and post-project trading between rich
and poor. These concerns, while valid, should be included as part of the project’s
estimated costs and benefits; they are not a valid argument against the correction-
of-CVs (Kuziemko 2007). Adler and Posner (2006) instead recommend a rule of
thumb that CBA should not be used for projects in which wealth disparities are
large. This renders it incapable of ranking a large proportion of possible projects,
including those related to many global environmental issues.
Despite the reservations of Adler and Posner (2006), the sum-of-corrected-CVs is
an improvement on the sum of CVs approach, though it remains relatively rare
(Tol 2005). At least the product of the CBA now has some meaning: it does
estimate (probabilistically) the effect of the project on overall welfare. However,
like the sum-of-CVs, it contains no information on the implications of the project
for ethical concerns other than for overall welfare, such as concerns about rights.
It cannot therefore be decisive, and the decision-maker is left with several
problems. First, it is unclear how they should weigh the relative importance of
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welfare and other ethical concerns, since it provides no information on the latter.
Second, if the decision-maker decided that the welfare gains did not justify the
ethical costs, it is far from clear that complete abandonment of the project would
be optimal – the introduction of compensation mechanisms may, depending on
their cost, result in an improvement over the status quo.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that many authors (e.g. Pearce et al. 2006)
treat the correction of CVs for the diminishing marginal utility of income as
synonymous with incorporating equity concerns into the CBA. This is not
necessarily the case. It is possible that society might have preferences for the
distribution of utility not just income. Correcting CVs for diminishing marginal
utility is necessary for a utilitarian maximisation of overall utility. Ethical
concerns over the distribution of utility are, conceptually at least, another matter
(Johansson 1993:15), and I discuss them next.
Social welfare functions
A further modification is often considered in CBA textbooks (e.g. Johansson
1993, Dinwiddy & Teal 1996) though rarely explored in applied CBAs of global
environmental issues (Tol 2001 gives a rare example in the context of climate
change). This is the use of social welfare functions.
Social welfare functions generalise from the purely utilitarian objective of
maximising the sum of utility (or welfare), to take into consideration other
concerns which society may have. They perform an analogous role at the societal
level to that performed by the individual’s utility function. If ethical concerns are
not captured within an individual’s CV, it is here in the social welfare function
that they may be addressed.
Thus, we can conceive a social welfare function W which aggregates each
individual’s utility level Vi. A purely utilitarian society concerned only with the
sum of individuals’ welfare simply maximises a function of the form (Johansson
1993:17):
Equation 2.1  
i
i i
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1
However, as discussed above, society may concern itself not simply with the sum
of welfare, but with individuals’ rights to portions of that welfare. One example
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would be where an individual’s claim to welfare is determined by (and only by)
their welfare relative to the rest of society. In the extreme Rawlsian case (based on
Rawls’s 1971 Theory of Justice), society’s welfare is determined solely by the
welfare of the least well-off person (Johansson 1993:19):
Equation 2.2 }...min{ 1 iVVW 
Thus, whereas the utilitarian social welfare function (Equation 2.1), assumed by
conventional CBA, treats utility losses and gains equally regardless of to whom
they accrue, other forms of social welfare function assume limited or no
substitutability between the utility of different individuals. More generally, the
spectrum from utilitarian to Rawlsian functions is given by (Johansson 1993:121):
Equation 2.3 )1]().([ 1
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Where ρ is the degree of inequality aversion30 and ai is an individual-specific
weight. Where ai=1 for all individuals, and ρ=0, the function reduces to the
utilitarian function (Equation 2.1), and when ρ tends to ∞, the function approaches
the Rawlsian function (Equation 2.2). In principle, the weights, ai applied to an
individual’s welfare might be determined by any of the factors mentioned
previously (moral standing, relative welfare), but in practice attention has
focussed on relative welfare as determining relative claim strengths, through the
parameter ρ (e.g. Johansson 1993, Azar 1999, Tol 2001). If, as seems plausible,
rights weightings apply not to the individual, but rather to a particular piece of
property or action, Equation 2.3 would have to be disaggregated, such that
different weights could be applied to different components of an individual’s CVs
for the project.
CBAs based on the sum of corrected CVs provide decision-makers with
information only on how the project affects the sum of welfare. In generalising
away from perfect substitutability, social welfare functions allow priority to be
30 It should be noted that, empirically, it may be difficult to distinguish between e, the marginal
utility of income to an individual, and ρ, the marginal social value of welfare, or the social
aversion to welfare inequality. This explains why many authors treat CV correction and equity
concerns as one process. This is a simple matter in the case of Prioritarian social welfare functions,
since Equation 2.4 has the same form as the function normally assumed to link income and utility
at the level of the individual However, with a Rawlsian social welfare function, the two processes
are not so easy to roll into one.
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given to less well-off people in distributing welfare, thus incorporating one of the
principal ethical considerations identified above. However, use of a social welfare
function of the form given in Equation 2.3, and in which ai=1 for all individuals,
does not incorporate concerns over other rights, e.g. to property or freedom of
action. Social welfare functions ignore these rights because they do not
distinguish between welfare losses; welfare gains which are “paid for” by these
losses (and therefore represent pure re-distribution); and welfare gains which
represent “value added” by the project. Yet it is probable that society would view
rights to these three categories of welfare differently.
The other problem with social welfare functions is that, like CBAs using
corrected-CVs, a project which appears to reduce the value of the social welfare
function relative to the status quo, might increase it if adequate compensation
mechanisms are deployed.
Summarising of the problems of existing approaches
In reviewing existing approaches to aggregation in CBA I have shown that all of
them are incomplete. Only the sum-of-corrected-CVs has a clear meaning,31 and
none are decisive. Since they are not decisive, society must collect other
information or value judgments, and weigh aggregated information against
disaggregated information. I do not believe that any of the current approaches
adequately helps the decision-maker to do that. In fact, I think it is plausible that
CBAs which present aggregated results, without incorporating all of society’s
relevant concerns, could in fact distort decision-making, by leading decision-
makers to under-weight those factors excluded from the aggregation process (e.g.
Heinzerling 1998).
In principle, a social welfare function which incorporated all ethical concerns,
would be meaningful and decisive. However, it could not be constructed without
consulting decision-makers, since the importance attached to various rights (to
property etc) are not easily estimable as population parameters, or at least, this is
31 Even this relies on the distinction made in Section II, between self-interested and disinterested
preferences, being valid and meaningful.
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not currently done. 32 This is a simple but important point: no value-free
aggregation procedure should be considered decisive. Aggregation is not possible
in isolation from society. We must therefore abandon the notion of CBA as a
value-free advisory tool, prepared by economists and presented to decision-
makers.
The second point to note is that for any social welfare function in which the
marginal social value of income is not constant, the result depends not just on the
“value-added” by the project, but the distribution of welfare gains and losses
among individuals, which depends on the precise design of the project. However,
CBAs have not generally considered compensation mechanisms as part of the
project specification, but instead leave this to the decision-maker. A fully
specified social welfare function, while potentially decisive, provides a largely
arbitrary test of whether action is justified, unless the project specification
includes possible compensatory mechanisms (which must be fully costed). A
project might fail to increase social welfare over the status quo, despite generating
sufficient value-added so that, with the addition of appropriate compensation
mechanisms, it could do so. In Chapter 11 I provide an empirical illustration of
these issues.
IV. Inter-temporal aggregation
In this section I consider whether aggregating CVs inter-temporally requires any
special treatment, beyond that required intra-temporally. Most economists hold
that it does, and that future CVs should be systematically discounted, usually
exponentially, relative to those in the present (Solow 1999). Even with relatively
low discount rates of, say, 4% per annum, this procedure reduces CVs which will
occur a century from now to one fiftieth of their undiscounted value, apparently
placing less weight on the preferences and welfare of future generations than on
that of our own. Not surprisingly, discounting has accounted for much of the
controversy surrounding CBA, and nowhere is this more true than in relation to
32 The one exception is the marginal social utility of income. However, estimates of this may be
confounded by other ethical issues. For example, a “pure” elasticity of the marginal social utility
of income could not be estimated from observing tax regimes (e.g. Evans 2005) since these also
incorporate ethical preferences over the strength of property rights.
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environmental issues, which often require analyses spanning several centuries. For
example, much of the controversy surrounding the Stern Review of climate
change (Stern 2006) has centred on its treatment of time (e.g. Dasgupta 2007c,
Nordhaus 2007b, Weitzman 2007, Spash 2008). Although Price (1993) has argued
that discounting as currently practiced cannot be justified, it remains the case that
the procedure is routinely applied in CBA (Basu’s 1994 assertions
notwithstanding).33
Drawing heavily on Price (1993), I briefly review the four most important
rationales for discounting. None can be entirely ignored in CBA, but none justify
routine use of uniform exponential discount functions to aggregate CVs through
time. As in the previous section, the cases where such a practice may be an
acceptable approximation to the truth turn out to be special rather than general,
and particularly unlikely in the context of global environmental issues.
The opportunity cost of capital
The original rationale for discounting was the observation that benefits which
occur early in time can offset, or compensate for, costs which occur later, because
the benefits can be invested between-times, growing according to the rate of
interest they attract. If a project requires early outlay for later reward, it is
therefore legitimate to ask whether those same outlays might achieve a greater
reward if invested elsewhere. Accounting for the opportunity cost of capital, and
comparing the returns from different projects (including investing the money
required in a bank) does not intrinsically discriminate against future generations
(Portney & Weyant 1999b). The problem is not with this rationale per se, but
rather with its application in CBA.
Conventionally, a uniform exponential discount rate is used to build this criterion
into the CBA (Price 1993). In effect, all benefits are assumed to be invested at this
rate, and all costs are assumed to be compensated out of funds so invested. Within
the scope of a narrow financial CBA, where all benefits and costs are received or
33 In reviewing Price (1993) Basu’s main criticism is that “what he sets out to demolish is upheld
by very few” (Basu 1994). However, Solow (1999) writes that “when asked to summarize and
evaluate costs and benefits over time, it is second nature for any economist to reach for a discount
rate, and very likely a market interest rate”.
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incurred in cash over a relatively short timescale, this may be appropriate.
However, there are at least three problems with using a uniform discount rate for
more complex projects.
The first is investibility. Using a discount rate based on market interest rates
assumes that the benefits received early in the project are actually invested at that
rate. In the case where the project would require cash to be borrowed on the open
market, this might be true. But many costs and benefits of projects do not take the
form of cash borrowed from or lent to banks (Price 1993). Strictly speaking,
positive CVs represent a gain in some individual’s income (or equivalent), not an
impersonal cash payout. When individuals receive a boost to their income, they
may save some of it, but the savings rate is rarely 100% and the marginal
propensity to save may depend on the income level of the individual (e.g. Dynan
2004) and may differ between individuals and countries. The savings rate may
also depend on the form that the benefit takes. Although positive CVs for non-
monetary benefits are themselves non-investible (one cannot directly invest a nice
view, Price 1993), they may lead to an increase in saving, since the person, by
definition, feels as well off as if they had received the money. The proportion
saved may be different from the case where the benefit was received in cash,
however.
This brings us to the next problem. The rates of return available to individuals
may vary and are linked to the per capita income growth rate (Ramsey 1928, see
below) as well as local factors (Saleem 1987). Although interest rates and growth
rates are commonly expressed in percentage terms over any given period, this
does not imply that investments or incomes grow exponentially, as I will show in
Chapter 3. Where projects affect individuals across a broad spatial and temporal
range, it is unlikely that a single exponential discount rate will provide a
sufficiently good approximation to real-life processes. In addition, the social rate
of return on investment may be lower than the market rate, if investments yield
negative externalities (Dasgupta et al. 1999).
The two preceding points highlight the fact that the opportunity-cost-of-capital
rationale for discounting relies on a similar logic to the potential compensation
criterion. In applying a discount rate to project costs and benefits, it is implicitly
assumed that compensating variations are actually made, i.e. that money is
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invested by beneficiaries and paid to losers in the future (Price 1993). Yet, in
reality, positive CVs in the present will only be partially saved and there is, of
course, no guarantee that the resulting capital will be distributed to future
individuals with negative CVs. Thus, the opportunity cost of capital rationale for
discounting suffers from the same disadvantage as the potential compensation
tests – it relies on an assumption that society is indifferent as to who is affected by
benefits and costs.
CBA cannot ignore the opportunity cost of capital, but to account for it using a
single exponential discount rate is only likely to be appropriate under very
specific conditions, which will be restricted to a narrow class of projects. Of
course, these are exactly the kind of projects for which CBA, and discounting,
were originally devised (e.g. Dupuit 1844 and Faustmann 1849, cited in Price
1993; see also Hanley & Spash 1993). CBA must now tackle a quite different set
of problems if it is to assist society in making decisions about global
environmental issues.
Expected income growth
Another rationale for discounting is based on the assumption that future
generations will be richer than our own. If this is the case, future CVs should be
corrected for the diminishing marginal utility of income just as they are intra-
temporally (e.g. Sharma et al. 1991, Stern 2006). Similarly, if society has
preferences over the distribution of utility, these should surely be applied in a
consistent manner intra- and inter-temporally. Note that both of these, CV
correction and equity weighting, may need to be accounted for separately from the
opportunity cost of capital. However, valid though these concerns are, three
important points must be considered before future CVs are discounted on the basis
of these rationales.
First, for exactly the same reason that CVs must be corrected for the marginal
utility of income, it is highly unlikely that CVs will be unchanging through time.
The CV for a given mortal risk for example, would be expected to rise with rising
incomes. If CVs for a given mortality risk are corrected for income, they would be
expected to remain roughly constant over time (though they might also be
weighted according to prioritarian concerns), and it would therefore be incorrect
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to use the diminishing marginal utility of income as a reason for placing less value
on a future life than on a present one (see Gravelle & Smith 2001).34 Project
consequences for which individuals have large positive income elasticities of
demand may lead to CVs which rise over time even after correction for the
marginal utility of income (Price 2000).
Second, as noted above, income growth takes place at very different rates in
different groups of individuals, and in different time periods. Over the last thirty
years, average per capita income in China has shown double digit annual growth
rates, while those in sub-Saharan Africa have stagnated, or even declined (UNDP
2006). Similarly, Western Europe experienced very different long-run growth
rates prior to and after the industrial revolution (Maddison 2006a,b).
Third, whether they are applied intra- or inter-temporally, social welfare functions
based on prioritarian concerns represent an arbitrary foray into deontological
territory, one which ignores ethical questions such as whether future generations
have any property rights over the physical resources of the world.
It is, thus, undoubtedly important that income-based corrections of CVs, together
with other ethical concerns, are applied in a consistent manner whether
aggregating intra- or inter-temporally. However, they must be based on explicit
income projections, with appropriate spatial and temporal resolution. Only in rare
circumstances will these considerations justify a uniform exponential discount
rate.35
Pure time preference
Pure time preference is a preference for utility experienced now rather than at
some other time, independent of any other considerations. It is the component of
time preference which remains after risk, uncertainty, mortality, bequest motives
and changes in the marginal utility of income have been allowed for (HM
34 If, however, life expectancies continue to rise, the value of a statistical life might well increase
even after correction.
35 One might also observe that support for discounting seems to be more widespread in CBAs than
support for CV correction. This might be explained by the fact that society certainly cannot carry
out post hoc redistribution of wealth from the future to the present, but the previous section already
highlighted the problems with assuming that even intra-temporal redistribution mechanisms exist.
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Treasury 2003). It is problematic to measure directly, because of the difficulty of
controlling for other factors, which include the individual’s own private
expectations about the future. Nevertheless, there is evidence that people exhibit
rates of time preference which are not fully explicable in other ways (Frederick et
al. 2002).
Even if the existence of pure time preference is undisputed, however, its
importance for CBA is not immediately clear. Price (1993) summarises
psychological evidence that pure time preference in fact represents a preference
for “nowness” rather than earliness, implying that pure time preferences are time
inconsistent and possibly irrational. Irrationality is difficult to prove, and should
not be assumed lightly. However, it is easy in this case to offer reasons why we
might expect irrationality. Irrational pure time preference may result from a
conflict between Homo sapiens’ long evolutionary history as fitness maximisers,
and Homo economicus’s economic role as utility maximisers. Many of our
heuristics may still tend to maximise fitness not utility (see e.g. Warneryd 2007).
In particular, in most countries, humans have experienced a dramatic reduction in
mortality rates over the last century or so (Friedman 2005, Maddison 2006a,b).
Whether pure time preference is a genetic fitness maximising heuristic or a
culturally inherited utility maximising heuristic the rate may be too high for the
lower mortality risk we now face.36
If pure time preference is irrational, it can be treated like other cognitive biases
which CB analysts might correct for when using an individual’s preferences to
estimate CVs within their own lifetime. Indeed there is evidence that, given the
opportunity, individuals often choose to correct their own myopic biases, for
example adopting mechanisms to limit procrastination (Ariely & Wertenbroch
2002).
Whether irrational or not, how should society treat the existence of pure time
preference when allocating utility across generations? Some economists argue that
36 Since lower rates of pure time preference lead to better educational outcomes (e.g. Fersterer &
Winter-Ebmer 2003), and since the latter reduce fertility (e.g. Basu 2002), there may not be any
reason to expect irrational pure time preferences to decline in the population at large. It will
depend on the relative success of genes coding for high pure time preference rates and memes
coding for smoothed consumption and lifetime utility maximisation.
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it is immoral for society to pay heed to individuals’ impatience (Price 1993) and
this “prescriptive” approach (Portney & Weyant 1999b) is the position taken by
Stern (2006) who adopts a zero rate of pure time preference. Nordhaus (2007b)
and Weitzman (2007) disagree, arguing that it is not for economists to overrule
the preferences of individuals.37 There are three questions here. First, to what
extent does market behaviour informs us about individuals’ moral beliefs?
Second, how should we aggregate the moral beliefs of those who constitute the
moral community (Kopp & Portney 1999)? And third, who constitutes the moral
community? As Deaton (2007:4) says:
“Whatever it is that is generating market behaviour, it is not the
outcome of an infinitely lived and infinitely far-sighted representative
agent whose market and moral behaviours are perfectly aligned, and
who we can use as some sort of infallible guide to our own decisions
and policies.”
We must be careful about inferring an individual’s normative position on the
rights of future generations from their saving decisions. Even if it were rational, it
is not at all obvious why an individual’s refusal to save money at less than 4%
interest implies a belief that, say, future generations do not have a right to certain
natural resources – the individual may impose ethical limits on their own
utilitarianism. As noted in the previous section with regard to inequality aversion,
economists may be guilty of misinterpreting behaviour as revealing moral beliefs
which the individuals themselves do not hold.
The question of how we should aggregate moral beliefs of the community and
who represents the moral community are somewhat circular, since the definition
of the moral community is a normative judgment (Shoemaker 2007). However, if
we assume that future generations would show time preferences which are
similarly symmetrical around “now” as those of the current generation, then the
pure time preferences of each generation would cancel out when aggregated. A
resulting question is, then, whether it is unacceptably paternalistic to include
future generations in the moral community, possibly against the wishes of the
37 Deaton (2007) argues that this illustrates a sharp divide between British and American
economists.
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present generation (Deaton 2007, Weitzman 2007). This is an important question,
but not one that economists can easily answer. Of course, this does not mean that
pure time preference can be ignored in other parts of the CBA. That it helps
determine interest rates is a positive fact, not a normative judgment, and as
described above, interest rates do matter for CBA.
Risk, uncertainty and extinction
The final rationale for discounting future costs and benefits is that they may not,
in fact, occur (Price 1993, HM Treasury 2003, Stern 2006). Technologies may be
developed which avert damages much more cheaply than is currently possible, or
which render expected benefits obsolete and thus valueless. In the context of
climate change, the probability that an efficient carbon storage technology will be
developed is clearly important in determining the case for emission cuts now
rather than later (Gilotte & Bosetti 2007).
Once again, this is a valid concern, but not one which should be subsumed into a
blanket exponential discount rate. Technological progress is likely to be related
(perhaps circularly) to economic growth (see Chapters 3-6), but more importantly,
specific advances are likely to be in response to specific incentives. Carbon
storage technology may be more likely under conditions where incentives for
carbon efficiency apply. Therefore, the rate of technological progress may not be
equal in the status quo and project worlds. Risk and uncertainty are best addressed
through ascribing explicit probabilities to events.
Some CB analysts have argued for discounting the future at a low but positive rate
which reflects the annual probability of human extinction, which would nullify all
future costs and benefits in both project and status quo worlds (e.g. Ng 2005). For
example, despite eschewing pure time preference, Stern (2006) included a
constant annual risk of extinction of 0.01%. This appears to be the only plausible
rationale for a project-wide discount rate, though even this rate might best be
considered endogenous to the particular project, or risk becoming a self-fulfilling
prophesy (Price 1993).
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Must “non-discount rates” equal market interest rates?
Price (1993) argues compellingly that the various processes put forward as
providing a rationale for exponential discounting, while often valid in specific
circumstances, cannot be adequately represented by a homogenous exponential
discount rate, assumed to equal market exchange rates. He therefore advocates the
abandonment of conventional discounting, to be replaced by a piecemeal
approach, which deals appropriately and explicitly with each of the issues above.
This position has been at least partially endorsed by Stern (2006) who explicitly
justified his ‘discount rate’ by building it up from its component parts, the
resulting rate of 1.4% being considerably lower than the market interest rates
normally used (though see Weitzman 2007 for discussion of the correct market
interest rate).
Dasgupta (2007c), Nordhaus (2007b) and Weitzman (2007) have all argued that
the analysis of Stern (2006) is flawed because his chosen parameters are
incompatible with observed savings and interest rates. The basis for these
criticisms is Ramsey’s (1928) equation which says that the interest rate r, is
determined by:
Equation 2.4 gr  
where δ is the rate of pure time preference; η is the elasticity of marginal utility of
income; and g is the growth in per capita income.
Since Stern takes g = 1.3%, δ=0% (plus 0.01% extinction rate), and η=1%, this
implies an interest rate, of 1.4%. Nordhaus (2007b) claims that this is too low
compared with observable interest rates, which he puts at nearer 6%. Dasgupta
(2007c) follows the same logic, observing that Stern’s values would imply a
savings rate of 97% at interest rates of 4%, and argues that Stern’s value for η is
too low.
Dasgupta may be correct that Stern’s value for η is too low. However, it is not
clear to me that Ramsey’s equation can be used to determine the consistency of
the parameter values used in a CBA. To argue that it can, is really just to restate
that future CVs must be discounted at market interest rates. Dasgupta (2007c)
appears to argue that, in matters of public policy, η must take up the slack left by
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reducing δ to zero (something he endorses). But this begs the question: if a policy
maker decides to include future generations in the moral community, choosing a
zero pure time preference rate, is there any reason why the “discount rate” implied
by these decisions should equal a market interest rate, given that the market
interest rate is partly composed of a pure time preference rate, which the decision-
maker has declared to be irrational, immoral or irrelevant? The fact that Ramsey’s
(1928) equation can be used in positive economics to estimate what interest rates
will be, given observed values of δ, η and g, surely does not imply that it can be
used to determine what ‘discount rates’ should be, in a CBA?38 The values of δ
and η may have different meanings in the two contexts. In positive economics, δ
represents an individual’s pure rate of time preference, in the absence of ethical
concerns about the rights of future generations, while η represents their elasticity
of marginal utility. However, in normative CBA, the former represents the risk of
human extinction, while the latter incorporates both the elasticity of marginal
utility and any additional inequality aversion.39 If the value taken by each of the
two parameters were necessarily identical in the two economic applications,
Rawls’ (1971) Theory of Justice could be disproved simply by observing market
exchange rates.40
VI. A generalised CBA for global environmental issues
“When all the requirements of ubiquitous market-centered evaluation
have been incorporated into the procedures of cost-benefit analysis, it
is not so much a discipline as a daydream.” Sen (2001:116).
“Do old fallacies ever die?” Friedman (1992).
38 DeLong (2006), responding to an earlier manuscript by Dasgupta, makes a similar argument.
39 In addition, when determining interest rates, g represents the individual’s expectation of their
future income growth over the period of the investment, which may be short, while in CBA it
represents society’s projection of income growth over the period of the project, which may be
long.
40 Put another way, we could take the existence of non-zero murder rates in the real-world as
evidence that, when deciding public policy, we should assume that some non-zero murder rate is
morally desirable. The point of public policy is that it is, in some senses, paternalistic and
coercive.
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CBA has the potential to improve the accuracy and rationality of public choices
when decision-makers are faced with highly complex issues. However, the
preceding review has highlighted a number of flaws in conventional approaches to
CBA which limit its ability to evaluate global environmental issues. These issues
present particular challenges for CBA, as their effects cross different nations,
levels of wealth and time periods. In order to meet these challenges, two major
changes in the way CBA are currently carried out are required:
1. The pretence to a decisive, value-free CBA should be abandoned in favour of a
two-stage procedure: relatively value-free projections of CVs, income growth
rates, etc; followed by an aggregation stage driven by society’s value judgments,
but assisted by economists.
2. Generalised CBA procedures should be developed, free of arbitrary
assumptions and omissions present in conventional CBA and able to be applied to
the widest possible range of cases.
These shifts have been advocated in one form or another by many previous
authors (e.g. Price 1993, Sen 2001, Azar & Sterner 1996) and they represent the
logical conclusion of the many critiques of CBA. Nevertheless, CBAs of global
environmental issues still use essentially the same methods as those developed for
bridge building and tree planting - and their results may be treated as decisive.
Therefore, to summarise the review, I outline in this section the form that I believe
a generalised CBA should take.
Estimation of compensating variations
Few adjustments are necessary to the standard approach, which uses CVs to
measure project consequences, except to stress that CVs should not be corrected
or “idealized” at this stage, other than to correct for distortions due to imperfect
information and cognition.41 Ideally, such corrections should take the form of
improved study design and project specification, rather than post hoc adjustments,
in order to limit the potential for analyst bias. CVs should be as complete as
possible; however, some components of a CV that relate to ethical concerns over
41 Of course, considerable improvements might be made to the methods used to estimate CVs, but
these lie outside the scope of this thesis.
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the rights of the moral community might be omitted if they are difficult to
estimate reliably. If so, these preferences must be explicitly incorporated into the
aggregation stage, below.
Aggregation
In the case of a CBA used to advise decision-makers, this stage requires that the
decision-maker’s ethical preferences are solicited in order to reach a conclusion,
which would then be decisive. The CBA is therefore shaped by decision-makers,
and cannot be presented to them as a fait accompli. It proceeds through four steps,
the process being iterative, as decision-makers explore the consequences of their
ethical preferences. Of course, this does not preclude analysts from anticipating
the likely preferences of decision-makers (perhaps through studying past
judgments) in order to minimise iterations. Neither does this conceptualisation of
CBA preclude analyses carried out for the purposes of research (as in Part III), but
it does strictly limit the conclusions which can be drawn from them. For example,
it is not possible to claim, as Balmford et al. (2002) do, that “the overall
beneﬁt:cost ratio of an effective global program for the conservation of remaining
wild nature is at least 100:1”. Instead, such analyses can explore the effect of
certain ethical assumptions, in the manner of Tol (2001), but their results can only
be illustrative, not decisive. The distinction between these two forms of CBA
must explicitly been made.
Step 1: identification of winners and losers
First, the distribution of CVs (corrected and uncorrected) can be analysed, to
identify winners and losers, and the reasons for their losses and gains. Next,
separate aggregations of positive and negative CVs (uncorrected) give a rough
indication of the monetary amounts which might be recouped from winners, or
which might need to be distributed to losers, if it were deemed necessary. The
results of this step allow the analyst to solicit, and probably anticipate, decision-
maker preferences; they have no other significance.
Step 2: evaluation of compensation mechanisms
Where the decision-maker is likely to indicate that individuals have claims over
utility losses, plausible compensation mechanisms must be designed. These
should be evaluated in the same way as the original project: their costs must be
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estimated, both in terms of the utility losses of those who pay for the mechanism,
and the operating or deadweight costs. The efficacy of these mechanisms in
compensating individuals who lost from the project should also be estimated, as
well as any other side benefits. In effect, the compensation mechanisms should be
treated as variations on the initial project. Therefore, CVs must be recalculated for
each possible mechanism. Such project redesigns are not restricted to
compensation mechanisms, but could apply to any aspect of the project, and might
be prompted by expert opinion as well as decision-maker value judgments. Thus
CBA has an important role in research and project design, as well as decision-
making (as noted by Hahn & Tetlock 2008).
Step 3: incorporation of ethical concerns
The views of decision-makers must now be solicited on the strength of each
individual’s claim to the utility which would be lost or gained as a result of the
project. This might take two forms:
A social welfare function, parameterised to reflect the strength of the decision-
maker’s pure aversion to utility inequality, ρ. This is society’s inequality aversion
in the absence of other ethical concerns over property rights etc. This can be
thought of as applying to “surplus” utility, generated by the project and belonging
a priori to no-one.
A judgment as to the strength of individuals’ claims to the utility they lose or gain
as a result of the project. This is an ethical parameter, eij representing the strength
of individual i’s claim to welfare loss (or gain) j. The value of this parameter will
determine those to whom compensation should be paid, and from whom it should
be extracted. Decision-maker judgments should be sought with regard to the
property rights of individuals, who, while not directly affected by the project,
might nevertheless be targeted for cost recovery, e.g. the payers of general
taxation.
Step 4: aggregation
Aggregation is best explained first in the simple case, where complete
compensation is made, and second in the case where it is not.
In the case where the compensation of negative CVs is projected to be completely
achieved, the project (including compensation) can be said to be ethically neutral
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with regard to rights to property or free action (note that it is ethically neutral
relative only to the status quo, and not in any absolute sense). In this, the simplest
case, the project and status quo can be compared on the basis of individual utility
changes (corrected-CVs), aggregated according to the social welfare function
specified in step 3.1. The sign of this function determines whether the project with
compensation is more or less socially desirable than the status quo, and the value
of the function can be used to determine the optimal compensation regime. In
addition, the project with compensation can be compared to that without,
providing an estimate of the opportunity cost (in social welfare terms) of insisting
upon compensation. 42 Thus, through the explicit inclusion of compensatory
mechanisms, ethical concerns can be incorporated into CBA, while still
complying with Sen’s (2001) principle of additive accounting. This is done by
calculating the opportunity cost of rights in terms of social welfare foregone.
However, compensation may be imperfect, either because some losers go
uncompensated, or because compensation is paid for by individuals who may not
have positive CVs for the project (e.g. general tax payers). In this case, utility
losses to which individuals have a claim enter into the social welfare function, but
as the product of the individual’s CV and the ethical parameter eij (step 3.2
above). 43 This parameter is subjective, and may be different for different
components of the individual’s CV. eij is therefore related, but not directly
analogous to, the individual-specific weight ai in the generalised social welfare
function 2.4, repeated below (as 2.6).
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Since the parameter ai applies to the entirety of an individual i’s welfare function
Vi, it represents the special case where the individual’s claim to the whole of their
utility is determined by a single factor. This might be the case when, for example,
42 Note that in the case where the compensated individuals are poorer than the compensating
individuals, this opportunity cost may actually be negative, if the deadweight costs of
compensation are sufficiently low compared with the elasticity of the marginal utility of income
and the inequality aversion parameter.
43 This parameter is necessary, because the inequality aversion parameter supplied in step 3.1
relates to project surpluses over which no individual has a claim, and must therefore be moderated
with respect to specific losses and gains.
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a criminal is sentenced to death, as a result of society’s judgment about their
moral standing. Where society acts only to prevent certain criminal acts (e.g.
speeding), but otherwise considers the would-be speeder a full member of the
moral community, it might zero-weight their CV for speeding, leaving other
preferences unaffected (i.e. ei,speeding= 0, ei,j = 1). It is important to note that
although it is subjective, a change in the value of the parameter ei,j can be priced
in terms of its social welfare opportunity cost (as I demonstrate in Chapter 11).
An example
For simplicity, we assume that there are two individuals, A and B, where B is
poorer than A; and B’s marginal utility of income is consequently higher than A’s.
B requires compensation as a result of the project (CVB<0), but this compensation
can only be supplied by taxing A, who is otherwise unaffected by the project
(CVA=0). Because of its positive inequality aversion (ρ>0), and the positive
elasticity of marginal utility of income (η>0), society prefers project surpluses to
go to B. However, society also values A’s claim to the welfare level A enjoys
under the status quo, out of respect for A’s property rights. Therefore, the decision
society faces is whether or not to take money from A and give it to B. This
depends on five things:
1) The relative marginal utilities of income of A and B (which determine the
correction factors applied to their CVs).
2) The inequality aversion parameter, ρ (which measures the strength of B’s
relative claim on the income, in the absence of other rights, on the basis of
B’s lower welfare).
3) The strength of B’s claims to the utility B lost as a result of the project,
eB,Project
4) The strength of A’s claims to the utility they lost to the compensatory tax,
eA,Tax
5) The efficiency of the compensation mechanism, which measures the
proportion of money lost to deadweight costs.
The parameters eB,Project and eA,Tax are subjective, and supplied by the decision-
maker, but the opportunity costs of adopting particular values, in terms of social
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welfare, can be calculated for a given value of ρ. The values can also be compared
across decision-makers and projects, and this framework could therefore increase
the transparency of decision-making, and provide a useful analytical tool for
political economists investigating the consistency of decision-makers, and the
relative support that they give to certain classes of rights (e.g. to property, free
action, equality).
Inter-temporal considerations
Discount rates cannot simply be inferred from market interest rates, as claimed by
Nordhaus (2007b). In fact, it can be argued that they cannot legitimately be used
at all (Price 1993). Explicit treatment of relevant processes, such as income
growth, and its effect on the marginal utility of income, is the best way to proceed,
and only rarely will circumstances allow this process to be collapsed into a single
discount rate, for the sake of minimising decision costs.
As discussed in Section V, the opportunity cost of capital, marginal utility of
income, and human extinction risk must be considered within the CBA, on a case
by case basis. Therefore, we can see that time itself requires few adjustments to
the atemporal aggregation procedure outlined above. The requirement to correct
CVs for the diminishing marginal utility of income should apply equally in the
future as in the present (e.g. Schelling 1999). Of course, this requires explicit
projections of income growth (which may in any case be necessary in order to
predict the volume of benefits, see next chapter and Chapters 9-10) and a value for
the inter-temporal elasticity of marginal utility, η, which might differ from the
intra-temporal value if adaptation to higher income levels occurs. Market interest
rates are relevant only to cash flows, which may be a relatively small part of many
CBAs of global environmental issues, though they may be an important
consideration in the design of compensation mechanisms. Inter-temporal
compensation can be treated in the same explicit way as it is intra-temporally.
Pure time preference is an ethical parameter, similar to those considered above for
rights and inequality aversion. If future generations are included in the moral
community, this should be given a value of zero, as done by Stern (2006). A
positive value implies a successively weaker right to welfare for each subsequent
generation. Human extinction risk can be accounted for by project-specific rates,
which may change over time.
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If compensation is incompletely or excessively made, this may affect the
individual’s welfare in future years, as well as in the year in question. This must
be true if CVs are estimated independently over time, in other words, if an
individual’s CV for the project in year n is calculated assuming that their CVs
were made in all years: 0,1... n-1. If this is the case, failure to compensate them
for losses in earlier years as well as in year n, might result in a welfare loss in year
n which is greater than that implied by their CV for that year, if they would have
invested some proportion of the previously lost income. This will be determined
by their marginal propensity to save, and the rate of return available to them.
Strictly, if there are positive externalities to capital investment, the welfare of
others may be affected as well. In practice, CVs may or may not be estimated
independently, something I discuss in relation to the case study in Chapter 10.
The necessity of explicit income projections
Explicit income projections for each individual or group of individuals are an
important requirement for any project spanning more than one time period. They
are needed to correct future CVs for the diminishing marginal utility of income; to
project the market interest rates to be applied to cash flows and compensation
mechanisms; and to estimate the rates of return available to individuals and their
propensity to save.
In addition, explicit income projections are also important for determining the
volume, as well as value, of many costs and benefits. Income affects both the
desirability of a good relative to other goods, and the amount an individual can
afford to spend on it. Together with other factors such as taste, income therefore
determines both an individual’s willingness to pay for a good and the quantity of
the good demanded by the individual (at any given price). While a higher income
will always increase the ability to pay for a good, the effect of income on
willingness to pay and quantity demanded is indeterminate.
A criticism anticipated
The most obvious criticism is that the generalised procedure outlined above is
considerably more complex than the conventional aggregation approach, of
summing CVs which have been discounted at market rates. However the
procedure simply makes explicit the moral decisions which a decision-maker must
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make. That the procedure appears complex shows that CB analysts should
reconsider their assumption that decision-makers are capable of making such
calculations, rationally and consistently, completely unaided. Second, CBA in its
present form assumes that decision-makers are incapable of estimating the welfare
implications of projects (CVs), yet capable of performing (presumably in their
heads) the calculations necessary to weigh their importance against other ethical
considerations. Third, if this generalised CBA were adopted as standard practice,
it is likely that decision costs would quickly be reduced, as we accumulate
information which is transferable from one CBA to another, such as income
projections and information on decision-maker preferences. Finally, like any
CBA, the procedure can of course be simplified on a case by case basis in order to
constrain decision costs. The difference is that by starting from the general
procedure outlined above, simplifications can be made on the basis of sensitivity
analysis, rather than being the product of historical precedents.
VII. Conclusions
I have reviewed many of the critiques of CBA, highlighting the deficiencies in
existing approaches, most importantly the arbitrary and simplistic approach to
aggregation. These deficiencies are likely to be of great significance in CBAs of
global environmental issues. To summarise these deficiencies, I have outlined the
generalised form that CBA must take to address them while still fulfilling Sen’s
three basic principles (Sen 2001). In Part II (Chapters 3-6) of the thesis I consider
the explicit income projections required by a generalised CBA, and in Part III
(Chapters 7-11), I investigate the social desirability of nature conservation in
developing countries, exploring the issues of aggregation and compensation using
a case study from Madagascar.
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3. 21st century economic growth:
comparing IPCC projections with
historical data
Abstract
Long-term income projections are rare and controversial, yet vital in applied
economics. The best known have been developed by the Inter-governmental Panel
on Climate Change and, despite criticism by some economists, underpin its most
recent assessments. I present the first rigorous comparison of these projections
with the historical data. I show that the results depend heavily on the models
considered and that convenient comparisons of growth and convergence rates are
not meaningful. I make recommendations for the development of future
projections and also for the way that economists statistically compare growth
projections.
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I. Introduction
Where will per-capita income levels stand in 2100? Long-run projections of
income are vital in applied economics: they determine discount rates in cost-
benefit analyses of public policy and help predict important variables such as
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet mainstream economics is largely devoid of formal
long-run projections (Lucas 2000 provides a rare example). Informal predictions
are more common but often involve cursory empirical analysis and no explicit
justification of the model used (e.g. Beckerman 2003:16-1744). In cost-benefit
analysis, growth rates are implicitly predicted whenever discount rates are
chosen.45 The choice of discount rate often determines the conclusion (see e.g.
Nordhaus 2007b), yet only rarely does this result from explicit economic
modelling (see Nordhaus 1993 for one example).
Perhaps this is unsurprising. Temple (1999) observed that, despite the undoubted
importance of the subject, “the study of growth at the aggregate level has often
been something of a backwater”, due to a lack of data and the perceived
exogeneity of the primary driver of growth; technology. More recently, Easterly
(2007) concludes that the explosion of empirical research into the causes of
growth has “collapsed from a surplus of answers”. 46 Away from academic
research, the long-range projections of most economic and finance organisations
span years rather than centuries.47
Regardless of the predictive power of growth theory, strong demand for long-
range projections of economic growth has encouraged their supply, particularly in
the domain of global climate change. The best known projections are those
44 Beckerman, like Lucas, uses an exponential function to extrapolate past growth rates. Neither
author provides any theoretical justification for their choice, or any measure of goodness of fit to
the historical data.
45 Whether discounting is justified using the opportunity cost of capital or from diminishing
marginal utility of income to richer, future generations, they ultimately derive from economic
growth.
46 Easterly quotes Durlauf et al. (2005) who note that “approximately as many growth
determinants have been proposed as there are countries for which data are available”.
47 The World Bank’s “Global Economic Prospects” includes “long-term global scenarios which
look ten years into the future” (World Bank 2007). The International Monetary Fund’s World
Economic Outlook, published in October 2007, forecasts output to 2012 (IMF 2007)
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published in the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (hereafter SRES,
Nakicenovic & Swart 2000), and which underpin the most recent assessments by
the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Critics (e.g. Castles &
Henderson 2003a,b) compared the projections to the historical data concluding
that they are implausible, which defenders of the SRES (Nakicenovic et al. 2003,
Grübler et al. 2004) hotly denied.
However, as I describe below, these comparisons had neither an explicit economic
basis nor rigorous statistical methodology. In this chapter, I attempt to address this
by carrying out the first comparison of the scenarios with the historical data,
something requested by the SRES team itself:
“We feel that [Castles and Henderson] have quoted selectively from
the literature and that much greater clarity, precision, and
comprehensiveness is required in the presentation and criticism of
SRES. A peer-reviewed evaluation of their criticisms could resolve
some of these issues and help inform future emissions assessments.”
Grübler et al. (2004 p13).
This study is important in three respects. First, the SRES projections underpin the
IPCC’s latest assessment,48 which will not be superseded before 2013 and is likely
to have significant influence on public policy. Understanding these scenarios is
vital to understanding the assessment itself. Second, the IPCC has called for the
development of new scenarios to underpin the next assessment,49 and the present
study aims to inform both the development and criticism of future income
projections. As the focus shifts from climate science, to the economics of climate-
change policies and adaptation (Hopkins 2007), income projections will assume
even greater importance. In particular, there will be a greater emphasis on the
relative as well as absolute income levels of nations and therefore on predictions
of convergence as well as growth. Whereas previous critiques have focussed on
growth rates at the expense of convergence, I try to redress the balance. In
addition, much attention has focussed on the quantification and presentation of
48 http: www.ipcc.ch
49 In an open letter from R.K Pauchari, Chairman of the IPCC, addressed to the scientific
community, dated 12 September 2006.
Chapter 3
57
uncertainty in the IPCC process (see Schneider 2001, Pittock et al. 2001), yet this
issue has received little attention in the debate over the SRES income projections.
I provide an analysis of the different kinds of uncertainty in projecting income,
and make recommendations as to how they should be presented. Finally, the
analysis presented here has wider implications for the way that economists
instinctively conceptualise economic growth, and the way that income projections
are parameterised and evaluated. In particular, I show that the historical data
provides little support for representing and extrapolating growth as an exponential
function. I also show that convergence must be seen as non-linear, non-
monotonic, and above all potentially cyclical; a product of at least three different
processes. This implies that, like annualised percentage growth rates, convergence
rates estimated using linear, monotonic models cannot be usefully extrapolated
from past to future.
In Section II of this chapter I describe the SRES and the controversy surrounding
it. In Section III, I outline the scope of the study and my analytical approach. The
candidate set of models are identified in Section IV and I explain my treatment of
the data and statistical methods in Section V. In Section VI, I present and discuss
the results for the richest region, the OECD, and in Section VII for the two
developing regions: Asia; and Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (ALM).
Finally, I conclude in Section VIII with a brief discussion of some points general
to the study as a whole, summarise my conclusions and make recommendations
for the development and evaluation of future income projections.
II. The SRES and the controversy
In the late 1990s, the IPCC published the SRES to provide the basis for its Third
Assessment Report. One objective of the scenarios was to provide projections of
greenhouse gas emissions to be used in the climate models but the IPCC also
made clear that the scenarios were to be used for “assessing alternative mitigation
adaptation strategies” (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000). Therefore, they included
projections of income (GDP per capita), which is both an input variable in
constructing emissions projections, and an important output of the scenario
process in its own right.
Chapter 3
58
The controversy over the SRES scenarios began with a critique by Ian Castles and
David Henderson.50 This took the form of seven separate letters and documents
they had sent to the IPCC, and which were then published as a single paper in
Energy and Environment (Castles & Henderson 2003a). This was directly
followed by a reply from the SRES authors (Nakicenovic et al. 2003) in the same
issue. Castles and Henderson responded to this reply (Castles & Henderson
2003b), and again the SRES team replied (Grübler et al. 2003).
Castles and Henderson’s most relevant criticisms of the SRES projections were
that they predominantly used GDP converted to international dollars using market
exchange rates (GDPMER) rather than purchasing power parity rates (GDPPPP), and
that they made over-optimistic assumptions about convergence between
developing countries and the west.51 In their view, using GDPMER ‘exaggerated’
the initial gap in income, and combined with the convergence assumptions led to
developing country growth rates that were historically implausible. In addition,
they asserted that where the SRES did project GDPPPP, the projections were
unsound as they do not display the characteristics expected of them.52 The SRES
team, for their part, robustly defended the scenarios (Nakicenovic et al. 2003,
Grübler et al. 2004). Earlier IPCC scenarios have been criticised for their
assumption that per-capita income growth rates will slow over time, something
also assumed by the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000, and see
below) but for which “there is no historical basis” according Nordhaus (1994).
The debate was covered in the popular press (see e.g. The Economist 2003) and
sowed serious doubt (in some quarters at least) about the validity of the SRES and
therefore the wider IPCC process. None of the four papers were peer-reviewed,
however, and the debate ended with neither side having convinced the other:
50 Respectively, former head of Australian National Statistics and former chief economist at the
OECD.
51 The critics ascribe these failings to their development by “an unrepresentative professional
milieu”, from which economists and economic historians were absent. They do concede, however,
that the IPCC should “have no illusions about what economists can say hope to say with
confidence about the future”.
52 I explore and largely reject this criticism of the PPP projections in Appendix B.
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“For the reasons that we have outlined in this article and its
predecessor, we do not think that the SRES should be taken as the
accepted point of departure for this coming Fourth Review.” Castles
and Henderson (2003b:430).
“We feel that Castles and Henderson have quoted selectively from the
literature and that much greater clarity, precision, and
comprehensiveness is required in the presentation and criticism of
SRES. A peer-reviewed evaluation of their criticisms could resolve
some of these issues and help inform future emissions assessments.”
Grübler et al. (2004:13).
This debate prompted further criticisms by others, notably by McKibbin et al.
(2004) and Ryten (2004). However a peer-reviewed evaluation of the SRES
concluded that the scenarios were adequate and did not need updating before the
fourth assessment report (van Vuuren & O’Neill 2006), though in an editorial
Stegman (2006) highlighted the narrow scope of this review. Finally, several
studies have been published that, like McKibbin et al. (2004) focus on assessing
the effect on emissions of the alleged deficiencies. Manne et al. (2005), Tol
(2006) and van Vuuren and Alfsen (2006) all found only a small effect in contrast
with McKibbin et al.’s analysis.
To date, reviews and critiques of the SRES have been selective and limited in
scope. For example, Castles and Henderson’s critique was hampered by their
confusion of low-growth scenarios with low-emissions scenarios, and most of the
historical comparisons they provide relate only to the latter, which in fact assumed
relatively high economic growth rates. Surprisingly, they mix GDPPPP and
GDPMER, comparing historical growth rates of the former with projected growth
rates of the latter. They are also selective in the periods and countries with which
they compare the SRES projections. Despite asserting that the convergence
assumptions adopted by the IPCC are implausible, they focus only on developing
country growth rates without directly comparing convergence rates. Finally, they
do not explicitly define their economic models, nor provide a clear statistical
analysis, both of which I will demonstrate to be crucial. The SRES team’s
response (Nakicenovic et al. 2003, Grübler et al. 2004), because it focussed on
directly refuting the points raised by Castles and Henderson, suffers from some of
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the same limitations as the original critique, as do other papers criticising the
scenarios (e.g. McKibbin et al. 2004). In the only quantitative evaluation of the
SRES to be peer-reviewed (van Vuuren & O’Neil 2006), the only comparison
with historical data compared the SRES projections with the data observed in the
decade since their development (1990-2000). Thus, the plausibility of the SRES
scenarios compared to the historical data has yet to be rigorously tested. Appendix
A gives a more detailed review of the SRES controversy.
III. Analytical approach and historical scope
In this study, I do not assume a particular model of economic growth. Instead, I
explicitly define, a priori, a candidate set of economically plausible models (see
Section IV) which are then fitted to the historical data. In contrast, the SRES
together with previous critiques, reviews and responses, simply compared
projections with the past using annualised percentage growth rates, the implication
being that if they differed, the projections were historically implausible. There are
two problems with this approach. First, it does not provide a very informative
comparison unless growth has been perfectly exponential in the past. Second, in
the context of developing countries, it makes little economic sense to compare
their growth rates in isolation from their contemporaries at the productivity
frontier. Below I outline how my approach addresses these issues before
discussing the data I use and the historical scope of the analysis.
Analytical approach
Once annualised percentage growth rates are abandoned, inter-temporal
comparisons become more complex. The only way to properly compare past and
future is to represent the past using an appropriate model or models and then to
extrapolate it into the future. This extrapolation can then be directly compared
with the projection, and the degree of overlap determined. This allows a measure
of confidence to be assigned to any conclusion of similarity or difference that
takes account of both model selection uncertainty and model fitting error. Of
course, the result is dependent on the set of models initially considered, and
assumes that growth is a smooth function and that the function remains constant
over time.
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After identifying the candidate set of models (Section III), I evaluate this set using
an information theoretic approach; the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). This
combines an estimate of the relative distance of each model from the ‘true’ model
(the Kulback-Leibler distance), and a penalty for each parameter included in the
model, to prevent over-fitting (Burnham & Anderson 2002). I then use weights
based on the AIC scores to produce a model-averaged extrapolation of the past
(Burnham & Anderson 2002:75). Finally, I compare the probability distribution of
this extrapolation with the full range of SRES scenarios, to estimate the degree to
which the scenario range encompasses the extrapolation of the historical data.
This method incorporates both model selection uncertainty and prediction error,
given a model.
Extrapolating the future from the past implies the ‘assumption of continuity’: that
future trends are discernible from past data, or that the past and future form part of
the same phase or population (Makridakis et al. 1998). To argue that projections
should be confined to extrapolating past trends is to make a strong assumption of
continuity. I stress that I do not suggest that the SRES scenarios should be limited
to such an “inappropriate historical determinism” (Nakicenovic et al. 2003:200),
although I do argue in Section VII that they should encompass, and be centred
upon, such an extrapolation. However, whether or not this latter point is accepted,
it remains true that the only way to compare scenarios with the past is to
extrapolate the past using explicitly defined and objectively evaluated models.
Inspired by Solow (1956), 53 economic theory usually treats the growth of
developing countries (which are capital-poor) differently from those in the
vanguard of economic growth, which operate at the productivity frontier; different
processes are assumed to be operating in each case. For example, in neoclassical
growth theory, technology is pre-eminent in driving the long-run rate of growth in
vanguard economies, while in poorer countries, their growth rates are determined
in part by their position relative to the vanguard economies (Barro & Sala-i-
53 As Mankiw et al. (1992) make clear, the Solow (1956) model actually referred to the behaviour
of a single economy around its own steady state, rather than the behaviour of poorer economies
relative to richer ones. Nevertheless, the convergence hypothesis took root, and a great deal of
empirical work followed. The strong assumption of convergence has been tempered by this
empirical work, and the consensus now emphasises convergence of poor countries on the rich,
conditional on several, somewhat poorly understood factors (see Islam 2003 for a review).
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Martin 2004).54 For this reason, it makes little economic sense to treat developing
country growth in isolation from that of the vanguard, as previous critiques have
done. In this study, I analyse trends in income level for the vanguard region (the
OECD) and in relative income for the developing regions. This allows the causes
of any disparities between the SRES scenarios and the historical data to be
identified. For example, developing country growth may be too fast for two main
reasons. Either the rate of convergence between them and the vanguard is too fast,
or the rate of growth in vanguard regions is too high. The framework adopted here
allows these two possibilities to be clearly separated.
The SRES projections
Despite the weakness of Castles and Henderson’s critique, they were correct on at
least one major point: the desirability of projecting GDPPPP (see Nordhaus
2007a).55 The SRES team have robustly defended their GDPPPP projections as
valid. In Appendix B, I show that the relationship with their sister GDPMER
projections is plausible, therefore, I confine my analysis to the projections of
GDPPPP (produced by the MESSAGE modelling group, one of five groups that
produced emissions scenarios for the SRES). Since the assumptions underlying
the economic projections were common to all groups, these are representative of
the SRES as a whole.
The SRES projections of population and GDP are available for ten-year intervals
(1990-2100) from the IPCC emissions scenarios database (Morita & Lee 199856).
The projections were made at the level of four large regions (Table 3.1). Since
disaggregated data is not available, my analysis is carried out at the level of these
regions. Because of the lack of reliable historical data for the REF region (see
Section IV and Appendix C) I exclude it from the study.
54This point was recognised in the SRES (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000). However, the SRES team
do not discuss convergence rates, only growth rates, in their debate with Castles and Henderson.
55 As Ryten (2004) notes, “the only viable alternative to the use of inadequate PPP-based estimates
is better PPP-based estimates”, and as far as predicting welfare is concerned, this is surely true.
56 Version 3, downloaded from: http://www-cger.nies.go.jp/scenario/index.html, 23rd August 2007.
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Table 3.1. Regions used in the SRES57.
Region Definition
OECD90 Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development in 1990: North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia and
New Zealand.
REF Countries undergoing economic reform: Eastern Europe and the former
USSR
ASIA Asia, including the pacific.
ALM Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.
Historical data and scope
When comparing projections with the past, the historical scope of the analysis will
determine the result. Analysing a longer sample period will potentially increase
the number of trends discernible in the data, leading to different, possibly more
accurate predictions. On the other hand, it will likely increase the number of
distinct phases represented in the data, increasing the within-sample complexity,
and reducing the chance that the data can be adequately described by a simple,
well-understood function. Therefore, it is helpful to divide the past into a number
of phases, each of which can be approximated by relatively simple functions, and
to distinguish between, on the one hand, trends within a phase and on the other,
phase shifts, when the data show a marked transition to another trend. If these
phase shifts themselves appear to follow a consistent pattern, they can be
characterised as “mega-trends” and subjected to statistical analysis allowing them
to be extrapolated (Makridakis et al. 1998). This is the approach adopted here, and
I proceed as follows. First, a formal statistical analysis is used to compare the
SRES with the modern data from the most recent phase of growth and this
comparison therefore makes a strong assumption of continuity. Second, this
analysis is placed within the context of the broader sweep of human history to
identify pertinent phase shifts and mega-trends, in order to consider the
plausibility of this assumption.
In the case of income, another consideration in determining the historical scope of
the analysis is the availability of data. Modern national accounts were developed
in the 1920s and 30s, and began to be published in developed countries after the
57 For full definitions of the regions see Appendix III of IPCC (2001):
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/149.htm
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2nd World War (Lequiller & Blades 2007:398-399). Although modern national
accounts are themselves complex and imperfect proxies, any estimates of income
that predate this are inevitably the results of considerable supposition and
inference, the more so the further back they extend (Maddison 2006a,b). Of
particular concern for this study is not only the decrease in the reliability of the
estimates moving backwards in time, but the possibility that certain models have
been assumed in estimating the data. For example, if annualised percentage
growth rates are interpolated or extrapolated backwards to fill in gaps in the data,
growth over the period will of necessity perfectly fit an exponential function,
whether or not growth was in fact exponential.
Thus, for analytical reasons, I draw a distinction between the modern phase of
economic growth (1950-2003)58 for which national accounts are more or less
directly available and the longer sweep of history for which income has been
estimated by economic historians. The data on the former is taken from the Penn
World Table 6.2 produced by Heston et al. 2006 (see also Summers & Heston
1991). This is the dataset used almost ubiquitously in studies of growth covering
the post war era. Data on the latter comes from the prodigious research efforts of
Maddison (2006a,b).
III. Candidate models
Vanguard economic growth
Economic growth is usually conceptualised as an exponential process (e.g. Lucas
2000, Nakicenovic & Swart 2000, Beckerman 2003), and all sides of the SRES
debate have directly compared annualised percentage growth rates from different
periods, thus implying the assumption of an exponential function. However, the
appropriateness of assuming an exponential function for growth has been
questioned by Wibe and Carlén (2006) who advocate the use of a linear function,
while Maddison (2006a) suggests that the long-run rate of technological progress
is slowing down, implying that growth may at present be sub-exponential. On the
58 Maddison (2006) identifies a number of internally consistent phases of economic growth, the
latest being 1950 to the present, although he does also subdivide this into two phases, broken at
1973.
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other hand, Nordhaus (1994) commenting on the previous set of IPCC scenarios,
which showed just such a trend, asserted that there is no evidence that per capita
income growth slows over time. 59 Indeed, ‘new economy’ advocates point to
steadily increasing growth rates since the start of the industrial revolution and
exponential improvements in technology, and predict rapid exponential or super-
exponential growth for the 21st century (e.g Kurzweil 2001, Hanson 2000).
Therefore, even without allowing for possible limits to growth (which I consider
in the next chapter) there is clearly a diversity of opinion about suitable growth
functions. This is in line with growth theory. If growth in vanguard economies is
at least partly determined by technology, and not simply by capital accumulation
(see Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004 for a review of modern growth theories and
evidence), there seems to be no reason why the economy as a whole should be
conceptualised as growing in the manner of compound interest. Indeed, there is
perhaps no reason why the economy should consistently grow according to any
particular mathematical function. Although there is evidence that many physical
measures of technology increase exponentially (e.g. Kurzweil 2001, Nordhaus
2007), economic growth results from the interaction between technology and
society, and there is no reason why exponential improvements in ‘physical’
measures of technologies will necessarily result in exponential growth. 60 New
Growth Theory provides no consensus on the functional form of income growth.
Conceptualising growth as inherently exponential appears to be a throw back to
pre-Solow ideas about capital accumulation.
To capture this diversity of opinion (and theoretical agnosticism) about possible
growth functions, I included three monotonic models in the a priori candidate
set:61 the conventional exponential function; the linear model suggested by Wibe
59 It is important not to confuse global growth rates with growth rates at the technological frontier,
i.e. in the richest economies. Global growth rates may often be higher, if poorer countries are
catching up with the richest countries.
60 Diminishing marginal returns to any particular technological advance (e.g. increased computer
processing power) may mean that growth is driven more by the rate of new innovations, rather
than the rate of improvement in existing innovations. It is harder to measure the rate of the former,
except through measuring productivity itself.
61 A super-exponential model was initially included, which allowed the annual growth rate to
increase as a function of time, i.e.: ))( tbtaeY  , however, the coefficient b was found to be
negative, meaning that the growth rate decreased over time, and the function was discarded
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and Carlén; and a power function. This latter represents an intermediate case
between exponential and linear growth where annual increments are ever-
increasing in absolute terms but ever-decreasing in percentage terms (see Ghiglino
2007 for an argument that productivity follows a power law).
Exponential:
Equation 3.1 )( btaeY 
Linear:
Equation 3.2 btaY 
Power:
Equation 3.3 ctbaY 
Where Y is per capita income, and t is time in years post 1951
Developing region convergence
Castles and Henderson (2003a,b) criticise the SRES scenarios for being overly
optimistic about developing country growth, both in absolute terms and relative to
the OECD region. They argue that the SRES scenarios have assumed universal
and unconditional convergence of developing countries on the OECD, and that
this is not justified by the literature. Research, they say, has failed to find evidence
for unconditional convergence on a global level, and where it has found
convergence, the rates estimated are quite slow62 (McKibbin et al. 2004 make the
same point). The SRES team openly admits that the convergence of developing
regions on the OECD was an assumption of the SRES process, but contend that
this is in line with the literature (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000, Nakicenovic et al.
2003).63 The critics are correct that research to date has not shown convergence to
be ubiquitous, but rather to be conditional, with certain types of countries
converging, while others do not (see Islam 2003 and Abreu et al. 2005 for
62 An apparent empirical consensus around 2% annual reduction in the relative gap between rich
and poor led some to claim a “natural law” but this consensus is questioned by Abreu et al. (2005).
63 Castles & Henderson 2003a even suggest that the SRES adopted convergence for political
reasons. However, it seems strange that developing countries would press for income scenarios
which predicted high growth for them, since this would have the effect of increasing pressure on
them to take part in emissions curbs, and also reduce the case for helping them cope with future
climate change.
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thorough reviews of the subject). Are the SRES scenarios implausible then,
compared to the historical data? I investigate this by fitting three models to data
on the relative gap64 between the developing region (ASIA or ALM) and the
OECD.
The first is an exponential decay function, which reflects the conventional way in
which convergence rates are estimated and presented in the literature65. When
applied to the time series data, this function will estimate a rate of convergence
which is analogous to those estimated through ‘growth initial regressions’ Islam
(2003). It was to the results of these analyses that the SRES team and critics refer,
and which they implicitly extrapolate into the future when debating the
plausibility of the SRES projections:
Exponential:
Equation 3.4 )( btaeG 
Where G is the relative gap in income, t is time in years post 1951, and the
constant b >0.
The second model represents the critics’ hypothesis that the developing region
will not converge, but rather continue to diverge. Since the size of the relative gap
is bounded at unity, I use a function that converges asymptotically upon one:
Asymptotic Exponential:
Equation 3.5 bteaG  1
where b >0 and a >0.
One reason why previous analyses such as growth-initial regressions have found
little evidence of convergence may be that they have focussed on monotonic
convergence, not allowing for the possibility of both divergence and convergence
64 Where the relative gap is the gap in per capita income between the developing region and the
OECD as a percentage of the OECD’s income. This is the natural metric to use because it is
referred to ubiquitously in the growth and convergence literature (Islam 2003).
65 The precise shape of the convergence function depends on the underlying growth model
assumed, and the convergence rates estimated are in fact approximations. However, results are
normally presented in terms of a parameter λ, which is the annual percentage reduction in the
relative gap between the poor country and the vanguard. This implies an exponential decay
function, which is assumed here in order to be agnostic about the underlying model.
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during the period studied (see Durlauf & Quah 1999). For example, in growth-
initial regressions, growth rates over a period are regressed on initial income
levels (Islam 2003). A negative slope indicates that poorer countries grew faster
than rich countries, thus indicating convergence. 66 However, divergence is a
precondition for convergence, since we know from Maddison (2006a,b) that all
countries and regions enjoyed roughly the same low level of income a few
centuries ago. It is therefore possible that during the period studied, developing
countries and regions will have experienced divergence, followed by convergence.
If this is the case, convergence may be masked when using ‘blunt’ methods such
as growth-initial regressions, which implicitly assume convergence to be a
monotonic, fundamentally linear process.67 I therefore include a third function, a
quadratic exponential function, which allows for a non-monotonic relationship.
This is not the only possible function, but this form is strongly suggested by
economic theory and history, and has the virtue of being simple. It includes a
period of exponential divergence from zero, such as would be seen if vanguard
economies ‘took off’ exponentially during the industrial revolution (see Maddison
2006a,b). This is followed by a period in which divergence slows, as the
developing economy begins to fulfil the conditions necessary for convergence.
During this period, two opposing forces are acting upon the developing economy.
On the one hand, and to the extent it has fulfilled certain conditions, it provides
higher returns to capital (due to a lower capital to labour ratio than vanguard
economies) meaning that it will tend to attract capital, increasing labour
productivity and thus income (as per Solow 1956). On the other hand, unfulfilled
conditions, such as poor institutions or low human capital prevent the developing
66 In fact, as Friedman (1992) and Quah (1993) have pointed out, evidence of beta-convergence, as
this is known, does not provide conclusive evidence for convergence but may simply represent
regression to the mean. Beta-convergence is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
convergence, since random perturbations may counter the general tendency to convergence. For
this reason Quah (1993) recommends analyses of income dispersion through time. Such studies
look for ‘sigma-convergence’ or a reduction in the dispersion of income levels over time.
However, in the context of this analysis, involving regionally aggregated data, stochasticity
becomes less important, and since comparisons are made between just two entities (the developing
region and the OECD), “beta convergence” would imply sigma convergence.
67 For example, the study quoted in the SRES and reproduced in Figure 3.10 of Nakicenovic &
Swart 2000), is Barro (1997), which uses the annualised percentage growth rate over 20 years
(1965-1985) as the dependent variable. This study does find a negative correlation between growth
rates and initial income, but only after other factors have been taken into account, which can be
interpreted as conditions, and perhaps as proxies for the country’s “stage of development”.
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economy from fully capitalising on its situation, and reduce the ability for it to
benefit from any positive externalities from vanguard economies’ innovation. As
more and more conditions are met, a turning point is reached, and convergence
begins, albeit slowly. Once all the conditions have been met, the only force acting
on the economy is advantageous – that of higher returns to capital - and it narrows
the gap exponentially. Convergence in this final phase proceeds as with the
exponential decay function above, with developing country growth rates
converging asymptotically on those of the vanguard as income levels converge.
Quadratic Exponential:
Equation 3.6 )( 2tctbaeG 
where c >0.
IV. Data and methods
The SRES projections show small differences in values for the initial year, 1990.68
I therefore divided through by a common factor all of the values in each
projection, in order to equalise the initial values with that of the average for all
scenarios. This leaves rates of change and the shape of trends unaltered.
I aggregated the Penn World Table income series to the level of the regions used
in the SRES by calculating a weighted average of per capita income over all
countries in the region that are included in the Penn table.69 The Penn World Table
runs from 1950 to 2004, but coverage (of variables other than population70) is
incomplete for many countries. In order to ensure that trends are genuine and not
the effect of changing the countries included in the analysis, I used a constant
sample of countries starting in 1952. This sample provided the best compromise
68 Since this year was not forecast by the scenarios, and was already ten years past by the time the
SRES was published, the reasons for these differences are not clear.
69 Data for Bhutan and Cambodia were excluded because the population data, and hence the GDP
per capita data, appeared to be seriously anomalous, and this was confirmed by the Centre for
International Comparisons (Ye Wang, pers. com. 31st July 2007). With the exception of Bhutan
and Cambodia all other countries listed by the SRES and not included in the Penn tables are
microstates, dependencies and overseas territories.
70 The population estimates come from the US Census Bureau. Because these represent the best
guess of the true population figure, they may differ from official population statistics published by
country governments and collated by the UN.
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between longitudinal and cross-sectional coverage (see Appendix C for more
details). The objective is to determine the historical plausibility of the SRES
projections, given the information available at the time they were developed, so
the sample ends in 1990. The observed data from 1991-2003 is also presented.
Once again, all points in each time series were divided through by a common
factor to equalise 1990 levels with the SRES projections.
All analyses were carried out using the nls function in R (R Core Development
Team 2007). Probability distributions for each extrapolated function were
estimated by fitting the function to 10,000 bootstrapped samples; and for the
model-averaged projections by taking wi 10,000 samples without replacement
from each function’s set of bootstrapped samples (where wi is the Akaike weight
of function i in the set). 95% confidence intervals for each function or model-
averaged projection were estimated by selecting the 250th and 9750th highest
prediction for each year from the probability distribution.
IV. Vanguard economy growth
Model fitting and selection
Comparing AIC scores (Table 3.2), the power function receives most support
from the data, the linear function considerably less, and the exponential function
essentially none (ΔAIC>10, Burnham & Anderson 2002).
Table 3.2. AIC scores and weights for models of vanguard economic growth.
Parameters AIC Score Delta AIC Akaike Weight
Power 3 565.59 0.00 0.87
Linear 2 569.35 3.75 0.13
Exponential 2 597.48 31.89 1.03x10-07
Figure 3.1 shows the functions fitted to the 1952-1990 data, and extrapolated to
2003, as well as the observed data from 1991-2003. The best performing function
as fitted to the data 1952-1990 (power), also best predicts income growth from
1990-2003. Thus, there is no evidence that economic growth in the vanguard
region has been exponential over the only period for which national accounts have
been published. The relatively strong performance of the linear model, and the
fact that the exponent c of the power function is only slightly above one (Table
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3.3), shows that growth has been much closer to linear (i.e. constant absolute
annual increments) than exponential (constant percentage increments).
Table 3.3. Model parameters for OECD growth.
Model Parameter Estimate Std. Error
Exponential a 8.663 0.020
b 0.027 0.001
Linear a 4672 111
b 289 4.841
Power a 5096 198
b 183 37.2
c 1.119 0.053
Figure 3.1. Near term income projections using models fitted to 1952-1990, a)
exponential and power, b) exponential and linear.
Chapter 3
72
Comparison of the SRES with the recent historical data
The SRES scenarios completely encompass the model-averaged projection, as
well as its 95% confidence intervals (Figure 3.2). The exponential function, on the
other hand, lies well outside the SRES scenario range.
Figure 3.2. The upper and lower limits of the SRES income projections, together with the
model-averaged extrapolation of the past, and of the exponential function alone (each
with 95% confidence intervals).
Compared to the model averaged function, the SRES scenarios are on the low side
early on, and on the high side later, but the proportion of the probability density of
the extrapolation falling within the scenario range never falls below 98 per cent.
The model-averaged projection from this candidate set therefore leads to the
conclusion that the SRES is comparable with the past (though tending to the high
side). Using the conventional model assumed by both sides of the debate – the
poorly performing exponential model - would lead to the opposite conclusion.
Annualised percentage growth rates in the SRES are well below those that would
be calculated if an exponential function were assumed for the historical data.71
This illustrates an important message of this chapter – whenever projections are
71 This makes their use of annualised percentage growth rates to compare the SRES scenarios with
historical data (Nakicenovic et al. 2003, Grübler et al. 2004) puzzling. As I explain further in the
discussion, unless one assumes an exponential function, such a comparison is meaningless.
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compared with the past, the models used to compare them must be explicitly
defined, justified by theory and then tested empirically on the past data. Blind use
of the exponential function is not an appropriate way to compare growth between
different periods, or to extrapolate the past.
Implications for conceptualising growth
The superior performance of the power function compared to the exponential
function in predicting growth 1991-2003 demonstrates the importance of careful
model definition, justification and selection, rather than simply relying on
conventional wisdom and convenience. When comparing income projections with
historical data, using annualised percentage growth rates is convenient, but
meaningless, if growth is not exponential. For example, Beckerman (2003) writes:
“.... this growth of output per head has been 2.1 percent [per
annum]..... The power of compound interest being what it is, world
average real incomes per head in the year 2100 should be 4.43 times
as high as they are now!”
‘Compounding’ is indeed powerful, but Beckerman provides no evidence that past
growth has been compounded. When Beckerman says growth has been 2.1% per
annum, he does not mean that he has fitted an exponential function to the data,
and found it to have an good fit, better than any other function. Instead he has
assumed the exponential nature of past growth, calculated an annualised
percentage growth rate from the initial and final values72 and then extrapolated his
untested function into the future.73
The only tenable position is to assume that no single, simple, function can be
expected to accurately represent growth in all phases, since even the simplest
growth model combines several different factors (capital accumulation, human
capital, technology) all of which may increase in different, perhaps non-linear
ways. Any growth function can only approximate such a process, and will likely
only be valid for a limited period. Another important implication is that if growth
72 The annualised interest or growth rate is found by dividing the final value by the initial value,
and then exponentiating the result by the reciprocal of the number of years.
73 I acknowledge that Beckerman is referring to global output here. However global output is not
exponential either (see Chapter 6).
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is not exponential, there is no rationale for using an exponential function when
discounting future costs and benefits.
Long-run mega-trends and phase shifts
Figure 3.3 shows three important mega-trends in economic growth, for Western
Europe.74 The aim is to examine the claim made by some (e.g. Nordhaus 1994)
that annualised percentage growth rates tend to increase over the long-run, and
therefore that ever faster exponential growth is likely. The figure plots three
variables, each calculated for successive time periods identified by Maddison
(2006a,b) as being distinct phases. First, the annualised percentage growth (solid
line), estimated by fitting an exponential function. Second, the ΔAIC score of the
exponential function compared to a power function (dashed line), which when
negative indicates that the exponential function receives greatest support from the
data, and when positive the reverse. ΔAIC of less than two indicate that both
functions receive considerable support. Finally, the dotted line shows the
exponent c of the power function, where c=1 indicates linearity.
First, it does appear that annualised % growth rates have been increasing, albeit
rather erratically. Interestingly, if the increase in growth rates is viewed as linear,
it is the high growth rates of the early post-war period that appear anomalously
high, rather than the more recent lower growth rates appearing to be low, which
calls into question the concept of a productivity “slow down” in recent years (see
e.g. Nordhaus 2002).75 Meanwhile, the dashed line shows another important trend,
the ΔAIC score of the exponential function. Never more negative than minus one,
it turns strongly positive as soon as we enter the modern era. This suggests one of
two possibilities. Either growth has become less exponential in the modern era, or
the exponential nature of earlier periods is an artefact of Maddison (2006a,b)
assuming an exponential function when reconstructing past income estimates.
Either way, it undermines any interpretation of historical growth rates that relies
on assuming an exponential function, and comparing annualised percentage
74 The trends for Japan, and the ‘western offshoots’ USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand are
qualitatively similar. However, Western Europe is shown here as it has been at or near the
productivity frontier for longest.
75 These very high growth rates could be attributed to a Solowian bounce back to each economy’s
steady state after the second world war.
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growth rates. Finally, the dotted line shows the exponent of the power function. If
the long run trend appears to be for increasing percentage growth rates, it also
appears to be for more linear growth, which presents a contradiction: the exponent
falls from 1.6 before the industrial revolution to close to unity in the present day.
The contradiction is resolved by recognising that while the gradient of the income
time series is increasing (whether measured linearly or using an exponential
function) the form of growth is not inherently exponential.
There are many different ways such mega-trends could be extrapolated, depending
on the assumptions one makes about the data and the underlying economic
processes, and further analysis is warranted. However, the message of the paper is
that it is unnecessarily selective to naively extrapolate increasing annualised
percentage growth rates, without also considering the (equally robust) trend for
growth to become more linear. Exponential growth at ever-higher rates can never
be ruled out for the future, but it is not necessarily implied by the long-run data, as
some authors have stated (e.g. Nordhaus 1994, Hanson 2000). The upper limit of
the SRES scenarios encompasses an exponential growth rate of around 1.7% per
annum, over the next 110 years. This is considerably lower than that which would
be obtained by linearly extrapolating the trend in increasing annualised percentage
growth rates (around 3.75%) and assuming a phase shift back to exponential
growth (see Figure 3.4). Estimating the probability of such a shift probably
requires subjective judgement and certainly lies outside the scope of this study.
Given that phase shift uncertainty is, by definition, infinite, it is a point for debate
as to whether the SRES should have included this possibility within the scenario
range or not.76
76 One interesting line of argument in favour of much faster growth in the 21st century, is based on
increases in computing power. I noted above that if computers are viewed as tools that increase the
productivity of people, one might expect diminishing marginal returns to increased processing
power. However, if one believes the predictions of artificial intelligence advocates (e.g. Kurzweil
2001) one can view computers as economically productive agents in their own right. In this case,
substantial increases in processing power would increase not only the productivity of workers, but
the number of workers per (human) capita. Heroic extrapolation of current apparently exponential
increases in processing power would predict one million human brain equivalents in 2017, and one
billion in 2027 (M. Bahner pers. com.) If we assume that humans could appropriate all of that
productive potential, this would have the effect of increasing the number of productive workers by
roughly 1/8th of the human population. This is of course highly speculative, but interesting
nonetheless.
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Figure 3.3. Mega-trends in economic growth in Western Europe based on 12 countries, using data from Maddison 2006b. Statistics are calculated
over the following periods, as per the phases identified by Maddison (2006a,b): 1000-1820, 1820-1880, 1990-1913, 1913-1950, 1950-1973,
1973-1998. Data points are plotted at the mid year of the phase.
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Economic model specification uncertainty
This study has used univariate regression to extrapolate historical trends in
income growth. This approach was chosen because it was in these terms that the
original debate over the SRES has been conducted. There are of course other ways
to extrapolate trends in income, involving other predictor variables, such as the
savings rate. However, when making long-run projections, one also needs to
project these predictor variables (leading to a ‘chicken-and-egg’ situation), unless
they enter the regression lagged by many decades. For most variables of economic
interest, this is implausible.
One class of variables which do show promise in this regard are demographic
indices, like the age structure of a population (see Ahlburg & Lindh 2007, and
other papers in the same issue). Given the relatively long life span of humans in
comparison with the time horizon of the projections (c70 years compared to 110
years), many demographic variables can be predicted with some certainty over at
least a portion of the projection period. There are many interesting theories that
link population and economic growth, some of which may result in predictions of
exponential growth. For example, Beckerman (2003) argues that it is the number
of people worldwide who posses high levels of human capital that drives growth.
Under this view, growth may accelerate as more countries converge on western
income levels. Such theories deserve further attention, but lie beyond the scope of
the original debate and therefore this study: it is sufficient to note that the results
of this study in terms of the plausibility of the SRES projections, are conditional
on the approach taken.
Another way in which the results presented here are conditional on the economic
model assumed and thus the analytical approach taken, relate to the use of
aggregate level data. I used this for simplicity’s sake and to directly mirror the
approach taken in the SRES projections. In respect of the OECD region, the
implication of this is that I have assumed that the OECD shows relatively
homogenous growth rates over the long term. If this assumption is relaxed, and a
new period of divergence and takeoff assumed, one can develop very different
extrapolations of the past. For example, we might define the US, rather than the
OECD, as representing the productivity frontier. Although the US has not grown
exponentially in the modern era, its growth has been more exponential (ΔAIC
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score of the exponential function compared to the power function is 1.98).77 A
model averaged function can then be extrapolated to predict US income in 2100.
However, to predict OECD income requires an assumption about what will
happen to the rest of the OECD. If we assume that this new US ‘take-off’ (sensu
Lucas 2000) would be similar to that of Great Britain at the start of the industrial
revolution, we would expect the rest of the OECD, and possibly some developing
countries to quickly catch up, as they caught up with Great Britain two centuries
ago (Maddison 2006a,b). Assuming a convergence rate of 2% from 1990 onwards
for illustrative purposes,78 would give an OECD per capita income in 2100 of
around 140,000, well above the upper limit of the SRES scenario range. Using
country-level data may therefore allow us to pick up new trends before they
appear in the aggregate data, but requires us to assume other parameters, like
convergence rates. On the other hand, we run a greater risk of confounding mere
stochastic variation with durable trends.
Figure 3.4 shows the implications of assuming this model, compared to the SRES
scenario range and the previous model-averaged prediction shown above. For
illustrative purposes, I also show the effects of including a logistic model in the a
priori candidate set,79 as well as the phase shift to ever increasing exponential
growth described in the previous section. The main message of the figure is that
the uncertainty surrounding plausible phase shifts and alternative model
specifications greatly exceeds that associated with model selection uncertainty
and prediction error, and also greatly exceeds the range covered by the SRES
scenarios. These uncertainties are difficult to assess probabilistically, which
demonstrates the need for scenario exercises that are not confined to an
“inappropriate historical determinism”. It is a matter for debate as to how far the
IPCC should go to encompass plausible phase shifts and alternative models, one
77 See Temple (2002) for a review of US performance in the 1990s.
78 This appears to be empirically plausible based on convergence studies of OECD countries (see
Islam 2003).
79 A logistic function could represent limits to growth, whether environmental or social. Taking the
narrow definition of GDP currently used, GDP per capita might be expected to flatten out as
people increasingly trade in marketed production (included in GDP calculations) for increased
leisure time (not included in GDP). This raises the question of the durability of the GDP concept,
discussed in Section VII below.
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that will be hard to resolve unless an effort is made to put subjective probabilities
on them, for example by polling expert opinion, a point I discuss further below.
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range (log scale).
V. Developing region convergence
Model fitting and selection
ASIA
Table 3.4 shows that the estimate of parameter b from the asymptotic exponential
function is negative, when it must be positive for the function to have the property
of asymptotic increase and this function is therefore discarded 80 - there is no
evidence of monotonic divergence in the data, given this model. Table 3.4 shows
that the quadratic exponential function receives vastly more support from the data
than the exponential decay function. Figure 3.5 shows the fit of the quadratic
exponential and exponential decay functions to the historical data. Both
divergence and convergence are clearly present in the period analysed, and the
quadratic exponential function has a good fit to the data. The exponential decay
80 The function as estimated is no longer an asymptotic function, but is decreasing in y.
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function, by contrast, has a very poor fit, and gives a very low estimate of
convergence speed, equivalent to that which would be estimated using a growth
initial regression over the period 1952-1990.
This figure also shows near term extrapolations of the two functions, together
with data observed 1991-2003. This more recent data confirms a more rapid
convergence trend than that which would be estimated from an analysis assuming
a monotonic function, though it suggests an even steeper rate of convergence than
that predicted by the quadratic exponential model. This is in part because the
quadratic exponential function is constrained to be symmetrical. Although this
helps to simplify the function, there is no economic reason why it should be so –
very different forces are acting during the divergence and convergence phases.81 It
would be interesting to experiment with similar, but asymmetrical functions in
order to predict future convergence, and they would likely predict a faster rate of
convergence in the near term.
Table 3.4. Parameter estimates for the ASIA region.
Model Parameter Estimate Std._Error
Exponential Decay a -8.90x10-02 3.67x10-03
b 2.84x10-04 1.61x10-04
Asymptotic Exponential a 8.47x10-02 3.23x10-03
b -3.18x10-03 1.61x10-03
Quadratic Exponential a -1.13x10-01 2.33x10-03
b 3.29x10-03 2.68x10-04
c 8.94x10-05 6.51x10-06
Table 3.5. Akaike Information Criterion scores and weights for the ASIA region.
Model Parameters AIC_Score Delta_AIC Akaike
Weight
Quadratic exponential 3 -312.03 0 ≈1
Exponential decay 2 -242.56 69.48 8.19x10-16
81 The speed of divergence is initially driven by the growth rate of the vanguard economy once it
has ‘taken off’. The convergence rate is a product of the way in which capital and technology flow
between regions. Any tendency for the vanguard economy to slow as it ‘matures’ (which may be
evident in the OECD data) may speed convergence if this maturing phase in the vanguard
economy happened to coincide with the convergent phase in the developing economy. This will
depend on the extent to which the developing economies are reliant on present-day, or past
technological progress in the vanguard economies.
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Figure 3.5. The fit of the quadratic exponential and exponential decay functions to
historical data on the relative gap between OECD GDP per capita and ASIA GDP per
capita.
ALM
Parameter b of the exponential decay function and c of the quadratic exponential
function are negative (Table 3.6). Thus, there is no evidence for any decreasing
trend in the data, given these models, and no evidence for a turning point. The
region shows only divergence from the OECD, over the period analysed. Both of
these convergence functions are therefore discarded, leaving only the asymptotic
exponential function, representing continued divergence, approaching the
mathematical maximum at unity. No AIC scores are presented for the ALM
region, since only one function could be estimated from the data.
Figure 3.6 shows the asymptotic exponential function fitted to the ALM data
1952-1990, and extrapolated to 2003. There is considerable variation around the
trend that appears to be somewhat cyclical. However the post 1990 data shows no
sign of returning to the trend, suggesting that the trend may have been shocked to
a new level in the late eighties. Therefore, I also show the same function
recalibrated to pass through the 1990 data (by adjusting the value of the intercept
parameter a), and this appears to fit the post 1990 data well.
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Table 3.6. Parameter estimates for the ALM region.
Model Parameter Estimate Std._Error
Exponential Decay a -3.41x10-1 4.70 x10-3
b -2.52 x10-3 2.00 x10-4
Asymptotic Exponential a 2.91 x10-1 3.81 x10-3
b 7.39 x10-3 6.15 x10-4
Quadratic Exponential a -3.32 x10-1 7.13 x10-3
b 1.19 x10-3 8.08 x10-4
c -3.31 x10-5 1.94 x10-5
Figure 3.6 The asymptotic exponential function fitted to the ALM data 1952-1990, and
extrapolated to 2003 (and recalibrated to pass through the 1990 data).
Comparing the SRES scenarios with the recent past
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 show the upper and lower limits of the SRES scenarios,
together with an extrapolation of the model-averaged function (with 95% CIs) for
ASIA and ALM respectively. It shows that, contrary to Castles and Henderson’s
claims, the SRES appears to have been pessimistic with regard to Asian
convergence82 and fails to encompass more than a few percent of the probability
density of the extrapolation. This conclusion should be treated with caution, since
only one non-monotonic function was considered, although the data since 1991
82 This may, in part, be due to their having been somewhat optimistic on OECD growth. On
balance then, they may have got Asian growth roughly right. If anything has contributed to
excessive ASIA growth projections relative to the historical data, it is over-optimism on OECD
growth, not ASIA convergence
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appear to confirm it. Note that here again, the comparison of the SRES with the
past depends very heavily on the models included in the a priori defined candidate
set. If only monotonic functions like the exponential decay function had been
considered (as implied by many convergence analyses) this would have led to the
conclusion that the SRES had been hopelessly overoptimistic in comparison with
the past. Including a non-monotonic function in the candidate set leads to the
opposite conclusion.
There appears to be no evidence of convergence for the ALM region, from the
aggregated historical data. Figure 3.8 compares the re-calibrated projection with
the SRES scenarios. Although the scenarios have taken a less optimistic position
on ALM convergence compared with ASIA, they nevertheless assume that a
turning point is reached at or before 2010. The SRES does not include a scenario
compatible with continued divergence past 2010, and the scenario range does not
encompass any of the probability density of the projection from 2040 onwards.83
Figure 3.7. The upper and lower limits of the SRES scenarios, together with an
extrapolation of the model-averaged function (with 95% CIs) for ASIA.
83 It should be remembered that the variable on the y-axis is income gap relative to the OECD.
Thus, near the maxima on this axis, small changes in y represent huge changes in ALM income
level. Holding OECD income constant, a reduction in the relative gap from 90% to 80% means
that ALM income level has doubled. The difference between the extrapolation line and the upper
limit of the SRES scenarios is therefore very large in terms of the income level of the developing
region.
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Figure 3.8. The upper and lower limits of the SRES scenarios, together with an
extrapolation of the model-averaged function (with 95% CIs) for ALM.
Implications for Conceptualising Developing Country Growth
The quadratic exponential function is only one of many possible functions, but it
serves to illustrate an important point. That the evolution of relative incomes of
countries behind the productivity frontier is non-linear, and despite their
convenience, convergence rates estimated from growth initial regressions cannot
be meaningfully extrapolated. The results show that the relative performance of
developing countries must be seen as a non-monotonic function of at least three
processes: take-off in other regions (at the productivity frontier), the gradual
attainment of the conditions leading to convergence, then convergence due to
diminishing marginal returns to capital in vanguard countries.
The analysis of aggregated data here presents a simple picture, of one region
having turned the corner and now converging, another still diverging. In reality,
the situation will be more complex. Country level data would show that this
aggregation contains individual nations at various stages of the cycle. In
particular, the long historical perspective, as well as evidence from ALM shows
that this process is best understood as cyclical or iterative (see below).
Convergence and divergence may follow each other, as major or minor take-offs
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occur in the vanguard, or when new conditions, not yet satisfied, suddenly
become more important.84
D. Long-run mega-trends and phase shifts
History shows that several successive periods of divergence and convergence can
follow one another. Figure 3.9 shows data for the areas currently known as Italy
and the Netherlands, from AD1 until 1900 (from Maddison 2006a,b). It illustrates
two points. First, divergence-convergence is not necessarily a one-off process.
Second, convergence may not necessarily be completed before another phase of
divergence sets in (1820), and third, what was previously the vanguard economy,
may become the laggard (1600). Viewed in this context, the SRES scenarios have
not explored historically plausible phase shifts for the ASIA region, such as the
reversal of convergence (as the OECD pulls away once more). The simplest way
to conceptualise this for ASIA would be as a sudden shift from a quadratic
exponential function to the asymptotic exponential function, the shift having a
certain (subjective) probability in any given year. For ALM, the reverse is the
case, and the SRES appears to have assumed a 100% probability of such a phase
shift occurring before 2020, which seems unreasonable. Explicitly stating these
subjective phase shift probabilities would greatly increase the transparency of the
scenarios and aid constructive debate.
84 An example of the changing importance of conditions might include the IT literacy of a
developing country’s population, which may be more different from that of vanguard economies
than literacy in general. If this suddenly replaced general literacy as an important condition for
capital inflows, convergence might slow or cease. Thus, convergence can be seen as requiring the
developing country to fulfil an ever-changing set of conditions, in order to stand on the escalator of
capital inflows.
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Figure 3.9. Estimated income for the areas currently known as Italy and the Netherlands,
from AD1 until 1900 (from Maddison 2006b).
Economic Model Specification Uncertainty
The conclusion that there is no information in the data about an ALM turning
point is tentative. It could be overturned by a country level application of a model
such as the quadratic exponential model, possibly modelling turning points by a
hazard function in a similar way to Lucas (2000). However, there is no evidence
of any slowdown in ALM divergence, which would be expected if some countries
had begun to converge.
VI. Discussion, Conclusions and Recommendations
The durability of GDP
In Section V I called into question the durability of the GDP concept using the
example of leisure time. It seems possible that GDP as currently measured, will
not continue to be a useful statistic in a century’s time, especially if the more
optimistic growth scenarios come to pass. GDP may become obsolete in two
conflicting ways, depending on the purpose of the income projections. If they are
to be used as a proxy for welfare then leisure time, social cohesion, environmental
quality and the diminishing marginal utility of income, all of which are ignored at
present in GDP calculations are likely to become increasingly important
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determinants of welfare in the future, leading to an ever-increasing divergence
between GDP and welfare.
If, on the other hand, the purpose of the projections is to predict emissions, GDP
may become obsolete for almost the opposite reason. The fact that GDP treats a
dollar of production equally, whether it stems from heavy industry or services,
means that correlations between GDP and emissions established over the recent
past may cease to be valid in a future economy, requiring subjective adjustments
to the observed relationship between GDP and emissions.85 If a radically different
version of GDP will be required in projections, this version will of course have to
be constructed for the past, in order to be able to parameterise projections using
past data. This would require an effort on a similar scale to that of Maddison’s
(2006a,b) work to provide modern GDP estimates for the two-thousand years
prior to 1950.
Conclusions
Critics have separately alleged that in comparison with the past, the SRES income
projections are unfeasibly high (in developing regions), and unfeasibly low (for
the world as a whole). However, these comparisons, and those provided by the
SRES team themselves, have been selective and statistically unsound. This study
provides the first rigorous comparison of the SRES projections with the historical
data, explicitly defining, justifying and empirically testing the models used. These
models were chosen to represent the terms on which the debate has taken place to
date: that is to say univariate comparisons of the SRES projections with the
historical data, using annualised percentage rates of change.86 Given these models,
I conclude that the SRES projections of OECD growth fully encompass recent
trends, and that there is not unambiguous evidence for predicting exponential
growth much above that encompassed by the SRES. For the ASIA region, I find,
contrary to the critics’ claims, that the SRES projections of relative income appear
85 Although the trend towards decreasing carbon intensity of economic activity with economic
growth has been observed and incorporated into the SRES scenarios (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000),
this relationship, estimated over a comparatively narrow range of GDP, may not hold if GDP
increases substantially in the future.
86 Although neither critics nor developers actually quoted convergence rates, they implicitly did so
in referring to the findings of the convergence literature, which had themselves been largely based
on linear analyses producing annualised percentage rates of change.
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to be somewhat pessimistic, though qualitatively reasonable, when compared to
the historical evidence. Only for the ALM region do I find that the critics’
concerns are justified. Here, the SRES appears to have made a strong assumption
about when this region will start to converge on the OECD, which is not justified
by the data observed before or since the SRES were developed.
That said, I have also explored the implications of phase shift uncertainty and
economic model specification uncertainty. I have demonstrated that the
uncertainty associated with historically plausible phase shifts, and economically
reasonable alternative model specifications is large relative to the SRES scenarios.
Thus, the SRES has not performed well in encompassing these two types of
uncertainty. This is ironic, given the SRES team’s insistence that they should not
be bound to “simple extrapolations of the past” (Nakicenovic et al. 2003).
However, in their defence, the difficulty of encompassing such uncertainty, given
the SRES’s terms of reference, was anticipated by the team (Nakicenovic & Swart
2000).
The principal message of this paper is that convenient metrics based on annualised
percentage rates of change, whether growth rates or convergence rates, are not
useful for the development, parameterisation or evaluation of income projections,
and that the business of comparing projections with the past is considerably more
complex than has hitherto been acknowledged by either side in the debate. I detail
my recommendations for the development and criticism of future economic
projections below.
Recommendations
The primary objective of the chapter has been to demonstrate the importance of
explicitly justified models and rigorous statistical analysis, when comparing
projections of income with historical data. I recommend that in future, scenario
authors, and their critics apply the following guidelines when developing income
projections or when challenging those developed by others – the two processes are
fundamentally the same, after all, since one cannot challenge a projection without
proposing an alternative.
First, the analytical approach and models used must be explicitly set out and
justified. Although the SRES discussed relevant economic theories and empirical
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evidence, the link between this discussion and the income projections themselves
was not very clear. Certainly, one could not have repeated the projections based
on the information given in the SRES.
These models should then be fitted to the historical data, and the best models
selected and averaged using objective techniques, such as those based on
likelihood. Where this is difficult, e.g. where phase shifts may occur, subjective
probabilities should be attached to these phase shifts. The models should then be
extrapolated into the future, together with a probability distribution. Scenario
developers should develop their scenarios with reference to this model-averaged
extrapolation.
Although there is no reason for scenarios to be constrained by a ‘deterministic
extrapolation of the past’ (Grübler et al. 2004), reference should be made to the
past, and divergences identified and explained. The range of scenarios should
encompass prediction and model selection uncertainty, as well as ‘reasonable’
phase shifts and alternative model specifications. The only way to be transparent
about what constitutes reasonable, is to assign subjective probabilities, and to
agree in advance some overall percentage of the probability distribution that
should be encompassed. Similarly, the range of projections should be centred on
the model-averaged projection, and be symmetrical with respect to the (partly
subjective) probability distribution. There is understandable demand from the end
users of scenarios for probabilities to be assigned to different outcomes
(Schneider 2001, Pittocket al. 2001). Although the SRES team are right to point
out that this cannot be done objectively (Grübler & Nakicenovic 2001, Grübler et
al. 2006), it is essential if the projections are to have any useful role in planning
and policy analysis, where tradeoffs must be made. The only solution therefore, is
to assign subjective probabilities, possibly based on polls of experts, to every
assumption not based on data, e.g. the probabilities of phase shifts occurring. This
does not preclude, and in fact improves, the representation of uncertainty on
which the IPCC insists (Grübler et al. 2006). This will help to ensure transparency
and constructive debate.
Attention should be paid to long-run mega-trends, though I recognised that
objectively comparing scenarios with such trends is more difficult, because of the
nature of the data, and the greater variety of methods that might be applied to their
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extrapolation. However, in principle, the same approaches that have been applied
in this study to the recent past, could be applied to longer-run data. I suggest that
adherence to these guidelines on the part of both developers and critics would
make for considerably more constructive debate when the next generation of long-
range income scenarios is published.
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4. The environmental limits to
economic growth: a review using
the Ecological Footprint
“Anyone who believes exponential growth can go on forever in a
finite world is either a madman or an economist." Kenneth Boulding
“Although life on this Earth is very far from perfect there is no reason
to think that continued economic growth will make it any worse.”
Beckerman (1972).
“….but there are also unknown unknowns.” Donald Rumsfeld.
Abstract
I review the debate over environmental limits to economic growth, considering
both mainstream and ecological economic perspectives. I introduce the
environmental and economic scales of the human economy. I argue that while
there are binding constraints on environmental scale, technological progress can
ensure that there are no such constraints on economic scale implying that
economic scale can be decoupled from environmental scale, resulting in an
environmental Kuznets curve. I consider the characteristics of technology, noting
that it is a form of manmade capital, and therefore that its development is
dependent on income levels. Furthermore, because of the non-rival nature of
technology, there may be significant spill-over to poorer countries. I argue that
empirical analyses of decoupling that separate technological change from
economic growth provide a biased assessment of the effects of economic growth
on the environment. I outline a hierarchy of analytical frameworks suitable for
investigating decoupling, ranked according to their treatment of technology. I
introduce the Ecological Footprint as a measure of environmental scale and
review analyses of the Footprint-income relationship, showing that the literature
is biased towards over-pessimistic conclusions about decoupling. The most
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pervasive source of bias is the use of analytical frameworks which ignore
technological progress. Finally, I demonstrate the quantitative effect of ignoring
technology when predicting future Ecological Footprints.
I. Introduction
In line with the mainstream view of economic growth, environmental constraints
on the growth of the human economy were not explicitly considered in the
previous chapter.87 However, a dissenting school of thought argues that, since the
human economy is a subsystem of a finite natural environment, dependent upon it
for all its material inputs, continued economic growth must be subject to
constraints. This issue must be addressed in any coherent cost-benefit analysis of
global environmental issues. It makes little sense to assume the existence of
important environmental concerns in calculating the expected net benefits of a
project, while ignoring them when estimating long run economic growth (and
therefore the discount rate).88 The aim of this, and the following two chapters is to
ecologically parameterise the economic predictions of the previous chapter so that
the resultant model can represent both mainstream and ecological economic
thought.
In Section II, I review the limits to growth debate, introduce the key concepts of
environmental and economic scale, and the central importance of technology. In
Section III I outline the unique characteristics of technology and discuss how
technology should be treated in analyses of the relationship between
environmental and economic scale, formalising this as a hierarchy of analytical
frameworks. Section IV introduces GDP and the Ecological Footprint as proxies
for economic and environmental scale respectively, which allow empirical
analyses of the issue. In Section V I conduct a systematic review of Footprint-
income analyses, and demonstrate that the literature to date has made
disproportionate use of approaches which ignore technology, leading to a bias
87 For example, in over 650 pages the leading graduate-level textbook on mainstream growth
theory (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004) makes only one explicit mention of environmental limits (pp
407-408) where the ideas of Malthus are briefly introduced and dismissed in a discussion of
fertility rates.
88 Dasgupta (2008: 3) dissects one example of this incoherence.
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towards overly pessimistic conclusions about decoupling and the existence of
environmental Kuznets curves. Section VI goes on to highlight several further
flaws in these analyses, which further bias the results towards pessimism. In
Section VII I estimate the quantitative implications of ignoring technology, and in
Section VIII I conclude.
II. Limits to the Scale of the Human Economy
The ecological economic approach to growth focuses on the scale of the human
economy relative to the finite natural environment on which it depends (e.g. Daly
& Townsend 1993:1-2). According to this view, the issue of scale has been
neglected in mainstream economics, the result being that under the mainstream
paradigm, the human economy will tend to reach a sub-optimally large scale,
relative to the finite environment. This cornerstone of ecological economics has
been the subject of vigorous debate and disagreement with mainstream
economists, which has lasted several decades and continues to this day (e.g.
Beckerman 1972, 2003, Georgescu-Roegen 1975, Daly 1997a,b, Solow 1997,
Dasgupta 2008).
One major disagreement is over the desirability of using resources sustainably.
The mainstream economic approach (e.g. Weitzmann 1997) emphasises welfare
or utility as the focus of sustainability.89 Thus, sustainable development is that
which ensures non-declining welfare over time, and sustainable resource use is
but one means towards that end. Many ecological economists, on the other hand,
focus on sustainable resource use, implying that sustainable use of natural
resources is an end in itself:
“I adopt the throughput definition [of sustainable development] and
reject the utility definition, for two reasons. First, utility is non-
measurable. Second, and more importantly, even if utility were
89 Dasgupta (2008) talks of non-declining productive base, but this productive base is valued from
a utilitarian perspective.
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measurable it is still not something that we can bequeath to the future.
Utility is an experience, not a thing.”90 Daly (2002:2).
These conflicting views can be analysed in two different ways, firstly as a
disagreement over ethics, second as disagreement over facts. Ethically speaking,
the ‘utility definition’ could be seen as consequentalist, while the ‘throughput
definition’ is based on the property rights of future generations, and therefore
deontological. Thus, if one argues deontologically, requiring sustainable resource
use does not imply that it is necessary for sustainable welfare, but rather that
future generations have a right to the same resource flows or stocks as presently
enjoyed, regardless of the consequences for present or future welfare (see e.g
Howarth 1995). If the disagreement is empirical, on the other hand, the
differences in sustainability definitions imply positive differences of opinion over
whether sustainable use of resources is a necessary condition for non-declining
welfare. Although the ethical argument is clearly valid, it will not be considered
further here, since the objective of the chapter is to consider the impact of
resource-use patterns on future welfare – and therefore requires a consequentialist
approach.
Before proceeding, I should note that in most of the following discussion, I focus
on per capita economic growth in a broadly stable human population, whose
present anf future size is more or less given. This is in contrast to much of the
limits to growth debate, which took place in the context of apparently relentless
population growth, and which often confounded the two issues. It now appears
more likely that, irrespective of environmental constraints, the human population
will stabilise during this century, and possibly decline thereafter, as a result of
individual reproductive choices (Lutz et al. 2001).
Nevertheless, sustainability and the limits to growth cannot be considered without
considering variable populations (where population is not exogenous to the
scenarios under consideration), since some viewpoints (e.g. Georgescu-Roegen
1977b) imply a trade-off, even at stable population levels, between the existence
of a human life now, and the existence of human lives in the future. Adler and
90 He continues, intriguingly: “I hasten to add that I do not think economic theory can get along
without the concept of utility. I just think that throughput is a better concept by which to define
sustainability”
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Posner (2006:176) refer to variable populations as a “foundational problem” for
cost-benefit analysis of the environment. The question of whether the existence of
an additional person is good or bad is partly scientific (the effects of that person’s
existence on the welfare of others) and partly philosophical (whether the moral
community includes those who will never be born under one or more scenarios).
The mainstream view of the limits to growth
Mainstream economists have not generally viewed unsustainable use of particular
resources, at a particular moment in time, as a barrier to ever-increasing welfare.
This is not because they view natural resources as infinite. 91 Instead, they
recognise that it is not just depleted stocks of resources (natural capital) which we
bequeath to our descendents, but also increased stocks of physical capital and
technology. Thus, Wilfred Beckerman (1972, 1974, 2003) dismisses claims that
increasing scarcity of natural resources would endanger the welfare of future
generations. Instead, he argues that scarcity would stimulate the search for new
deposits and substitute materials, and especially, the development of new
technologies, which would increase the productivity of those resources that
remained by reducing extraction costs and increasing resource use efficiency.
Continuous technological improvement would allow endless substitution and
recycling of resources and solve environmental problems, keeping living
standards rising, even as natural resources were depleted (see also Barnett &
Morse 1963). The ecological-economic response to this argument has been
framed in terms of two key concepts, entropy and capital, which I discuss in turn
below.
Entropy
Georgescu-Roegen (1971) argued that since the economic system, like any other,
must be subject to the laws of thermodynamics, continual economic growth was
impossible: “in thermodynamic terms, the economic process converts
matter-energy from a state of low entropy to a state of high entropy” (Georgescu-
Roegen 1995:177). In a closed system, endless recycling and substitution is
91 Beckerman (2003:9) says: “Either resources are finite in some relevant sense, in which case
even zero growth will fail to save us in the long run, or resources are not really finite in any
relevant sense”.
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impossible, since any reduction in entropy can only be had at the expense of an
even greater increase elsewhere. According to Georgescu-Roegen then, the
arguments of Beckerman are flawed (Georgescu-Roegen 1975). However, while
the laws of thermodynamics are not in doubt, three criticisms have been levelled
at Georgescu-Roegen’s assertion that they necessarily imply that continued
economic growth is impossible and undesirable.
First, if the earth were a closed system, entropy would continually increase even if
humans returned to the hunter-gatherer state, or ceased to exist altogether.
Georgescu-Roegen (1977) argues that even a steady state or declining economy
will “converge toward annihilation in a finite environment”. In this case, drastic
steps might postpone extinction, but at what cost in the meantime? Will our
societal welfare function regard this as worthwhile? As Pournelle (1977)
observes: “To recommend negative growth on the basis of billion-year
thermodynamic analyses is to take a very long view indeed.”92
Second, and more importantly, the earth is not a closed system, but receives a
continual flow of solar radiation (low entropy energy) from the sun and radiates
higher entropy energy away as heat (Young 1995). Indeed, according to
Georgescu-Roegen himself (1971[1999]) “surprising as it may seem, the entire
stock of natural resources is not worth more than a few days sunlight!” Thus,
given a constant flow of low entropy energy, and sufficient technological
progress, complete recycling may theoretically be possible – at least until the sun
ceases to radiate energy, in five billion years time.93 Pournelle (1977) comments
thus:
92 Note that this point does not directly contradict the assertion that sustainable resource use is
necessary for non-declining welfare, it merely points out that Georgescu-Roegen appears to argue
that sustainable resource use is impossible, and therefore that non-declining welfare is also
impossible. This is a challenge to Daly’s steady-state argument, and presents a seemingly
insurmountable problem, one which Georgescu-Roegen apparently tries to solve by demanding
that population must not remain steady, but rather decline (1977). Of course, an ever declining
population must eventually reach zero, also implying “premature” extinction of the human race.
93 Georgescu-Roegen’s (1977) insistence that complete recycling is not possible because “it
suffices to recall the impossibility of completely purifying a mixture (Planck 1945) in order to see
why, in addition, no single substance can be recycled completely” seems unconvincing. Since very
few if any materials were completely pure when humans first used them, there does not seem to be
any reason why they should be completely pure second time around.
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“If Georgescu-Roegen's analysis merely indicates that the universe
will someday suffer heat death," he has said little that is new and
nothing of utility for policy planning.” Pournelle (1977).
In Georgescu-Roegen (1977a), he is more specific in his definition of the earth as
a closed system: although it is an open system with regard to energy, it is closed
with regard to matter. Georgescu-Roegen argues that matter can be viewed
entropically, and thus the entropy of the earth’s matter must forever increase.
However, Young (1991) argues that the entropy law can only be applied to matter
by way of analogy, and that “materials entropy cannot be defined independently
of technology” (Young 1995). Thus, technological progress, which changes a
stock of matter from unavailable to available, can reorder a system, such that it
has lower entropy than the system had before. Although Townsend (1992) and
Daly (1992) argue that Young is wrong, in my view their arguments do not refute
his central point. For example, Townsend disputes Young’s contention that
technological progress can reduce the matter-entropy of a system, arguing instead
that while technology can improve the efficiency with which we derive services
from entropic degradation, it cannot change the direction of flow. In my view this
is incorrect. However, even if we accept this as true, it is not at all clear that his
conclusion is correct, i.e. that “economic growth ...reduces the potential for
generation of services from stocks for future generations”. If technological
progress increases the potential for generation of services from given stocks, and
if technological progress results from, or occurs in parallel with economic growth,
the effect of economic growth on the “potential for generation of services from
stocks” is indeterminate, not necessarily negative. Similarly, Daly (1992) appears
to admit the truth of Young’s argument when he writes that “new knowledge may
expand available matter faster than economic activity will convert it into
unavailable matter (and energy)”. Although he goes on to argue that “new
knowledge may also reveal new limits and reduce available matter-energy (e.g.
discovery of greenhouse effect lowers the effective availability of fossil fuels...”
While the second point is no doubt correct, it still points to an indeterminate,
rather than necessarily negative, effect of economic growth (with attendant
technological progress) on the potential for generation of services for future
generations. In summary, Young (1991) does not argue that the entropy laws do
not hold, but rather that they are irrelevant to economics:
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“In principle economic models of resource prices which signal relative
resource scarcities are sufficient. There is no need to add anything
based on the idea that entropy inevitably causes increasing absolute
scarcity ... entropy considerations are redundant in an economy which
generates a “correct” relative price structure”. (Young 1995).
However, despite the reservations of Young (1991, 1994) and Pournelle (1977),
entropy does offer a useful framework to analyse sustainability, since it makes
clear that mankind does face some constraints, and also because the real-world
economy does not, at present, “generate a correct price structure”. In addition,
Young (1994:213) admits that his arguments do not amount to a deterministic
assurance that there are no environmental limits to growth, since the future
development of technology is inherently uncertain:
“This point in no way implies a belief that technology will solve all
problems or that economic growth is not environmentally limited. To
say that technology changes system boundaries in beneficial ways is
not to predict that relevant technologies, e.g. cheap solar energy, will
be forthcoming.” Young (1994).
While endless recycling and substitution might theoretically stave off scarcity
forever, they are bounded by the supply of low entropy energy that we receive
from the sun and by our technological ability. This highlights the central role
which technology must play in future economic growth, and offers a potential
route towards the quantification of limits, which I discuss below.
This highlights a third criticism which can be made of the arguments of
Georgescu-Roegen and Daly. Namely that their arguments appear to rely on a
presumption that continuing technological progress is impossible. For example,
when arguing that even a stationary population must suffer an ever-declining
standard of living, Georgescu-Roegen (1977b:771) writes:
“Let y1, y2,. . . ,yn, be the amounts of mineral resources ranked in the
order of the real unitary costs of bringing them to the surface of the
earth: c1<c2<c3<...<cn<.... After a stationary population consumes y1, it
must turn to y2. Since the latter is harder to mine, something must
happen: Either an invention miraculously comes up to decrease the
unitary cost from c2 to c1, or the population decreases, or life
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becomes less "good." The Fourth Law of Thermodynamics proves that
there is no way to avoid this impasse forever.” Georgescu-Roegen
(1977b), emphasis added.
Yet, the highlighted sentence exactly describes the process that has occurred since
man began to mine minerals (Beckerman 2003). Extrapolation is not proof, but it
seems unnecessarily pessimistic to characterise a historically observed process as
miraculous, and therefore impossible. It is ironic that Georgescu-Roegen’s
(1977a) assertion that a flaw of neoclassical economics is that it does not
recognise the evolutionary, and irreversible nature of the environmental-economic
system, could equally be levelled at Georgescu-Roegen himself: “knowledge itself
is not entropic, because it is not conserved when it is used...knowledge can be
created” (Young 1994:212). Thus knowledge can accumulate, implying an
optimistic aspect of irreversibility.
Thus, the entropy approach to economic activity developed by Georgescu-Roegen
is useful, but his own interpretation of it appears too simplistic and pessimistic to
convince mainstream economists (e.g. Young 1995, Solow 1997, Stiglitz 1997) or
even some ecological economists (e.g. Ayres 1998). Given continual
technological innovation and solar radiation, it might therefore be possible for
economic growth to continue indefinitely. However, the above analysis has
focussed on flows, and would tend to imply that the actual stock levels of natural
resources are unimportant. This is partly because, until relatively recently, the
focus of the limits to growth debate was on non-renewable minerals (Barnett &
Morse 1963). 94 The actual stock level of these materials may be relatively
unimportant to the functioning of the earth. Since then, attention has increasingly
turned to the “new scarcity”: firstly of goods and services supplied to humankind
by dynamic living processes, and secondly the harmful effects of waste products
(Simpson et al. 2005). The latter indicates that levels of high-entropy may be as
important as levels of low-entropy.95 Analysis of the former requires attention to
capital levels.
94 Note however that Beckerman (1972, 1974) treats the issue of pollution at length.
95 Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 are one example of damaging high-entropy matter. As
Young (1991) pointed out, the stocks of high entropy matter can be reduced by technology, in this
Chapter 4
100
Capital
Ecological economics recognises at least four generalised, but non-homogenous
types of capital: natural capital; physical capital; human capital; social capital; and
cultural capital or technology (Edwards-Jones et al. 199996). The level of current
consumption is determined by the level and composition of the overall capital
stock. Capital of any type can be consumed in the short run to boost consumption
levels but a permanent reduction in the level of any type of capital will, holding
all else equal, reduce current and future consumption possibilities (see e.g. Arrow
et al. 2004).
Natural capital predated humans, while the other capital types result from
investments made by humans out of current consumption – they could be included
within a broadly defined “man-made capital”. However, while this emphasises the
point that human and social capital and technology result from human actions and
require savings (and therefore income) as well as human brainpower (Simon
1981), they differ from physical capital in that they do not directly contain natural
resources (although natural resources may be used in their production). Viewed
from a capital perspective, the history of the world since the emergence of humans
has been one of decreasing natural capital, and increasing man-made capital
(including technology and human capital). I discuss the particular characteristics
of technology, and the implications for empirical analyses of sustainability, in
Section II.
In principle at least, we can envisage substitutability between natural capital and
manmade capital. Depending on the level of each, an efficient solution is to invest
foregone consumption in the capital type offering greatest marginal returns.
However, the degree to which the two types of capital are substitutable is the
source of considerable debate (e.g. Daly 1997a,b, Dasgupta 2008). Ecological
case, technologies which either return atmospheric CO2 to a less damaging form (sequestration) or
which protect against the negative impacts of climate change (mitigation).
96 Human capital includes the abilities and knowledge possessed by individuals, which dies with
those individuals. It is commonly separated from raw labour (e.g. Mankiw et al. 1992). Cultural
capital or technology includes knowledge, policies and institutions, which can be passed on.
However, it is common in all strands of economics to treat technology as a residual – whatever is
not specified in a particular analysis. It is in this sense that I will refer to technology throughout
much of this chapter, but the point that technology is a form of capital, which requires investment,
but does not contain either matter or entropy, should always be retained.
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economists argue that there are significant constraints on the substitutability of the
two forms of capital, and that there may be thresholds beyond which depletion of
natural capital leads to non-linear and devastating consequences (Arrow et al.
1995).97 This leads to the concept of critical natural capital, destruction of which
would be irreversible and disastrous. Almost by definition, the point at which such
non-linearities begin is highly uncertain (Arrow et al. 2004). This argument
presents significant difficulties for conventional economic analysis (Dasgupta
2007a), though neoclassical economists have begun to respond (e.g. Weitzman
2008). Entropy and capital are linked because the reduction of entropy levels
requires that a greater part of solar radiation must be appropriated by humans (for
a given level of technology), implying a reduction in the natural capital that is
sustained by the remaining solar radiation.
Thus, aside from the simple fact that declines in low-entropy stocks or natural
capital cannot continue indefinitely, future consumption can be jeopardised in at
least two ways. First, elevated entropy levels, even at equilibrium, may be
dangerous: for example, elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations, which lead to
climate change. Second, levels of natural capital may be reduced beyond critical
thresholds. The human economy therefore faces both entropic and natural-capital
constraints. As a result the scale of the economy, measured in entropic and natural
capital terms (what I will term the environmental scale98) is constrained. However,
this does not determine whether future growth in welfare (the economic scale of
the economy) is possible as this depends on whether the environmental scale of
human society is constantly proportional to the economic scale.
Economic scale and environmental scale
In refuting what he saw as ecological pessimism about the possibility for growth
in the economic scale of human society, Beckerman (1972) commented thus:
97 In effect, the marginal rate of substitution between manmade capital and natural capital becomes
suddenly infinite at these thresholds.
98 Environmental scale is used throughout this thesis to mean the size of the human economy
relative to binding environmental constraints. It is therefore measured in physical units, not
economic ones (except for a given level of technology). It is multi-dimensional, since constraints
are multi-dimensional. Informally, it will be used interchangeably with “environmental impact”,
e.g. when discussing the “IPAT” formula.
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“Hence, when the scientists ... decide that [ecological demand is a
function “f” of GDP]: it seems obvious to them that the only way to
stop an indefinite rise in [ecological demand] is to stop the rise in
GDP. But, of course, to the social scientist, it is equally obvious that
one must first ask whether it would not be preferable to use some
policy instrument to change 'f'.” Beckerman (1972).
This can be restated as:
Equation 4.1 Environmental Scale = f(Economic Scale)
In considering that f might need to be changed, Beckerman implicitly
acknowledges that there may be limits to the environmental scale of human
society. In assuming that f can be changed he denies that limits to growth can
meaningfully be measured in economic terms. Thus, environmental scale is
measured in physical units (e.g. entropy and capital) while economic scale is
measured in terms of utility (perhaps approximated by dollars of GDP per capita).
To Beckerman at least, it is clear that the economic growth that many ecological
economists believe must stop, is the same economic growth for which GDP acts
as a proxy: the value of goods and services consumed by the population. This is,
after all, the conventional and almost ubiquitous definition of economic growth.
However, it is not at all clear what many prominent ecological economists mean,
when they refer to an “economic growth” which must stop.99 For example, Daly
and Townsend (1993) state baldly that: “economic growth is both physically and
economically unsustainable, as well as morally undesirable”. Later in the same
book (p325), Daly (1993) equates economic growth with growth in physical
capital and throughput of matter-energy, since it is these (along with population)
which he proposes be held constant in a steady-state economy. He then (p330)
introduces a distinction between economic growth and economic development,
the former representing growth in services attributable to growth in throughput,
while economic development represents changes in the efficiency with which
99 Boulding’s famous statement, which began the chapter, refers only to “growth” and does not
mention economic growth. It is unclear whether Boulding meant “economic growth”, or whether
he believed that nothing, not even non-physical quantities like utility or happiness, could grow
indefinitely in a finite universe.
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throughput renders services. Yet no mainstream definition of economic growth
makes this distinction, a point Daly (1993) acknowledges (p330).
Has the limits to growth debate therefore been the result of semantic differences
over the meaning of economic growth? Would Daly and Boulding be reconciled
with Beckerman and Solow if they all agreed to a definition of economic growth
that was not directly related to physical stocks and flows? I find it difficult to say.
Of course, the former were arguing that mankind was not making sufficient effort
to change Beckerman’s f: i.e. that our environmental policy was sub-optimal. But
this is really a question of degrees: how much effort should we make to change f
at any given time? The greatest differences have been the emphasis by ecological
economists on non-linearities in the substitutability of natural capital and
manmade capital (e.g. Dasgupta & Maler 2003), their focus on the conditions
necessary to maximise intergenerational welfare, 100 and also their repeated
reminder that the real-world economy does not resemble the perfect price
generating economy assumed in standard economic models. In addition, many of
their criticisms of the status quo have been directed at policies which seek to
maximise crude statistical proxies (such as GDP) rather than welfare itself (of
which more in Section III). These are valid contributions and correct important
flaws in the neoclassical approach. However, none of them necessarily dictates
that continued growth in per capita welfare is impossible if appropriate attention is
paid to the environment.
Technology, decoupling and the environmental Kuznets curve
If we adopt a utility-based definition of economic growth, it is clear that continued
growth in economic scale may be possible, if it can be sufficiently decoupled from
environmental scale.101 As Ayres (1998) argues:
“It is possible to have economic growth - in the sense of providing
better and more valuable services to ultimate consumers - without
necessarily consuming more physical resources.” Ayres (1998).
100 For example Weitzman’s (1997) approach relies on perfectly functioning markets and perfect
information.
101 This decoupling may be urgent, if mankind is presently close to critical thresholds in high-
entropy levels (atmospheric CO2) or natural capital (e.g. biodiversity).
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Of course, the key determinant of decoupling is technology. If we obtain greater
utility from smaller throughput, that is because technology, broadly defined, has
changed. 102 Technology, broadly defined, can be thought of as the f in
Beckerman’s equation. Yet some ecological economists have stated that it is
reckless to put too much trust in technology:
“This blind and total optimism about the ability of technology to solve
all our problems and allow economic and population growth to
continue un-abated forever is certainly not a position held by many
reputable economists.” (Costanza 1995 p89).
There are two problems with this view. First, it seems to ignore that, under most
definitions, Daly’s prescription for a steady-state economy (about which Costanza
speaks highly) is a technology.103 The technologies that could bring us ever-lasting
economic growth, in the face of fundamental scarcities, include policies which act
to increase the efficiency with which physical throughput is turned into utility. To
the confusion over definitions of growth, we can add confusion over the definition
of technology.104 Second, this seems to ignore issues of causation. Technology is
the cause of economic growth, if factor endowments are held constant. To argue
that economic growth should not be “allowed” to continue (even if resource
depletion is constrained) is to argue that technological progress should actually be
banned, not simply that it should not be relied upon.
A specific formulation of the belief that economic and environmental scales can
be decoupled is the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) hypothesis. This posits
that environmental scale 105 increases initially with rising incomes, and later
decreases (see e.g. Dasgupta et al. 2002). If f can be changed, particularly as
greater stocks of technology are accrued, then an EKC may exist, and it becomes
102 This may also include preferences, since the final stage in the process of converting services
into utility occurs within the human brain.
103 Both sides of the debate define technology broadly. For example, the IPAT formulation
(Impact=Population*Affluence*Technology) favoured by many environmentalists, e.g. York et al.
2003 define technology thus: “In the STIRPAT model T represents everything that is not
population and affluence” (p 354). In neoclassical economics (e.g. Solow 1956) technology is
everything apart from reproducible capital and population.
104 Of course, Costanza may mean that we should not deplete resources in the hope that technology
will enable them to be recycled or replaced, within entropic restraints, but this is not clear.
105 Scale is multidimensional, since constraints are also multi-dimensional.
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possible to reconcile an ecological economic view of the human economy – one
which sees it as embedded within an ecological earth system, bounded within an
entropic-capital framework – with continued economic growth. Of course, as
Arrow et al. (1995) point out, an EKC is not a sufficient condition for long-term
sustainability. For example, if there are thresholds on the extent to which natural
capital can be depleted, if raised entropic levels carry their own dangers, and if
both of these risks may manifest themselves without sufficient warning, human
society might still be doomed even as it describes a perfect EKC. This issue is
more complex, contains deep uncertainty, and will be discussed further at the end
of the next chapter.106 The remainder of this chapter, and most of the next, is
concerned with empirical analysis of the changeability of f, and the existence of
an EKC.
Conclusions
This section has described how the limits to growth can be conceptualised in
terms of constraints on the environmental scale of the human economy and that
the two major dimensions of these constraints are natural capital and entropy.
Although these constraints are binding, they do not imply a binding constraint on
the economic scale since this is not directly proportional to environmental scale,
the relationship between the two being determined by technology and therefore
potentially mutable with technological progress. I have argued that technology is a
form of man-made capital resulting from human investments, and therefore
cannot be considered as independent from income levels: economic growth may
increase the capacity for technological progress. However, given the highly
uncertain consequences of natural capital depletion and entropy increase, and the
unpredictability of technological progress itself, economic growth may endanger
the wellbeing and even existence of future generations, and the issue of limits to
growth is inextricably linked to questions of the treatment of as yet unborn, and
never born generations.
106 However, note that if f is changeable, and if an EKC exists for environmental scale, the
question becomes one of trading off (potentially unknown) risks against (potentially
immeasurable) welfare gains, and the answer will be far from clear-cut: see Weitzman (2008).
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III. The treatment of technology in analyses of decoupling
and the environmental Kuznets curve
The previous section highlighted the importance of understanding how
environmental scale is linked to economic scale (f in Equation 4.1 from the
previous section), and of technological progress in changing this relationship.
Chapter 3 also made clear the central role of technology in driving economic
growth. Neoclassical economists recognise that, for a given level of technology
(broadly defined) an ever increasing physical capital stock has diminishing
returns, in terms of per capita income (Solow 1956). To continue to expand
income requires continual improvements in technology. This perspective is shared
by ecological economists, who would also add that physical capital comes at the
expense of natural capital and also there is limited and highly uncertain
substitutability between the two (though this is technology dependent). In
addition, given entropic constraints, maintaining the world at steady entropic
equilibrium, while maintaining natural capital, will require steadily increasing
stocks of technology.
Technological progress therefore drives economic growth and it is clear that we
cannot ignore it. However, can we rely upon it? Will it continue? If technology
drives growth, what drives technology?
In this section I consider the implications of technology for empirical analysis of
the relationship between environmental scale and economic scale, and of
decoupling between the two (an environmental Kuznets curve EKC). I propose a
hierarchy of preferred analytical frameworks for these analyses (which will be
used in Section IV to evaluate the existing literature).
The Drivers and Characteristics of Technology
I show in Section IV that the special characteristics of technology are often
ignored in empirical analyses. In order to determine how analyses of economic
and environmental scale should treat technological progress, it is helpful to first
consider these characteristics and the factors which determine the rate of
technological progress.
Unlike physical and human capital, technology is partly non-rivalrous. Thus, there
is likely to be overspill from individuals or nations who invest in technology to
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those who do not. For example, China is adopting European standards of vehicle
pollution controls with a lag of only 8-10 years (Stern 2004).107 Technology is also
potentially immortal, leading to considerable inter-temporal overspill. 108 Thus,
while future generations are likely to bear some negative externalities as a result
of the present generation’s resource use, they are also likely to benefit from the
positive externalities of its innovation and accumulation of physical capital. This
discussion should make it clear that technological progress cannot be considered
at the level of a single country.
In addition, the rate of global technological progress is likely to be related to the
other variables of interest in the analysis, including:
1) Expected returns on investment, which will be related to the perceived
proximity of environmental limits or thresholds (i.e. proximity to binding
environmental constraints will stimulate investments in technological
progress).
2) Income. Technology results from investing foregone present consumption
(income or welfare) and rates of investments are likely to increase with
income levels.109
3) Human capital. Simon (1981) argued that the source of all wealth was the
human brain. The level of human capital is related to a population’s size
but also its health, age, education and economic and social freedom.
Human capital is itself an investment, and is correlated with income (e.g.
UNDP 2006).
The driving forces of technology, together with its non-rival nature, make
analyses of the relationship between environmental and economic scales difficult.
107 Friedman (2005) provides another striking example of technological overspill. Life expectancy
in China is 71 years, despite its relatively low per capita income of $5,000. In 1880, when the US
had a similar level of per capita income, life expectancy was only 41 years.
108 The dispute between ecological and mainstream economists could be viewed as differences of
opinion over the relative magnitudes of positive and negative externalities of economic growth.
The former believe that growth has a net negative externality for future generations, because of
resource depletion. The latter believe it has a positive externality because of intergenerational
overspill of technology. According to conventional measures like GDP, the latter has apparently
been the case to date (Maddison 2006).
109 This would be true even if the marginal propensity to save were constant or to diminish with
increasing income. In fact, it is probable that it increases (e.g. Dynan et al. 2004).
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This is clear if we consider a regression analysis of environmental scale and
economic scale (Equation 4.1), based on cross-sectional data. In such analyses, it
is common to use the “IPAT” formulation, whereby Impact is proportional to
Population, Affluence and Technology (e.g. York et al. 2003a, Dietz et al. 2007).
In general, increasing population and per capita affluence are expected to increase
the environmental impact (scale) of society, while technology is often the residual
in the regression. The problem is that while it is relatively easy to attribute the
direct consumption-related impacts to the country responsible, and therefore to
income levels, it is very difficult to attribute the technological advances that result
from increased income levels.110 It is likely that the environmental impacts of
poorer countries are deflated by technological overspill from past economic
growth in rich countries. Consequently, analyses which ignore the role of one
country’s economic growth in driving technological progress in other countries,
will lead to pessimistic estimates of the relationship between economic growth
and environmental impact. I show in Section V that many studies commit this
error, and in Section VII I quantify the effect.
A hierarchy of analytical frameworks
It is possible to identify a rough hierarchy of preferred analytical frameworks for
modelling the relationship between economic and environmental scales, and for
testing for the existence of an EKC.
The best analysis would be a detailed panel analysis of data covering many years
and a large sample of countries. It would include measures of capital investment
(including human capital and spending on research and development),
technological innovation and overspill.111 The environmental impacts of goods and
services would be attributed to their consumption rather than their production,112
and technological innovations to the country and year of origin. Note that this
110 Castles and Henderson (2003a) criticise this separation of technology from affluence in the
IPAT formula.
111 Data on patent citations might offer one way of looking at overspills between countries, but
would not extend to less developed countries. Griffith et al. (2007) use patent citations to
demonstrate increasingly rapid overspill between countries.
112 This controls for the “off-shoring” of environmental impacts, see e.g. Nahman & Antrobus
(2005).
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analysis would not be expected to yield a simple EKC, since the consumption and
technology effects of income are separated (see next chapter).
The next best alternatives are to use simpler panel data (where technological
progress is analysed at the world level and consumption is analysed at the national
level) and global time-series (where both technological progress and consumption
are analysed at the world level). Although apparently more informative, simple
panel analyses are potentially misleading: the true sample size of a simple panel
analysis in any given year is still one,113 and if technological progress is modelled
as a function of time, it risks the impression that the process of technological
progress is independent of income levels.114 Global time-series analyses, while
simplistic, may be more analytically honest, since they do not disguise that the
true sample size is one, and they fully incorporate technological progress into
economic growth. They provide the best simple test of an EKC.
Next, time-series analyses of individual countries have limited generalisability,
and do not account for the origin of technological progress. They can be used to
test the EKC hypothesis, if impacts are correctly attributed to consumption rather
than production. However, particularly for developing countries, they may fail to
find an EKC when one does exist, because they fail to account for technological
overspill.
Finally, cross-sectional studies can only be justified if all other options are closed,
and even then their usefulness seems doubtful. Because of technological
overspills, they are extremely unsafe for projecting future trends and they cannot
reasonably be used to test for an EKC, since they exclude the technology effects
of income growth. The EKC is a fundamentally longitudinal hypothesis.
Conclusions
In contrast to some ecological economists, I take the view that technology is best
considered as being endogenous, and positively related to income, which is in turn
positively related to technology. Therefore, the best analysis is one which uses
113 Again, such an analysis would not be expected to display a simple EKC, a point apparently
ignored by Stern (2004).
114 I discuss alternative specifications that may be more appropriate than time, including Gross
World Product, in Section VI.
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detailed data to explore the drivers of technology, and to explore the exact nature
of the relationship between technological progress and economic growth.
However, if this data is unavailable, it is more justifiable to subsume
technological progress into economic growth than to separate it out.
IV. Proxies for economic and environmental scale
Since the economic and environmental scale variables are difficult, if not
impossible to measure exactly, any empirical analysis must use imperfect proxies.
Below I introduce two common proxies and discuss their advantages and
limitations.
GDP as a Proxy for Economic Scale
The most common measure of economic scale is Gross Domestic Product
(GDP115). Gross National Income (GNI) would be preferable, since it more closely
relates to the income of citizens, but is less commonly available. When aggregated
to the world level (as in the next chapter), the two measures are in any case
equivalent (i.e. Gross World Product ≡ Gross World Income). Net National
Income and Net National Product are less preferred, since they are not solely
concerned with current income or utility, but rather with maintenance of the
productive base.116
Per capita GDP or GNI are at best proxies for utility and may not even be
monotonically related to it. Two potential causes of discrepancy are the exclusion
of non-traded goods and services (including those provided by the environment
and by leisure time), and the diminishing marginal utility of monetary income.
Several attempts have been made to correct for these biases.117 However, many of
115 At constant prices converted using purchasing power parity.
116 A measure based purely on capital, rather than income could be used to measure economic
scale, but this would pose a slightly different question. Arrow et al. (2004) propose such a measure
(Genuine Wealth), which includes natural capital. Although they do not present this finding,
analysis of data from their Table 2 shows a strong positive correlation between growth rates in
GDP per capita and Genuine Wealth (R2=89%, 69% if China is excluded, indicating that if such a
measure was used instead of GDP, similar results might be obtained).
117 Tobin and Nordhaus (1973) showed that their Measure of Economic Welfare, which accounted
for leisure time and natural capital depletion, were well correlated with GDP. Daly & Cobb (1989)
propose the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, which developed into the Genuine Progress
Indicator (Talberth et al. 2007). These indicators apparently show a levelling off for the USA,
Chapter 4
111
these have also accounted for the depletion of natural capital, as well as or instead
of unmarketed ecosystem services. Therefore they are corrections to Net rather
than Gross Income.
While GDP is imperfect, no available alternative includes utility-flows from
natural and social capital and leisure, while controlling for the diminishing
marginal utility of income. However, OECD (2006) shows that, cross-sectionally,
adjusting GDP for the value of leisure time and for income inequality does not
greatly change the ranking of countries. 118 More importantly, it should be
remembered that all of these omissions from GDP are more likely to weaken
evidence for decoupling than to strengthen it, since utility derived from non-
physical capital and leisure time ought to be even more decoupled from physical
throughput than GDP is.119 Thus, if decoupling of GDP from environmental scale
is found, this should provide grounds for optimism. However, this does not in any
way justify the use of GDP in public policy. Indeed the adoption by governments
of improved accounting measures, which improve policymaking by governments,
may be a necessary condition for further decoupling of income from
environmental scale.
A Proxy for Environmental Scale: The Ecological Footprint
The last decade or so has seen a proliferation of indicators designed to measure
the impact of human society on the environment, and therefore its sustainability.
Böhringer and Jochem (2007) review ten measures with an explicitly
environmental component. Of these, the Ecological Footprint (Wackernagel &
Rees 1995) has been more influential than any other indicator in both academic
since the late 1970s, in contrast to a steady rise in GDP. However, Fig 7, p24 of Talberth et al.
(2007) shows that the main cause of divergence between Genuine Progress Indicator and GDP has
been depletion of natural capital – which is accounted for on the left hand side of the analysis
under discussion. Dietz & Neumayer (2007) argue that this threshold effect is a methodological
artefact.
118 Longitudinally, the change in adjusted GDP over time might be different. However, the effect
of leisure time and diminishing marginal utility of income would be expected to act in opposite
directions, partly off-setting each other.
119 An interesting question, which illustrates this issue, would be: “is per capita GDP at present a
better measure of quality of life or of environmental scale, and how is that likely to change in the
future?” It is clearly an imperfect proxy for either. My suspicion is that GDP, as currently
measured, will become a less good measure of both scale variables, but that the GDP methodology
will be adapted, such that it will remain a passable measure of the former, and a much worse
measure of the latter.
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and popular discourse (Figure 4.1). The Ecological Footprint compares the
environmental impact of nations and the world with the available biocapacity. Its
units are the Global Hectare (gha), where one gha has the bioproductivity of the
world’s average hectare. Eight components are included in the Ecological
Footprint: cropland, livestock, forests, fisheries, built-up land, fuelwood, nuclear
power and CO2 emissions, the latter three making the energy component.
Redefining Progress and the Global Footprint Network 120 provide Ecological
Footprint data covering most nations of the world. The latter contributes to the
WWF’s biennial “Living Planet Report” which publishes the latest cross-sectional
data for most countries, as well as time-series data for the world since 1961.
Ecological Footprints have also been calculated for some nations by independent
researchers (see Section IV).
The Ecological Footprint can be interpreted in an entropic-capital framework. The
non-energy Footprint, as a proportion of available biocapacity, represents the
proportion of natural capital displaced by human activity, and therefore the space
remaining for wild nature (Noon & Dickson 2004). The energy Footprint
represents the annual net change in high entropy stocks (of CO2). The conversion
rate between these two measures identifies what depletion of natural capital
(increase in human appropriation of low-entropy solar radiation) would be
necessary to render zero the net change in high-entropy stocks. CO2 emissions are
converted into global hectares based on the area of land that would need to be
planted with trees to sequester the excess emissions.121 The Ecological Footprint
does not yet measure stocks of low-entropy energy-matter (e.g. non-renewable
resources), though Nguyena and Yamamoto (2007) attempt this. Nor does it
measure the human appropriation of low-energy flows relative to the maximum
theoretically available from solar radiation.
The Ecological Footprint has several features that make it attractive for analyses
investigating the relationship between economic and environmental scale and it
has been widely used for this purpose (see Section IV). First, it covers a relatively
large spectrum of human resource use but converts them into comparable units
120 http://www.rprogress.org/ and http://www.footprintnetwork.org/ respectively.
121 The area of land which would need to be given over to biofuels to eliminate carbon emissions
gives similar results (Loh & Wackernagel 2004).
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(global hectares). Second, data are publicly available for a large number of
countries in multiple years. Third, it attributes resource use to consumption rather
than production (avoiding “off shoring” of environmental impacts, which could
lead to the false discovery of EKCs in individual countries (Stern 2004).
However, because the Ecological Footprint converts all impacts into gha, using
global average yields, country-specific yield factors would be necessary to
separate consumption and technology effects of income. These yield factors are
not publicly available.
The Ecological Footprint has been the subject of several reviews. 122 Some
criticisms of Ecological Footprint represent simple misunderstandings,123 while
others have criticised the ways that the data have been presented, rather than the
underlying concepts. 124 A third type of criticism relates to impacts which are
omitted from the Ecological Footprint, for example greenhouse gasses other than
CO2. In principle these could be included within the existing framework were data
available.
The most important criticisms of the Ecological Footprint are those that cannot be
met within the framework of an accounting measure. For example, van den Berg
and Verbruggen (1999) criticise the calculation of the energy Footprint in gha,
using only currently available technologies. It is unacceptable, they argue, to
imply that the CO2 emissions of the world would ever be tackled solely through
the planting of trees and use of biofuels. Another criticism is that by summing
impacts across different components and ecosystems, the Ecological Footprint
122 It was reviewed by van den Bergh and Verbruggen (1999) with responses by several
contributors in the same issue of Ecological Economics (29:1) and again in volume 31:3. It was
the subject of a discussion in the same journal in volume 32:3. Other critiques include Levett
(1998), Ferguson (2002), and Jorgenson (2003, see also McDowell 2002) and Grazi et al. (2007).
123 E.g. van den Berg and Verbruggen (1999) criticise the equal equivalence factors given to both
built land and cropland – despite the former having greater environmental impact. This criticism is
incorrect. Built up land, uniquely amongst the components, is added to both Footprint and
Biocapacity (Loh & Wackernagel 2004). Thus, it reduces the biocapacity available for other uses.
The equivalence factor is therefore irrelevant, but is set to be equal to that of arable land, since
most built-land comes at the expense of arable land (Loh & Wackenagel 2004).
124 van den Berg & Verbruggen (1999) have criticised the publication of “Ecological Deficit”
figures for individual nations, because this displays an anti-trade bias. They argue that small,
densely populated countries, like cities, will always run an ecological deficit, and yet such
aggregations may be the key to ensuring sustainability (for example they can reduce per capita
Footprints by reducing transport needs). This is a valid criticism: national Ecological Deficits
themselves are not very informative (though trends might be), but they are not fundamental to the
Ecological Footprint concept.
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assumes substitutability of natural capital types, at least at the margin. These
problems are inherent in static accounting measures (Wackernagel 1999). They
highlight the need for: analysis of trends rather than static values in order to
monitor technological progress; and modelling of plausible scenarios of
technological progress and non-linearities in natural capital.
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Figure 4.1. The relative influence of nine environmental sustainability indicators listed in Bohringer and Jochem (2007). Some of these measures
(e.g. Green NNP) combine environmental and economic scale. The Human Development Index was excluded since it focuses on purely social
aspects (eg GDP per capita). The “Well-Being Assessment” combines the “Well-Being Index”, which is not environmentally based, with the
“Ecosystem Well-Being Index” automated searches do not distinguish between the very large number of papers in the medical literature on the
“Well-Being Index” and those on the broader index so this was excluded. However, the combined total of all of these papers (303) is comparable
with those of the Ecological Footprint (245) meaning that the Ecological Footprint ranks higher than the environmentally based “Well-Being
Assessment”. The Google search was not possible for “Genuine Savings” because of the large number of commercial sites offering “genuine
savings”. The H-index was originally designed to quantify the productivity of an individual scientists. The H-index in this context is calculated
from the set of articles that mention the indicator. It is the highest number (h) such that there are h articles, which have themselves been cited at
least h times (Hirsch 2005). Thus, for the Ecological Footprint, there are 23 articles mentioning the Ecological Footprint which have themselves
been cited at least 23 times. Searches were made on 27 January 2007.
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V. A Critical Review of Footprint-Income Analyses
In this section I identify and describe studies that have used Ecological Footprint
and GDP (or closely related measures) to investigate the relationship between
environmental and economic scale. I review their conclusions, and classify them
according the hierarchy set out in Section II.
Identification of studies
I reviewed all papers on the ISI Web of Science database containing the term
“Ecological Footprint*” in the title, abstract or keywords (245 papers on 27th
January 2007). Through examination of the abstracts of these papers, I identified
all studies that reported inter-country or inter-temporal analyses of Ecological
Footprint. I did not include studies that calculated Ecological Footprint for a
single country or region in a single year. I found 23 such studies.125
Classification of studies and summary of results
Cross-sectional studies
Section II argued that cross-sectional studies are unsuitable for investigating the
relationship between economic scale and environmental scale, because they
ignore the effect of technological progress, which is positively related to
economic scale. Because of this, cross-sectional studies are likely to provide a
too-pessimistic representation of the true situation. Cross-sectional studies are also
likely to reject the EKC hypothesis, when in fact it holds, or to find turning points
which are higher than for the world as a whole. Despite these inherent flaws,
cross-sectional analyses were the most common in the review, with eight studies
investigating the influence of GDP per capita.126 Of these studies, six explicitly
test the EKC hypothesis.127
125 One other study (Bagliani et al. 2007) was identified by using Google Scholar to search for
“Ecological Footprint” since 2005, and included in the review.
126 Jorgenson (2003), York et al. (2003a&b), Rosa et al. (2004) Jorgenson & Rice (2005), York et
al. (2005), Hammond (2006), Dietz et al. (2007). Two other studies (Jorgenson 2003 & 2004) use
closely correlated variables (World Systems Position and urbanization).
127 The exceptions being Jorgenson and Rice (2005) and Hammond (2006).
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The eight studies used 3 different analytical specifications. Of those that test for
the EKC, all used a quadratic income term. One group (York et al. 2003a&b,
2005, Rosa et al. 2004 and Dietz et al. 2007) used logged variables, aggregate
Ecological Footprint and included population as an explanatory variable, while
Bagliani et al. (2007) used untransformed variables and per capita Ecological
Footprint. While the former group all find positive coefficients on the quadratic
income term (implying the opposite of an EKC), Bagliani et al. (2007) report a
negative coefficient. Nevertheless, Bagliani et al. (2007) argue that there is no
evidence for an EKC because the quadratic function is outperformed by a strictly
increasing concave power function, and because the turning point is at a relatively
high income level, although within the range of the data. A final study, Hammond
(2006) did not test for the existence of an EKC and used a power function. He
finds the exponent on GNI per capita to be 2/3, implying a concave, though
strictly increasing relationship.
As expected, Footprint-income studies that use cross-sectional specifications have
reached pessimistic conclusions about the existence of decoupling between
Ecological Footprint and income. However, in the next section I show that each of
these approaches has flaws beyond those inherent in the cross-sectional approach,
and that even the cross-sectional data are consistent with more optimistic
conclusions.
National time-series studies
The primary aim of most studies reporting national time-series was to assess the
trend in sustainability for the country in question.128 Nevertheless, several studies
discuss the role of economic growth in determining Ecological Footprint (e.g.
Lammers et al. 2008, B. Chen & GQ. Chen 2006, 2007), and some (e.g. Lammers
et al. 2008) appear to have this as their primary objective. However, only D. Chen
et al. (2004) carry out any explicit analysis of the relationship between income per
capita and Ecological Footprint, the rest reported trends in each variable
128 Wackernagel et al. (2002) is a similar analysis at the global level. As with studies at the
national level, no attempt is made to explicitly model the relationship between economic growth
and Footprint.
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separately. Those results which are reported are described below, arranged by
country and study.
Lammers et al. (2008) “examines how Ireland’s economic growth has affected
environmental pressure by calculating a time series of Ireland’s Ecological
Footprint”. They plot indices of GDP per capita and Ecological Footprint from
1983 to 2001 for Ireland but strangely, given their objective, do not explicitly
model one as a function of the other. Over this period, income increased by a
factor of 6 and Ecological Footprint by a factor of 1.5. These results imply a
steady reduction in the Ecological Footprint intensity of the economy, though the
authors conclude only that “the growing economy has intensiﬁed human’s 
pressure on the Irish environment”. Ecological Footprint per capita increased from
roughly 4 gha/capita to 6 gha per capita over the period, but information on
absolute levels of GDP per capita are not given. Assuming a GDP per capita of
US$30,000 in 2001 this would imply an intensity of 5000 US$/gha in 2001
compared with 1875 US$/gha in 1983. The energy Footprint was responsible for
most of the rise in total Ecological Footprint. Interestingly, although the period
1995-2001 had the fastest growth in per capita income (>9% per year) the growth
rate in per capita energy Footprint was slower for this period than for the period
1993-1995 which, the authors report, had lower, though still strong growth,
implying that at least partial decoupling has taken place in this component.
For China, Chen and Chen (2006, 2007) provide time series of Ecological
Footprint from 1981-2001. They plot the ratio of GDP to Ecological Footprint
over the period, and this appears to rise fairly steadily, but, as with Lammers et al.
(2008) no explicit analysis is made of the relationship. M. Chen et al. (2006)
report very similar trends. D. Chen et al. (2004) is the only time-series study to
explicitly analyse Ecological Footprint as a function of income. However, like
Hammond (2006) they fit only a power function to data from 1981 to 2000, and
find an elasticity of less than unity, implying some decoupling of Ecological
Footprint from income. Their results are restricted by the choice of model, and I
demonstrate in the next section that the data are consistent with more optimistic
conclusions, and provide some evidence for an EKC.
Hanley et al. (1999) calculate a time series of Ecological Footprint for Scotland,
but do not analyse it as a function of income, since this is not the purpose of their
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study. However, they do report that Ecological Footprint per capita and
population stayed roughly constant over the period considered, while GDP per
capita rose. This indicates reduced Ecological Footprint intensity of the economy,
and therefore at least partial decoupling.
van Vuuren and Smeets (2000) tabulate changes in population, GDP per capita,
carbon intensity of GDP and energy Footprint, for four countries and three years
(1980, 1987, 1994). Based on these patchy data, the relationship between GDP per
capita and Footprint appears indeterminate. They also report an analysis of the
effect of using local rather than global average yields when converting
consumption impacts to Footprint. Their Figure 5 shows that using local yields
makes the per capita Ecological Footprints of the four countries appear much
more equal, while using global average yields tends to increase the Ecological
Footprint of higher income countries relative to poorer ones. This demonstrates
one way in which investments in richer countries underwrite the Ecological
Footprint of poorer countries (when expressed in gha), by raising global average
yields. In their Figure 6 they reproduce a cross-sectional regression using data
from Wackernagel et al. (1997) showing a convex relationship between GDP per
capita and energy Footprint per capita, while for land use Footprint it is concave,
demonstrating opposing trends in natural capital depletion and entropy increase.
Similarly, Haberl et al. (2001) and Erb (2004) report interesting analyses for
Austria. Although they do not explicitly investigate the effect of economic
growth, they demonstrate the effect of the choice of yield factors on Footprint, in
a similar manner to that of van Vuuren and Smeets (2000).
All national level time series appear to show at least partial decoupling of per
capita Footprint from income. However, despite many aiming to investigate the
effect of economic growth on Footprint, none except Chen et al. (2004) explicitly
model the relationship, and then only with functions which exclude the possibility
of finding decoupling. I show in the next section that in this case at least, the data
are again consistent with more optimistic conclusions.
Panel studies
Only one study (Jorgenson & Burns 2007) carries out a panel analysis of
Footprint and income, concluding that economic growth drives Ecological
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Footprint. However, they regress the change in Footprint per capita (1991-2001,
not transformed) on GDP per capita (GDPpc) in 1991 (logged), without any
information on the change in GDP per capita 1991-2001. Therefore, they do not
provide any information on the effect of marginal changes in income on the
Ecological Footprint.
Global time-series studies
As well as their cross-sectional analysis, Bagliani et al. (2007) carry out the only
global time-series analysis of Ecological Footprint and income. They find a
concave relationship, but report that the turning point lies beyond the range of the
data. However, for reasons they do not explain, they use aggregate global
Ecological Footprint and Gross World Product when testing for a Kuznet’s curve
at the world level, without dividing either measure by population, thus
confounding the influence of income and population growth over the period.129 In
the next section I demonstrate some other flaws in this analysis, and in the next
chapter, show that the use of aggregate rather than per capita data masks the
presence of decoupling.130
Results
In all, 11 studies reported time series for a single country (or in two cases 3-4
countries) covering 11 countries in total. Eight studies reported cross-sectional
analyses of a large sample (>100) of countries in a single year (of these, six tested
for the existence of an EKC). Only one study reported a panel analysis (Jorgenson
& Burns 2007) and only one study reported a time-series analysis of the global
Ecological Footprint (Bagliani et al. 2007)131 – both of these tested for an EKC.
129 As I show in the next chapter, this masks a clear EKC in the data.
130 This working paper has recently been published in Ecological Economics (Bagliani et al. in
press). Interestingly, the authors have dropped the global time-series analysis (which is consistent
with a relatively optimistic view of decoupling) and retained only the cross-sectional analysis.
131 One other study (Wackernagel et al. 2002) provided a time series of global Footprint, but did
not make any analysis of the relationship between Ecological Footprint and income, while van
Vuuren & Bouwman (2005) carried out an analysis of scenarios for multiple world regions.
Bagliani et al. (2007) provided both cross-sectional and global time-series analyses and this is
therefore counted amongst the 10 cross-sectional studies and one global time-series study in my
review.
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Research effort has therefore been directed towards the lower end of the hierarchy
I proposed at the end of Section III above (Table 4.1). As expected, cross-
sectional analyses have on balance reached more pessimistic conclusions about
the shape of the relationship between Footprint and income, and therefore about
decoupling, than have higher ranked studies. Unlike cross-sectional studies, all
but one of those reporting time-series at the national level did not explicitly
analyse the relationship, despite being better placed to do so, and despite in
several cases including this among their objectives.
In the next section I show that in addition to this tendency to use analytical
frameworks which are inherently pessimistic about decoupling, I find that most of
the studies contain further flaws which lead to results which are more pessimistic
than are supported by the data.
Table 4.1. Classification (see Section III) of Footprint-income analyses.
Number of Studies Explicitly Investigating:Rank Study Type Shape of
Relationship
Found EconomicDevelopment
EKC
Highest Detailed Panel N/A 0 0
≈2nd Global Time-series
Concave 0-11 0-11
≈2nd Panel N/A 0-12 0-12
4th National Time-series
5 Concave
1 indeterminate
63 0
Lowest Cross-sectional 2 Concave5 Convex 8
4 5
1 One study, Bagliani et al. (2007) does carry out an analysis at the global level, but I argue below
that it is flawed. See Chapter 5 for a global time-series analysis.
2 One study (Jorgenson & Burns 2007) does attempt a panel analysis, but I argue below that it is
flawed. See Section V for a panel study.
3 This was rarely the primary objective of the paper.
4 Includes York et al. (2003b) which analyses drivers of only the energy part of Footprint. In
addition, Jorgenson (2003) uses ‘World Systems Position’ and Jorgenson (2004) uses
urbanization, rather than GDP per capita. However, the two measures appear to be strongly
correlated with GDP per capita.
What has caused the bias towards low-ranked analysis types? Table 4.2 shows
that the bias is partly explained by the way in which Footprint data has been made
publicly available. With the exception of studies reporting national time-series, all
the analyses have made use of publicly available data, and the data allowing cross
sectional studies was published earlier (2000) than data which allowed simple
panel analyses (2004) or global time-series analyses (2002). However, the table
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also shows that author choice has played a role. Of the seven studies exclusively
reporting cross-sectional analyses, five could have carried out global time-series
analysis and two of these could also have carried out simple panel analyses, which
have not yet been carried out for marginal changes. Without these deliberate
choices on the part of authors, the literature would be much less biased towards
relatively pessimistic specifications. No authors explicitly justify their use of
cross-sectional data rather than other formulations.132
Table 4.2. Classification, and ranking (see Section III) of types of analyses of Footprint
and income.
Rank Study
Type
Year Data
Available
Number of Studies
using approach
Number of studies which could
have used this approach (and
none better)
Highest DetailedPanel
N/A 0 N/A
≈2nd
Global
Time-
series
2002
0-1 5
≈2nd SimplePanel
2004 0-1 4
Lowest Cross-sectional
2000 7 2
Discussion and conclusions
To date, the literature on the Footprint-income relationship has tended to use
analytical specifications which are inherently biased towards relatively pessimistic
conclusions about the existence and potential of decoupling. This bias stems first
from the way data has been published, and second from the choices made by
authors, given the available data. Although several studies acknowledge the
problems with a cross-sectional approach (e.g. York et al. 2003a, Rosa et al. 2004,
Dietz et al. 2007, Bagliani et al. 2007), they still draw confident conclusions that
are not supported by the data. The best example of this being Rosa et al. (2004)
who claim to have “embarrassed” the EKC hypothesis, and Dietz et al. (2007)
who use their results to make an overly pessimistic projection of Ecological
Footprint (see Section VI). In the next section, and the next chapter, I show that,
132 Note that while Bagliani et al. (2007) report a global time-series analysis as well as cross-
sectional analyses, and although they acknowledge the limitations of the cross-sectional approach,
they omitted the time-series analysis when republishing their working paper (Bagliani et al. in
press).
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even given the analytical framework chosen by the authors, a series of flaws has
led them to conclusions which are more pessimistic than those supported by the
data. As a result, I develop guidelines for more robust analyses of the Footprint-
income relationship, which are also applicable to any analyses of the decoupling
of economic from environmental scale.
VI. Methodological issues in Footprint-Income analyses
In this section I discuss flaws in previous Footprint-income analyses which led
studies to overly pessimistic conclusions of economic growth.
Testing for an EKC using skewed or log-transformed cross-
sectional data (Dietz et al. 2007)
In addition to ignoring technological progress, cross-sectional Footprint-income
analyses pose other challenges and ambiguities. For example, Bagliani et al.’s
(2007) finding of a negative quadratic term contrasts with other cross-sectional
studies which found a positive term (York et al. 2003a,b 2005, Rosa et al. 2004,
Dietz et al. 2007). There are two differences between the approaches used, which
may explain the conflicting results, and I investigate these by re-analysing the
data from Dietz et al. (2007). The first difference is that Bagliani et al. (2007)
regress Ecological Footprint per capita, on GDP per capita, while the others
regress total national Ecological Footprint on population and GDP per capita, a
formulation implied by their “IPAT” framework, which sees impact (I) driven by
population (P), affluence (Y: GDP per capita) and technology (T; Equation 4.2).
Equation 4.2 TYPaI cb 
where technology is the residual. They use this formulation, despite finding
impact elasticities of population which are not significantly different from unity,
implying that a per capita specification would be possible (see below).
The second difference, which also stems from the use of IPAT, is that Dietz and
colleagues transform all variables using natural logs, to allow them to use the
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IPAT formulation in a linear regression.133 However, in order to test the EKC, a
quadratic of the logged affluence term is used,134 either:
Equation 4.3 2)]()[ln( YmeanY 
(York et al. 2003a,b, Rosa et al. 2004).
or:
Equation 4.2 2)][ln(Y
(Dietz et al. 2007).
All four papers interpret a positive coefficient on this term as implying the
opposite of an EKC. However, I demonstrate below that the positive coefficient
on this term does not strictly imply a concave form in the untransformed data.
Methods
I fitted a simplified version of Dietz et al’s (2007) model to their dataset of 135
countries:135
Equation 4.5 2)][ln()ln()ln( AAcapitaperEF 
Since all studies have found the coefficient on population not to be significantly
different from unity, I eliminate population, and use Ecological Footprint per
capita as the response variable, allowing the results to be represented in two
dimensions. The model was fitted using the lm function in R (R Core
Development Team 2007). I then plot this model, estimated from the transformed
data, on untransformed axes.
Results
The coefficient on the quadratic term is positive, as in the original studies (Figure
4.2a). However, when the model is plotted on untransformed axes it is clear that it
133 They also justify this on the grounds that the Ecological Footprint and GDP per capita data
show excessive skew (non-homogeneity of variance), and this does appear to be the case (Figure
4.2b).
134 Squaring affluence prior to logging would be simply twice ln(A), and perfectly co-correlated.
135 Dietz et al’s model included latitude dummies and the ln(land area). This simplified
formulation allows the model to be visualized in two dimensions.
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is almost completely linear (Figure 4.2b). Closer scrutiny reveals that the model is
actually slightly concave to the origin (Figure 4.2c).
One reason for using log-transformed variables is that models fitted to the
untransformed data show non-homogeneity of variance, meaning that too much
weight is placed on higher income data points. However, if the aim is to
investigate the effect of income growth on Footprint, it is this less well populated
part of the data which is of greatest interest.
Figure 4.2: The misinterpretation of quadratic logged models based on IPAT framework.
a) the logged data, together with the fitted line obtained using the simplified version of
Dietz et al.’s (2007) model. b) the simplified Dietz et al’s (2007) model on an un-logged
scale. The positive quadratic shape disappears – in fact the trend is slightly concave. c) a
close up of Figure 4.2b, near the origin showing the slightly concave nature of the model
fit.
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Discussion
It is clear that the positive quadratic found by Dietz et al. (2007) in the log-
transformed data does not imply a convex relationship in the untransformed data.
In fact, it is concave (albeit only slightly). Contrary to claims in York et al.
(2003b) it is not at all clear that using the IPAT formula with a quadratic term is
an appropriate method of investigating the relationship between income and
Footprint. Although the model with the quadratic does outperform the same model
without the quadratic, the authors do not provide any a priori justification for
believing this to be an appropriate representation. Instead, they justify the
inclusion of the quadratic term specifically in order to test for the existence of an
EKC. Yet the quadratic term is somewhat unnecessary for this purpose, since any
exponent of less than one on the affluence term implies a concave (albeit strictly
increasing) relationship in the unlogged variables, which is as much as is implied
by a negative sign on a quadratic term in untransformed data.
This analysis suggests that the authors’ conclusions of convex relationships
between economic and environmental scale (the opposite of an EKC) are unsafe.
According to their own model, it appears to be slightly concave when plotted on
untransformed axes. The analysis also illustrates the problem that in cross-
sectional studies, the results are dominated by low-income countries in a skewed
data set, yet the interest is generally in what will happen if incomes increase
above this very low level.
Aggregate data (Bagliani et al. 2007, Dietz et al. 2007)
I noted above that York et al. (2003a,b, 2005), Rosa et al. (2004) and Dietz et al.
(2007) used aggregate rather than per capita Ecological Footprint as the dependent
variable, including population as an independent variable. They do this despite
finding repeatedly that the impact elasticity of population is very close to unity. At
best this clouds interpretation of the relationship between income and per capita
Footprint, particularly given that, longitudinally, population is related to income
per capita, higher levels of the latter tending to be associated with lower or zero
growth in the former, implying that there may be a “population Kuznets curve”. It
would be better to use per capita values, and include population density as an
independent variable (as Hammond 2006 does).
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More seriously, Bagliani et al. (2007) also use aggregate Ecological Footprint
when analysing a global time-series (despite using per capita Footprint in their
cross-sectional analysis), and use aggregate, rather than per capita, Gross World
Product. This is problematic since, even if a population Kuznets curve exists,
population growth over the study period may obscure the decoupling of Footprint
from Income, if the population Kuznets curve peaks at a higher income levels.
Indeed, I show in the next chapter, that this does seem to have been the case.
Marginal changes and panel analysis (Jorgenson & Burns 2007)
Jorgenson and Burns (2007) state that their objective is to: “[test] a series of
hypotheses concerning the political-economic causes of change in per capita
consumption-based environmental impacts”. One of the primary causes of change
which they are interested in is “level of economic development”, for which they
use GDP per capita as a proxy.
However, their analysis actually investigates the relationship between absolute
changes in Ecological Footprint per capita (EFpc) over the period 1991-2001 and
percentage differences in initial income level. In the simplest model without GDP
per capita, they find:
Equation 4.6 19912001 830.0 EFEF 
where EF is Ecological Footprint per capita. Thus, on average, per capita
Footprints were 17% lower in 2001 than in 1991, despite the world economy
having grown over that period. The authors make no mention of technological
progress, or the significance of this term. Adding GDP per capita (in 1991) to
their model, they find:
Equation 4.7 ]ln[517.0417.0 199119912001 YEFEF 
where Y is GDP per capita. The interpretation of this is extremely difficult. It is
equivalent to:
Equation 4.8 ]ln[517.0583.0 199119910191 YEFEF  
i.e. absolute change in per capita Footprint is regressed on the logarithm of initial
income level. What is missing is any measure of change in income over the
period. Thus, the analysis mixes absolute increments on the left-hand side and
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percentage increments on the right-hand side, and also compares changes over
time on the left-hand side with initial levels on the right-hand side.
When controlled for initial income, the larger a country’s per capita Footprint in
1991, the smaller the absolute increase in per capita Footprint over the following
10 years, implying that Footprints were levelling off. On the other hand, there is a
positive relationship between the logarithm of per capita income in 1991, and the
absolute change in Footprint over the period. Thus, richer countries (which would
tend to have larger per capita Footprints) experienced larger absolute increases in
Footprint. However, without any measure of economic growth over the period, it
is impossible to come to any conclusions about the effect of economic growth on
Ecological Footprint. It is true that Jorgenson and Burns (2007) state that they
wish to evaluate income level as a driver of Footprint change, but unless they
believe that Footprints are completely decoupled from economic growth at the
margin (which apparently they do not) or they believe that economic growth is
unrelated to initial income (which it is not, see Chapter 3) this analysis does not
address the question they pose. Jorgenson and Burns (2007) claim that their
results show that continued economic growth is incompatible with stable or
declining environmental impact, yet it is difficult to see how their unusual
specification can be used to determine this.
As I noted in Section II, a simple panel analysis (like that in the next section)
cannot be used to determine the effects of income growth per se, since the source
of technological development is not accounted for. However, for the results to be
in any way informative, measures of initial levels and changes over time must be
available for both dependent and independent variables (as in Section VII, below)
Otherwise, the analysis cannot properly be considered a panel study.
The importance of considering alternative models: time-series
evidence for an EKC in China (Chen et al. 2004)
Chen et al. (2004) is the only time-series study to provide a regression of
Ecological Footprint per capita on GDP per capita. However, the authors fit a
power function (which is strictly increasing), and do not consider alternative
functions, despite their power function showing a relative poor fit to the data (D.
Chen et al. 2004, Figure 2). Thus, they are constrained to find only a partial
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decoupling since no model of complete decoupling is tested. Similarly, Hammond
(2006) uses only a power function when analysing cross-sectional data. I tested
for the existence of an EKC in D. Chen et al’s (2004) data, by comparing a strictly
increasing, an asymptotic and a humped function.
Methods
I re-analysed the data from D. Chen et al. (2004). I fitted a humped function (a
biexponential), an asymptotic function (asymptotic exponential) and an
exponential quadratic function as well as the original authors’ strictly increasing
power function:
Power (strictly increasing):
Equation 4.9 bYaF 
3 Parameter Asymptotic Exponential:
Equation 4.10 )( YcebaF 
Exponential Quadratic:
Equation 4.11 )exp( 2cYbYaF 
Bixponential (strictly humped):
Equation 4.12 dYbY eceaF 
All models were fitted using the nls function in R (R Core Development Team
2007) and compared on the basis of AIC scores (Burnham & Anderson 2002).
Results and Discussion
Based on the AIC score, both the asymptotic and the quadratic exponential
outperformed the authors’ original function, while the strictly humped
biexponential function did not converge (Table 4.3). Figure 4.3 shows that in this
case, the quadratic exponential function is functionally asymptotic, since the
maximum lies near the upper limit of the data. The data are therefore consistent
with full decoupling of economic and environmental scales at the margin in the
world’s most populous and fastest growing economy. However, this receives little
attention from the authors, since their restricted choice of function permits them
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only to find an increase in the environmental efficiency of the economy, rather
than a potential decoupling.
Table 4.3. AIC comparison of alternative models.
Type Function Parameters AIC ΔAIC over 
power
function
Strictly Increasing Power 2 -62.9 n/a
Asymptotic 3 Param. Asymptotic 3 -67.3 4.4
Quadratic exponential 3 -74.1 21.2
Humped Biexponential 4 Did not converge
Figure 4.3. Ecological Footprint per capita vs income per capita for China (1981-2000).
Showing Chen et al’s (2004) power function (solid line) and a humped function
(quadratic exponential) which outperforms it, strongly implying a turning point or
asymptote within the range of the data. Redrawn using data from Table 1 in Chen et al.
(2004).
Bagliani et al. (2007): Model comparison using AIC
Bagliani et al. (2007) use the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to compare
competing models, including a strictly increasing concave power function and a
quadratic function which is humped within the range of the data. The convention
is that models with ΔAIC <2 are considered to receive considerable support from
Chapter 4
131
the data (Burnham and Anderson 2002).136 Yet the ΔAIC of the power function
over the quadratic function in Bagliani et al. (2007) is only 0.03, implying that the
two models receive virtually equal support from the data.137 In addition, Bagliani
et al. (2007) do not estimate all of the power function’s coefficients using the
regression analysis, but specify a fixed exponent, the value of which is separately
optimised on the basis of the R2. Since this parameter is not estimated in the
regression on which the AIC is calculated, the power function is inadequately
penalised, by 2 AIC points.138 If the correct penalty were applied, the quadratic
function would now outperform the power function by 1.97 AIC points, and the
model averaged turning point would lie within the range of the data. These errors
of interpretation lead Bagliani et al. (2007) to unnecessarily pessimistic
conclusions. They repeat the mistake when analysing time-series at the global
level, leading them to erroneously conclude that the power function, rather than
the (negative) quadratic function is best supported by the data. Although they
correctly note that the turning point of the quadratic lies outside the range of the
data, it does not lie far beyond, and the model averaged turning point (with
recalculated AIC scores) would be similarly close. Thus, even when using
aggregate, rather than per capita figures, the evidence against the EKC is weaker
than their conclusions would suggest.
In addition, they note that the turning point implied by the quadratic model is high
relative to the range of the data. Yet, because of the flaws noted above, cross-
sectional models will tend to provide turning point estimates which are biased
upwards: the authors do not acknowledge this. Certainly, it is vitally important
that the position of a quadratic’s turning point is calculated, and compared to the
range of the data, since a quadratic whose turning point lies at or beyond the upper
limit of the data is functionally indistinguishable from asymptotic or strictly
increasing functions respectively. However, in effect, cross-sectional analyses
136 AIC scores are on a log scale, and measure the relative distance of a model from the “true”
model (Burnham and Anderson 2002). Thus, in if two models are compared, a ΔAIC of 2 implies
an evidence ratio of approximately 3:1, and Akaike weights of 73% and 27% (Burnham &
Anderson pp 75-77).
137 This implies an evidence ratio of 50.3:49.6.
138 The AIC score incorporates a penalty of two points for each parameter estimated in the model
to ensure parsimony.
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only provide an estimate of the upper limit of the population turning point, since
they ignore technological overspill. The position of a quadratic turning point in
cross-sectional data cannot therefore be used to reject the EKC hypothesis.
Conclusions
In addition to a general bias towards analytical frameworks at the lower end of the
hierarchy outline in section II, many studies contain flaws in their analysis or
interpretation, which further bias their results towards more pessimistic
conclusions about the existence of and potential for decoupling Ecological
Footprint from Income.
In summary, I suggest the following principles for analyses of this issue, in
addition to those outlined in section II:
1. Per capita data should be used wherever possible, to separate the effects of
income and population growth on Footprint, and if necessary to separately
investigate the relationship between population and income.
2. In studies which use time series (including panel studies) marginal changes,
rather than initial levels, should be used (c.f. Jorgenson & Burns 2007).139
3. Caution should be exercised whenever transformed variables are used (c.f.
Dietz et al. 2007, and Jorgenson & Burns 2007). Ideally, samples which are
skewed towards the lower range of the data (which represents “the past” when
viewed longitudinally) should be avoided altogether. Log-transforming variables
does not change the fact that one still has only sparse data at higher income levels,
despite this being the zone of greatest interest. If logged variables are used, the
functional form of any model in the untransformed data should be examined.
4. If a quadratic approach is used, it important not to rely only on the sign of
quadratic term, but also to locate the turning point (as Bagliani et al. 2007 do)
together with confidence intervals. However, if cross-sectional analyses are used,
one should be aware that turning points may be biased upwards, and therefore the
position of a turning point itself cannot be used as justification for rejecting the
EKC hypothesis.
139 Parallels can also be drawn with the growth-initial regressions criticised in Chapter 3).
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5. In addition to using quadratic models, it is desirable to consider several
alternative models, each representing an a priori sensible hypothesis, e.g. strictly
increasing, asymptotic and humped-shaped models. If concave, the first represents
increasing Footprint efficiency of an economy, but only incomplete decoupling.
Asymptotic models represent full decoupling at the margin (further increases in
income result in no further increases in Footprint), while humped models imply
intra-marginal decoupling (an EKC) – i.e. that increase in income actually reduce
Footprint. Alternative models can be compared on the basis of AIC scores.
VII. A quantitative measure of cross-sectional technology
pessimism
The problem with cross-sectional analyses of environmental and economic scale
is that technological innovation is ignored, leading to overly pessimistic
inferences about decoupling. In this section, I demonstrate the extent of upward
bias in projections of future Ecological Footprint based on cross-sectional
analyses by reanalysing a recent cross-sectional study by Dietz et al. (2007).
Introduction
Using cross-sectional data, Dietz et al. (2007) investigated the factors driving the
Ecological Footprint of nations, and found that population, affluence, land area
and latitude were the most important. Using this model, they predicted that, given
continued economic and demographic growth, humanity’s Ecological Footprint
would continue to expand, exceeding the biological capacity of the world by 60%
in 2015.
However, as Dietz et al. acknowledged, their analysis ignored technological
progress. This omission is likely to lead to overestimated projections of global
Footprint. In order to determine the extent of this over-prediction, I modify Dietz
et al’s (2007) analysis to allow a panel approach, which estimates the rate of
technological progress over time (where technological progress is broadly defined
as the average reduction in the Footprint intensity of economies over time140). I
140 This includes preferences, policies, institutions, and human capital in addition to ‘physical’
technologies.
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then extrapolate this rate forward to correct Dietz et al’s (2007) projection of
global Footprint in 2015.
Methods
Dietz et al. used data on Ecological Footprint and population from the WWF
Living Planet Report 2004 (WWF 2004), and combined this with data on land
area and GDP per capita from the World Bank (World Bank 2004). They also
classified countries as arctic, temperate or tropical semi-subjectively depending on
the location of major centres of population (T. Dietz, pers. com.) Data were
available for 135 countries in all,141 and all data referred to 2001. Using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS) regression, they estimated the following model:
Equation 4.13
)(181.0)(085.0)(log0552.0)]([log161.0
)(log661.0)(log931.0562.0)(log
10
2
10
101010
ArcticTemperateAreaY
Ypopimpact


where impact is aggregate Ecological Footprint and Y is GDP per capita. In order
to repeat Dietz et al’s work as a panel analysis, I exploited the fact that WWF
(2004) provides an estimate of the percentage change in Ecological Footprint per
capita from 1991 to 2001. Using this, I calculated Ecological Footprint per capita
in 1991, for Dietz et al’s (2007) 135 countries. Since WWF (2004) does not give
population estimates for this year, and World Bank (2004) was no longer
available, I calculated population and economic growth rates 1991-2001 from
World Bank (2007) to estimate population size and GDP per capita in 1991.
Latitude and land area were, of course, unchanged. Because of poorer data
availability in 1991, 130 countries remained in the sample (see Hockley et al.
2008 for the list of countries).
Using this multi-year dataset, I compared Dietz et al’s (2007) model (equation
4.13), with a modified version (equation 4.14 below). This model differs in
141 In fact, data was available for 137 countries, with only the latitude classification missing for
Swaziland and Serbia & Montenegro, unambiguously tropical and temperate respectively.
However, to ensure maximum comparability, these two countries were also omitted from the
analysis described here.
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including a term t*(year-2001) representing the annual change in log(Impact) due
to technological progress from 1991 to 2001.
Equation 4.14
)()(081.0)(085.0)(log
052.0)]([log661.0)(log931.0562.0)(log
200110
2
101010
yeartsArcticTemperateArea
Ypopimpact


Note that I constrained the original coefficients to equal those in Dietz et al’s
(2007) model. Therefore my analysis estimates the degree of under-prediction in
1991 which occurs as a result of using Dietz et al’s (2007) model, which assumes
a 2001 level of technology. This is the amount by which actual Log10(Impact) in
1991 exceeds that predicted by Dietz et al. This implies that their model will over-
estimate Ecological Footprint in 2015 if technological progress continues.
To avoid bias in estimating t I include an intercept term s in equation 4.14. The
two models were fitted by OLS regression using the lm function in R (R Core
Development Team 2007) and compared on the basis of AIC scores. If
technological progress (t) has reduced Footprint over time, the annual change term
should improve the model and t should be negative. This work is published in
Hockley et al. (2008).
Results
As expected, the model including technological progress (4.14) received most
support from the data (ΔAIC=8.9 compared with equation 4.13, R2=95%), and the
coefficient t was negative at -6.18x10-3 (Table 4.4), indicating that technology did
improve over the period 1991-2001.
Table 4.4. Results from the analyses with constrained coefficients.
Estimate Std. error
Intercept, s -1.06x10-2 (1.32x10-2)
Technological progress (year-2001), t -6.18x10-3 (1.86x10-3)
n 130
ΔAIC 8.9
R2 95%
Annual change in impact 1.4%
This estimate of t implies an annual decrease in the Footprint of a country
(holding other factors constant) of around 1.4%. Adjusting Dietz et al.’s (2007)
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projection accordingly means that the global Footprint in 2015 would be around
20% lower than they predicted, but would still exceed the biocapacity of the earth
by around 27% (Figure 4.4). I also repeated the analysis using unconstrained
coefficients, and obtain similar results (Table 4.5).
Figure 4.4. The effect of technological progress on the projection of global Ecological
Footprint to 2015 (see Hockley et al. 2008).
Table 4.5. Results from the analyses with unconstrained coefficients.
Parameter Estimate Std. error.
(Year-2001) -5.72x10-3** (1.80x10-3)
Log10(Population) 0.93*** (0.02)
Log10(Affluence) -0.63* (0.29)
[Log10(Affluence)]2 0.14*** (0.04)
Log10(Area) 0.05** (0.02)
Temperate 0.21*** (0.02)
Arctic 0.30*** (0.04)
Intercept 0.65 (0.53)
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001;
n 130
ΔAIC 8.2
R2 95%
Annual change in impact 1.3%
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Discussion and conclusions
Dietz et al’s reliance on a cross-sectional analysis (despite data being available for
a panel study) led them to over-estimate the likely global Ecological Footprint in
2015 by around 20%. While their projection suggests an acceleration of growth in
global aggregate Ecological Footprint, my projection, corrected for technological
progress, is consistent with it beginning to decelerate.
I modeled technological progress as a function of time for simplicity, and because
I only had data from two years (1991 and 2001): the data could not support a more
complex specification. However, this is an unrealistic representation of
technological progress (see Section II), which is unlikely to proceed at a constant
rate independent of other factors. If these other factors were included (higher
incomes and human capital, increased urgency) this would likely reduce the
projection still further.
VIII. Discussion and Conclusions
I have argued that technological progress could allow continued per capita
economic growth, despite binding constraints on the environmental scale of the
human economy. In addition, that technological progress cannot be seen as
independent from economic growth: rather that a positive feedback loop exists
between the two.
Using a systematic review of the literature, I have identified significant bias in
published analyses of the relationship between economic and environmental scale.
The primary source of this bias is the choice of analytical frameworks which
ignore technological progress and its links to economic growth, though numerous
other flaws also lead authors to draw conclusions about the potential for
decoupling which are more pessimistic than the data allow.
The systematic nature of the bias present in the literature suggests that there has
been a tendency to accept without question studies which confirm the
conventional ecological economic wisdom: that decoupling economic scale from
environmental scale is impossible. This bias is surprising since, as I noted in
Section I, the existence of decoupling or an EKC does not imply that economic
growth is unbounded by environmental constraints, nor does it imply that policy
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action is not required to ensure sustainability: indeed, decoupling is likely to
require policies which recognise the environmental constraints faced by human
society. Although ecological economists accept this last point, they appear blind
to evidence that mankind is already making progress in this direction.
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5. An Environmental Kuznets
Curve for Global Ecological
Footprint
Abstract
I present the first test of the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis (an inverse
U-shaped relationship between environmental scale and income) using time-
series data on global Ecological Footprint from 1961 to 2001. This approach
captures technological effects of income growth, unlike previous cross-sectional
studies. In contrast to these studies, I find evidence for the existence of an
environmental Kuznets curve. I also investigate trends in the principal Footprint
subcomponents, finding significant decoupling of economic growth from the CO2
Footprint, and a steady decline in per capita non-energy Footprint. The results
suggest that, given appropriate policies, continued growth in per capita income
might be compatible with declining per capita environmental impact.
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I Introduction
Given the undeniable constraints imposed by a finite environment, our quality of
life can only continue to improve if the economic and environmental scales of the
human economy are substantially decoupled. This decoupling is often represented
as an environmental Kuznets curve (EKC), which posits an inverse U-shaped
relationship between environmental scale and income (Grossman & Krueger
1995, Dasgupta et al. 2002). Investigating the existence of, or potential for, an
EKC is therefore one of the most important issues in sustainability science.
Several authors have proposed a theoretical basis for the EKC, and many
empirical studies have provided evidence for EKCs (see the review by Dasgupta
et al. 2002). However, other reviews have taken the opposite view, concluding
that the evidence for the EKC hypothesis is ambiguous or flawed (e.g. Stern 2004,
Nahman & Antrobus 2005). The literature on the drivers of the Ecological
Footprint, which is the most comprehensive and influential indicator of
environmental impact (Wackernagel & Rees 1995), is almost universally
pessimistic about the prospects for decoupling (see Chapter 4), with some studies
even proposing a convex relationship between Footprint and income (e.g. Dietz et
al. 2007).
In Chapter 4, I showed that a great deal of the pessimism in the Footprint-income
literature results from flawed analyses, the most important flaw being the
assumption that technology is unrelated to income. Similarly, much pessimism in
the EKC literature comes from separating the scale and technology effects of
income. 142 For example, Stern (2004) seems to regard the observation that
developing countries are adopting environment regulations at lower income levels
than did richer countries as evidence against the EKC hypothesis. The discussion
in the previous chapter makes clear that, in fact, this is more properly viewed as
evidence that the analysis is looking at the wrong scale. Given the existence of
technological overspill, and the limited publicly available data, the only proper
142 It seems rather asymmetrical that critics of the EKC are anxious to control for off-shoring of
production and its environmental impacts to poor countries, but ignore the positive externalities
from technological innovation in rich countries.
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scale at which to evaluate an EKC in Footprint is global, using a time-series
analysis, rather than cross-sectional (e.g. Dietz et al. 2007, Bagliani et al. 2008).
In this chapter I use data on global per capita income and ecological Footprint
from 1961 to 2001 to test for the existence of an EKC, as well as exploring trends
in its major subcomponents. To the best of my knowledge, the analysis I present
here is the first such test of an EKC in Ecological Footprint.
II. Methods
Ecological Footprint data came from Table 3 of the 2004 Living Planet Report
(WWF 2004:32). This provides estimates of the global aggregate Ecological
Footprint for each year, 1961-2001, in current gha (n=41). Cross-sectional data
from successive editions of this report have been used in most previous studies of
Footprint (Bagliani et al. 2008, Dietz et al. 2007, Rosa et al. 2004, York et al.
2003a,b), but this is the first study to make use of the global time-series data. The
Ecological Footprint concept and data are reviewed by van den Bergh and
Verbruggen (1999a) and Monfreda et al. (2004).
I converted global aggregate values to per capita values using the population
estimates provided in the same table. Data on global per capita income are from
the latest update of Angus Maddison’s estimates (Maddison 2007, described in
Maddison 2006a & b), which provide per capita GDP in 1990 International
Geary-Khamis dollars. I used three different approaches to test for the existence of
an EKC. First I fitted a quadratic function to the data, and determined the sign of
the quadratic term, and the position of the turning point. Second, I extended this
approach by considering higher order polynomials. Third, I used non-linear
regression to fit alternative models to the data, each representing different
hypotheses: strictly increasing, asymptotic and humped.
A. Quadratic
A common test of the EKC is to fit a quadratic function to the data, and observe
the sign of the quadratic term (e.g. Rosa et al. 2004). I fitted a quadratic curve to
the per capita Ecological Footprint data from 1961 to 2001:
Equation 5.1
2YcYbaF 
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where F is Ecological Footprint per capita and Y is income per capita (a, b and c
are constants). I then compared this with a linear model on the basis of its Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) score:
Equation 5.2 YbaF 
If the quadratic function outperforms the linear function, the sign of the
coefficient c on the quadratic term can be used to infer whether an EKC is present
(see e.g. Bagliani et al. 2007). If the quadratic test is used, it is important to
determine the position of the turning point, as well as the sign of the quadratic
term. A negative quadratic may be found when the turning point lies far outside
the range of the data, and merely indicates an income elasticity of impact below
unity, rather than the existence of a turning point. Negative quadratics whose
turning points lie near or beyond the limit of the data are functionally
indistinguishable from strictly increasing or asymptotic functions. I calculated the
turning point for the quadratic function from Equation 5.3
Turning point
c
b
2


Finally, 95% confidence intervals for the quadratic function, and its turning point,
were estimated using bootstrapping. A probability distribution was produced by
fitting the function to 1,000 bootstrapped samples. Confidence intervals were
estimated by selecting the 25th and 975th highest prediction for each year from
the probability distribution. Confidence intervals for the turning point were
estimated by calculating the turning point for each bootstrap sample using
Equation 5.3, and taking the 25th and 975th highest estimates. The analyses were
implemented using the lm function in R (R Core Development Team 2007).
B. Higher order polynomials
In addition to quadratics, some studies have also used cubic functions (e.g.
Bagliani et al. 2008). However, unlike the quadratic, which provides a simple
representation of the EKC, it is not clear what hypothesis is represented by these
models, or why other polynomials are not tested. To allow comparison with these
studies, I extended the above analysis by fitting successively higher order
polynomial functions (Equation 5.4) until the AIC score was minimised. Thus, the
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AIC scores provide an objective means of model selection, preventing under- or
over-fitting.
Equation 5.4 nn
n
n YbYbYbYbaF 


1
1
2
2
1
1 ...
C. Non-linear regressions
As noted above, care is required when using a quadratic function to represent the
EKC hypothesis. This is because quadratics, being constrained to be symmetrical,
can be estimated even when the data are strictly increasing. The sign of the
quadratic term determines whether the function is convex or concave to the origin,
but not whether the data are humped. A more thorough test, therefore, is to
determine the consistency of the available data with three possible relationships
between Footprint and income: strictly increasing, asymptotic or humped, again
using AIC scores to determine the support received by each model from the data
(Equations 5.5-5.9). Strictly increasing functions represent no or only partial
decoupling. Asymptotic functions represent full decoupling at the margin. Each is
consistent with the early stages of an EKC, but do not provide evidence for it. To
represent the EKC hypothesis (with intra-marginal decoupling) I fitted a strictly
humped biexponential function, which estimates separate parameters for the rising
and falling slopes of the hump, providing a more robust test of the EKC than the
quadratic function.
Strictly Increasing
Equation 5.5 Linear: YbaF 
where b is positive
Equation 5.6 Power: bYaF 
where a and b are positive and b is the impact elasticity of income. If b<1, the
function is concave (implying partial decoupling at the margin), if b>1, the
function is convex (implying increasing marginal impact).
Asymptotic
2 Parameter Asymptotic Exponential:
Equation 5.7 )1( bYeaF 
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Where a is the value of the asymptote, and b is negative (asymptote approached
from below)
3 Parameter Asymptotic Exponential
Equation 5.8 ))( cYeabaF 
Where a is the asymptote, b is the intercept and c is negative.
Strictly Humped
Biexponential
Equation 5.9 dYbY eceaF 
The biexponential function may take a variety of forms: humped, U-shaped or
strictly decreasing, and if humped, may have a steeper up or down slope
depending on the signs and values of the parameters. If its second exponential is
replaced by a constant (i.e. if d=0) this equation is directly equivalent to a three
parameter asymptotic function, with asymptote=c. Thus, the last three functions
are nested, with the biexponential being the global model.
Note that each model is consistent with different stages of an EKC, but if the
turning point lies near to, or beyond, the upper limit of the data, only models 5.5-
5.8 will be supported. Such a finding does not exclude the possibility of an EKC
occurring in the future, but implies that the present data are also consistent with
less optimistic inferences. Models were compared on the basis of AIC scores, and
bootstrapped confidence intervals for the functions were estimated as above. All
the analyses were implemented using the nls function in R (R Core Development
Team 2007).
III. Results
A. Quadratic
The results of the quadratic test unambiguously favour the existence of an EKC.
The quadratic model received considerably more support from the data than the
linear model (ΔAIC=-66.6) supporting the inclusion of the quadratic term. In
addition, the quadratic term was negative and the turning point, together with its
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95% confidence intervals, lies well within the range of the data, at $5,036 or the
average global income in 1988 (Table 5.1, Figure 5.1).
Table 5.1. The results of the quadratic test for an EKC in global per capita Footprint.
Parameter Estimate Std Error
a -6.51x10-1 1.74X10-1
b 1.15X10-3 7.98X10-5
c -1.14X10-7 8.92X10-9
Turning Point $5,036
95% CI $4,858-$5,158
Data Range $2,833-$6,153
ΔAIC over linear -66.6
Adjusted R2 91%
Figure 5.1. The quadratic function fitted to data on world average Footprint per capita and
income per capita (1961-2001) with 95% confidence intervals.
B. Higher order polynomials
AIC score was minimised by the fifth order polynomial (Table 5.2). This supports
the existence of a clear hump, with a single maximum well within the data at
$4,624, or the world average income in 1984, and no minima (Table 5.3). All
polynomials fitted (up to 7th order) have a clear maximum between $4,000 and
$5,500, although the 4th, 6th and 7th order polynomials have minima beyond this
level, due to over fitting the fluctuations in the post maximum data (Figure 5.2).
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Table 5.2. AIC scores of the polynomial functions.
Polynomial AIC ∆AIC from best function
1st (linear) -61.3 80.8
2nd (quadratic) -127.9 14.2
3rd (cubic) -137.7 4.5
4th -141.6 0.5
5th -142.1 0.0
6th -141.1 1.0
7th -140.9 1.2
Figure 5.3. Parameter estimates and turning point of the 5th order polynomial.
Parameter Estimate Std Error
a 31.93 18.43
b1 -3.692x10-02 2.183x10-02
b2 1.721x10-05 1.018x10-05
b3 -3.837x10-09 2.335x10-09
b4 4.138x10-13 2.638x10-13
b5 -1.740x10-17 1.175x10-17
Turning point $4,624
Data Range $2,833-$6,153
Adjusted R2 94%
Figure 5.2 Higher order polynomial functions fitted to world average Ecological Footprint and income per capita (1961-2001).
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C. Nonlinear regression
The results of the nonlinear regression are also consistent with the existence of
significant decoupling of per capita global Ecological Footprint from income.
First, the asymptotic functions are much better supported than the strictly
increasing functions, indicating full decoupling at the margin. This implies that
for the last decade or so, per capita economic growth has not lead to increases in
the global Ecological Footprint per person. This conclusion is robust, with narrow
95% confidence intervals of the position of the asymptote, between 2.27 and 2.22
gha,143 lying within the range of the data (Figure 5.1). Further, the existence of an
EKC, and intra-marginal decoupling, is also supported by the non-linear
regressions: the humped biexponential model receives substantially more support
from the data than any other model (Table 5.4).
Table 5.4. AIC and ΔAIC scores for the five functions.
Type Function Parameters AIC ΔAIC
Strictly Humped Biexponential 4 -135.2 0
3 P. Asymptotic 3 -120.5 14.7Asymptotic
2 P. Asymptotic 2 -83.6 51.5
Power 2 -68.3 66.9Strictly Increasing
Linear 2 -61.3 73.8
Quadratic (for comparison) 3 -127.9 7.3
Confidence intervals, however, could not be obtained for the biexponential
function, as bootstrapping failed because the model failed to converge for a large
proportion of samples144. This is because of the relatively small number of data
points available after the maximum. Inspection of the parameter estimates and
their standard errors (Table 5.5) indicates that the standard errors of the down
slope parameters (c and d) are large relative to the estimates and t-values are
143 Based on 500 bootstrapped samples
144 I also attempted to produce confidence intervals using the jack-knife procedure. However,
while the model converged on all leave-one-out samples (n=41), it failed to converge on all leave-
two-out samples (n=820) meaning that insufficient samples were available to estimate confidence
intervals.
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small. Thus there are insufficient data to robustly derive the shape of the down
slope and, while the available data are clearly humped in shape, it is still too early
to draw any firm conclusions about the form of the curve to the right of the
maximum. Remember that if d=0, the biexponential function collapses to the 3
parameter asymptotic function, with asymptote=c.
Although the best fitting higher order polynomials (3≤n≤7) outperform the
biexponential function, they cannot easily be mechanistically justified a priori,
and therefore are not well suited to drawing inferences from the data (Burnham &
Anderson 2002).
Table 5.5. Parameter estimates and standard errors for the three best supported functions.
Type Function Parameter Estimate Std. error
t-
value
Std. error
as % of
estimate
a -10.32 2.255 4.6 21.9
b -5.475x10-4 3.510x10-4 1.6 64.1
c 5.527 5.468 1 98.9
Strictly
Humped
Biexponenti
al d -1.287x10-4 1.077x10-4 1.2 83.6
a 2.238 1.590x10-2 140.8 0.7
b -49.171 30 1.6 61
Asymptotic
3 Parameter
Asymptotic c 1.564x10-3 1.994x10-4 7.8 12.7
a -6.506x10-1 1.735x10-1 3.7 26.7
b 1.153x10-3 7.977x10-5 14.5 6.9
Quadratic (for
comparison) c -1.144x10-7 8.921x10-9 12.8 7.8
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Figure 5.3. The asymptotic exponential function with 95% confidence intervals and the
biexponential function (no confidence intervals) fitted to world average Ecological
Footprint and income per capita (1961-2001).
IV. Footprint subcomponents
Wackernagel et al. (2002) warn that, regardless of whether there may be
decoupling between environmental impact and economic scale, the world’s
Ecological Footprint has already exceeded the world’s biocapacity. This means
that the stocks of natural capital that would have to be depleted to ensure that
there was no net emissions of CO2 exceed those that remain.145 This underlines the
point that while Footprint analysis allows the two main components of Footprint,
natural capital and entropy, to be compared, this does not imply that they are, in
practice, fully inter-convertible or that mankind is optimising the balance between
the two (van den Bergh & Verbruggen 1999a, Wackernagel 1999). It is therefore
interesting to investigate trends in the subcomponents of ecological Footprint.
145 CO2 emissions can be reduced through reforestation (or afforestation) to sequester the CO2, or
by growing biofuels to displace fossil fuels. However, both options can either directly or indirectly
displace natural capital, and in any case, the land required at current technologies exceeds that
available.
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WWF (2004) provides a breakdown of Ecological Footprint into three categories:
“Food, Fibre and Timber”; “Built-up Land”, and “Energy”. The last represents
increases in high entropy CO2 and therefore represents an “entropy component”,
or more specifically a “CO2 component”. The first two represent the pressures on
natural capital, and therefore a “Natural Capital component”. The CO2 component
and the natural capital component are not only conceptually different, but have
also had very different economic histories. Table 5.6 gives some illustrative dates
for scarcity signals and government policies directed towards these resource types.
The nature conservation movement is thus at least a century old, implying that a
value has been placed on the conservation of some natural capital for at least that
long. In contrast, while there have always been incentives for increasing
efficiency in the use of fossil fuels, there have not, until very recently, been any
incentives for improving the CO2 efficiency of economies, although policies
aimed at other, more local, pollution problems (e.g. the Fuel Price Escalator in the
UK) may also have improved the CO2 efficiency of many economies as a by-
product. Also, apart from specific price shocks in the 1970s, there have been few
signs of absolute scarcity in the supply of fossil fuels, whereas the supply of land
in most countries has been highly inelastic for many centuries.146 Overall then,
incentives for efficiency in the CO2 component of the Footprint have probably
lagged at least a century or more behind similar incentives in the natural capital
component.
146 The creation of land from the sea in the Netherlands, where the price of land is very high, only
serves to illustrate this point.
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Table 5.6. Scarcity signals, government policy and international treaties relevant to the
Natural Capital and CO2 components of the Ecological Footprint.
Natural Capital CO2
Scarcity signals <1800s Frontier expansion
reaches W. Coast of
USA147
1970s Oil Price Shocks
1872 Yellowstone National
Park created
1973 US Endangered Species
Act
1979 EU Birds Directive
1988 EU Set-aside Scheme
National / regional
government policies
specifically targeting these
externalities
1992 EU Habitats Directive
2005 European Union
Emissions Trading
Scheme148
1971 Ramsar Convention on
Wetlands
1973 CITES
International treaties signed
1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity
1997 Kyoto Protocol
International treaties enter
into force
1975 Ramsar & CITES 2005 Kyoto Protocol
This suggests two hypotheses about trends in the two principal components of
Ecological Footprint. First, we might expect to see efficiency improvements to
occur earlier in the natural capital component than in the CO2 component and
stronger evidence for an EKC in the former. Second, since specific incentives for
efficiency gains in both components are relatively recent, especially on the
international level, we might expect further gains in efficiency in the future. To
examine these propositions, I examine trends in each of these components of the
Ecological Footprint with increasing per capita income.
Natural capital component
The natural capital component of the ecological Footprint shows a clear and
consistent decline per capita throughout the period 1961-2001 (Figure 5.4),
implying that the peak of the EKC, if any exists, lies to the left-hand side of the
147 Vandenbroucke (2008)
148 See Ellerman and Buchner (2007) Convery and Redmond (2007) and Kruger et al. (2007).
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data. Because of this, the models used above are not suitable.149 Figure 5.4 also
shows world biocapacity per capita over the same period, also taken from T able 3
of WWF (2004:32). Despite rapid population growth over the period, the non-CO2
Footprint has not yet come close to exceeding the world’s biocapacity. 150
However, natural capital per capita has declined considerably.
Figure 5.4. The trend in the non-energy component of global Ecological Footprint (1961-
2001).
CO2 component
The CO2 component of Ecological Footprint shows a very different trend,
increasing for most of the period (Figure 5.5). I repeated for this component the
tests used above for total Ecological Footprint. The quadratic function fitted well
(adjusted R2=99.9%) and outperformed the linear (∆AIC=100.9), and the
quadratic term was negative. However, the turning point lay near the upper end of
the data range at $5,728 or the world average income in 1998 (Table 5.7).
149 The power, two- and three- parameter asymptotic and biexponential functions did not converge,
while the linear function was of course strictly decreasing rather than increasing.
150 Note that the total space left for natural capital, which can be represented by the gap between
aggregate non-CO2 Footprint and biocapacity, cannot be seen on this graph, which shows per
capita natural capital.
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Table 5.7. Parameter estimates for the quadratic equation.
Parameter Estimate Std Error
a -2.27 9.82x10-2
b 1.20x10-3 4.52x10-5
c -1.05x10-7 5.05x10-9
Turning Point $5,728
95% CI $5,553-$5,854
Data Range $2,833-$6,153
ΔAIC over linear -100.9
Adjusted R2 99.90%
Figure 5.5. The quadratic function with 95% CIs fitted to world average CO2 Footprint
per capita.
In the non-linear regression, the quadratic function clearly outperforms the strictly
increasing and asymptotic functions (Table 5.8). However, the biexponential
function did not converge, since there is no evidence for any maximum in the data
(Figure 5.6). Thus, in this case, the quadratic function is functionally
indistinguishable from the asymptotic function (as evidenced by the position of
the turning point). This case demonstrates the importance of not relying on the
quadratic test of EKCs alone.
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Table 5.8. AIC and ΔAIC scores for the per capita CO2 Footprint.
Type Function151 Parameters AIC ΔAIC
Asymptotic 3 Parameter
Asymptotic
3 -163.7 0
Linear 2 -73.7 90Strictly
Increasing Power 2 -67.8 95.9
Strictly
Humped
Biexponential 4 Did not converge
Quadratic (for comparison) 3 -174.6 -10.9
This indicates that, while the data are consistent with the existence of an EKC, the
data are also consistent with an asymptotic model – it is too early to conclude that
an EKC exists for CO2.152
Figure 5.6. The quadratic and three parameter asymptotic functions fitted to world
average CO2 Footprint per capita (1961-2001).
151 The two parameter asymptotic function, like the biexponential function, did not converge.
152 Note, however, that these results are considerably more optimistic about the possibility of
decoupling than the positive quadratic apparently found by Rosa et al. (2004) for national CO2
Footprints (see previous chapter). The difference is primarily due to their use of cross-sectional
data, and logged variables. As I showed in the previous chapter, a positive quadratic in the latter
does not necessarily imply a convex function in the untransformed variables.
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V. Discussion
Empirical assessments of the EKC hypothesis should not be viewed as binary
pass/fail tests, but rather as measures of the strength of the evidence for an EKC,
given the available data, compared with alternative hypotheses. Any functional
form, even one which is convex, is compatible with the existence of an EKC at
some point in the future. Since we lack a definitive, mechanistic model of the
relationship between environmental impact and income level (and indeed, it seems
plausible that, given its complexity, no model could exist) it is only possible to
draw conclusions about the period covered by the data. This study has
demonstrated the weakness of the quadratic approach for these purposes, and the
advantages of using a strictly humped function, such as the biexponential. It has
also demonstrated that the arbitrary use of cubic functions, as opposed to other
higher order polynomials, without a priori justification (e.g. Bagliani et al. 2008),
is of questionable utility.
The relationship between global Ecological Footprint per capita and income per
capita over the period studied is best described by a humped function, although an
asymptotic function cannot be ruled out. This implies that, at minimum, economic
growth has been fully decoupled from growth in environmental scale, and
furthermore that intra-marginal decoupling is probably occurring (an EKC). This
is a striking result, and considerably more optimistic about the possibility of
decoupling than those of recent studies which have used cross-sectional data, and
therefore ignored technological progress (Dietz et al. 2007, Bagliani et al. 2008).
It is all the more interesting given that the indicator used (Ecological Footprint)
controls for off-shoring and represents a more comprehensive range of impacts
than has been tested in most studies of the EKC (Stern 2004).
Although theory suggests several mechanisms by which EKCs may be produced
(Dasgupta et al. 2002), an EKC remains fundamentally a descriptive rather than a
deterministic model. Evidence for an EKC, such as that presented above, should
be interpreted cautiously, as demonstrating that growth in income is potentially
compatible with declining environmental scale, it does not ensure that this will be
so. In particular, evidence for the existence of an EKC cannot be used to argue
against policies aimed at improving environmental quality, since these policies are
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part and parcel of the EKC hypothesis (Dasgupta et al. 2002). At most, evidence
for decoupling can be used to argue against policies aimed at preventing further
economic growth at the macro level (e.g. Czech 2002). In addition, Arrow et al’s
(1995) caveats apply: unanticipated non-linearities could result in environmental
catastrophe before the EKC is completed.
As expected, the components of Ecological Footprint show markedly different
trends. The natural capital component shows a steady decline per capita, but
although the CO2 component shows significant decoupling per capita, there is no
hard evidence for a turning point, and certainly no decline, in CO2. This reflects
the point made in the previous chapter that technological progress (including
policy development) will be related to urgency. As stated earlier, incentives for
reducing the CO2 component are relatively recent. It is seems plausible that, given
suitable such policies and incentives, an EKC for the CO2 component will emerge.
In any case, the results presented here are considerably more optimistic about the
potential for decoupling than those derived for CO2 by other authors (e.g. Rosa et
al. 2004) from cross-sectional data.
This chapter demonstrates that significant decoupling of Ecological Footprint
from income has been achieved over the last four decades. This is in stark contrast
to the rest of the literature on Ecological Footprint. Since I use the same data
source, the difference seems largely to result from using a more suitable spatial
scale (global rather than national) to analyse technological progress, capturing
international overspill. However, without accelerated technological progress,
human society will continue to overshoot the biocapacity of the earth for some
time to come. Chapter 6 will conclude this part of the thesis, by combining the
models developed here (representing marginal and intra-marginal decoupling)
with the economic projections developed in Chapter 3, to calculate overshoot
parameters for each economic projection, based on alternative technology
scenarios.
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6. Economic, demographic and
ecological projections to 2105
Abstract
Chapter 3 discussed the use of income projections in cost-benefit analysis: the
desirability of finding a global model on which all parties can agree and which is
parameterised with reference to observed data, as well as subjective opinion.
Some progress was made in Chapter 3 towards constructing such a model, with
reference to the historical data, and in Chapters 5 and 6 environmental
constraints were investigated. The purpose of this chapter is to combine these two
strands of investigation, and to produce historically-referenced, environmentally-
parameterised income projections that can be used in the illustrative cost-benefit
analysis of nature conservation in Madagascar, which follows in the next three
chapters.
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I. Projecting regional income to 2105
In Chapter 4, I developed projections of per capita income for the OECD90 region
and the relative income gap 153 for the ASIA and ALM regions 154 through
extrapolation of historical data. I limited the analysis to data from 1952 to 1990, to
allow comparison with the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change’s
projections (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000). Although at least one candidate model
performed well for OECD90 and ASIA, considerable unexplained variation
remained for the ALM region, the region of greatest interest for the case study. In
addition, no such analysis could be carried out for the REF region, due to the lack
of pre-1991 data.
To project regional per capita income for the period 2005-2105, I repeated the
analysis in Chapter 4 using the latest available income data from Heston et al.
(2006) covering the period 1952-2003 for OECD90, ALM and ASIA and 1990-
2003 for the REF region. The results are summarised below, see Chapter 4 for full
methods.
OECD90
Not surprisingly, given the excellent performance of the power function in
predicting the data 1991-2003 (Figure 3.1), it once again performs best out of the
three functions when fitted to the full dataset (Figure 6.1), with even larger ∆AICs 
compared with the linear and exponential functions (Table 6.1), such that model
averaging is unnecessary (∆AIC>16).155 The parameter estimates are also similar
to those estimated in Chapter 4 (compare Table 6.2 below, with Table 3.3).
153Relative income gap is the gap between a region’s income per capita and that of the OECD,
expressed as a percentage of the OECD’s income per capita. Thus if ASIA region has a relative
income gap of 90%, its income per capita is 10% of the OECD’s. See Chapter 4 for full details.
154 OECD90 = members of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1990, i.e.
Western Europe, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan; ASIA = Asia excluding former
Soviet Union and Japan; ALM = Africa, Latin America and Middle East; REF = countries
undergoing economic reforms: Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union. See chapter 3 for full
definitions of regions.
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∆AIC of >10 implies that a model has essentially no empirical support (Burnham & Anderson
2002:70) and in the case where there are two candidate models, implies an Akaike weight of 0.7%
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Figure 6.1. Power, exponential and linear models fitted to income per capita data for the
OECD90 region (1952-2003). For region definitions, see footnote 2, main text.
ASIA
Similarly, for ASIA, the quadratic exponential function remains the best
supported and provides an excellent fit to the observed data (Figure 6.2). ∆AICs
are even greater than before, and there is no need to model average (∆AIC>140). 
Once again, parameter b of the asymptotic exponential is negative (Table 6.2),
when it must be positive for the function to have the property of asymptotic
increase, and this function is therefore discarded.
(Burnham & Anderson 2002:75). In other words, the model would contribute just 0.7% of
bootstrap samples when calculating model averaged projections.
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Figure 6.2. Quadratic exponential and exponential decay models fitted to data on the
relative income gap between the ASIA region and OECD90 (1952-2003). For region
definitions, see footnote 2, main text.
ALM
In Chapter 4 I found no evidence of convergence for this region, with parameter b
of the exponential decay function and c of the quadratic exponential function both
negative, and therefore only the asymptotic exponential function was retained.
Extending the dataset to 2003 does not change this finding; indeed, it increases the
estimate of the asymptote from 74% to 93% (Tables 3.6 and Table 6.2, Figure
6.3). This suggests that we should expect the ALM region to continue diverging
from the OECD90 region.
However, as before, the fit is poor relative to those of the previous two regions. If
the analysis is restricted to the last two decades of the data (1983-2003), the
quadratic exponential is now concave to the origin, and is the best supported
function (Table 6.1), though the asymptotic exponential function also receives
some support (∆AIC=3.1). A concave quadratic exponential function implies 
divergence followed by convergence – as for the ASIA region. However, the
turning point lies beyond the range of the data, in 2010 (Table 6.2, Figure 6.4).
Thus, this result should be treated with caution.
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This highlights the sensitivity of projections to the choice of data set, when none
of the candidate models explains the data well. Given this uncertainty, two
alternative scenarios for ALM income are adopted for illustrative purposes. The
pessimistic scenario is that ALM will continue to diverge from the OECD90
region, following the asymptotic exponential function parameterised using the
data 1952-2003. The optimistic scenario is that ALM divergence will end in 2010,
after which it will begin to converge, i.e. that it will follow the quadratic
exponential function fitted to the data 1983-2003. These scenarios are illustrative,
and relative probabilities are not assigned to them. Nevertheless, they are at least
transparently derived with reference to the historical data and represent plausible,
if subjective, views on the future of ALM income level.
Figure 6.3. The asymptotic exponential model fitted to data on the relative income gap
between the ALM region and OECD90. Data is from 1952-1990 and 1952-2003. For
region definitions, see footnote 2, main text.
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Figure 6.4. Alternative models fitted to alternative subsets of the data on the relative
income gap between the ALM region and OECD90. For region definitions, see footnote
2, main text.
REF
This region was not considered in Chapter 4 because of the paucity of pre-1990
data (see Chapter 3). For the purposes of the case study, I use data from 1990-
2003, analysing it in the same way as that from ASIA or ALM. Like ASIA, the
region shows divergence and then convergence over the period studied, and the
quadratic exponential function offers the best fit (Table 6.1, Figure 6.5). The
turning point is reached in 1998 (Table 6.2). Parameters a and b of the exponential
decay function were both negative, implying an increasing rather than decreasing
function, and this is discarded.
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Figure 6.5. Quadratic exponential and asymptotic exponential models fitted to data on the
relative income gap between the REF region and OECD90 (1990-2003). For region
definitions, see footnote 2, main text.
Regional projections of per capita income
Combining the projection of OECD90 income per capita, with those of the
relative income gap for ASIA, ALM and REF regions allows income per capita to
be projected for each region. Figure 6.6 shows these projections from 2000 to
2105, together with the observed data and model fits. Both optimistic and
pessimistic projections are shown for ALM.
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Figure 6.6. Observed GDP per capita (points), model fits and income projections to 2105.
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Table 6.1. AIC comparisons of the income and relative income models, for the four
regions, and the world.
Parameters
AIC
Score ∆AIC
Akaike
Weight
OECD90
Power 3 749.09 0.00 1.00
Linear 2 765.56 16.48 2.64 x10-4
Exponential 2 819.29 70.20 5.69x10-16
ASIA
Quadratic exponential 3 -407.36 0 1.00
Asymptotic exponential 2 -266.62 140.74 N/A
Exponential decay 2 -249.46 157.90 5.16x10-35
ALM
Quadratic exponential 3 -337.04 0 N/A
Exponential decay 2 -328.05 8.99 N/A
Asymptotic exponential 2 -313.53 23.51 1.00
ALM using subset of data from 1983 to 2003
Quadratic exponential 3 -171.73 0 0.82
Asymptotic exponential 2 -168.65 3.09 0.18
Exponential decay 2 -164.13 7.61 N/A
REF using data from 1990 to 2003
Quadratic exponential 3 -98.06 0.00 1.00
Asymptotic exponential 2 -53.43 44.63 1.52x10-10
Exponential decay 2 -52.85 45.22 N/A
Global income projection (see Section III)
Power 4 492.38 0.00 0.99
Linear 3 501.83 9.45 8.79x10-3
Exponential 3 531.06 38.68 3.95x10-9
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Table 6.2. Parameter estimates for the income and relative income models, for the four
regions, and the world.
Model Parameter Estimate Std. Error
OECD90
Exponential a 8.74 1.91x10-2
b 2.38x10-2 4.94x10-4
Linear a 4.49x103 1.03x102
b 3.00x102 3.39
Power a 5.17x103 1.60x102
b 1.68x102 2.22x101
c 1.14 3.23x10-2
ASIA
Exponential decay a -6.62x10-2 6.52x10-3
b 1.77x10-3 2.19x10-4
Asymptotic exponential a 6.34x10-2 3.83x10-3
b -1.81x10-2 1.64x10-3
Quadratic exponential a -1.19x10-1 2.21x10-3
b 4.18x10-3 1.94x10-4
c 1.14x10-4 3.60x10-6
Turning point 1969
ALM
Exponential decay a -3.47x10-1 3.80x10-3
b -2.94x10-3 1.20x10-4
Asymptotic exponential a 2.98x10-1 3.63x10-3
b 9.27x10-3 4.54x10-4
Quadratic exponential a -3.34x10-1 5.34x10-3
b 1.45x10-3 4.52x10-4
c -2.76x10-5 8.12x10-6
Turning point
N/A (convex
function)
ALM using data from 1983 to 2003
Exponential decay a -2.57x10-1 2.54x10-3
b -3.38x10-3 1.99x10-4
Asymptotic exponential a 2.29x10-1 1.95x10-3
b 1.39x10-2 7.29x10-4
Quadratic exponential a -2.66x10-1 3.35x10-3
b 5.54x10-3 6.90x10-4
c 9.74x10-5 3.02x10-5
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Turning point 2010
REF using data from 1990 to 2003
Exponential decay a -3.81x10-1 2.58x10-2
b -5.52x10-3 2.98x10-3
Asymptotic exponential a 3.23x10-1 1.88x10-2
b 1.55x10-2 7.23x10-3
Quadratic exponential a -4.99x10-1 8.67x10-3
b 4.88x10-2 2.57x10-3
c 2.86x10-3 1.65x10-4
Turning point 1998
Global income projection
Power a 2.68x103 8.00x101
b 1.52x102 2.85x101
c 8.24x10-1 4.62x10-2
Linear a 2.91x103 3.34x101
b 7.53x101 1.38
Exponential a 8.05 1.26x10-2
b 1.65x10-2 4.51x10-4
Chapter 6
169
II. Regional and global population to 2105
I have not considered population so far in this thesis. Yet to aggregate regional
income projections into a global projection (next section) demographic projections
are of course required, as they are for the case study which follows. The most
recent peer-reviewed long-range projection of population covering the whole
world is Lutz et al. (2001),156 which extends to 2100. I used the median population
projections from this source.157 The projections are provided in five year intervals,
therefore, to provide annual estimates I fitted a third order polynomial to each
projection (R2>99%) and used this, extrapolating it forwards by five years to 2105
(Figure 6.7).
156More recent projections are available from the United Nations Population Division (UNPD
2006) but these extend only to 2050.
157 Data downloaded in 5 year intervals from:
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/POP/proj01/IIASA_projections2001.xls 9th May 2008. Regions in
Lutz et al. (2001) are aggregated into the regions considered in Chapter 4 as follows: OECD90 =
North America, Western Europe, Pacific OECD; ASIA = China region, South Asia, Pacific Asia;
ALM = North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, Middle East; REF = Central Asia,
Eastern Europe, European part of the former USSR. See
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc/emission/149.htm.
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Figure 6.7. Population projections from Lutz et al. (2001), with interpolation (solid line)
and extrapolation to 2105 (dotted line) using a 3rd order polynomial function (R2 >99% in
each case).
Combining unrelated demographic and economic projections in this way assumes
that population and income levels are independent of one another, yet there is
evidence for linkages between the two (see Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004).
However, the demographic projections used here were developed independently
from any economic projection, and the developer’s opinion is that “the general
pattern of demographic transition ... is related to general development, but not
economic growth specifically” (Wolfgang Lutz, pers. com).
III. Environmental implications of income projections:
Ecological Footprint to 2105
Numerous authors have questioned the environmental feasibility of continued
income growth (e.g. Georgescu-Roegen 1971[1999], Daly & Townsend 1993,
Costanza 1995, see Chapter 4 for discussion) and income projections play a
contentious role in environmental cost-benefit analyses. For example, Spash
(2007b) questions the feasibility of the income growth assumptions made by Stern
(2006), arguing that environmental limits will prevent income reaching the levels
predicted. Therefore in any long-range CBA, the environmental implications of
the income projections used should be investigated.
In Chapter 5 I introduced the Ecological Footprint as a way of conceptualising
these limits using an accounting measure, and reviewed the existing literature on
economic growth and Ecological Footprint, finding it to be biased towards
pessimism. Chapter 6 continued this work, finding good evidence for there being
(at minimum) decoupling of economic scale from environmental scale at the
margin, and some evidence of intra-marginal decoupling – an environmental
Kuznets curve. While it is impossible to predict by extrapolation something so
strongly under the influence of deliberate human policy, it is instructive to project
the environmental scale (e.g. Ecological Footprint) of the income projections
developed above, using the best available models of the relationship between
income and Ecological Footprint (taken from Chapter 5).
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First, I combine the regional income and population projections, to project
average world income per capita (Figure 6.8). There are two projections for the
two different scenarios of ALM growth. For comparison, Figure 6.8 also shows a
projection derived from directly extrapolating average global per capita income
using the best supported function (a power function, see Tables 6.1, 6.2).158 It is
interesting to note that this projection differs markedly from that obtained through
projecting each region individually, showing that the scale at which data is
aggregated is important in comparing projections with the historical data. This has
implications for the work in Chapter 4, and above, which has used data aggregated
to large regions, following the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
(Nakicenovic & Swart 2000). The difference is due to the fact that the historical
data covers the period where the ASIA and REF regions were diverging from, as
well as converging on, the OECD. Averaged over this period their growth was
relatively slow, therefore. However, if the convergence which is already present in
the historical data continues, they will continue the current relatively rapid growth
in the future, raising overall growth rates.
158 I used data on global averaged income per capita (1961-2001) from Maddison (2006) since this
is not available from Heston et al. (2006).
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Figure 6.8. Projections of global average per capita GDP (1990 US$), based on:
aggregating regional projections (broken lines) and on extrapolation of world average
GDP per capita (solid line).
Next I project global Ecological Footprint for these income projections, using the
Footprint-income models derived in Chapter 6 and the population projections
from Section II, above. Global Ecological Footprint is shown Figure 6.9 and for
comparison, I also show three projections developed by the WWF, in the Living
Planet Report 2006: a business as usual projection (their representation of current
trends) and slow and rapid transitions to more sustainable economies, as defined
by WWF (2006). Ecological Footprint is shown as a factor of available global
biocapacity (i.e. number of planets required), assuming that the supply of global
hectares remains constant at year 2000 levels.159 Table 6.3 provides estimates of
the number of planet-years of overshoot implied by each projection, where
overshoot is the amount by which global Ecological Footprint exceeds global
biocapacity.
Figure 6.9. Ecological Footprint projected for each economic projection, using alternative
models developed in Chapter 3.
159 In fact the number of global hectares (GHa) on the planet has been increasing over time, due to
conversion of unproductive land and forests to cropland, which has a higher biocapacity
(according to the Ecological Footprint method). I assume that this process is halted in order to
conserve wild nature.
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Table 6.3. Ecological overshoot (in planet-years) calculated for alternative models of
decoupling, income scenarios and for WWF’s (2006) scenarios. A planet-year of
overshoot is equivalent to the world’s Ecological Footprint exceeding the available
biocapacity by 100% for one year.
Overshoot (planet-
years)
Decoupling model Economic scenario Year overshoot
ends
2000-2050 2000-2100
Optimistic ALM
growth
2019 2.71 2.71Intra-marginal
decoupling
(biexponential) Pessimistic ALM
growth
2020 2.85 2.85
Marginal decoupling
(asymptotic
exponential)
Any income growth
scenario
>2100 26.50 63.39
WWF Scenarios
WWF Business as usual ? 30.6 N/A
WWF Slow transition 2088 13.6 17.9
WWF Rapid transition 2042 5.9 5.9
These projections, of course, represent extrapolations well beyond the range of the
observed data, and are dependent on the initial set of candidate models.
Nevertheless, they illustrate several important points. First, that looking at the two
lines representing optimistic and pessimistic ALM growth, faster economic
growth reduces Ecological Footprint faster than slower growth does, under the
biexponential Footprint-income model, in which intra-marginal decoupling occurs
(Figure 6.9). However, both growth scenarios lead to rapid reductions in
Ecological Footprint, more rapid than any of the WWF scenarios. Second, under
the more pessimistic asymptotic income-Footprint model, in which no intra-
marginal decoupling occurs, Ecological Footprint continues to rise for quite some
time, and a very substantial “ecological debt” (WWF 2006) accumulates.
However, this rise is driven by population growth, not economic growth (the
projection of Ecological Footprint is identical for both income projections).
Slower income growth makes no difference, since the asymptote of the Footprint-
income relationship has already been reached. In this model, only negative income
growth could reduce Footprint. To an extent, this is an artefact of the overly
simplistic analysis carried out in Chapter 5, in which it was not possible to
separate consumption and technological progress. It might be possible to reduce
Footprint by slowing income growth, but only if technological progress was not
also slowed. Therefore, rather than managing aggregate consumption, it might be
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more appropriate to provide targeted incentives for greater efficiency in the use of
scarce resources (e.g. carbon taxes). Finally, the projections developed in this
thesis are generally more optimistic than those in WWF (2006). The reason for
this cannot easily be deduced, since WWF (2006) provide no detailed information
about how their projections were developed.
These projections serve to illustrate the implications of the finding that at present
and based on the proxies used (GDP per capita and Ecological Footprint), the
economic and environmental scales of the human economy are at worst decoupled
at the margin. At best, with intra-marginal decoupling, economic growth might be
compatible with reduced environmental scale. This is acknowledged by the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000, Nakicenovic
et al. 2003, Grübler et al. 2004). Thus, using these proxies, which are widely used
in the sustainability literature, there does not appear to be any evidence that
current trends in income growth are necessarily unsustainable. Whether or not
they prove to be sustainable will depend on both the earth’s capacity to tolerate
overshoot, and on whether current trends in decoupling economic and
environmental scale continue. The latter depends on the rate of technological
progress and therefore, in part, on the policy environment and the preferences of
individuals.
IV. Conclusions
This chapter has brought together work from the previous four chapters to
produce income projections which can be used in the cost-benefit analysis case
study which follows. The aim has been to work towards the requirements outlined
in Chapter 3. First, income projections used in cost-benefit analyses should be
transparently developed, clearly linked to the historical data (without being
constrained by it) and probabilistic, incorporating both subjective and objective
probabilities. Second, their environmental feasibility should be investigated.
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7. The Ranomafana-Andringitra
new protected area in
Madagascar: introduction to the
case study
Abstract
Increasingly, conservationists argue that conservation efforts should be
prioritised towards developing countries, because of their high levels of species
richness and the relatively low monetary costs of conservation. However, cost-
benefit analyses of the value of conservation in the poorest countries are rare. In
this chapter I introduce an empirical case study of a conservation project that
aims to conserve an area of Madagascar’s eastern rainforests: the Ranomafana-
Andringitra corridor. Madagascar is renowned for extremely high biodiversity (it
has been identified as a global priority for conservation) but also for the extreme
poverty of its human population. The following chapters will use the CBA
framework introduced in chapter 2 to investigate the social desirability of this
project.
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I. Introduction
An important challenge for the international community is to respond
appropriately to the ongoing transformation of the natural environment and the
consequent loss of wild nature. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, cost-benefit analysis
has the potential to help human society decide how to respond to this challenge;
however, such analyses are rare. In this chapter I introduce an empirical case
study of one conservation project that aims to conserve an area of Madagascar’s
eastern rainforests, which is threatened by conversion to agriculture, mining and
timber extraction. This case study will be developed further in the next four
chapters, and will serve to illustrate some of the points made in Chapter 2.
Biodiversity conservation and the objective of the case study
Nature conservation has traditionally had a diverse range of objectives and
motivations. Many of the early protected areas focussed on conserving landscape
and wilderness, rather than preventing the extinction of species, and as a
consequence, numerous studies have noted that protected area networks may be
relatively inefficient in maximising the number of species they protect (e.g.
Rodrigues et al. 2004, Araujo et al. 2007, Maiorano et al. 2007). Although the
authors of these studies invariably see this as a flaw, it is not immediately obvious
why nature conservation should focus exclusively on maintaining the maximum
possible species richness (number of species) of the country concerned (or of the
whole world). The value of maintaining global or national species richness is
poorly understood (Christie et al. 2006, Pearce 2007, see also references in
Chapter 9), and species richness may be a poor predictor or driver of other
conservation objectives, such as maintaining landscape beauty, recreation value,
or ecosystem functioning (Price unpubl., Edwards-Jones et al. 1995, Schwartz et
al. 2000). Thus, when Balmford et al. (2002) attempted to carry out a meta-
analysis of the economic benefits of biodiversity conservation (i.e. maximising
species richness), they had to abandon the task, and instead evaluate the value of
conserving “wild nature” since no studies provided sufficient evidence of a
linkage between species richness and the benefits they valued (Andrew Balmford,
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pers. com.) Even then, they found only five suitable case studies, none of which
concerned biodiversity conservation in low income countries.160
Nevertheless, especially in the international realm, the focus of nature
conservation has become increasingly dominated by the concept of biodiversity,
and work on optimising conservation planning tends to emphasise maximising
global or national species richness (e.g. Wilson et al. 2006, Underwood et al.
2008).161 Although such planning exercises have begun to include the economic
costs of biodiversity conservation, the benefits are still usually measured in
numbers of species conserved (Naidoo et al. 2006).
There are several problems with this approach. First, even if we accept that the
proper objective of conservation is maximising species richness, the cost-
effectiveness of achieving this goal can only be measured if benefits (number of
species) are divided by net costs, i.e. costs (e.g. of land purchases) minus other
benefits (e.g. of carbon sequestration). More fundamentally, using species
richness as a proxy for conservation benefit is deeply problematic, for the reasons
noted above: it is not clear why society should consider this to be an over-arching
goal (Hockley et al. 2007).
Finally, because of the focus in international conservation on maximising the
number of species saved per dollar of cost, the case is repeatedly made (e.g. Pimm
et al. 2001, Mittermeier et al. 2004) that conservation efforts should be focussed
in the tropics, which have relatively high levels of species richness, and relatively
low costs of conservation (measured in dollar terms). However, because the
relationship between species richness (wherever and whatever the species may be)
and social benefit is uncertain, and because the costs of conservation tend to be
160 Using the World Bank’s classification (World Bank 2005). One study concerned a high-income
country (Canada), one upper-middle (Malaysia), and three lower middle income countries
(Cameroon, Philippines and Thailand); no studies were found from low-income countries.
161 Note, however, that when conservation seeks the support of governments, biodiversity is often
defined much more broadly, to include, for example, ecosystem function (for example, the
Convention on Biological Diversity defines biodiversity loss as “the long term … reduction in
components of biodiversity and their potential to provide goods and services” Molnar et al.
(2004), emphasis added.
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measured using a monetary, rather than welfare numeraire, the social value of this
focus on developing countries is highly uncertain.
In this case study I largely assume that there are benefits to society from avoiding
species extinctions (see Chapter 9), and focus instead on the second issue, the
problems associated with measuring conservation costs and benefits in monetary
terms, and the implications of this for the value of conservation.
II. Study area and policy context
Madagascar
The island of Madagascar formed part of Gondwanan super-continent, splitting
from mainland Africa, south America, Antarctica, Australia and India between
160 and 30 million years ago (Upchurch 2008). Its Gondwanan origins and long
isolation gave Madagascar a diverse and unique biodiversity, with exceptional
levels of endemism (Myers et al. 2000, Ganzhorn et al. 2001, Brooks et al. 2002).
For example, 75% of mammals and 80% of flowering plants are found nowhere
else and the country has more endemic families of plants and animals than any
other on earth (Mittermeier et al. 2004).
People first arrived in Madagascar nearly 2000 years ago having travelled
westwards across the Indian ocean via East Africa (Burney 2003). The Malagasy
language is the westernmost member of the Malayo-Polynesian branch of the
Austronesian language family (Wittmann 1972), and is spoken throughout the
island (though strong regional dialects exist). It is unrelated to nearby African
languages, although it includes many borrowings from Bantu languages, as well
as Arabic, French and English. Despite the strong Austronesian influences on
Malagasy culture and language, recent studies suggest that the Malagasy derive
over 60% of their genetic makeup from Africa, reflecting Bantu immigration in
addition to Austronesian settlers (Regueiro et al. 2008). Compared with many
African countries, the island is ethnically relatively homogenous. Although the
Malagasy have been classified into twenty or more ethnic divisions, or foko,
ethnographers have argued that these divisions are relatively recent (Kottak 1971),
while anthropologists note that they are better seen as relatively flexible culturally
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and economically adapted groups rather than tribes (e.g. Harper 2002). Certainly,
while most Malagasy would self-identify as belonging to one or more foko, there
are considerable cultural similarities between groups, whose dialects are more or
less mutually intelligible, and migration and inter-marriage between groups is
quite common, although tanin-drazana (land of one’s ancestors) remains
important.
In pre-colonial times, several Malagasy rulers established control of large parts of
the island, most notably the kings and queens of the Merina, who established a
centralised state centred on the present-day capital Antananarivo, in the central
highlands. Considerable interaction between Madagascar and the west occurred
during the 18th and 19th centuries, particular with Great Britain and France. The
latter invaded Madagascar in 1883 and again in 1895, annexing it in 1896. An
uprising in the south east (including the study area) in 1947 was brutally
repressed, and Madagascar remained under French control until 1958, when it
became an autonomous state in the French community, full independence
following 2 years later (Brown 2001).
Since independence, Madagascar has had five presidents and just one peaceful
handover of power. Serious internal conflict has been mercifully rare compared
with many African countries, but repeated political crises, together with poor
governance and frequent cyclones have taken their toll on the Malagasy economy,
which has shrunk by over 40% since 1960 (Heston et al. 2006). Today
Madagascar is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita in
2003 of $758.95,162 and 73% of the population live in rural areas (Heston et al.
2006, UNDP 2006).
The twin challenges of conservation and development in
Madagascar
As in many other island regions of the world (Miller et al. 1999, Barnosky et al.
2004), the arrival of people on Madagascar was followed by a wave of extinctions
among the megafauna (MacPhee & Burney 1991, Burney et al. 2003). For
162 GDP is adjusted for Purchasing-Power Parity.
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example, 17 species of large lemur disappeared in the late quaternary, probably
due primarily (directly and indirectly) to man’s arrival (Godfrey & Jungers 2003,
Perez et al. 2005). As well as leading to extinctions among the fauna, the arrival
of humans resulted in major changes in vegetation across much of the island,
caused by a combination of increased fire frequency and active clearance of land
for agriculture and grazing (Burney 2003).
Land conversion has continued into colonial and post-colonial times and is the
result of a combination of complex drivers (Jarosz 1993, Casse et al. 2004).
Swidden agriculture (known as teviala in the study area) is practised in many parts
of the country but commercial timber extraction, mining and fuelwood collection
also contribute to forest loss and degradation (Durbin et al. 2003). Hunting
(Garcia & Goodman 2003, Goodman 2006, Jenkins et al. 2007, Dunham et al.
2008) and collection for the pet trade (O’Brien et al. 2003, Walker et al. 2008)
also represent important threats to some species.
Madagascar’s exceptional endemism, combined with high past and present rates
of natural habitat conversion (Green & Sussman 1990, Consigilo et al. 2006,
Harper et al. 2007), led Mittermeier et al. (2004) to recognise Madagascar and the
other Indian Ocean Islands as one of the “hottest of the biodiversity hotspots” and
therefore one of the world’s highest priorities for biodiversity conservation.
The co-incidence of extreme poverty and biological richness presents a huge
challenge to the Government of Madagascar and the international community,
who are committed to both the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the
UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The objectives of these include
reducing the rate of biodiversity loss by 2010 and halving extreme poverty by
2015 respectively.163 These aims frequently conflict, since large populations of
poor people, highly dependent upon natural resources (Ferraro 2002, Jones et al.
2006), surround many areas of high conservation interest. This challenge is not
unique to Madagascar, but is faced in many developing countries. To date, success
in combining these two agendas has been rare elsewhere in the world (Adams et
163 See www.biodiv.org for the CBD and www.un.org/millenniumgoals for the MDG.
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al. 2004), and efforts to combine conservation and development in Madagascar
have also been criticised (see Peters 1998, Ferraro 2001, Harper 2002, and below).
The history of conservation in Madagascar
Malagasy culture is rich in traditions and taboos (fady), many of which have been
credited with offering some protection to certain species and habitat patches
(Tengo et al. 2007, Jones et al. in press a). However, despite the value of these
traditional environmental protection institutions (Colding & Folke 2001), it is
naïve to imagine traditional people as “noble savages” living in simple harmony
with nature (Buege 1996, Alvard 1998). As shown above, throughout their history
the Malagasy, like all other societies, have substantially altered their natural
environment.
The first protected areas in Madagascar were established by the French colonial
government in the 1920s (Randriananadranana et al. 2003), and the first national
parks were established in the early 1950s. Throughout the island, colonial and
post-colonial governments made repeated and generally unsuccessful attempts to
control teviala and to regulate the use of forest resources over the last century
(Kull 1996, 2004). Many of these failed, either because of active community
resistance, or the sheer scale of the task of monitoring and enforcing centrally
imposed regulations across large areas of forest (Kull 1996, 2004).
The major internationally-funded conservation efforts of the modern era began in
1985, with the development of Madagascar’s first National Environmental Action
Plan (Hannah et al. 1998), which had a broad environmental focus, not limited to
biodiversity conservation. However, the second environmental plan (1995-2000)
was more focussed on biodiversity conservation,164 and expanded the system of
protected areas (e.g. Kremen et al. 1999, Randrianandianana et al. 2003, Figure
8.1). Many of these protected areas were based on the model of Integrated
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs).
164 This was the result of effective campaigning in the United States, by the ‘big four’ conservation
organisations: WWF, Conservation International, The Nature Conservancy and The Wildlife
Conservation Society (Corson 2007).
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Although rigorous evaluations are surprisingly rare, protected areas in
Madagascar appear to have had some success in reducing rates of forest
conversion and preventing illegal mining and timber harvesting, though their
impact has been highly variable (Sommerville 2005, Dollar 2006). Their success
in reducing less visible threats to biodiversity, such as small-scale extractive uses
(including hunting), remains unquantified and is probably less impressive:
certainly considerable illegal activity continues within protected areas (Adany et
al. 1994, Garcia & Goodman 2003, Jones et al. 2005, 2006). They have been
criticised as being top-heavy (Peters 1998) and inefficient due to the weak
linkages between biodiversity conservation and rural development (Ferarro 2001).
Many authors have criticised their negative impact on local livelihoods (Marcus
2001, Harper 2002, Ormsby & Kaplin 2005), due to the opportunity costs of
conservation (Shyamsundar & Kramer 1997, Ferraro 2002), and there is some
evidence that they have undermined existing resource management institutions
(Rabesahala Horning 2003, Jones et al. in press a).
During the third environmental plan (2001 onwards), there has been an increasing
emphasis on community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). CBNRM
attempts to reconcile conservation and development by exploiting the assumed
synergies between them (Adams & Hulme 2001, Hockley & Andriamarovololona
2007). In Madagascar, CBNRM has been promoted through the policy of
Transfert de Gestion des Ressources Naturelles Renouvelables or simply
Transfert de Gestion165 (Erdmann 2003b, McConnell & Sweeny 2005). Through
Transfert de Gestion, the state delegates limited tenure and sustainable use rights
(sometimes including commercial timber harvesting) to a legally recognised local
community institution (Erdman 2003).166 However, implementation of this policy
has frequently been hurried (Josserand 2001), and both NGOs and the government
have underestimated the level of support required by communities in order to
fulfil their contracts, which are externally defined. This has compromised the
165 lit. “Management transfer of renewable natural resources” or “management transfer”
166 Transfert de Gestion has been implemented using two legal instruments: the GELOSE law
(Gestion Locale Sécurisée: secured local management) and later GCF (Gestion Contractualisée
des Forêts : Contractualised Forest Management).
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long-term viability of the community institutions (Hockley &
Andriamarovololona 2007).
In 2003, President Marc Ravalomanana announced at the World Parks Congress
in Durban, South Africa, that Madagascar intended to triple the size of its
protected areas (Norris 2006). In order to fulfil this “Durban Vision”, the
Government of Madagascar identified Nouvelles Aires Protégées (New Protected
Areas) which would cover much of the remaining area of natural forest not
already protected (Kremen et al. 2008, Figure 7.1).
Figure 7.1. The protected areas of Madagascar prior to 2003 and the proposed expanded
network (data provided by the Durban Vision group, Antananarivo, July 2007).
The Ranomafana-Andringitra New Protected Area
One area included in the Durban Vision was a corridor of natural forest in
southeastern Madagascar that runs along the escarpment between Ranomafana
National Park in the North, and Andringitra National Park and Pic D’Ivohibe
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Special Reserve in the south (Figure 7.2). Long recognised as important for
biodiversity (Goodman & Razafindrasita 2001), the area was formally identified
as a candidate for a new protected area by a biological priority-setting workshop
held in Fianarantsoa in January 2005. 167 The workshop extended the area
traditionally considered as the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor to include the
contiguous forest as far as Fandriana in the north and Vondrozo in the south. Note
that, as described below, the analysis in this and subsequent chapters was
restricted to the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor, hereafter “the corridor”.
The corridor area is relatively densely populated, with most of the forest frontier
communes having over 20 persons per km2 (Minten et al. 2003: map 1.2). Most
people in the area self identify as either Betsileo (on the western side), or Tanala
(on the eastern side), with some Bara to the south (Minten et al. 2003: map 1.15;
pers. obs.).
Biogeographically, the corridor is situated within the humid forest biome (see
Goodman & Benstead 2003). It is an important refuge for biodiversity (Goodman
1996, Goodman & Razafindrasita 2001) and, together with the three protected
areas it links, boasts two endemic primate species168 and contains a wide range of
rare and endemic flora and fauna. However, like most of the remaining forest in
Madagascar, it is threatened by conversion for small-scale agriculture, timber
extraction and mining (Freudenberger 2003). On 15 September 2006 the ministers
of the Environment, and Energy and Mines signed an inter-ministerial order169
giving temporary protection to the area, prior to it being declared a full protected
area in due course.
167 L’Atelier Scientifique de Planification: Corridor Forestier Ranomafana – Andringitra – Pic
d’Ivohibe. 17-20 January 2005. Alliance Ecorégionale (2005).
168 The Golden Bamboo Lemur (Hapalemur aureus) and the Greater Bamboo Lemur (Prolemur
simus, H. Randrianasolo pers com.)
169 Arrête Interministériel No. 16.071 -2006/MINENVEF/MEM Portant protection temporaire de
l’aire protégée en création dénomme « Corridor Forestière Fandriana-Vondrozo ».
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Figure 7.2. Map of the Ranomafana–Andringitra Corridor showing the existing protected
areas.
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III. Analytical Framework
Any CBA consists of comparing one or more projects with a non-project
‘business-as-usual’ case. The projects are compared on the basis of the costs and
benefits they produce over a given time horizon. In the case of social cost-benefit
analysis, and in the approach developed in chapter 2, the effects of the project are
disaggregated by stakeholder groups. These groups may be based on geographical
location, income, ethnic group, gender etc, but there are good reasons for using
subdivisions which are relatively homogenous in income and in the way in which
they are affected by the project. The definitions of the project scenario and the
groups of beneficiaries, together with a list of potential benefits of the project
form the analytical framework of the CBA.
CBA is not usually a very participatory decision-making tool: it is normally
analyst driven, and most stakeholders in the project will not contribute in any
direct way to the analysis. 170 Chapter 2 has already discussed in detail the
problems with this approach to CBA, most of which relate to aggregation. Yet
even in the earlier stages of a CBA, the analyst must make judgements that will
affect the results. They will need to amass a great deal of information on a wide
range of benefits, much of which will be vague, uncertain, or missing completely.
The analyst is forced to decide which value is most plausible, or even to assume a
particular value. Most crucially, the framework of the analysis will determine the
results: if the identification of potential benefits and beneficiaries is incomplete, or
if the project and non-project scenarios are not suitable, the analysis will be
flawed. Therefore, although CBA aspires to objectivity, there is often considerable
scope for ‘observer-bias’ to affect the results, even prior to aggregation.
In this section, I describe how the analytical framework was developed for the
Ranomafana-Andringitra case study. The original cost-benefit analysis based on
this framework (Hockley & Razafindralambo 2006) considered almost all of the
costs and benefits and stakeholder groups identified. However, it used a relatively
170 That said, some stakeholders, particularly if they commission the analysis, may have
disproportionate influence over the results.
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conventional approach (for example, CVs remained uncorrected, while a social
discount rate was used to aggregate net benefits over time) although great
emphasis was placed on the distribution of benefits. The experience of carrying
out this analysis motivated much of what is described in this thesis. In order to
concentrate on a manageable number of key issues, the analysis presented in the
following chapters is less extensive than the original analysis, in terms of the costs
and benefits and stakeholder groups considered, the reduction breadth allowing an
increase in depth. In what follows I highlight the simplifications made.
Stakeholder consultation
In April 2005 I organised a workshop in the provincial capital of the study area
(Fianarantsoa), funded by the US Agency for International Development, to
enable a wide range of stakeholders to discuss the socio-economic implications of
the proposed Protected Area.171 Prior to organising this workshop, I had spent
three years in Madagascar studying forest use by local people and was fluent in
Malagasy. Around 80 delegates attended the workshop, including representatives
of local communities, NGOs and government agencies, as well as independent
researchers Table 7.1.
171 26-28th April 2005, Soafia Hotel, Fianarantsoa.
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Table 7.1. The organisations and institutions represented at the stakeholder workshop
held in Fianarantsoa April 2005.
Institution Number of
representatives
Explanation
l'Association Nationale pour la
Gestion des Aires Protégées
4 National quasi-governmental body with
authority for protected areas
Direction de l'Environnement
des Eaux et du Forêts
6 Government department with authority for
all forests in Madagascar
Regional government 4 Representatives of each of the four regions
(large administrative unit of government)
covering the study area
Local government (commune) 6 Mayors of some of the communes in the
study area, or their representatives
Donor-funded projects 11 USAID, World Bank, UN Environment
Programme and UN Development
Programme projects
Community representatives 5 Local leaders from some of the forest-
frontier communities
National NGOs 5 e.g. SAGE (Service d'Appui à la Gestion de
l'Environnement) and Ny Tanintsika
International NGOs 14 Worldwide Fund for Nature, Conservation
International, Wildlife Conservation Society
National researchers 10 Researchers from Malagasy universities and
research institutions
International researchers 13 Researchers from universities and research
institutes in France, USA and the UK.
Business 4 Representatives of ecotourism and timber
extraction businesses
The central feature of the workshop was the breakout groups that each considered
a different part of the socio-economic impact of the proposed protected area. In
addition, presentations on a variety of subjects, from the hydrological effects of
deforestation to the policy context of carbon sequestration, were followed by
question and answer sessions. The results of all group discussions were presented
back to the whole group, both verbally and visually, allowing everyone to
comment on the results. The workshop was carried out through the medium of
Malagasy, with translation into French for the small number of non-Malagasy
participants who did not speak the language.
The aim of the workshop was to tap into the considerable knowledge and
expertise concerning potential economic impacts of conservation in the corridor
which would not otherwise be available. Key outputs from the workshop were:
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1) agreed definitions of the project and status quo scenarios, i.e. descriptions
of the form which the new protected area was likely to take, as well as the
most likely business-as-usual scenario in the absence of the protected area;
2) identification and sub-division of the stakeholders who might be affected
by the proposed protected area;
3) a comprehensive list of potential market and non-market benefits of the
protected area;
4) a wealth of expert information, particularly on the hydrological aspects of
forest protection, and timber harvesting in the region, which would feed
into the calculations of benefit flows.
I used this list of benefits and beneficiaries to define the scope of the analysis and
followed-up and cross-checked expert knowledge and data gathered during the
workshop using interviews with key respondents in Madagascar between April
and October 2005.
The Project Scenario
The cost-benefit analysis was designed to evaluate the desirability of conserving
the forest corridor by placing it under the formal protection of a New Protected
Area. It did this by comparing two alternative scenarios:
Business-as-usual scenario. Deforestation and extractive activities continue as
they would in the absence of protection.
Project scenario. A new protected area is established, composed of a core of
strictly protected forest, surrounded by a peripheral zone in which certain
extractive uses might be permitted.172
172 At the time of the workshop it was unclear whether and where commercial timber harvesting
would be allowed within the new protected area, nor was it clear what other extractive activities
would be allowed, and under what circumstances (Jean Razafitsotra pers. com.). At the time of
writing matters are no less unclear: the arrête declaring the corridor’s temporary protection does
not precise the future role of commercial timber harvesting in the area, and the role of community
forest management is also unclear. Hockley & Razafindralambo (2006) evaluated a number of
different options.
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On the advice of workshop participants, the study was limited to the Ranomafana-
Andringitra portion of the corridor, for reasons of data availability. The two
national parks at either end of the corridor, Ranomafana and Andringitra, together
with the Special Reserve of Pic d’Ivohibe, are already protected and managed by
ANGAP (l'Association Nationale pour la Gestion des Aires Protégées), the
National Parks service. Although the project scenario will affect only the currently
unprotected corridor the analysis considers the New Protected Area in the corridor
together with the parks, and compares this with a situation where no parks,
reserves or New Protected Areas were present.
Stakeholders
The workshop participants identified the following groups of stakeholders as
useful subdivisions for the analysis. The aim was to identify groups which were
quite homogenous in income and in the way that they will be affected by the
protected area, but they were also defined partly out of convenience: matching
administrative units for which demographic data is available. The groups are:
1) residents of fokontany173 bordering the forest;
2) residents of communes 174 bordering the forest (excluding the previous
category);
3) residents of the rest of Madagascar;
4) people of all other countries in the world.
Stakeholders considered in this thesis
The analysis presented in the following chapters will consider just two
stakeholder groups. First, Group 1 above, the “local” group will be most directly
affected by the project and their CVs will be largest as a percentage of income
(Hockley & Razafindralambo 2006, and Chapter 10). Second, all other
173 Fokontany are the lowest unit into which communities are organised by the government. Each
fokontany contains one or a few villages and fokontany populations usually range from 500 to
3000 inhabitants.
174 Communes form the next level of administration up from fokontany. Each commune contains
up to 30 fokontany.
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stakeholder groups are combined into one, predominantly international group.
This large and heterogeneous group is justifiable only in terms of the limited
range of costs and benefits considered (below).
Potential costs and benefits
The workshop participants identified many potential costs and benefits of the
protected area that should be assessed as part of the analysis. These can be divided
into three categories: opportunity costs, resulting from the cessation of activities;
direct costs of establishing and managing the protected area; and benefits from the
creation of the protected area. These are summarised in Table 7.2.
Table 7.2. Potential costs and benefits of the New Protected Area identified by
participants.
Opportunity costs
All forest conversion, including teviala, will be strictly prohibited, reducing agricultural incomes.
Non-timber forest product exploitation may be prohibited or regulated in certain areas, which may
reduce harvester incomes.
All logging will be strictly prohibited, reducing employment opportunities in rural areas, as well as
profits for loggers.
Mining will be prohibited, reducing employment and profits. Note, however, that mining has
environmental costs for communities on the edge of the forest.
Direct costs
Managing the protected area requires capital and skilled labour, taking scarce resources away from
other sectors of the economy.
Benefits
The ecotourism potential of the corridor should be enhanced through protection.
Reduced forest clearance may bring hydrological benefits, e.g. reduced flooding.
Reduced deforestation may avoid greenhouse gas emissions compared to the business as usual
scenario, thus reducing future anthropogenic climate change
Genetic resources will be conserved by avoiding extinctions due to deforestation.
Non-timber forest product harvesters may benefit from the establishment of no-harvest zones (which
may increase yields), and from the cessation of logging and teviala.
Existence values of biodiversity will be higher in the project scenario, since deforestation will be
reduced.175
175 See chapter 8 for more details of deforestation rates.
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Costs and benefits considered in this thesis
Table 7.2 identified ten potential costs and benefits of conservation, which a
comprehensive CBA should address. However, in the CBA that follows I focus on
two of these, which Hockley and Razafindralambo (2006) found to be among the
most important: the international non-use values (Chapter 9) and the local
opportunity costs through lost opportunity for agricultural expansion (Chapter 10).
I ignore the potential foregone revenues from timber harvesting, since it is
uncertain as to whether it will be allowed in Madagascar’s new protected areas
and because of the great difficulty of projecting future timber prices (Price 1989).
In addition, the impacts of timber harvesting on biodiversity and carbon
sequestration, as well as the local benefits it might generate, are extremely
dependent on the manner in which it is carried out (Ganzhorn et al. 1990, Healey
et al. 2000, Hockley & Razafindralambo 2006), and therefore the effect of
including timber harvesting on the results of the CBA is likely to be somewhat
indeterminate. Since some form of timber harvesting is potentially compatible
with both project and non-project scenarios, it is probably be best to evaluate its
desirability on a case by case basis.
Similarly I do not consider mining. At present, there is no large-scale mining
being carried out in the study area, although many mining permits remain extant,
and there is some small-scale artisanal mining.176 The potential benefits of mining
require detailed geological data, which is not publicly available, and the local
benefits are somewhat indeterminate, as with timber they depend on the manner
by which the mining is carried out.
Protecting forest cover may have hydrological benefits, such as reduced flooding
or improved dry season flows. However, these are rather uncertain (Bruijnzeel
1990, 2004) and remain controversial (Bradshaw 2007, Laurance 2007a, Calder et
al. 2007) and their economic value has often been overstated (Chomitz & Kumari
1996, 1998).177 The key point from this literature is that the hydrological effects of
176 M. Freudenberger (pers. com.)
177 This literature is reviewed with reference to the corridor by Annis & Hockley (2006).
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deforestation depend heavily on what replaces the forest, with some land uses like
long-fallow cropping, providing much of the same benefits as old-growth forest
cover. In many cases, the worst hydrological effects could be substantially
avoided by actions other than forest protection, which might have much lower
opportunity costs.
Finally, forest clearance will tend to lead to net emissions of greenhouse gasses,
though once again, the quantity of emissions will depend greatly on the vegetation
which replaces the forest, and is extremely difficult to estimate (Fearnside 2000,
Schimel 1995, Ramankutty et al. 2007). Nonetheless, net-emissions will almost
certainly be higher in the non-project scenario, and including this benefit would
probably increase the international benefits of conservation. The effect on the
distribution of benefits from the project would depend on how greenhouse gas
emissions are priced. The negative impacts of climate change are expected to be
greatest in low latitude developing countries (Mendelsohn et al. 2006, Tol 2002);
therefore, pricing greenhouse gas emissions based on their impacts would shift the
benefits of forest conservation to poorer countries. If, on the other hand, the
responsibility for curbing emissions lies with the rich countries (who have
contributed by far the greatest quantity to date), as it effectively does under the
Kyoto protocol (Bettelheim & D'Origny 2002), then higher emissions in
developing countries implies greater cuts in the rich countries, shifting the
benefits of forest conservation back to the rich countries. Finally, if Kyoto is
replaced by a system which curbs the emissions of all countries (perhaps on a per
capita basis), and allowed trading of unused quotas, increased green house gas
emissions from clearing Madagascar’s forests will imply a direct cost to
Madagascar, in quotas which can no longer be sold. This is yet another illustration
that, once the arguments for abandoning conventional costs benefit analysis are
accepted, the results of any CBA depends on ethical judgments about the
allocation of rights (see Chapters 2 and 11).
Time horizon
Like most environmental projects, this one has impacts that are likely to persist
for centuries, perhaps indefinitely. Ideally, the project should be evaluated over an
infinite time horizon. However, the problem is that the longer the time horizon,
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the greater the uncertainty over benefit flows, and fundamental variables such as
population sizes. Although some approach must be found to deal with this issue
(Price 1993, Portney & Weyant 1999a), I limit my analysis to a time horizon of
100 years (2005 to 2105).
IV. Income and population projections for Madagascar
The previous chapter developed population and income projections for four
regions of the world: OECD90, ASIA, ALM and REF; into which the
international community will be divided for the purposes of this case study. Here I
develop income and population projections for Madagascar as a whole, and hence
for the local stakeholder group.
National demographic projections
The only available country-specific population forecasts are those of the United
Nations Population Division (UNPD), however these extend only to 2050 (UNPD
2007). The most recent long term projections are those of Lutz et al. (2001),
which extend to 2100. However, the lowest unit of aggregation used by Lutz et al.
is ‘sub-Saharan Africa’. Madagascar differs from most of sub-Saharan Africa, in
that it currently has a relatively low rate of HIV (around 1%) despite high rates of
other sexually transmitted infections (Behets et al. 2001) – the so-called “Indian
Ocean Paradox” (Dada et al. 2007). This might result in Madagascar following a
higher population growth trajectory than the rest of Africa. On the other hand,
population density affects growth rates (Lutz et al. 2001, 2006) and that in
Madagascar is equal to the average for sub-Saharan Africa (28 km-2). Figure 7.3
compares UNPD high, medium and low variant forecasts for Madagascar with a
projection that assumes that Madagascar grows at the same rate in each year as
predicted by Lutz et al. (2001) for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole. Lutz et al’s sub-
Saharan trajectory is similar to, though slightly below the UNPD’s low variant.
Some of the difference may be due to UNPD assumptions about fertility rates
which Lutz (2006) has criticised, while the rest may be due to Madagascar-
specific factors influencing the country’s UNPD predictions, like those discussed
above. Since the case study requires projection to 2105, I use the projection based
on Lutz et al. (2001), but note that this may be an underestimate.
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Figure 7.3. Alternative population projections for Madagascar. In grey are the high,
medium and low variants from UNDP (2006) and in black, a projection derived by
assuming that Madagascar follows the same trajectory forecast for sub-Saharan Africa as
a whole, by Lutz et al. (2001).
National Income Projections
Madagascar’s GDP per capita in 2003 was $758.95 (PPP adjusted, Heston et al.
2006), which is well below the average for the ALM region of around $3,700, and
makes it one of the poorest countries in the world. The question is then, how will
Madagascar perform relative to the rest of ALM? Chapter 4 reviewed the rather
ambiguous literature on convergence and growth in developing countries, finding
some evidence for convergence among “clubs” of similar countries, but weak or
no evidence of more general convergence (Islam 2003), though this may partly be
due to a failure to consider non-linear models. Africa-specific evidence on
convergence is scarce. Jones (2002) finds an annual rate of convergence of 1.7%
within the Economic Community of West African States, broadly in line with the
approximately 2% per annum reported by numerous studies covering a wide range
of different countries and groups (see Islam 2003, Abreu et al. 2005). However,
McCoskey (2002) finds “little evidence ... to substantiate claims of convergence
across Africa, although in some cases, smaller convergence clubs within Africa
may be found”.
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Madagascar’s economic performance has been very disappointing for most of the
last four decades. After some growth during the first decade post-independence, it
has declined steadily since 1971 (Figure 7.4a). Its performance relative to the
ALM region has also been poor: income levels in Madagascar have diverged
steadily over the period, from around two-thirds of the ALM average in 1960, to
around a fifth in 2003 (Figure 7.4b).
Figure 7.4 a) Time series of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita for Madagascar
(dashed) and ALM (Africa, Latin America & Middle East) region (dotted). b) relative gap
in income level between Madagascar and ALM. Data from Heston et al. (2006).
In order to represent the uncertainty over Malagasy economic performance in the
simplest manner, I assume that Madagascar converges on the optimistic ALM
projection at a rate of between -0.1% year-1 and 2% year-1. These upper and lower
bounds result in Malagasy national income levels of $4,706 and $33,782 per
capita respectively (these and all subsequent figures are quoted in year 2000
international dollars).
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Domestic income distribution
By international standards, Madagascar has a fairly unequal income distribution
with a Gini index178 of 47.5, similar to that of Mexico, and the poorest 10% of
Malagasy enjoy just 1.9% of national income (UNDP 2008). Reliable data on the
sub-national distribution of income in Madagascar is not easily available.
However, INSTAT (2002) and Minten et al. (2003) indicate that the Ranomafana-
Andringitra corridor region is one of the poorest in Madagascar, and poverty tends
to correlate with remoteness (Jacoby 2000).
I assume that the average income in the local communities is that of the lowest
10th percentile, i.e. 1.9% of national income. This implies a mean income in the
local communities of $156, in the year 2000.179 Within this group there is a great
deal of variation around the mean, which I ignore.
Kuznets (1955) proposed that income inequality has an inverted-U shaped
relationship with income, and that industrialisation initially increases and then
decreases the share of income going to the richest percentiles, and he provided
both cross-sectional and time-series data to support this (Kuznets 1963). If this
were reliably the case, we might expect Madagascar’s income distribution
eventually to become more equitable as it grew richer, possibly after an initial
increase in inequality.
Since Kuznets proposed the hypothesis, however, increasing inequality has
accompanied economic growth in several developed countries (Aghion et al.
1999) and the Kuznets curve hypothesis has been challenged by many subsequent
analyses (Moran 2005). It is clear that there is no simple relationship between
178 The Gini index measures the degree to which a country’s income distribution diverges from
perfect equality (Anand & Segal 2008). The higher the number, the more unequal the income
distribution, with 0 corresponding to perfect equality and 100 to perfect inequality (one individual
has all of the income). Gini indices range from 24.7 (Denmark) to 74.3 (Namibia), Madagascar is
ranked 97th out of 123 countries (UNDP 2008). All of the highest Gini indices are found in
developing countries, though the USA has a Gini index comparable to that of Madagascar (40.8).
179 By way of comparison, Shyamsundar & Kramer (1996) estimate household incomes in
Mantadia region at US$279 in 1991-1992 (non-PPP adjusted). This $253 per capita (PPP
adjusted). Incomes in Madagascar have fallen on average by around 12% from 1991-2000, making
this around $220 in the year 2000. However, Minten et al. (2003: map 1.12) suggest that
agricultural incomes in this region are higher than in the study area. This suggests my illustrative
figure is approximately accurate.
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economic growth and income inequality: inequality may dampen growth, yet
growth may worsen inequality (Aghion et al. 1999). Furthermore, “the extent to
which the growth process actually induces rising inequality depends on the
institutional characteristics of each country.” (Aghion et al. 1999:1654).
Madagascar’s income distribution should ideally be projected explicitly in the
same way as that between regions or countries. However, given the poor baseline
data, and the weak and somewhat indeterminate (or at least complex) relationship
between growth and inequality, I simply assume that the share of national income
going to each percentile of the income distribution remains unchanged by time
and economic growth.
Domestic population distribution and urbanisation
Minten et al. (2003) provide baseline population estimates for forest frontier
communes. Unfortunately, population figures are not easily available below the
commune level. The proportion of the corridor communes’ populations living in
fokontany bordering the forest (and hence in the “local communities” group) was
estimated from those communes for which I was able to collect fokontany
population figures first hand.180 I then calculated a weighted average of these
proportions and applied it to the total corridor population to give a corridor-wide
estimate of 35% (range 14-71%), based on figures from five communes.
To project local communities’ populations over time, I first assume that the
project has no effect on local populations, i.e. that local population growth is
exogenous to the project. In practice, the effect of a protected area on local
population growth is unlikely to be neutral. ICDPs that succeed in providing
benefits to people living around the protected area may lead to immigration of
people seeking to tap into those benefits (e.g. Noss 1997, Schulte 2003). On the
other hand, rigorously enforced protected areas, which did not compensate local
180 I visited several of the relevant communes and in five (Maromiandra, Ambatofotsy,
Ambinanitromby, Ambohimahamasina, Ambolomadinika) was able to copy down locally-held
fokontany population figures from the commune offices. Unfortunately, these figures are not held
at any higher level, and many communes did not keep records for fokontany level population
figures. Fokontany were defined as bordering the forest using first hand observation of the
presence of forest, combined with discussions with commune and fokontany officials, to determine
the position of fokontany boundaries.
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residents might conceivably lead to emigration from the area, as people move to
seek opportunities elsewhere (Ewers & Rodrigues 2008). However, in a country
with stagnant economic growth, and rising populations, there may be few
opportunities for internal migration. Some authors have even suggested that
protected areas might increase mortality and morbidity directly, by reducing food
security and the incomes of local people, leaving them vulnerable to disease and
less able to purchase treatment (Harper 2002). In principle, if compensation was
targeted specifically at those resident in the area prior to the park’s establishment,
the effect on local population might be neutral, though defining those with a claim
on the compensation would be difficult (a subject I discuss in more detail in
chapter 11). Even if this is the case, some protected areas might seek to lower
fertility rates in the local area, through improved provision of family planning
services, again leading to local population growth rates that differ between project
and non-project scenarios. Thus, the effect of a new protected area on population
growth is indeterminate, and is highly dependent on the manner in which the
protected area is established, in particular the nature of any compensation
provided to local residents. For simplicity, I assume that the project scenario is
neutral with respect to local population growth.
If it is assumed, furthermore, that the local community population follows the
same trend as rural populations nationally, projecting local population sizes
through time can be made using a projection of urbanisation in Madagascar. It is
known that there is a positive relationship between the percentage of a country’s
population that is urban, and its income level; with urbanisation apparently
resulting from economic growth, rather than the other way round (Asadoorian
2008, Bloom et al. 2008, though see Henderson 2003 who suggests that under- or
over-urbanisation can reduce growth181).
Using data for 2004 from UNDP (2006) and Heston et al. (2006), I carried out a
non-linear regression of the percentage of a country’s population that is urban on
181 Asadoorian (2008) comments thus: “Although there is evidence that urbanization depends
endogenously on economic variables, long-term forecasts of the spatial distribution of population
are often made exogenously and independent of economic conditions”.
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per capita income, for 77 countries, using the 3 parameter asymptotic function
(Equation 7.1, Table 7.3, Figure 7.5).
Equation 7.1 ))exp(exp()(% ycabaUrban 
Where a is the asymptote, and b is the intercept and c is the natural log of the rate
constant. This function can be used to forecast urbanisation as Madagascar grows
richer.
Given the arguments advanced in Chapter 5 against the use of cross-sectional
analyses for forecasting, this is somewhat unsatisfactory. It is possible that the
process of urbanisation, like environmental efficiency, is subject to ‘technological
overspill’, and therefore that urbanisation may occur even in the absence of
economic growth.182 To investigate this, I also fitted the model to the data from 66
countries for which data on population and income level was available in both
1975 and 2004 (Table 7.3). There does appear to be a time shift in the model fit at
lower and higher incomes, implying that in the richest and poorest countries, there
has been some urbanisation over time, independent of economic growth. 183
Certainly, Madagascar has experienced some urbanisation over the period (from
16.3% to 26.6%), despite its GDP per capita having fallen (from $1,268 to $750).
Nevertheless, except at the lowest income levels, the effect is modest and, for this
function at least, inconsistent over the range of incomes: for middle income
countries there is a very small shift is in the opposite direction. 184 Without
conducting a panel analysis using data from many different years, it is impossible
to determine the nature of this shift, and I therefore use the relationship derived
from 2004 as an approximation
It is likely that country-specific factors also determine the level of urbanisation,
with some countries tending to be more highly urbanised than others at all income
182 Note that economic development itself may be driven by technological overspill.
183 Given the relatively small sample size, the shift might also be partly due to movement along the
x-axis of individual countries, having high or low urbanization rates. It could also partly be an
artefact of the choice of model.
184 Note that this does not imply that individual countries have de-urbanised, but rather that the set
of countries in the middle of the income range has become slightly less urbanised over time, as
some countries have moved out of the middle income set, and others have moved in.
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levels. Figure 7.5 shows the position of Madagascar in 2004 and 1975. In both
cases it lies quite close to, but slightly below, the fitted line. In using the model to
forecast Madagascar’s urbanisation, I assume that its residual remains constant at
the 2004 level. I assume that the rate of urbanisation does not itself affect either
national or local income levels, nor does it affect national population growth.
Table 7.3. Parameter estimates for the three parameter asymptotic function of
urbanisation against GDP per capita; n=77.
Parameter Estimate Std. Error
a 80.28 3.65
b 24.69 5.49
c -8.92 0.26
Figure 7.5. Three-parameter asymptotic functions fitted to data on the percentage of
countries’ populations which are urban vs GDP per capita. Data points and model fits are
coloured black (2004) and grey (1975). Data points for Madagascar are shown as solid
squares (2004=black, 1975=grey). Population data are from UNDP (2006) and GDP data
from Heston et al. (2006). Data was available for 77 countries in 2004. Of these, data was
available for 66 countries in 1975. Fits are shown for the full dataset for 2004 (solid line)
as well as the reduced dataset for both 1975 (dotted line), 2004 (dashed line). The
projection of Madagascar’s urbanisation is based on the model fitted to the full dataset
(n=77) for 2004.
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V. Summary
This chapter has introduced the proposed new protected area that aims to conserve
the Ranomafana-Andringitra forest corridor in south-eastern Madagascar, for
which a partial cost-benefit analysis will be developed over subsequent chapters.
The purpose of the case study is to contribute to the sparse literature on the net
benefits of nature conservation in developing countries and to provide an
empirically plausible illustration of the issues discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter
has defined the framework of the case study, introduced the groups into which
affected individuals will be aggregated and completed the task of developing
income and population projections for each group. Chapter 8 develops projections
of forest cover, for the project and non-project scenarios. Chapter 9 projects
species extinctions, and the non-use values of avoiding these. Chapter 10 projects
local opportunity costs, while Chapter 11 summarises and discusses the results
according to the framework laid out in Chapter 2.
Chapter 8
8. Projecting forest cover in the
Ranomafana-Andringitra
corridor (2005-2105)
Abstract
To estimate the costs and benefits of the proposed Ranomafana-Andringitra
protected area, estimates of the likely trends in forest cover in the absence of the
protected area are needed. Estimates of past deforestation do not represent
deforestation rates in the absence of any conservation interventions, and
extrapolation into the future is difficult because rates depend on a number of
macroeconomic and social factors which may change overtime. However despite
these problems, such estimates are useful for establishing the relationship
between deforestation and socio-economic drivers and as a basis for projections.
Unfortunately considerable uncertainty surrounds estimates of past deforestation
rates. I review the available estimates of deforestation rate in the eastern
rainforests of Madagascar and discuss two likely drivers of deforestation in the
region. I then use the relationship between past rates of deforestation and rural
human population size to project future deforestation rates in the Ranomafana-
Andringitra corridor in the absence of the protected area.
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I. Introduction
The main purpose of the proposed Ranomafana-Andringitra protected area is to
maintain native old-growth forest cover by preventing it from being cleared for
agriculture or mining, or degraded by timber harvesting (Repoblikan’ i
Madagasikara 2006). The differences in forest cover between the project and non-
project scenarios will therefore drive many of the opportunity costs and benefits
of implementing the project. One cannot assume that the simple act of designating
a protected area will halt deforestation and equally, it would be wrong to simply
equate a lack of formal protection with inevitable extirpation of all native old-
growth forest (e.g. Dirzo & Raven 2003). Therefore, the CBA described in the
next two chapters requires explicit projections of deforestation with and without
the existence of the Ranomafana-Andringitra protected area, for the duration of
the analysis.
Before a projection of forest cover can be developed, a brief discussion of what is
meant by ‘forest’ is required. For the purposes of the CBA, forest would ideally
be defined with respect to the functions it fulfils, and multiple definitions might
therefore be used. Old-growth native forest and eucalyptus plantations might both
be considered to be ‘forest’ for the purpose of timber extraction (though differing
in important characteristics), but not from the perspective of biodiversity
conservation. Conservationists therefore tend to emphasise the importance of old-
growth, undisturbed, native forest to the exclusion of plantation and secondary
forest, while foresters may be more inclusive (Grainger 2008, Wright & Muller-
Landau 2006a, Gardner 2007). However, when estimating forest cover, one is
limited by the capabilities of the methods used: satellite images, for example, may
be unable to distinguish old-growth native forest from plantations or secondary
forest, whether or not the end-user wished to do so (see below). In practice
therefore, the measures of forest cover and loss available will be imperfect for the
purpose, and their limitations must always be born in mind. Given these
difficulties, it is not surprising that considerable uncertainty and controversy
surrounds estimates of past and present forest cover, forest loss, and the reasons
for this loss (Jarosz 1993, Bertrand & Sourdat 1998, Fairhead & Leach 1998,
Casse 2004, Grainger 2008). This is well illustrated in Figure 8.1, which shows
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estimates of total forest cover for Madagascar, taken from Dufils (2003, table 4.4).
These uncertainties multiply when projections of future deforestation are made
(see e.g. Laurance 2007b).
In this chapter, I consider estimates of past deforestation rates in the humid forests
of eastern Madagascar, as well as evidence on those factors likely to affect
deforestation rates over time (focussing on human population size). Based on
these data, I then develop a family of projections for future deforestation rates in
the study area both for the project and non-project scenarios. The estimates
considered concern native forest for the most part, but generally do not distinguish
old-growth from secondary forest, or relatively undisturbed forest from degraded
forest. In the study area, where much of the agriculture takes the form of shifting
or swidden cultivation, the treatment of secondary forest is likely to be
quantitatively important. The details of how each study has treated secondary
forest are given below.
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Figure 8.1. Estimates of Madagascar’s total forest cover (data from Dufils 2003). Figures
are based on: the estimates of early authors (); aerial photos (); and satellite images
().
II. Estimates of deforestation in the eastern rainforests
The CBA requires an estimate of the ‘natural’ deforestation rate in the absence of
conservation activity. Unfortunately this is probably not directly observable in the
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recent past (and older estimates may no longer be valid). Deforestation throughout
Madagascar may be depressed by the Malagasy state’s efforts to enforce
prohibitions on deforestation which, while sporadic and poorly funded (Kull
2004), may at the least have raised the costs of practising teviala. For example,
farmers report having to pay forest service officials fees for permits to clear
forest.185 There has also been considerable conservation and conservation-linked
development activity in the study area since the early 1990s, which may have
been at least partially successful in reducing deforestation rates (Hawkins &
Horning 2001).186 On the other hand, conservation may also increase deforestation
rates in some periods. For example, Kull (2004) documents burning as a protest
against perceived government heavy-handedness. Alternatively, a perceived threat
to prevent deforestation can lead to opportunistic clearances during temporary
absences of enforcement (e.g. during elections) or prior to the start of a
conservation project – both of which have occurred in Madagascar (Kull 2004).
Despite these caveats, I review below the available evidence on deforestation rates
in the eastern rainforests of Madagascar.
Observed deforestation rates
Four studies have estimated deforestation in the eastern rainforests of
Madagascar, though all but one (Hawkins & Horning 2001) extends beyond the
study area (Table 8.1, Figure 8.2). All studies used LANDSAT images, except for
the 1950s for which Green and Sussman (1990) and Harper et al. (2007) used the
map prepared by Humbert and Cours Darne (1964-1965) from aerial photos.
There is a considerable variation in annual deforestation rates between areas and
between time periods (range: 0.37-2.79 % yr-1, Table 8.1). There are even
substantial differences between the two estimates most specific to the study area,
Hawkins & Horning (2001) and MIARO (2005), who estimate rates of 0.64% and
1.32% yr-1 respectively, despite covering broadly similar time periods and areas.
185 Interviews conducted in Angalampona, Miarinarivo commune, Sept 2006. The legality of these
permits and fees is questionable.
186 This conclusion should be treated with caution for several reasons. First, there is no satisfactory
way to compare deforestation rates between areas (see below) and second, the estimate for the
Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor includes three strictly protected areas, while the control corridor
included none.
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Remote-sensed estimates are subject to several sources of error and differences in
methodology, which may account for some of this variation. The definition of
forest cover varies between studies, as do the rules for classifying grid cells as
forest or non-forest. Ideally, classifications should be ground-truthed, but this was
either absent (e.g. Green & Sussman 1990, Hawkins & Horning 2001) or
restricted to airborne visual surveys at only the most recent point in time (Harper
et al. 2007). No methodological details were provided by MIARO (2005). Cloud
cover obscured much of northern Madagascar in 1973 (Green & Sussman 1990)
and much of the lowland area in the images used by Hawkins and Horning (2001).
Errors will be higher for fragmented forest with a high perimeter : area ratio
(Green & Sussman 1990).
Annualising forest losses estimated over relatively short time periods is also
subject to error, because swidden agriculture (teviala) is a seasonal practice. The
cutting of the forest is normally conducted during a few months before the sowing
season when the weather is dry enough to allow the plot to be cleared with fire
(Kistler & Spack 2003, pers. obs.) and the timing of this period may vary from
place to place. Depending on the precise dates of the images used, this could
result in the number of years’ worth of teviala captured in the period being
miscalculated, if the first set of images are taken directly after a teviala season,
while the second set are taken directly before. Thus a roughly ten-year interval
between images could capture between 8 and 12 years’ worth of teviala, implying
a maximum error rate of 20% (though this would be extreme).
The treatment of regeneration varies from study to study, and will affect the
estimates produced, as well as their meaning. Green and Sussman (1990) could
not distinguish secondary forest from old-growth forest. They found
approximately 8% of forest cover in 1985 occurred outside the 1950 extent
suggesting significant forest regeneration. Hawkins and Horning (2001) were also
unable to distinguish the two forest types, however, they excluded cells that
changed from non-forest to forest during the period studied, thus eliminating any
recent regeneration. The degree to which recently regenerated forests can be
treated as ecologically or economically equivalent to old-growth forest is
controversial, and depends on the particular forest function in question. Quantities
of different components of biodiversity, timber species populations, sequestered
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carbon, and hydrology all vary with the degree of disturbance or stage of growth
of forest stands (Wright & Muller-Landau 2006a,b, Brook et al. 2006, Laurance
2007b, Gardner et al. 2007, Chomitz & Kumari 1998, Bruijnzeel 2004).
All studies except MIARO (2005) provide some measure of uncertainty in their
estimates: 10% (Green & Sussman 1990); “better than +/- 15% at a 95%
confidence interval” (Hawkins & Horning 2001), and “89.5% accuracy in
identification of forest and non-forest land” for 2000 (Harper et al. 2007).
However, robust quantitative estimates of all the sources of error and bias noted
above are impossible to obtain without extensive ground-truthing. Nevertheless,
these errors probably do not account for all, or even most, of the variability in
deforestation rates. Identifying the sources of variation between areas is important
but beyond the scope of this chapter. In Section II, below, I consider some factors
which may systematically affect deforestation rates over time.
Deforestation in protected areas
How effective are protected areas at preventing deforestation? Globally, several
studies have demonstrated lower rates of deforestation and other degradation
within protected areas compared with surrounding or control areas (e.g. Bruner et
al. 2001, Nepstad et al. 2003, DeFries et al. 2005). Bruner et al. (2001) found that
important determinants of a park’s effectiveness are the number of guards per km2
and the compensation of local people for opportunity costs as a result of the park’s
establishment. Nevertheless, even poorly funded parks appear to reduce
deforestation. In Madagascar, Sommerville (2005) found that protected areas have
been generally successful in reducing deforestation, while Dollar (2006) found
more mixed results, with some protected areas appearing to show an increase in
deforestation relative to control areas, while others succeeded in cutting
deforestation. A caveat which should be attached to these results is that protected
areas may displace, rather than prevent, deforestation (Armsworth et al. 2006,
Ewers & Rodrigues 2008), which would lead to their effectiveness being
overestimated. If this were the case, both the benefits and opportunity costs of
protected areas might be also be exaggerated.
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Table 8.1. Estimates of deforestation in the eastern rainforests of Madagascar (Figure 8.2
shows the location of the named forest areas).
Source Area Period Rate % yr-1 Rate ha yr-1
Total 1950-1985 1.96 108,571
High1 pop
density
1950-1985 2.79 43,143
Med pop
density
1950-1985 1.85 34,286
Low pop
density
1950-1985 1.48 31,429
High pop
density
1950-1973 2.50 51,000
Green &
Sussman
(1990)
Eastern
rainforests
High pop
density
1973-1985 0.79 16,000
Zahamena-Mantadia
Corridor
1993/4–
1999/2000
0.37 1817
Anosibe an’Ala Corridor 1994-2000 1.14 2417
Hawkins &
Horning
(2001)2
Ranomafana-Andringitra
Corridor
1993-1999 0.64 1,567
Dufils3 (2003) Evergreen forests 1953-1993 1.3 112,275
1993-1999 2.0 119,866
Miaro (2005) Extended Ranomafana-
Andringitra Corridor4
1990-2000 1.32 5,468
c1953-c1973 0.6 n/a
c1973-c1990 1.7 87,188
Harper et al.
(2008)
All humid forest5
c1990 –
c2000
0.8 16,100
1Green and Sussman (1990): Population density categories: high >10 km-2; med 5-10 km-2, low <5
km-2. The 1973 map covered only 68% of high population density areas.
2 Hawkins and Horning (2001): rates are calculated on the basis of six years between images
(actual range: 5 yr 5 months – 7 yr).
3Dufils (2003) category of evergreen includes some evergreen forests in western Madagascar.
Based on Humbert and Cours-Darne (1964-1965) for 1953.
4Miaro (2005): this study includes a larger area than the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor of
Hawkins and Horning (2001) and larger than that discussed in this thesis. It includes the forest
north of Ranaomafana as far as Ambositra and south of Andringitra/Ivohibe as far as Vondrozo.
5Green and Sussman’s (1990) eastern rainforests broadly coincides with Harper et al’s (2007)
humid forest category.
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Figure 8.2. The extent of Madagascar’s eastern rainforests (data from Conservation
International Madagascar, December 2007) and the approximate position of the areas
mentioned in the deforestation studies listed in Table 8.1.
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III. Factors affecting deforestation rates over time
The difficulties in estimating past deforestation rates, though considerable, are
relatively minor compared with those of projecting such rates into the future. The
first problem is that very few data points through time are usually available –
three at most in the studies identified above. This provides limited information
about the functional form of the relationship between deforestation rates and time,
or other explanatory variables.
Projection of deforestation is also hampered by the lack of a truly satisfactory unit
with which to measure it, and therefore it is difficult to define a naive “no-change”
projection (Makridakis et al. 1998), based on a meta-analysis of estimates.
Absolute deforestation rate (ha yr-1) most directly describes the conversion that is
actually happening, and what, ultimately, must be projected, but this is clearly
unsatisfactory for comparing and collating estimates from different areas which
vary in spatial extent – estimates derived from larger areas (e.g. “eastern
rainforests” as opposed to “Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor”) will, ceteris
paribus, show greater deforestation. Using relative, rather than absolute measures
(% yr-1), is one way to compare rates between different areas and periods.
However, I demonstrated in chapter 4 the danger of using an exponential function
to extrapolate rates of change that, for convenience’s sake, have been expressed in
percentages.
Below I review two principle factors which might be expected to systematically
affect deforestation rates over time: accessibility and population. Previous studies
have found the evidence linking economic development to deforestation to be
ambiguous, and I do not consider this further here (Wunder 2001, Scrieciu 2007).
Slope angle and accessibility
Green and Sussman (1990) noted that in areas in the eastern rainforests of
Madagascar defined in 1960 as densely populated, deforestation has slowed over
time, whether measured in absolute or relative terms. Their explanation is that
most of the remaining forest in these areas was restricted to steep slopes, the more
productive land already having been cleared. Most of the Ranomafana-
Andringitra corridor is classed as having a high population density by Green and
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Sussman (1990), has experienced high past-levels of land conversion and much of
its remaining forest is on steeply sloping land. We might therefore expect rates
(however measured) to continue to decrease. The subsequent estimate from
Hawkins and Horning (2001) of 0.64% yr-1 for 1993-1999, which is lower than
the rates reported for high density areas by Green and Sussman (1990), lends
some weight to this argument (Table 8.1).
Accessibility has been shown in many studies to directly influence deforestation
(Mertens & Lambin 2000, Wilkie et al. 2000, Nagendra et al. 2003). The ratio of
perimeter to area is likely to influence rates as it helps to determine the
accessibility of the forest (Harper et al. 2007).187 If forest cover is reduced, without
becoming fragmented, this will tend to decrease the absolute length of the
perimeter, while increasing its ratio to forest area. Under such circumstances, we
might expect, ceteris paribus, that absolute rates would decrease, while percentage
rates might increase.188 If, on the other hand, the forest is fragmented as well as
reduced in extent, the perimeter length might increase, leading to increases in both
absolute and percentage rates.
Green and Sussman (1990) provide estimates of perimeter length, summarised in
Table 8.2, to which I have added perimeter : area ratios and percentage change in
these ratios. In high population density areas, perimeter length has decreased over
the period 1950-1985, while in medium density areas it has remained constant
(while forest area decreased). This may have contributed to the reduction in
deforestation rates in high density areas noted above. Across all three categories,
perimeter : area ratios have increased, though the rate of increase is inversely
correlated with population density. Although they do not provide estimates of
perimeter length, Harper et al. (2007) provide two other measures of
fragmentation: the proportion of forest in blocks >500 km2 or <100 km2; and the
proportion of forest <250 m, or >1 km from the forest edge. For the humid forests,
all of these measures appear to show considerable increases in fragmentation from
the 1950s to the 1970s, but almost no change in both subsequent periods (1970s-
187 The presence of roads and other transport infrastructure are also important (Wilkie et al. 2000),
and may or may not be included in any estimate of perimeter.
188 Absolute rates might increase if deforestation increases the effective human population size
(people km-2), intensifying pressure on remaining forest.
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1990s, 1990s-2000s), implying little fragmentation has occurred in the last 30
years.189 Harper et al. (2007) write that “The more general pattern of deforestation
in the dry and humid forests was of small-scale clearance at forest edges.” Thus it
seems unlikely that absolute deforestation rates will increase in the future as a
result of fragmentation or endogenous increases in the accessibility of forest.
Table 8.2. Changes in forest area, forest perimeter and perimeter : area ratio of rainforests
in eastern Madagascar in areas of high, medium and low human population density. Data
from Green and Sussman (1990, Table 1, last two columns calculated by the author)
Year Aerial
extent
(hax106)
Forest
remaining
(%)
Forest
Perimeter
(km x103)
Perimeter : area
ratio
(km per ha x103)
Change in
perimeter : area
ratio
(%)
High density
Original 4.7 100 3.5 0.74
1950 2.4 50 7.8 3.25 339
1985 0.89 19 4.5 5.06 56
Medium Density
Original 3.4 100 2.2 0.65
1950 2.5 76 4.9 1.96 202
1985 1.3 38 5 3.85 96
Low Density
Original 3.1 100 3.4 1.10
1950 2.7 86 5 1.85 68
1985 1.6 51 6.1 3.81 106
Total
Original 11.2 100 9.1 0.81
1950 7.6 67 17.7 2.33 188
1985 3.8 34 15.6 4.11 76
Population growth and density
Another factor which has been shown to influence deforestation is human
population density. Wright and Muller-Landau (2006a) provide evidence that the
proportion of a country’s maximum forest extent which still remains is strongly
and inversely correlated with its population density. Although urban and rural
189 The fragmentation apparently seen between the 1950s and 1970s may, perhaps, be an artefact
of switching from using maps (drawn from aerial photos) for the 1950s to using LANDSAT
images in all subsequent periods. It seems plausible that many small fragments of forest might
have been omitted from the earlier maps.
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population densities have been strongly correlated in developing countries, they
find some evidence to suggest that it is the rural, rather than total population
density which determines forest cover (Wright & Muller-Landau 2006a). This is
crucial, since rural and overall population growth rates are expected to
significantly decouple in most developing countries in the future (Chapter 7).
Wright and Muller-Landau (2006a) develop projections of future forest cover by
linking cross-sectional models of forest cover and population density to UN
Population Division population projections. The projections differ significantly
depending on whether total, or rural population density is used, though both types
of projection are more optimistic than other recent estimates of future forest cover
(e.g MEA 2005). In the next section, I investigate the inter-temporal relationship
between forest cover and human population size in Madagascar.
IV. Human population and forest cover in Madagascar
Wright and Muller-Landau (2006a) carried out a regression of forest cover (as a
percentage of potential maximum) on human population density (rural or total) for
a cross section of 45 humid tropical countries. They were unable to conduct a
panel or time series study, since reliable longitudinal data on forest cover is not
easily available (Grainger 2008). In this section I repeat Wright and Muller-
Landau’s (2006a) analysis for time series data from Madagascar.
Methods
I regressed time-series data of Madagascar forest cover (Harper et al. 2007)
against population (UNPD 2007, 2008). Like Wright and Muller-Landau (2006a),
I used both the rural and total human population of Madagascar as the predictor.190
Harper et al. (2007) provide forest cover data for three forest types: humid
(eastern rainforests), dry (western forests) and spiny (southern forests). I use
humid forest and all forest as the response variable in separate regressions.
Because the analysis is restricted to Madagascar, there is no need to correct for
country size; therefore I use forest cover in km-2, and absolute population size
190 UNPD population estimates are available at five-year intervals. Therefore, as in Chapter 8, I
used a third order polynomial function to interpolate values for 1953 and 1973 (R2>99%).
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rather than population density.191 Wright and Muller-Landau (2006a) fitted the
model:
Equation 8.1 )(log10 PbaF 
where F is forest cover (humid or all) and P is population (rural or total). This
implies negative forest cover above a certain population level, leading to complete
extirpation of the forest. As an alternative, I also fitted an exponential model:
Equation 8.2 )exp( PbaF 
which implies constant percentage decreases in forest cover, with constant
absolute increases in population.
Results and discussion
For humid forest, and also for all forest, there is a strong negative correlation
between human population size and forest cover, as in Wright and Muller-
Landau’s (2006a) cross-sectional analysis (Figure 8.3). As always, the
relationship may of course be explained by a third, unknown variable that is
correlated with both forest cover and human population. However, since most
forest in Madagascar is cleared for small-scale agriculture, there is at least an
obvious mechanistic link between the two variables.
For humid forest, rural population outperformed total population as a predictor (as
in Wright & Muller-Landau 2006a) and ∆AIC was large (>5). However, the 
reverse was true for all forest types combined (Table 8.3, Figure 8.4). Similarly,
the logistic model outperformed the exponential model for humid forest
(∆AIC>7), with the reverse being true for all forest. The differences may be due to 
different factors driving deforestation in different forest areas. For example,
charcoal production, which predominantly serves the urban markets, is a major
driver of deforestation in the southern spiny forests, but relatively unimportant in
the case study area. Both functional forms give quite similar predictions for humid
forest (Table 8.4, Figure 8.3, Figure 8.4).
191 The results are of course unchanged if forest cover is expressed as a percentage of potential,
and population density is used instead, since both variables are simply divided by constants
(original area of forest, and area of Madagascar, respectively).
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Figure 8.3. Time series of all forest cover (data from Harper et al. 2007) against
population (data from UNPD 2007, 2008) for Madagascar. Exponential (solid) and
logarithmic (dashed) model fits are shown and extrapolated to the limits of population
projected in the previous chapter for 2005-2105.
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Figure 8.4. Time series of humid forest cover (data from Harper et al. 2007) against
population (data from UNPD 2007, 2008) for Madagascar. Exponential (solid) and
logarithmic (dashed) model fits are shown and extrapolated to the limits of population
projected in the previous chapter for 2005-2105.
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Table 8.3. AIC scores for exponential and logarithmic models of forest cover regressed
on human population size, for all forest and humid forest and for total population and
rural population.
Model Predictor Parameters AIC ∆AIC
All forest
Exponential Total population 2 80.10 0.00
Exponential Rural population 2 81.72 1.62
Logarithmic Total population 2 83.59 3.50
Logarithmic Rural population 2 84.23 4.13
Humid Forest
Logarithmic Rural population 2 59.12 0.00
Logarithmic Total population 2 64.18 5.06
Exponential Rural population 2 71.99 12.87
Exponential Total population 2 76.25 17.13
Note: total and rural population is for the whole of Madagascar, not only forested areas.
Table 8.4. Parameter estimates for exponential and logarithmic models, using total or rural population to predict all or humid forest cover.
Reduction in forest cover as population
increases by:Model Predictor Parameter Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
1 million 10%
All forest types combined
Exponential Total population a 203859 6593.2 30.92 0.0010
b -5.17 x10-5 3.55 x10-6 -14.55 0.0047 5.03%
Exponential Rural population a 224289.7 10509.4 21.34 0.0022
b -7.81x10-5 6.55 x10-6 -11.92 0.0070 7.51%
Logarithmic Total population a 644798.7 52777.6 12.22 0.0066
b -131571.3 13324.8 -9.87 0.0101 5,446km2
Logarithmic Rural population a 744719.4 68175.6 10.92 0.0083
b -160552.9 17627.9 -9.11 0.0118 6,646km2
Humid forest
Exponential Total population a 115914.7 4537.6 25.55 0.0015
b -6.53x10-5 4.52 x10-6 -14.45 0.0048 6.33%
Exponential Rural population a 131041.1 3573.3 36.67 0.0007
b -9.91x10-5 3.98 x10-6 -24.88 0.0016 9.43%
Logarithmic Total population a 391025.1 4662.2 83.87 0.0001
b -83032.1 1177.1 -70.54 0.0002 3,437 km2
Logarithmic Rural population a 454828.9 2957.3 153.80 0.0000
b -101514.8 764.6 -132.76 0.0001 4,202 km2
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V. Forest cover projections for the case study
The only past estimates of deforestation rates for the Ranomafana-Andringitra
corridor (Hawkins & Hornings 2001) were from the 1990s. They cannot be used
as estimates of deforestation in the absence of conservation as they include three
protected areas and significant conservation activities were established in the
corridor linking the protected areas by the mid 1990s (Hawkins & Horning 2001).
Other deforestation estimates for the eastern rainforests / humid forests (which
include the corridor) show considerable variability across space and time, and
comparisons are difficult because of the lack of an appropriate unit.
As noted in Section II, deforestation rates appear to be slowing in high population
density areas like the corridor (Green & Sussman 1990), and there is no evidence
that the forests are becoming more fragmented over time (Green & Sussman 1990,
Harper et al. 2007). My analysis above suggests that humid forest cover in
Madagascar is negatively related to rural human population size by a logarithmic
function (as found for a cross-section of countries by Wright & Muller-Landau
2006a).
Deforestation projections in the non-project scenario
Given the considerable uncertainty over initial deforestation rates, I propose a set
of projections which are illustrative rather than predictive, and aim to capture a
broad range of possible futures. For the initial deforestation rate (2000-2005) I use
a range of rates from 0.5% to 2.5% per year. This captures the full range of
deforestation rates that have been estimated for the eastern rainforests (Table 8.1).
In order to project forest cover into the future, I assume the existence of a
logarithmic relationship between rural human population size and forest cover, as
found in section IV. This is calibrated for each initial deforestation rate, by
selecting values for the parameters a and b in Equation 8.1 (repeated as Equation
8.3 below), to match the actual rural population sizes in 2000 and 2005, the actual
forest cover in the corridor in 2000 (from Hawkins & Horning 2001), and the
forest cover that would have been present in 2005, had each initial deforestation
rate pertained over the period. Parameter values are calculated with Equation 8.3,
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substituting values for 2000 and 2005, and solving simultaneous equations as
follows (Equation 8.4, Equation 8.5):
Equation 8.3 )]([log10 tt PbaF 
where F is forest cover, P is rural population, and t is the year index. Rearranging,
and inputting values for 2000 and 2005, and solving simultaneous equations
gives:
Equation 8.4 )]([log10 tt PbFa 
Equation 8.5
)])([log)](([log 05100010
0500
PP
FF
b



Thus, if a logarithmic function is assumed to link forest cover in the eastern
rainforests and Madagascar’s rural population size, then forest cover can be
projected into the future using the projections of population size developed in
Chapter 7.192 Figure 8.5 shows projections of forest cover for the range of rural
populations projected in the previous chapter.
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Figure 8.5. Forest cover projected using a logarithmic relationship between total
population (solid lines) or rural population (dotted lines), for two illustrative initial
deforestation rates (black = 0.5% yr-1, grey = 2.5% yr-1). Projections are shown over the
full range of population sizes projected in chapter 8.
192 Recall from the previous chapter that rural populations in the corridor are assumed to grow in
proportion to the rural population of Madagascar as a whole.
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Four illustrative projections of forest cover through time are shown in Figure 8.6.
The most optimistic projections are those which are based on the most optimistic
economic / urbanisation 193 projection for Madagascar (convergence on ALM
region =2% year-1). In these projections (dotted lines) forest cover declines until
around 2030, when the rural population is predicted to peak, after which they
begin to recover. As I discussed above, the ecological and economic importance
of secondary forest is the subject of considerable debate, and varies according to
the context, and the particular value under consideration (existence values,
hydrology, carbon sequestration etc). The implications of this predicted recovery
will be discussed in chapter 9, including the possibility that the loss of forest
cover, or important functions of the forest, might be irreversible. For the time
being, this re-grown forest can be thought of as potential forest. Forest cover
projections based on the most pessimistic economic and urbanisation projection
(convergence on ALM region =2% year-1), decline until around 2085.
It is interesting to note that the higher the assumed initial deforestation rate (black
lines) the faster the recovery, after the population peak. Thus for the most
optimistic economic/urbanisation scenario, the forest cover projection which
assumes the highest initial deforestation rate (2.5% yr-1) actually exceeds that
which assumes the lowest rate (0.5% yr-1) by around 2070 (though a higher
proportion of this forest would be recent re-growth, rather than old-growth forest).
It is tempting to dismiss this as an artefact of the model, but in fact it captures an
important point. If forest cover is chiefly threatened by rural population growth,
then the more rapacious is the growing population (i.e. the greater the hectares
required per person), the faster the pressure upon the forest is relieved when the
population begins to shrink (concerns over irreversibility aside).
193 Since I have used only one model linking urbanisation to economic growth, rate of urbanisation
is driven by the choice of economic scenario.
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Figure 8.6. Four illustrative forest cover projections, assuming that forest cover is
logarithmically predicted by rural population size. Dotted lines show the most optimistic
economic and urbanisation scenario, solid lines the most pessimistic. For each economic
scenario, projections are shown for two initial deforestation rates, 2.5% yr-1 (black) and
0.5% yr-1 (grey).
Deforestation in the project scenario
In this case study, I assume that the protected area will be funded and managed
such that deforestation is successfully eliminated within its boundaries. This
assumption is made partly for simplicity, and partly because the study area is a
medium to high conservation priority within Madagascar (Kremen et al. 2008, Fig
2a), which is itself considered as one of the countries of highest conservation
priority globally (Mittermeier et al. 2004). Therefore, adequate funding ought to
be available.194 I do not explicitly consider the displacement of deforestation to
other areas, which is unlikely to be a serious problem in this case, since the
proposed protected area would include virtually all natural forest in the area
(Repoblikan’ i Madagasikara 2006) and all priority areas for conservation
(Kremen et al. 2008 Fig 2b).
194This assumption is convenient but probably naïve. At the time of writing (20 months after the
area received temporary protection) no significant additional management or enforcement capacity
had been put in place (Mijasoa M. Andriamarovololona pers. com. 26th May 2008). However, the
purpose of the CBA is to evaluate the social desirability of properly implementing and enforcing
the protected area, regardless of whether this is likely to happen. The costs of half-heartedly
implementing conservation programs with inadequate funding may be large, but do not concern us
here (see Hockley and Andriamarovololona 2007 for such a case).
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VI. Summary
Published deforestation estimates for the eastern rainforests of Madagascar show
considerable variability across space and time, and the true rate of deforestation in
the absence of conservation cannot be estimated with any great certainty. This
uncertainty can only increase when deforestation is projected into the future. In
this chapter I developed a set of deforestation projections for the non-project
scenario, which incorporate the observed variability in initial deforestation
estimates, using rural human population size to predict forest cover. These
projections, like those of population and income developed in previous chapters,
are illustrative and open to challenge, but are transparently derived from observed
historical data. The sensitivity of the CBA’s results to this uncertainty will be
explored in subsequent chapters.
Chapter 9
224
9. The value of avoided extinctions
Abstract
Previous chapters have developed projections of economic growth and rural
population size for Madagascar (Chapter 7 and, based on these, projections of
deforestation in the corridor Chapter 8). In this chapter I investigate what the
predicted rates of deforestation in the area might mean for the biodiversity of the
corridor, and what the value might be of avoiding the predicted extinctions. First,
I use the link between habitat area and species richness (the species-area curve)
to predict the future species richness of the corridor through time, as a percentage
of maximum species richness. Then I correct this prediction, taking into account
the fact that extinctions do not immediately follow area reductions, i.e. that there
is an extinction lag. Finally, I provide a tentative estimate for the annual
international value of these averted extinctions based on published values of
willingness to pay for species conservation.
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I. Introduction
Loss of habitat is one of the major threats to wild nature worldwide and is
considered by the world conservation union (IUCN) to be the most important
threat to many taxa (Groom et al. 2006). It is not only the absolute rate of habitat
loss which is a cause for concern but fragmentation of habitat into isolated patches
(Fahrig & Merriam 1994, Turner 1996, Debinski & Holt 2000). Deforestation and
fragmentation are major drivers of biodiversity loss in tropical forests (Dodson &
Gentry 1991, Renjifo 1999) including the eastern rainforests of Madagascar
(Brooks et al. 2002). The species area curve (MacArthur & Wilson 1967) is often
used to predict the relationship between forest loss and extinction (Andren 1994).
Society clearly considers the conservation of wild nature to be a worthwhile
pursuit. At least $6 billion is spent worldwide on managing protected areas
annually (Balmford et al. 2003) and in 2002 at least 190 countries committed to
achieving a significant reduction in the current rate of biodiversity loss by 2010
(Balmford et al. 2005). This suggests that biodiversity has a value (Gowdy 1997).
However, although case studies valuing particular ecosystems or species abound
(see Loomis & White 1996 for a review), we lack systematic information about
the value of wild nature in general, and about which components of wild nature
are valued (Nunes & van den Berg 2001, Christie et al. 2006). For example,
although there is evidence that diversity itself is valued in some circumstances
(Naidoo & Adamowitz 2005), in other contexts it appears to be trumped by other,
non-biological factors (Edwards-Jones et al. 1995). One important value of wild
nature is attributable to the provision of goods and services by natural ecosystems
(e.g. Turpie et al. 2003), although the link between biodiversity per se and
ecosystem function is hotly debated (Schwartz et al. 2000). The usefulness of
species richness and genetic diversity for pharmaceutical development has been
proposed as an important value of biodiversity, but estimating these values has
proved very problematic (Simpson et al. 1996). With respect to non-consumptive
and non-use values, beauty, ‘naturalness’, and ease of access clearly have a role in
determining the value of a particular area (Edwards-Jones et al. 1995, Price 1978),
and non-biotic elements of landscapes are also valued (Webber et al. 2006).
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As described in Chapter 7 and 8, the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor (hereafter
“the corridor”) is threatened by the conversion of natural forest to agriculture. In
section II, I use the species area curve and projections of forest loss from Chapter
8 to predict the future species richness of the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor
through time, as a percentage of maximum species richness. In section III, I
correct this prediction, taking into account a possible lag in species extinctions. In
section IV, I review published estimates of willingness to pay (WTP) for species
conservation and, in section V, I use these to estimate the value of avoided
extinctions by protecting the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor.
II. Deforestation and extinction
It is well established in ecology that smaller parcels of habitat contain more
species per area than larger parcels. The relationship between habitat area and
species number was first established using observations from islands (MacArthur
& Wilson 1967) but has since been found to be applicable in the context of
continental habitat islands (Brown 1971) such as remnants of forest in landscapes
which are converted to other land uses (Pimm & Askins 1995). The relationship is
frequently represented as a power function, known as a species area curve (e.g.
Pimm et al. 1995, Brooks et al. 1999b). This relates the area of intact habitat, A, to
the number of species remaining within it, S:
Equation 9.1 ZcAS 
where c and z are constants. Following other authors (Brooks et al. 1999b, Wright
& Muller-Landau 2006a) I take the value of z to be 0.25, which is well established
as a reasonable average for tropical forest ecosystems. Thus, for a given
projection of forest cover in the corridor, this function can be used to calculate the
number of species predicted to remain in the forest (Sp), as a proportion of the
maximum number (Smax):
Equation 9.2 z
z
pp
A
A
S
S
maxmax

For simplicity, I treat the corridor as a solid block, isolated from other forest, and
assume that all of the species within it are restricted to forest habitat. To a first
approximation these assumptions seem reasonable: the available evidence
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suggests that fragmentation is not important in the corridor (see Chapter 8); most
endemic species in Madagascar are known to be restricted to natural forest
(Goodman & Benstead 2003); and the corridor has minimal connectivity to other
areas, relative to its size.195 The percentage of species being lost will be a function
of the deforestation rate (Figure 9.1).
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Figure 9.1. Prediction of the percentage of species surviving in the Ranomafana-
Andringitra corridor from the species-area curve (equation 9.2) under the most
pessimistic scenario for deforestation (stagnant economic growth and high (2.5%) initial
deforestation rate; taken from Chapter 8).
195 Although the portion of corridor considered here does connect to forest at its northern and
southern ends, biodiversity in Madagascar is know to be restricted by river systems, which cut off
the corridor from other forested areas (Wilme et al. 2006).
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III. Extinction lags and relaxation time
Species area curves have been shown to accurately predict extinctions in
temperate forests, where the deforestation took place centuries ago and records of
species presence and absence are available for long periods (Pimm & Askins
1995). Few extinctions have yet been recorded in the tropics, where deforestation
has continued to the present day historical data on the presence of species is much
patchier, and many species are yet to be described (Brooks et al. 1999b). However
several studies have found that species-area curves, when applied to recent habitat
losses, predict the number of species classified as threatened with extinction
(Brooks & Balmford 1996, Brooks et al. 1997), suggesting that species extinctions
follow habitat loss with a time lag – a process known as relaxation (Brooks et al.
1999b).
The rate of relaxation is very important if, as the analysis in the previous chapter
suggested, forest cover might be expected to recover through natural regeneration
of secondary forest as rural population sizes decline, due to urbanisation and
demographic transition. Wright & Muller-Landau (2006a) used the existence of
extinction lags, together with their predictions of forest loss and gain, to argue that
the tropical extinction crisis may have been overstated. However, the ability of
forest regeneration to ‘rescue’ species depends on the relaxation rate, and on what
proportion of species are able to survive in regenerating secondary forest. There
are few estimates of the former (Brooks et al. 1999b), and little information about
the latter (Gardner et al. 2007).
Although relaxation rates have been estimated for oceanic islands (Diamond
1972) and prairies (Leach & Givnish 1996), I am not aware of any for large tracts
of tropical forest. However, Brooks et al. (1999b) estimated the speed at which
relaxation took place, by reconstructing the history of fragmentation and loss of
bird species for the five small parcels of the Kakamega rainforest in Kenya. They
assumed that relaxation followed an exponential decay function, whereby the
proportion of ‘excess’ species I (where I=Smax-Sp), decays over time as follows:
Equation 9.3 )( kteI 
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where k is a constant and t is time. Assuming this functional form, they estimated
a half life of between 23 and 80 years. The half-life appeared to be positively
correlated with the size of the fragment (range: 100-8600 ha in their study), but
also negatively correlated with its distance from other forest patches (range: 0.5-
9.4 km), and the sample size (5) of that study was too small to distinguish
between these effects. Thus, while the corridor’s larger size (247,700 ha in 2000)
might imply a longer half-life, as far as species which are endemic to the corridor
are concerned (see below) it is completely isolated (there can be no immigration
of endemic species from outside of the corridor). Without further research, tt is
impossible to say which effect will dominate.
Figure 9.2 repeats Figure 9.1 above, adding the estimated numbers of species
remaining, taking into account the time lag to extinction (assuming an exponential
decay function and a half-life of 50 years). In these calculations, because of the
time lag, regrowing secondary forest is able to ‘rescue’ species which can utilise it
before they become extinct from the corridor (dotted line), but not those which are
reliant on old-growth forest (lower solid line). However, species are assumed not
to return from other forest areas, into areas of regrowing secondary forest.
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Figure 9.2. Projected species extinctions for the most pessimistic forest cover scenario
(stagnant economic growth and high initial deforestation rate of 2.5%) assuming a
relaxation rate with a half-life of 50 years. Smax in 2005 is not the number of species found
in the corridor, but the number not already committed to extinction by past deforestation.
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Given that estimates of relaxation rates are so rare and variable, and that they will
depend on many factors (including the degree of degradation within the habitat), it
is impossible to draw any firm conclusions about the correct relaxation rate to
apply to the corridor. As a consequence, Figure 9.3 demonstrates the sensitivity of
the predictions to variations in the assumed half-life. These are moderate, within
the range considered (10-150 years). The percentage of original species lost by
2105 is increased from 9% (150 year half life) to 30% (10 year half life). The
results are insensitive to alternative half-lives exceeding 150 years (6% of species
lost with 250 year half-life, data not shown). However, this effect is due to the
functional form (exponential decay) assumed for the relaxation process, and most
studies, including Brooks et al. (1999b), do not have enough data points through
time to determine the actual functional form.
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2005 2025 2045 2065 2085 2105Year
Fo
re
st
ex
te
nt
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
S
pe
ci
es
total forest extent old-growth extent
species (not old-growth dependent) species(old-growth dependent)
Figure 9.3. Projected species extinction rates for the most pessimistic forest cover
scenario (Fig. 9.1) showing the effect on percentage of species surviving of variation in
the half lives: 10 (bottom pair of thin lines); 50 (middle pair of thin lines), 150 years (top
pair of thin lines).
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IV. Estimating the non-use value of protecting
biodiversity
Existence values of biodiversity are often estimated from contingent valuation
studies (Loomis & White 1996, Bateman et al. 2002). However there are a
number of difficulties associated with this approach to valuing biodiversity. The
degree to which contingent valuations identify true willingness to pay (WTP) has
been questioned (Pearce 2007). There may be a gap between willingness to pay
estimated by contingent valuation studies and actual payments made when
contributions are required (Foster et al. 1997, Kamuanga et al. 2001). Other
problems may be that people refuse to make trade-offs which require the
substitution of biodiversity for other goods and that their understanding of the
biodiversity concept is insufficient to allow them to give meaningful values in
contingent valuation studies (Spash & Hanley 1995).
Another common criticism of valuations of single sites or species is that
respondents may attribute all of their WTP for conservation in general, to
whichever specific site or species they are asked about in the study, an effect
called “embedding” (Kahneman & Knetsch 1992). Thus, the study reveals not the
WTP for the site in question, but for all wildlife sites (Price unpubl. provides a
good summary of this and other such problems).
Despite these problems with contingent valuation, there are few other approaches
available which can provide estimates for non-use values of biodiversity. For my
CBA, an estimate of the international biodiversity value of the Ranomafana-
Andringitra corridor is required. To reduce the problem of embedding described
above, I looked for estimates of people’s aggregate WTP for conservation in
general from which to estimate the share of that WTP which is attributable to the
corridor. 196 Unfortunately, such aggregate studies are rare (Menzel 2005, S.
Menzel pers. com.). I found just two such studies that were suitable and I review
them below.
196 Note that, as I discuss below, this may still over-estimate the value attributable to the corridor,
since it infers marginal values from average values, which are likely to be higher.
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Candidate studies
US willingness to pay to conserve tropical rainforests (Kramer & Mercer 1997)
Kramer & Mercer (1997) used contingent valuation to estimate the willingness of
US citizens to make a one-off payment to conserve an extra 5% of tropical
rainforests throughout the world (over and above the 5% already in protected
areas). They estimated mean WTP per household to be US$26 (in 1996 dollars),
equating to $10.84 per capita (in year 2000 international $). The corridor would
appear to fit this valuation object well, since it represents an extension to the
protected area network in Madagascar, itself one of the highest priority
conservation areas in the world (Mittermeier et al. 2004). The corridor accounts
for around 0.5% of this additional 5% of the world’s tropical rainforests.197 This
would imply a one-off willingness to pay to conserve the corridor of $0.054 per
American.198
German willingness to pay to prevent extinctions (Menzel 2005)
Menzel (2005) used a dichotomous choice method in telephone interviews with
1,017 people between April and May 2001 to estimate the monthly contribution
which German residents over the age of 18 were prepared to make, in the form of
a “biodiversity tax”, for the “protection of half of the endangered species expected
to become extinct in the next 10 years” (Menzel 2005:33). The study asked
respondents to reply for themselves, and not for their family or household,
yielding a value per adult. The mean response was approximately €108 per year199
or $106. Converting this to a per capita value by dividing it by the ratio of all
German residents (82m, Heston et al. 2006) to adult residents (66m, Menzel 2005)
gives $85 per capita per annum. However, Menzel (2005) states that this could be
an overestimate, because people may, despite instructions to the contrary, have
197 World tropical rainforest extent = 995 ha x 106 (FAO 2001). Corridor extent in 2000 =
247,700ha (Hawkins & Horning 2001). 247,700/[0.05x995x106]=0.5%. This is an average, not
marginal value, and thus (roughly) the value of protecting the corridor as part of the larger project.
198 This and all subsequent dollar values are in year 2000 international dollars (using PPP
exchange rates from Heston et al. (2006), and dollar deflators from Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2008).
199 Respondents who refused to answer, or dropped out of the survey were assumed to have a WTP
of zero.
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replied on behalf of their household. Therefore, I have divided the original figure
by the number of people per household200 giving $45 per annum (equating to
$3.7billion nationally) which Menzel views as conservative.
This figure of $45 per annum per person represents the annual willingness to pay
to protect “half of the species expected to become extinct in the next ten years”
(Menzel 2005). I estimate the relative importance of the corridor in meeting this
objective by estimating the proportion of this set of species which are found
within the corridor. Because the data are most reliable for birds and mammal
species, I restrict the calculation to these taxa. There are 362 critically endangered
birds and mammals in the world (IUCN, quoted in Mittermeier et al. 2004) of
which four are found in the corridor, three being found nowhere else.201 Thus, the
corridor accounts for approximately 1.66% (3/[0.5x362]) of the set of species
considered by the contingent valuation study of Menzel (2005),202 implying an
annual WTP to conserve the corridor of $0.74 per capita.203
Comparison and interpretation of the estimates
The two estimates differ greatly in their estimate of WTP for conservation of the
corridor. The estimate derived from Menzel (2005) of $0.74 per annum is far
larger than that from Kramer & Mercer (1997) of a one-time only $0.054,
200 Calculated using the number of households in Germany quoted by Menzel (2005).
201 The three species endemic to the corridor are: the tufted-tailed rat (Eliurus penicillatus), golden
bamboo lemur (Hapalemur aureus) and the greater bamboo lemur (Prolemur simus). The critically
endangered Madagascar serpent eagle (Eutriorchis astur) is also found in the corridor as well as
other areas of Madagascar (H. Randrianasolo pers com). Clearly, loss of suitable habitat in the
corridor would increase the probability that this bird would go extinct, making the calculation
presented here conservative. Since the publication of Mittermeier (2004), the white collared brown
lemur (Eulemur albocollaris) has been described, and classified as critically endangered. This
species is found at the southern end of the corridor (including the extension to Vondrozo), as well
as in the two fragments of forest in the Manombo Special Reserve and Mahabo Forest (Irwin et al.
2005, David Knox pers. com.). However, this fifth species is not included in my calculation
because it is additional to the total in Mittermeier et al. (2004).
202 Note that, strictly, the value of conserving the corridor is therefore contingent on other
conservation projects undertaken worldwide, since this calculation effectively assumes that the
corridor would be among the sites chosen to conserve the first 50% of critically endangered
species. Given the very high priority attached to Madagascar by conservationists (Mittermeier et
al. 2004), on account of its high rates of endemism, and the corridor’s relatively high priority
status within Madagascar (Kremen et al. 2008), this seems a reasonable assumption.
203 Once again, this uses an average, rather than marginal value per species. the marginal value of
protecting the corridor species (if the remainder of the 50% had already been protected) would
probably be lower.
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regardless of the discount rate and time horizon assumed by the respondents in
each case.204 Only a small proportion of the difference in WTP is due to the
difference in importance of the corridor in achieving the stated goal (1.66% versus
0.5%) which results from the very high endemism, but relatively small area of the
corridor (the corridor accounts for 0.8% of the world’s critically endangered birds
and mammals, yet only 0.025% of its tropical rainforests).
There are several other factors which could account for this difference. First,
awareness of global (as opposed to local or national) conservation issues has
probably increased in most western countries between Kramer & Mercer’s study
in 1993 and Menzel’s in 2001.205 Second, the proposed payment vehicles (one-
time payment in Kramer & Mercer (1993) versus monthly payments in Menzel
(2005)) could have influenced the WTP: 6 cents per month may not sound so
different from a 5.4 cents one-off payment, if respondents did not carefully
consider their responses. However, Loomis & White (1996) found that one-time
WTP estimates were significantly higher than annual estimates, when other
important characteristics were held constant. Third, there may be differences
between the sampled Germans and Americans in their enthusiasm for
international conservation, their belief in its efficacy, or their feelings of
responsibility towards ecosystems in other countries (Menzel [2005] found that
the latter two attitudes significantly affected WTP). These differences may or may
not reflect differences in the benefits felt by respondents as a result of successful
conservation. Fourth, the survey method (mail versus telephone) may have
increased the stated WTP in Menzel’s (2005) study which used the latter, since
respondents may have felt under greater pressure to agree to bids when speaking
to the interviewer. This may or may not be a flaw, in the case of a global and non-
excludable good like biodiversity, which might be prone to free-riding, even when
not actually making payments (Sen 2001).
204 Assuming that the first payment was collected at the same time in each case.
205 On the other hand, Loomis and White (1996) hypothesise that WTP in the US may decrease
over time, as a result of negative publicity associated with the Endangered Species Act. Although
they find a negative relationship between study year and WTP, it was not significant and was
difficult to separate from refinements in methods.
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More substantially, the project proposed in Menzel’s (2005) study (protecting
50% of endangered species) seems more ambitious than merely protecting 5% of
tropical rainforests, although this is taken account of when calculating the
corridor’s contribution. However, contingent valuation studies do not always
seem to be sensitive to the magnitude of the benefit proposed, with respondents
apparently indifferent between saving 20,000 or 200,000 birds (Desvouges et al.
1993, cited in Sen 2001), although Loomis & White (1996) found that the size of
the proposed increase in an endangered species’ population was positively related
to WTP. Although it is common practice in contingent valuation to randomise bid
levels, to check for starting point bias in responses, it is less common to determine
the effect of changing the size of the proposed benefit. While this is
understandably difficult (though not impossible) in studies of single species or
sites, it is certainly possible in studies of this type (e.g. 5%, versus 50% of
species).
It is impossible to say whether these factors can account for all of the difference in
WTP between the two studies, or whether the object of valuation (area of forest
versus number of species) is also responsible. I would note, however, that while
the global scope of these two studies offers some protection against the type of
embedding effects noted above, it seems plausible that they remain vulnerable to
embedding in terms of the precise nature of the object valued. For example, it
seems quite plausible that many of the respondents in Menzel (2005) gave their
WTP for nature conservation in general, rather than for saving half the species
expected to go extinct in the next 10 years, and therefore one should be careful in
drawing any firm conclusions from these studies about the relative merits of
species richness versus landscape based conservation. Even if Menzel’s (2005)
estimate is taken as intended, there is no reason to expect that the WTP stated
would, if disaggregated, apply equally to all species in all locations (Loomis &
White 1996): indeed, the species found in the corridor might not even make it into
people’s preferred 50% of species! However, since charismatic species rely on
appropriate habitats for their existence, there is a case for attributing some portion
of the values of charismatic species to the other species with which they share a
habitat (e.g. Sergio et al. 2006).
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Another difficulty in interpreting these studies is that the counterfactual remains
unknown. Intuitively the net benefits from protecting a forest should be contingent
on what would have happened in the event that the forest was not protected. These
expected net benefits will not simply be a function of the true counter-factual, but
also of the respondent’s perception of the counter factual. Thus, we do not know
how many species (or what percentage of the world’s total) respondents in Menzel
(2001) thought would go extinct in the next 10 years, or what the respondents in
Kramer and Mercer (1997) believed would happen to the rainforests if they were
left unprotected. As noted in Chapter 8, considerable uncertainty exists over how
much rainforest would be lost (both globally and in the corridor) if action was not
taken (Dufils 2003, Grainger 2008).
As with deforestation, and for much the same reasons, the proportion of the
world’s species which are likely to go extinct in the future is highly uncertain
(Wright & Muller-Landau 2006a,b, Gardner et al. 2007). In addition, the public’s
perception of deforestation or species extinctions may be biased either down
(through ignorance of the problem) or up (through exaggeration by environmental
organisation, Lomborg 2001). This is important, since it seems likely that the
perceived threat to species and their habitats would influence the WTP for action.
Indeed, Menzel (2005) found that a respondent’s perception of the threat posed to
global biodiversity was an important factor in determining their WTP.
Because of the difficulty of interpreting the one-off estimate provided by Kramer
& Mercer (1997) and because of my focus in this case study on conservation
based on species-richness, I use Menzel’s (2005) estimate to derive an
international annual benefit from protecting the corridor. However, I reiterate the
caveats noted above, that this cannot be taken as evidence for the value of
conservation focussed on species-richness per se, relative to other forms of nature
conservation in developing countries. I also note that, in my view, the annual
WTP estimated by Menzel (2005 ($45 per capita, equivalent to $0.74 per capita to
conserve the corridor) seems high.
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V. Combining economic valuations and extinction
projections
Although it appears relatively straightforward to derive the share of Menzel’s
estimate accounted for by the corridor (as above), it is more difficult to precisely
apply this willingness to pay to protect “half of the endangered species expected
to become extinct in the next 10 years” to a WTP for protecting the corridor, over
time. First, as noted above, many of the species which will actually go extinct in
the next ten years may already be committed to extinction by past habitat loss
meaning that preservation of the corridor at its 2005 extent alone will not save
them. In addition, the contingent valuation was framed as an ongoing, monthly
financial commitment, yet the object of valuation related only to species predicted
to go extinct in the next ten years. Presumably, the benefits to respondents would
increase over time, as the number of averted extinctions increases.
For simplicity, I interpret this WTP ($0.74 per annum) as being the annual benefit
received by respondents, from the continued existence of the species found in the
corridor, which are not already committed to extinction. I assume that this applies
to all of the corridor’s species, and not only those which would have gone extinct
in the non-project scenario. Thus, the WTP is a maximum compensating variation
(CVmax) representing the value to respondents of averting the complete extirpation
of the corridor and its species. Therefore, the actual net benefit of the project to a
respondent in any given year (CV) is determined by the CVmax (annual WTP
estimated above) multiplied by the proportion of the corridor’s species which have
been saved by the project:
Equation 9.4 )]([ maxmax SSSCVCV projectnonproject 
Where Sproject is assumed to equal Smax, and Snon-project is determined by the
deforestation projection, species area relationship and relaxation rates, as above.
Recall that Smax is the number of species present in the corridor in 2005 that are
not already committed to extinction (Equation 9.2).
This approach is not completely satisfactory, since it does not precisely map onto
Menzel’s (2005) contingent valuation question. However, it goes some way to
addressing the problem that we do not know the respondent’s perception of the
counter-factual (important, given the illustrative purpose of the analysis), and
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avoids the need to predict future extinctions from past deforestation. If the WTP
of $0.74 is accurate, this approach may underestimate true benefits, since it values
species which would not have gone extinct. Or it may over-estimate true benefits
since it ignores the extinctions already destined to occur, and which the project
would not prevent. It is, in any case, best thought of as an illustrative rather than
definitive value, which nonetheless serves the purpose of motivating the
subsequent discussion in Chapter 11.
Projecting existence values through time and space
Of course, it is not only Germans who are likely to value the existence of species
– nature conservation movements are present in many countries. The value of
$0.74 per intact corridor (CVmax), per German, per year, in 2001, must therefore be
extended to other countries, and other years. The value put on a species’ existence
may not be constant between countries and years. It is likely to depend on several
factors, including an individual’s income and preferences.
Many contingent valuation studies, including Menzel (2005), find a link between
the income of a respondent and their stated WTP for environmental goods (e.g.
Kramer & Mercer 1997). Of course, this may partly be explained by a greater
ability to pay (see Chapter 2), but whether existence values rise or fall as a
proportion of income as people get richer will depend on the income elasticity of
existence value. The value placed on the intact corridor, CVmax can be represented
as:
Equation 9.5 eYaCV max
where a is a constant, Y is income and e is the income elasticity. If e is greater
than unity, existence values will rise faster than incomes. a can be parameterised
such that:
Equation 9.6 eGYa 0174.0
Where YG01 is the mean income of German residents in 2001206 ($25,319, Heston
et al. 2006). Unfortunately, Menzel does not provide any information about the
206 Measured, as before, in year 2000 international dollars.
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income elasticity of WTP in her study (Menzel 2005:35). Therefore, in later
analyses (see Chapter 11), I include a range of elasticities, centred around unity, in
projecting how existence values will change over time. Of course, the residents of
different countries may also differ, on average, in their preferences for nature over
other things, even holding income levels constant, and preferences for nature may
change over time, independent of income changes (including due to spillover
effects from rich or culturally dominant countries). For simplicity, I ignore these
possibilities here.
I also ignore the possibility that Malagasy value their ‘own’ biodiversity more
highly than do equivalent non-Malagasy. Although there is qualitative evidence
that rural Malagasy do value the existence of certain biodiversity components (e.g.
Jones et al. in press a) estimates of the existence values of biodiversity to very low
income people is sparse (for example Turpie 2003 estimates this for South
Africans, but here lowest income category is $100 per month, an order of
magnitude higher than that of rural Malagasy). However, the existence values of
biodiversity to local Malagasy will affect their behaviour, tending to reduce
deforestation rates, and therefore the estimates of net opportunity costs considered
in the following chapter.
Figure 9.4 shows the results of combining economic projections (from Chapters 6
and 7), with deforestation projections (Chapter 8) and the species-area
relationships and relaxation rates (assuming a half life of 50 years), to project
aggregate global non-use benefits of protecting the corridor. Non-use values rise
over time as a result of global economic growth, and because the number of
avoided extinctions also rises. Aggregate non-use values are very sensitive to the
biological urgency of conservation to prevent species extinctions (within the range
considered plausible in Chapter 8), being far higher under the most pessimistic
deforestation scenario than under the most optimistic. The implications of this for
the overall value of conservation are explored in the next chapter. Lower values
for the income elasticity of CVmax (e) lead to marginally higher initial values, but
considerably lower values in the future.
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Figure 9.4. Projected aggregate global non-use values of protecting the corridor using two
different deforestation scenarios: pessimistic (initial deforestation rate = 2.5%, pessimistic
Malagasy economic growth) and optimistic (initial deforestation rate = 0.3%, optimistic
Malagasy economic growth), as well as two different values for e (the income elasticity
of CVmax). The half-life of the rate at which species relax to extinction is assumed to be 50
years.
VI. Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the complexity of estimating the net-benefits of
protecting the corridor, in terms of global non-use values. Although considerable
uncertainties persist concerning the rate at which species become extinct
following habitat loss, and the degree to which regrowing (secondary) forest can
and will ‘rescue’ species, the uncertainties concerning the economic benefits of
avoiding extinctions are probably even greater. Two potentially suitable
contingent valuation studies, which address global issues and therefore provide
partial protection against embedding effects, are discussed and found to be
difficult to compare. Nevertheless they imply very different existence values for
the corridor, although they are difficult to interpret because of the difficulty of
adequately specifying the counter factual, and of mapping contingent valuation
questions onto real conservation projects. Nevertheless, the projections developed
here are useful in illustrating the fact that the value of any conservation project
will be contingent on the true biological urgency of conservation, the implications
of which will be explored in subsequent chapters.
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10. The local costs of conservation
Abstract
Many areas of conservation concern in developing countries are surrounded by
substantial populations of poor people who depend on natural resources for their
livelihoods. One of the most important components of any cost-benefit analysis of
conservation projects must therefore be the assessment of local opportunity costs
resulting from restricted access to natural resources.
In this chapter I outline the main difficulties associated with estimating local
opportunity costs, based on my own field experience, as well as that of other
authors. I then review published estimated of local opportunity costs of
conservation in the eastern rainforests of Madagascar, finding them to be
significant as a proportion of local incomes: estimated at between 17 and 62%.
However, I note several problems in interpreting and projecting such estimates as
part of a cost-benefit analysis, including the difficulty of ensuring that opportunity
cost estimates are consistent with other assumptions and projections made in the
analysis, such as income growth and deforestation.
I therefore propose a simple way to link opportunity costs to income and
population growth and deforestation rates, and use this to project local
opportunity costs over the time horizon of the project. This analysis, while crude,
demonstrates the link between deforestation rates (both in the present and future),
and local opportunity costs as a proportion of incomes. This highlights one
extremely important point, which I believe has received insufficient attention in
the conservation literature, namely that the urgency of conservation action (which
was shown in Chapter 9 to drive its economic benefits) is also likely to be related
to the seriousness of its ethical implications.
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I. Introduction
Millions of people around the world live in close proximity to tropical forests and
are dependent on those forests for their livelihoods (Grimes et al. 1994, Byron &
Arnold 1999). Many of these practice traditional swidden agriculture which is a
major driver of tropical forest loss or degradation (Myers 1991, Noble & Dirzo
1997). Harvesting of non timber forest products also provides goods for
subsistence use or trade (Pimentel et al. 1997). Excluding local people from
forests therefore entails opportunity costs for forest-dependent communities by
limiting agricultural expansion and reducing access to valuable forest products
(e.g. Ferraro 2002, Balmford & Whitten 2003). These costs, which are often borne
by some of the world’s poorest people, have been identified as a major source of
conflict between conservation projects and local people, potentially reducing the
effectiveness of protected areas (Wells et al. 1990, Ghimire 1991).
The livelihoods of many of the people living around the eastern rainforests of
Madagascar are based heavily on small-scale swidden agriculture (Messerli 2000,
Laney 2002, Styger et al. 2007) and the harvesting of forest products such as wild
honey, crayfish and timber for house building (Ferraro 2002, Jones et al. 2006).
One of the most important impacts of a conservation project aimed at preventing
deforestation in Madagascar is therefore likely to be the opportunity costs
associated with restricting these activities (Hockley & Razafindralambo 2006). In
this chapter I consider some of the difficulties associated with estimating these
local opportunity costs before reviewing available published estimates. I discuss
how such estimates might be interpreted, and some of the difficulties associated
with projecting and using such micro-level, present-day estimates in CBAs. I then
outline a possible response to these issues, using a macro-level perspective to
project local opportunity costs into the future.
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II. Practical difficulties in estimating local opportunity
costs
Estimating opportunity costs in developing countries where markets are weak or
non-existent is very challenging. The principal input is the individual’s own time,
although the labour of others may be hired or borrowed (against reciprocal labour,
or a share of the production), and wage rates are difficult to estimate. Land or
extraction rights are rarely if ever sold, instead they are inherited, and often
managed through communal institutions rather than as private property. Capital
inputs are low; borrowing is rare. Formal capital markets are difficult for local
people to access, and local markets may be shallow, often informal and governed
by institutions that may not be easily understood by the outsider. Much production
is for subsistence use and cash exchanges represent only a small proportion of
transactions. This is true of the lives of a great proportion of humanity, but is not
proportionately reflected in the activities of economists (Dasgupta 2007b).
Attempts to estimate the opportunity costs of a conservation area tend to take the
form either of (i) micro-level investigations of cash-flow or production function
analysis of households (e.g. Ferraro 2002, Straede & Treue 2006), or (ii)
contingent valuation studies aimed to investigate the compensation level at which
household’s would be willing to accept restricted forest access (e.g. Richards
1994, Shyamsundar & Kramer 1996).
Below, I outline the main practical challenges to this work, based on my own field
experience in eastern Madagascar. Between September 2001 and September 2006,
I spent 36 months living and working in the study area, as a research assistant,
independent researcher, PhD student and consultant, during which time I became
fluent in spoken Malagasy. One of the aims of my research was to quantify local
people’s use of the forest, for agriculture and forest products. This work is
summarised in Hockley et al. (2002, 2003, 2005b, 2006) and Andriahajaina et al.
(2005) and some has been published as Hockley et al. (2005a), Hockley &
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Razafindralambo (2006), Hockley & Andriamarovololona (2007), Jones et al.
(2005, 2006, 2007a & b, in press a and b).207
Quantifying forest product use
Several reviews have proposed guidelines for the assessment of forest product use
by local people (Godoy & Lubowski 1992, Gram 2001, Sheil & Wunder 2002).
Rather than provide a comprehensive review, I focus here on the issues I found to
be most important in my own field work.
Methods for estimating the use of forest products can be thought of as lying upon
a spectrum of research intensity per subject. At one end is direct recording of
forest product harvesting; by following harvesters (Zeleznik & Bennett 1991,
Muchaal & Ngandjui 1999), recording products as they enter the village
(Stearman 1990, Wilkie & Curran 1991, Hockley et al. 2005a) or monitoring
forest entry/exit points and recording the flow of harvesters and goods (Appasamy
1993, Wickramasinge et al. 1996). Less direct monitoring techniques include
focus group discussions or semi-structured interviews with key informants (Hegde
et al. 1996, Paoli et al. 2001, Larsen 2002), harvester diaries (Gram 2001) and
rapid rural appraisal (Hellier et al. 1999, Hockley et al. 2002, Sambou et al. 2002,
Marshall & Newton 2003), and finally administered questionnaires (Shyamsundar
& Kramer 1996, Ferraro 2002).
Rapid methods can get information much more quickly than methods involving
direct observation but at a cost to detail and possibly accuracy (Belshaw 1981,
Godoy et al. 1993). There has been considerable debate about the use of ‘quick
and dirty’ methods for collecting social science data relative to more detailed
methods (e.g. Stocking 1980) but few studies are available which validate the
rapid techniques (Adams et al. 1997). For example, prior to the work by
colleagues and I (Jones et al. in press b), only one study (Gavin & Anderson
2005) had compared the results of one-off interviews and regular reporting as
methods of estimating levels of natural resource use.
207 I also supervised the work of others, on wild honey (Andriamarovololona 2003), bamboos
(Andriamarovololona 2005), pandans (Tayer 2005), and the commercialisation of forest products
(Rakoto 2004).
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Having trialled the use of rapid interviews to estimate the use by local people of
the forests (Hockley et al. 2002), colleagues and I established a system of daily
interviews with forest product harvesters (described in Hockley et al. 2005a and
Jones et al. 2005). After this study had been running for over two years, Jones et
al. (in press b) carried out one-off interviews with harvesters, looking back over
the previous year, and compared the results of the daily and one-off interviews.
Because the two types of interview covered the same period, this provided a more
satisfactory test of recall reliability than Gavin and Anderson’s (2005) study.
However, there are several reasons why our study provides only an upper bound
on the reliability of one-off interviews. First, it is quite possible that the
experience of regularly reporting and quantifying their harvests during the
preceding year improved the recall reliability of respondents. Second, by the time
of the one-off interviews, the interviewers were well known to the harvesters,
having worked in the village for over three years. This meant that there was little
incentive to deliberately mislead the interviewer about harvesting activities, since
these had been directly observed over the previous year, and since the
interviewers were very familiar with local practices. Third, the one-off interviews
were conducted in an unhurried fashion, and made full use of Rapid Rural
Appraisal techniques to elicit quantitative information; these are likely to be more
reliable (though slower) than administered questionnaires. 208 The same
interviewers conducted every interview, reducing the potential for alternative
interpretations of survey questions. Fourth, the study focussed on just two of the
most frequently harvested products (crayfish and firewood), rather than
attempting to cover the full range of forest products.
Bearing these caveats in mind, the results of the study suggest that the one-off
interviews provided relatively accurate information about the quantities of forest
products collected per individual, although there was a tendency to over-estimate
collection activity among low volume harvesters (Jones et al. in press b). If this is
a general trend, it could lead to significant over-reporting, since the subjects of
this study were relatively heavy harvesters by the standards of this village, which
208 Experience shows that by using RRA it is difficult to conduct more than two interviews per
day. Most questionnaire-based studies (e.g. Ferraro 1994) aim to complete far more than this.
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is itself one of the most important forest-product-harvesting villages in the region
(pers. obs.) Gavin & Anderson (2005) also reported an apparent tendency to over-
report harvesting volumes.
Thus, while the results of this study are encouraging for the use of one-off
interviews in what were close to ideal conditions, the performance of rapid one-
off interviews with more ambitious sample sizes remains unquantified,
particularly with regard to low-volume, low-frequency, subsistence harvesters,
which are likely to form the majority of respondents in the study area (and in the
study of Ferraro 1994, 2002), considered below). My opinion is that studies
aiming for large sample sizes using administered questionnaires during rapid
visits to an area are likely to be subject to large biases, the direction of which may
be unknown and difficult to predict.209
Another challenge is to estimate the spatial use of the forest for forest product
harvesting. If most exploitation only occurs within the outer fringes of the
potential protected area, closest to the villages, then having a buffer where forest
product extraction is allowed will reduce local opportunity costs (Hockley &
Razafindralambo 2006). It may be possible to relocate harvesting activities carried
out further inside the forest to a forest buffer zone or secondary forest, though at
some cost to product quality / size or harvesting efficiency.
In the long-term study of forest product use by villagers from Vohiparara in the
Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor (hereafter “the corridor”, reported in Hockley et
al. 2005a), I found that most harvesting occurred relatively close to the village
(Figure 10.1). If a buffer zone of at least 2.5 km in from the current edge of the
forest was established, opportunity costs from lost access to forest products would
fall to close to zero (Hockley & Razafindralambo 2006). Unfortunately, collecting
such spatial information is costly and time consuming: this study involved daily
interviews over the period of a year, including mapping of local place names
using GPS (Hockley et al. 2005a).
209 With colleagues I trailed this approach (though using RRA techniques rather than
questionnaires) in a village which we had not previously visited, with the aim of quantifying
resource use. This experience contributed heavily to my negative opinion of such methods, and
subsequent in-depth research in the same village (Andriamarovololona 2003) confirmed the
unsatisfactory nature of much of the data collected during the initial visit, which we discarded.
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Figure 10.1. The cumulative proportion of forest product collecting trips carried out with
increasing distance from a harvesting village, Vohiparara, in the Ranomafana-Andringitra
corridor. Data are taken from a year-long study of forest product use described in
Hockley et al. (2005a) and the graph appears in Hockley and Razafindralambo (2006).
A further challenge to identifying the opportunity costs of restrictions on forest
product harvesting opportunities is to identify the degree to which the
domestication of key species or the use of substitutes is possible. This will, of
course, vary from species to species and domestication of forest products is not
always possible (Jones et al. 2007a). However if substitutes are available or
domestication can occur, the true opportunity costs of lost access will be much
less than the value of the harvested products. Note, however, that domesticated
alternatives may not be accessible to poorer households who lack the capital
necessary (Hockley et al. 2003).
Finally, one of the most fundamental difficulties in estimating opportunity costs
from micro-level data on household forest use is that it is often extremely difficult
to specify the counter-factual – i.e. what households would do their access to the
forest is restricted by a protected area, or when forest is lost to agriculture (Laney
2002). Most studies equate the opportunity costs of lost access to the forest with
the benefits obtained by using it, which are rendered net by subtracting a shadow
wage rate from the gross returns from forest use (e.g, Ferraro 2002). However,
such shadow wage rates may be extremely difficult to estimate in areas like the
corridor, where labour is seldom sold. In addition, any shadow wage rate that is
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estimated will only be valid for marginal changes in the allocation of labour. Yet,
as the studies reviewed below demonstrate, the effects of forest conservation are
likely to be intra-marginal, rendering such shadow wage rates invalid.
Opportunity costs due to teviala prohibition
Estimating the opportunity costs of prohibitions of teviala and other swidden
systems is extremely difficult. Teviala is conducted for a variety of reasons, not
always directly connected to present day needs, including securing access to land
for future generations (Hockley & Andriamarovololona 2007). Direct approaches
to opportunity cost estimation rely on constructing a production function for
teviala, to determine the relative returns to labour, land and capital. This approach
is fraught with difficulties even in relatively conventional farming systems (Ellis
1993). It is even more difficult in the case of teviala in Madagascar. Teviala plots
are seldom sold, and then only in extremis (Harper 2002), making a meaningful
price impossible to ascertain. Labour inputs are almost impossible to estimate,
since even the work of clearance and planting is organised semi-informally,
making great use of the haona system, whereby farmers work for each other, for
rewards which are often difficult to define, including payoffs in social capital
terms (Ferraro 1994). Measuring labour inputs is further complicated by the
unstructured nature of much of the work (which is not easily rendered into person-
days) and the substantial time input of children and those looking after them,
particularly for pest control (pers. obs.)
There is considerable inter-plot variability in biophysical characteristics (e.g.
slope angle, aspect, soil nutrients) but also in the way teviala plots are used: the
crops planted, and the fallow period between cropping (pers. obs.). This makes
productivity of both land and labour difficult to determine, even for a single
cropping period. However, contrary to the assumptions of some authors (e.g.
Kremen et al. 2000) teviala plots, particularly on the eastern side of the eastern
rainforests of Madagascar , can remain productive over cropping-fallow cycles for
generations (Erdmann 2003a, Styger et al. 2007), and land clearance is as much an
investment for the future as it is a short-term production decision. This means that
the returns to both labour and land must be assessed over the productive lifetime
of the plot. One consequence of this is that inter-temporal issues become
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important, and the rate of time preference used by researchers may be very
different from that of local people (see next section).
A second, more practical, consequence is that assessing the lifetime productivity
of a plot is heavily reliant on farmer recall over several decades, which may be
impossible since land is passed down and across generations and requires
interviewing several different farmers for each plot, some of whom are likely to
be very old or dead. From my experience, each plot must be visited in person by
both the interviewer and interviewee (if they are willing), since even land-poor
households will often have several, scattered plots which are difficult to define (to
the interviewer). Even defining a plot is difficult or impossible, since plots are
often expanded gradually, meaning that any plot more than a few years old is
likely to be a mosaic of areas with different forest conversion and management
histories. Since land is rarely sold, most respondents have only a hazy grasp of
formal measurement units and I have found that area estimates reported in
interviews can be very unreliable. Directly obtaining even rough measurements of
a plot’s area (necessary to link opportunity cost estimates to hectares of forest
saved) can be extremely time consuming, since plots are frequently large, with
many areas in a state of overgrown fallow (which may be functionally
indistinguishable from the land category of “secondary forest”), steep, and rocky.
Finally, ownership of plots within an extended family is difficult to determine,
and often changes depending on the circumstances of the constituent households.
This makes it identifying the population who will be affected by prohibitions on
teviala difficult. In the case of a ban on agricultural expansion at the forest
frontier, existing teviala land may be reallocated within a family, protecting the
livelihoods of frontier farmers to some extent but leading to ripple effects
spreading back from the forest frontier. On the other hand, the livelihoods of
certain households, who lack a strong extended family, may be very badly
affected by any restrictions on forest conversion. As with forest products, the
counter-factual is very difficult to define, due to the unreliability of estimated
shadow wage rates and the difficulty of predicting how labour will be re-allocated
in the event that the forest frontier is closed and, once again, labour re-allocation
may be intra-marginal.
Chapter 10
250
Further complicating matters, teviala plots are often converted to irrigated (paddy)
rice agriculture. In some cases, conversion to paddy may be carried out almost
straight after forest clearance, in others, conversion takes place when the soil has
begun to lose fertility (Hockley & Andriamarovololona 2007). Clearance of
vegetation and cultivation in Teviala plots on the surrounding slopes may be
undertaken to prevent shading of the paddy) or even to erode nutrients from the
hillside into the paddy (Kull 2004, pers. obs.)
My field work generated extremely useful qualitative information about the
conduct and importance of teviala (which I use below in interpreting and
projecting the estimates of others). However, I concluded that achieving
opportunity cost estimates with acceptable levels of precision would require an
almost anthropological level of detail to the work, implying a very large research
effort for a reasonable sample size.
Contingent valuation: a possible alternative for estimating local
opportunity costs?
The contingent valuation method offers an alternative to direct, analyst-
constructed estimates of opportunity costs. Contingent valuation studies are
relatively common-place in developed countries with largely market-based
economic systems (Hanemann 1994). However, they have been relatively rare in
developing countries (Shyamsundar & Kramer 1996), but are rapidly increasing,210
probably in part because of the difficulty of constructing revealed preference
estimates of CVs in societies which lack an all-pervasive market-based economy.
Yet, contingent valuation relies on a market analogy, and the absence of markets
may weaken this analogy for the participants. For example, Shyamsundar &
Kramer (1996, reviewed below) state that “[our] method solicits simple ‘‘Yes’’
and ‘‘No’’ responses to an offered bid, and therefore mimics market type
everyday behavior.” Yet this does not mimic everyday market behaviour in a
country where haggling and non-market institutions (e.g. familial ties and power
210 For example a search for TOPIC=("contingent valuation*" AND "developing countr*") in the
Web of Science database (9th June 2008) showed a faster-than-linear increase from just 0-1
articles per annum 1990-1992 to 13 articles in 2007. The same search, this time omitting the
developing country term, showed a linear increase from 15-30 per annum in 1990-1992 to 206 in
2007.
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relations) dominate many exchanges. Onwujekwe et al. (2008) find evidence that
contingent valuation studies based on “structured haggling” improve the validity
of responses.
Linguistic and cultural barriers (including within countries) may also pose
problems, and researchers using contingent valuation approaches may have
increased difficulty in providing credible scenarios and payment vehicles to
respondents, who are often used to the unreliability of governmental and non-
governmental institutions (Whittington 2002, Whittington 2004, Chaudhry et al.
2007). These difficulties are unlikely to be solved simply through the use of non-
monetary payment units, such as rice (as implied for instance by Shyamsundar &
Kramer 1996).
A final problem with contingent valuation studies, wherever they are carried out,
is that while it is common to look at the consistency of responses with economic
theory (e.g. whether they are predicted by observed socio-economic variables), it
is very rare that the results of contingent valuation are compared with actual
behaviour. This makes it impossible to determine whether contingent valuations
are consistently biased, either up or down. I know of only one example where the
results of a developing country contingent valuation study have been compared
with actual behaviour. Kamuanga et al. (2001) estimated the willingness of rural
people in Burkina Faso to contribute (money and labour) to a project to eliminate
tsetse fly. In this case, the project was of potentially great importance to the
respondents, and was credible and quite well understood by them, having been
implemented in other villages in the area. Nevertheless, the authors found that the
contingent valuation study consistently and significantly over-estimated people’s
actual willingness to contribute to the project. Such biases are likely to be at least
as large (but of unknown sign) in cases where the project is more difficult for
respondents to evaluate (such as the permanent and unprecedented loss of access
to their forests).
Conclusions
Estimating local opportunity costs of conservation in developing countries is
extremely difficult and whichever method is chosen it is likely to require very
considerable research effort relative to the population size. Any estimates may
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well be affected by significant biases of unknown sign and magnitude. In the next
chapter I discuss the implications of these large decision costs and considerable
uncertainties for CBA as an enterprise. In my own case, these difficulties led me
to focus my own field research on aspects of natural resource use other than
quantitative estimates of opportunity costs (e.g. the viability of community forest
management), and to focus in this part of the thesis on the use of data on costs and
benefits within CBA (next chapter). Below I review estimates of the local
opportunity costs of conservation in the eastern rainforests of Madagascar
produced by other authors, and discuss their interpretation and projection, subject
to the caveats noted above.
III. Published estimates of local opportunity costs
Four estimates of the local opportunity costs of conservation in the eastern
rainforests of Madagascar have been published: Ferraro (1994, 2002),
Shyamsundar & Kramer (1996), Kremen et al. (2000) and Minten (2003).
However, the assumptions made by Kremen et al. (2000), based on Masoala forest
(in the north-east of Madagascar), seem implausible for the study area of the
corridor. For example, they assume that the only benefit derived by local people
from clearing forest is a single crop of rice, whereas the observations of myself
and others (Ferraro 1994, Messerli 2002, Styger et al. 2007) suggest that cleared
land is used for many years. For this reason I discount the Kremen et al. (2000)
study.
Local opportunity costs of the Ranomafana National Park
(Ferraro 1994, 2002)
Ferraro (1994, 2002) carried out a cash-flow analysis of local forest use in the
periphery of the soon-to-be-established Ranomafana National Park, at the
northern end of the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor, during 1990-1991. The
analysis was based on a household questionnaire administered by a team of non-
governmental nurses to 490 households in 17 villages, together with the results of
semi-structured interviews and other information, such as market prices, gathered
at the same time. Many of the concerns raised in section II above apply to this
study, including the reliability of one-off estimates of forest use, and the difficulty
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of converting gross benefits to net benefits, and therefore opportunity costs. For
example, Ferraro was not able to estimate the benefits which would be obtained
by local people from outside the park, in the event that they were denied access to
resources inside the park, and therefore his estimates rely heavily on combining
estimated wage rates with estimated labour inputs, to determine opportunity costs.
These difficulties are acknowledged by Ferraro, who deliberately erred on the
conservative side, and considered his estimates to represent the lower bound of
opportunity costs.211
Local opportunity costs of Mantadia National Park
(Shyamsundar & Kramer 1996):
In July 1991 Shyamsundar & Kramer (1996) conducted a contingent valuation
study to establish the willingness to accept compensation (WTA) of farmers
located in the periphery of Mantadia National Park in the north east of
Madagascar. They used a dichotomous choice method, using rice as a
“currency”212 to elicit the annual quantity of rice which respondents felt would
compensate them adequately for lost access to the forest within the National Park
“every year from now on” (Shyamsundar & Kramer 1996).
Local opportunity costs in Maroantsetra (Minten 2003):
Minten (2003), estimated the willingness of farmers in the Maroantsetra area of
north-eastern Madagascar to accept compensation for halting forest clearance.
WTA was again measured in rice,213 this time using a stochastic payment card
method (following Wang and Whittington 2000, 2005). As with the study of
Shyamsundar & Kramer (1996), the CVM question asks for “the quantity ... of
211 One of the most important reasons for believing that the estimates may under-estimate
opportunity costs is that local forest use in the area was already depressed prior to the park’s
establishment (c.f. Chapter 8), due to the area’s status as a relatively well enforced classified forest
(Forêt Classée), and Ferraro (1994, 2002) noted a tendency to under-report forest activities during
the household survey, because of respondents’ fears of sanctions by the Forestry Department
(Ferraro 1994, 2002). Local people are unlikely to have been convinced of the non-governmental
nature of the health team, since, prior to the mid-nineties, virtually all salaried workers in rural
Madagascar (other than priests) were government functionaries (F. E. Rakoto, pers. com.).
212 The unit was a vata of rice, which the authors state equalled 30 kg.
213 The units were sobika, a basket containing approximately 12 kg of rice. Minten (2003)
converted these quantities to Francs Malgache (FMG)
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rice every year that you would need” to be equally satisfied as in the case where
access had not been restricted (Minten 2003:6, emphasis added).
Comparison and interpretation
The three estimates of opportunity costs from these studies are shown in Table
10.1, converted to a common base year and PPP-adjusted to allow comparison
with estimated local income levels (as defined in Chapter 7). Ferraro (1994)
presented his opportunity cost estimates as net present values (NPVs) discounted
at 5% per annum over a 60 year time horizon, but he also provided an annualised
figure, which allows tentative comparisons to be made with the other studies,
which estimated (constant) annual CVs. The estimates show a considerable spread
(range= 97% of mean), which illustrates the great variability and uncertainty
associated with estimates of opportunity costs. However, the estimates are all
important when compared with local incomes.
Table 10.1. Three estimates of the local opportunity costs of forest conservation and the
percentage of this accounted for by lost opportunities for teviala. Figures are rounded.
WTA, willingness to accept.
Per capita opportunity
costs as % of local
incomes in 2000
Study Method Annual
opportunity
costs capita-1
(2000 US$1)
Percentage of
costs due to
teviala
prohibition Total Teviala
Ferraro
(1994,
2002) 2
Cash-flow
analysis
27 52 17 9
Shyamsun
dar &
Kramer
(1996)
WTA,
dichotomous
choice
46 - 29 -
Minten
(2003)
WTA,
payment card
(median)
96 48 62 30
Mean 71 50 45 22
1 Ferraro (1994, 2002) used 1991 US dollars, Shyamsundar & Kramer (1996) used 1991 US
dollars, Minten (2003) used 2001 US dollars. Dollar deflators are taken from US Bureau of Labor
Statistics (2008).
2 Annualised value provided by Ferraro (1994 Table IV), based on the NPV (which assumed a 5%
discount rate and 60 year time horizon).
Ferraro’s (1994, 2002) estimate is lower than the other two, and there are several
reasons which might explain this, aside from regional variability and the
conservative assumptions noted by Ferraro. First, Ferraro’s (1994, 2002) estimates
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are discounted at 5% over a limited time horizon (60 years), while the other two
estimates represent, at least theoretically, the respondents’ own annuity estimates,
derived from their own private time preference rates and time horizons. Teviala is
often practised with long-term objectives in mind, including the provision of land
to one’s descendents (as discussed above), so the treatment of time will clearly be
critical. Although it is commonly assumed that residents of low income countries
have high time preference rates (e.g. Kremen et al. 2000214), this is difficult to
reconcile with the low or even negative income growth rates observed in many
countries (Chapter 7, Price 1993). Although those who are acutely poor may show
very high rates of time preference during times of crisis (e.g. famines), there is no
reason why the chronically poor, who have little reason to expect their incomes to
improve dramatically, should do so, and there is evidence that residents of low
income countries demonstrate only modest rates of time preference (Moseley et
al. 2001).215 Even if time preference rates are positive true welfare costs may not
be well represented if annual costs are discounted (see Chapter 2). In fact, in
generating his projections of opportunity costs, Ferraro assumes stagnant
technology and a decline in levels of soil fertility which almost certainly imply
falling real incomes. This is difficult to reconcile with positive discount rates
(Chapter 2, Price 1993).
The second important factor which influences Ferraro’s (1994, 2002) opportunity
cost estimates is that he uses an estimate of per capita deforestation (0.003%
capita-1 yr-1) to extrapolate field-level estimates of teviala productivity to the
household and population levels. This estimate corresponds to an equivalent
annual deforestation rate for the corridor of around 0.3% per year which is lower
than the range of estimates taken from the literature and discussed in Chapter 8. It
is quite possible that Ferraro’s deforestation rate estimate, derived as it is from
ground-level observation, is more accurate than the remote sensed estimates,
214 Kremen et al. (2000) quote high interest rates charged on loans in Madagascar as support for
assuming a high positive discount rate with respect to local benefits. However, these rates are
likely to reflect risk on default. Real (and sometimes even nominal) interest rates on savings in
Madagascar are often negative, once inflation has been taken into account (pers. obs.).
215 Although poor people generally face higher mortality rates, the difference in the uncorrected
population mortality rate between rich and poor countries is actually fairly small, because the
population is these countries tends to be younger (WHO 2008).
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which probably double-count some clearing of land in the fallow phase of the
teviala cycle as deforestation ? of previously unconverted forest. When projecting
opportunity costs into the future they must be contingent on the assumed rate of
deforestation: deforestation rate may be slower than that estimated from remote
sensing studies, or, if not, opportunity costs are likely to be higher than estimated
by Ferraro.
This brings us to the issue of projecting opportunity costs through time, as part of
a CBA of the form described in Chapter 2. First, estimates of costs should be
consistent with other assumptions made elsewhere in the analysis; for example,
rates of income growth or deforestation, and this is true of costs estimated either
using cash-flow or production function analyses, as well as contingent valuations.
Indeed, as will become clear in the next chapter, the level of opportunity costs
relative to incomes over time is likely to be at least as important as the dollar
value of costs themselves (which are the only important consideration in a
conventional CBA). If incomes are predicted to rise over time (possibly justifying
“discounting” on the basis of diminishing marginal utility of income) it is
important to know whether opportunity costs themselves are likely to be a
function of income over this time period. This seems very likely in the case of
local costs. The dollar values of the products of field and forest will not be
independent of macro-economic variables like the national income level, since
this will affect them through determining demand for the products, transport
infrastructure (which will greatly affect farm-gate prices of both products and
inputs like fertiliser) and local technological progress (which may increase yields).
As described in the previous chapter, demographic variables are likely to affect
deforestation rates, and therefore both aggregate and per capita opportunity costs.
Summing up estimation of local opportunity costs
It is clear from the discussion above that the estimation of near-term local
opportunity costs through direct means (whether cash-flow analysis or CVM
studies) presents considerable difficulties to the analyst. When it is necessary to
project these costs into the future, further problems arise, particularly in ensuring
that the estimates are compatible with assumptions and projections made
elsewhere in the analysis. As a result, in the next section I outline a macro-level
approach to the estimation and projection of opportunity costs. While incomplete
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and simplistic, this provides a way to derive projections of opportunity costs
which are at least consistent with other components of the CBA.216
IV. A macro-level approach to estimating and projecting
local opportunity costs
The previous sections have demonstrated the great difficulty of estimating local
opportunity costs of conservation - the prodigious quantities of data required to do
so and the difficulty of projecting the resulting estimates in a way which is
compatible with assumptions made elsewhere in the CBA, and with intra-
marginal re-allocation of labour. The aim of this section, then, is to explore the
value of taking a macro-perspective of opportunity costs as a function of macro-
economic variables.
For simplicity I focus only on costs associated with agricultural production,
discounting those associated with forest product harvesting. This is both because
forest product collection in the study area, although widely carried out, is
relatively low in value (e.g. Jones et al. 2006) and because enforcement of
prohibitions on forest product harvesting is unlikely to be fully effective in the
project scenario. I base this assumption on the observation that exploitation of
forest products continues within long established national parks (Jones et al. 2005,
Jones et al. 2006, pers. obs.) which are smaller and better funded than the
proposed new protected areas like the corridor (Hockley & Andriamarovololona
2007).
The model
The preceding chapters have developed projections, with reference to empirical
data and published studies, of the following variables.
National Population Size. Chapter 7 developed projections for population size.
These are assumed to be determined by non-economic factors, and rely on the
projections of Lutz et al. 2001.
216 As I explain below, these opportunity costs are scaled to the same proportion of incomes as
found by the three published studies (Table 10.1).
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National Income Level. This is determined with reference to vanguard
technological progress in the OECD (extrapolated from historical data, see
Chapter 7) and a convergence parameter, which is allowed to vary to represent
varying degrees of optimism about Madagascar’s progress relative to other
developing countries (Chapter 7).
Rural Population Size. This is assumed to be a function of national population
size and income level, the function’s form having been estimated through
empirical analysis (Chapter 7).
Rural income levels. These will be determined by national income levels, and
determined by technological development (broadly defined to include institutions
within Madagascar and infrastructure). Given the uncertainty over the relationship
between inequality and economic development (reviewed in Chapter 7) I assume
that these are a fixed proportion of national income levels.
Forest cover. Chapter 8 reviewed the evidence linking forest cover to the size of
the rural population. Although there remains some uncertainty over whether
deforestation is driven by the national or the rural population, and whether it
might also be affected by macro-economic variables, I assume that it is driven
solely by changes in the rural population size, the function being parameterised
according to the assumed initial deforestation rate(between 0.3 and 2.5% per
annum) over the period 2000 to 2005, relative to the observed population change
over that period, as described in Chapter 8. I discuss this important assumption
further below.
Given the functional forms and parameter values estimated for these projections,
what can we infer about local opportunity costs of forest conservation? Note that,
if the rural income per capita, Yr, is known or estimated, and the rural population,
Pr, is known to derive a significant proportion, f, of its income from farming, and
the current area of land available, A, is known,217 the gross income per capita per
hectare which rural people receive from their land can be estimated thus:
217 This could either be estimated from estimates of actual landholdings, or simply from the known
land area of the population of interest. I use the estimates of land-holding size from Minten (2003).
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Equation 10.1
A
PcapitafYhacapitafY rrr



 )($)($
1
11
Of course, it is possible that the importance of agriculture in rural incomes (f) will
fall with economic development, representing ‘urbanisation of the countryside’.
However, this will only decouple income levels from agricultural productivity if
the off-farm income is not dependent on the agricultural sector. If non-farmers are
earning a living selling goods and services to farmers, it seems unlikely that such
incomes could rise while farm incomes fell. If off-farm income was independent
of agriculture, and rose while agricultural incomes fell, it seems likely that
deforestation would slow. Therefore, for simplicity, I assume that f is constant at
100%, and therefore that all of the shift away from agriculture is accounted for in
the predictions of urbanisation, thus equating the ‘rural population’ of the forest
frontier fokontany218 with the ‘farming and forest clearing population’. In this and
the following chapter I refer to this as the ‘local’ community.
Although Ferraro (1994, 2002) assumed declining productivity levels on
agricultural land with time since conversion from forest, there is no macro-level
evidence to suggest that rural incomes or population densities decline
substantially with distance from the forest frontier and therefore with assumed
time elapsed since deforestation (Minten et al. 2003).219 This is not unreasonable,
since with increasing distance away from the forest frontier the decline in soil
fertility of upland land may be offset by greater investment in lowland land
(conversion to paddy rice), and by easier access to markets and fertiliser. Thus, for
simplicity, I assume that there are no systematic differences in the economic
returns from land-holdings near or far from the forest frontier. Then, under the
non-project scenario (with f set at 1), as agriculture expands beyond the boundary
218 Fokontany are the lowest administrative unit in rural Madagascar, and I have assumed that the
people living within fokontany bordering the forest are those bearing the local opportunity costs of
conservation (see Chapter 7 for more details).
219 Note, this does not imply that returns to labour per hectare are identical across all lands at any
given time. Extended families manage land for the long term, investing in clearing some land,
while planting older land and intensifying agriculture on even older land. Overall, at the macro
level, incomes and population densities may not be greatly different at or behind the agricultural
frontier. However, to reflect uncertainty over this, I scale my opportunity cost estimates to be
broadly comparable with those reviewed above and summarised in Table 10.1, as a percentage of
local incomes.
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of the would-be protected area, YPA, the aggregate agricultural income coming
from land within what would be the protected area (APA), can be estimated as:
Equation 10.2 PArrPA AA
PYY  )(
where APA is determined by the area deforested, and hence by the rural population,
as described in Chapter 8, and above. The main point that I wish to make here is
that it is unreasonable to assume that rural incomes per capita are rising, while the
productivity of land continues to fall, if agriculture makes up a large proportion of
rural incomes.
Equation 10.2 estimates the aggregate income derived from agricultural activity
within the would-be protected area’s boundaries. To determine the true
opportunity costs to local residents, (CVlocal), this net income must be multiplied
by a parameter, O, reflecting what the productivity of this labour might be
Equation 10.3 OYCV PA 
If labour productivity outside the protected area was high relative to that inside, O
would have a low value (~0) and opportunity costs would also be low (~0). Now,
the rate at which the marginal product of labour declines as the quantity of labour
increases on land outside the protected area is likely to be positively correlated
with the initial deforestation rate. If, for a given increase in population,
agricultural land area expands greatly (high initial deforestation rate), this
suggests that the marginal productivity of labour on existing agricultural land
outside the forest is declining sharply, relative to the costs of clearing new land. If
on the other hand, a given increase in population results in little deforestation, this
suggests that the marginal product of labour on existing agricultural land is
relatively high and constant.
In order to link opportunity costs as a proportion of gross incomes directly to
deforestation rates via this mechanism of productivity of labour on existing
agricultural land, I therefore scale this opportunity cost parameter to co-vary
linearly with the initial deforestation rate, Dt=0, such that average opportunity
costs as a proportion of income lie within the range estimated by the studies
reviewed above (Table 10.1):
Equation 10.4 0 tDbaO
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where a and b are constants.
Clearly, the above analysis is simplistic, and, with the information available, does
not solve the problem that the redeployment of labour when access to land in the
protected area is restricted remains unknown, as it is in the already published
opportunity cost estimates, but it does at least ensure that the parameter O, is
linked to other variables in an appropriate way. To estimate O any other way
would require more macro-level evidence than is currently available on changes in
population density and incomes, moving away from forest frontiers where the
forest remains open, has been closed, or has been exhausted, to determine how the
productivity of labour is affected by population increase in an area with a fixed
supply of land. Evidence from detailed anthropological studies of agriculture
(reviewed in Boserup 1965) suggests that technological innovation, driven by
necessity, maintains labour productivity even while the population increases,
though leisure time, and therefore overall welfare, may decline. The parameter O
reflects the degree to which agricultural productivity responds to additional
labour, and therefore represents a point on the Malthusian-Boserupian spectrum,
with Malthus (1798[1999]) expecting a poor response (and therefore starvation)
while Boserup argued that productivity responds better than Malthus expected,
due to the adoption of new technologies (Boserup 1965).
The model also links opportunity costs directly to income levels in Equation 10.1
(which will help determine the social weight placed upon these opportunity costs
in the next chapter), and also to deforestation rates (in Equation 10.4), which
determine the benefits of conservation action (Chapter 9). This allows the range of
opportunity cost estimates reviewed above to be projected in a way which is
internally consistent, something which is vital in CBAs of the type attempted here.
It also illustrates an important point which has received insufficient attention in
the conservation literature, and which I discuss below.
Illustrative results and discussion
The importance of the initial deforestation rate in determining aggregate
opportunity costs in the model is clearly demonstrated in Figure 10.2. The effect
of income growth on aggregate opportunity costs is buffered, because while
income growth raises opportunity costs per hectare it also reducing rural
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population growth through urbanisation. Under high income growth, opportunity
costs per capita peak earlier than under low income growth, but then fall due to
rural depopulation (Figure 10.2). In a conventional CBA, naive application of a
discount rate which was independent of income growth, might lead to the
conclusion that opportunity costs were more important under high income growth
(see Chapter 11).
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Figure 10.2. The effects of initial deforestation rate and income growth on aggregate
annual local opportunity costs of preventing all future deforestation in the proposed
protected area, the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor (in year 2000 international dollars).
After five years opportunity costs, however, are a greater proportion of income
under the low income growth scenario than under the high income growth
scenario (Figure 10.3). Lower initial deforestation rates imply lower opportunity
costs both in dollar terms and as a percentage of income.
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Figure 10.3. Local opportunity costs per capita, in international $ (solid lines) and as a
percentage of income (dotted lines).
The urgency of conservation and its ethical implications
The model indicates that if initial deforestation rates are high (given observed
population growth rate), there are high opportunity costs as a proportion of
incomes. The link between the biological urgency of conservation (and therefore
the international non-use benefits of conservation action) and opportunity costs as
a proportion of income is in fact two-fold.
First, as shown above, the higher the estimates of initial deforestation rates, for a
given observed rate of population increase, the higher are the subsequent
opportunity costs as a percentage of lost gross income, since high initial
deforestation rates indicate rapidly declining marginal productivity of labour on
land outside the protected area.
Second, the higher the subsequent rural population growth rate, the higher the
subsequent deforestation rate (if the forest is not protected) and the greater the
proportion of agricultural land that will lie in what would be the protected area.
Gross incomes lost due to prevention of deforestation will therefore be higher as a
percentage of total incomes.
Together, this means that the more urgent and important conservation appears
(high initial and projected deforestation rates), the higher will be the opportunity
Chapter 10
264
costs as a proportion of incomes (though they may still be important if initial
deforestation rates are low). This point is crucial, and will be explored in greater
depth in the next chapter. Much of the international conservation agenda is driven
by a sense of urgency, and an assurance that we must act now to avert species
extinctions (e.g. Pimm et al. 2001). Conventional economic analyses of
conservation, such as those reviewed by Balmford et al. (2002) reinforce this
impression, by focussing on the net, aggregated benefits of conservation, which
appear to be large. However, the more urgent conservation appears, the more
serious are the ethical concerns with respect to the livelihoods of local people, and
therefore the more important becomes the mechanisms by which conservation is
achieved. This issue will be explored in much greater depth in the next chapter;
for now it suffices to note that the relationship between the urgency of
conservation (viewed from a biological perspective) and the net benefit of hasty
action may well be indeterminate.
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11. The value of biodiversity
conservation
Abstract
Several studies have attempted to demonstrate the value of biodiversity
conservation using conventional cost-benefit analysis techniques. In this
chapter I use a partial cost-benefit analysis of the Ranomafana-Andringitra
new protected area to demonstrate that, under conservative assumptions
about the marginal utility of income, the net value of conservation is likely
to be negative unless complete and efficient compensation is assured. I
suggest that the effects of conservation on social welfare are likely to be
worst where conservation appears most urgent. These findings suggest that
current approaches to conservation, which seek to minimise dollar costs by
directing conservation efforts to the developing world, may be counter-
productive, and detrimental to social welfare.
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I. The conventional economic case for biodiversity
conservation
In previous chapters I developed illustrative projections of two of the most
important costs and benefits of the proposed Ranomafana-Andringitra protected
area. Local opportunity costs are high relative to local incomes (Figure 10.3),
which are some of the lowest in the world, but much smaller in aggregate terms
than the international non-use values (Figure 11.1). This result is qualitatively
similar to that found in a more comprehensive CBA of the same case study
(Hockley & Razafindralambo 2006), as well as in several other CBAs of
conservation in developing countries (e.g. Yaron 1999, 2001, Kremen 2000) and
this pattern is considered by some to be general (Balmford & Whitten 2003). In
every year, the net benefits of the project (sum-of-CVs) are positive, evaluated
according to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (Figure 11.1).220 Again, this result may be
quite general (Balmford et al. 2002) and the observation that conservation in
developing countries ‘makes economic sense’ has provided an impetus to strident
calls to protect biodiversity in developing countries (Pimm et al. 2001, Balmford
et al. 2002).221
220 In the early sections of this chapter I will deliberately avoid questions of inter-temporal
aggregation. In any case, the figures are such that, over the lifetime of the project, whichever form
of inter-temporal aggregation was applied, the results would be unchanged.
221However, some apparently believe that such evidence is unnecessary to prove the case for
conservation (e.g. Collar 2003)
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Figure 11.1. Aggregate compensating variations for the project (from Chapters 9 and 10).
The sum of local communities’ CVs (local, dotted line) is lower than the sum of CVs of
all other stakeholders (global, dashed line). Thus, the sum of CVs in each year (according
to Kaldor-Hicks criterion) is also positive (solid line). Results are shown assuming
pessimistic economic growth in Madagascar (-0.1% y-1 convergence), 2.5% initial
deforestation rate, income elasticity of existence values=1; but are qualitatively
unchanged by varying parameter values across a reasonable range (0.3-2.5% initial
deforestation rate, -0.01% to 2% annual convergence rate, 0.8-1.2 income elasticity of
existence values).
II. Correcting CVs and measuring social welfare
However, I argued in chapter 2 that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion could not
legitimately be applied except where certain conditions were met, either: i) there
are no large disparities in income levels; and costs and benefits are small as a
percentage of incomes; or alternatively: ii) winners and losers form part of the
same society, where income can be redistributed at no cost, in order to achieve a
social optimum. Neither of these conditions holds here, and Kaldor-Hicks must be
abandoned.222
222 An analogy that suggests itself here is that of a parametric statistical test that can only be used if
certain assumptions (such as normality of the underlying data) are met. Thus, we have to resort to
the economic equivalent of non-parametric statistics.
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CV Correction
First, as I described in Chapter 2, CVs must be corrected for the diminishing
marginal utility of income, such that they are no longer measured in dollars, but
rather in terms of utility. A conventional approach to this is to first assume that
utility U is related to income Y as follows:
Equation 11.1
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where η is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income (Layard et al. 2008). It
follows that a CV measured in monetary units can be converted to a utility-based
numeraire, correcting for the diminishing marginal utility of income thus:
Equation 11.2 )()( YUCVYUCVcorrected 
where U(...) is calculated as per equation 11.1. However, the units are arbitrary.
To convert them to a more meaningful unit, we can divide through by a standard
unit of utility that is specific to the project. For example, )1($2005
OECD
tU  , the utility
value of one international dollar to someone with the average OECD income in
2005 ( OECDtY 2005 ) is:
Equation 11.3 )()1()1($ 200520052005
OECD
t
OECD
t
OECD
t YUYUU  
This represents one dollar’s worth of utility to someone with that annual income
(hereafter $U).
Estimates of η differ, with HM Treasury (2003) advocating unity, while Dasgupta
(2007c) argues that it should be between 2 and 4. In addition, some authors (e.g.
Price 1989) suggest that the marginal utility of income should approach infinity
not at Y=0, but rather at some minimum level of income necessary to maintain
survival, Ys, such that Y-Ys is substituted for Y in equation 11.2 above.223 This has
223 Dasgupta (2007:6) also suggests this, when he writes: “In fact, to suppose that [η] is 1 is also to
suppose that starvation isn’t all that painful!
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the effect of greatly increasing the utility value of costs and benefits to those with
incomes close to Ys, and little effect on those with higher incomes. I take η=1, and
make no adjustment for survival incomes (i.e. marginal utility approaches infinity
at Y=0), and thus make only a very conservative correction for the diminishing
marginal utility of income. Nevertheless, this value of unity is quite sufficient to
illustrate the points I wish to make, as shown by Figure 11.2 which plots
corrected-CVs for the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor new protected area
project (hereafter ‘the project’), and the sum-of-corrected-CVs. The effect of
valuing project effects using corrected- rather than uncorrected-CVs is enormous:
welfare losses exceed gains by several orders of magnitude, over the time horizon
considered, even using a conservative value for ρ.
Thus, it can clearly be seen that, under conservative assumptions about the
elasticity of marginal utility of income, and a utilitarian social welfare function (of
which more below), conservation is shown to be economically highly undesirable
(over the time horizon considered). It is difficult to say how general this result
may be, however the example of Yaron (1999, 2001) considered below, suggests
that it is not unique to this case study. It is important to stress that this analysis
relies on nothing that is not standard economic theory, even if it is not always
standard CBA practice.
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Figure 11.2. Aggregate corrected compensating variations for the project for: local
communities’ (local, dotted line)and all other stakeholders (global, dashed line). Sum of
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corrected-CVs is also shown (solid line), and are negative throughout the period
considered. CVs are calculated as per Figure 11.1, correcting CVs as per equations 11.1,
11.2 and 11.3 for the diminishing marginal utility of income (η=1). Values are corrected
to constant utility units $U, worth $1 of utility to someone with the mean OECD income
in 2005, )1($2005
OECD
tU  . Results are shown assuming pessimistic economic growth in
Madagascar (-0.1% y-1 convergence), 2.5% initial deforestation rate, income elasticity of
existence values=1; but are qualitatively unchanged by varying the values of these
parameters across a reasonable range (0.3-2.5% initial deforestation rate, -0.01% to 2%
annual convergence rate, 0.8-1.2 income elasticity of existence values).
Intra-temporal aggregation and social welfare functions
The sum-of-corrected-CVs presented in Figure 11.2 implies that utilities are
additive, and therefore that society wishes to maximise a utilitarian social welfare
function. This means that society is indifferent as to which of its members gains
or loses a given utility increment. However, several alternative social welfare
functions have been proposed, including Rawlsian (Equation 2.2), which aims
simply to maximise the utility of the lowest utility person, and prioritarian
(Equation 2.3), in which utility gains to individuals are weighted according to
their utility levels, though not infinitely (Johansson 1993). As I noted in Chapter
2, the process of summing individuals’ utilities in a social welfare function is
often seen as part and parcel of correcting for the diminishing marginal utility of
income to the individual, i.e. correcting in one step for the changing social
marginal utility of income. One reason for seeing it this way is that the two things:
marginal utility to the individual and to society, may be difficult to separate, at
least on the basis of evidence from individual consumer’s behaviour. Also, the
effect of applying a prioritarian social welfare function can be achieved by
increasing the value of η, above that derived from individual ‘self-regarding’
behaviour (Chapter 2). However, such a view is incompatible with, say, a
Rawlsian social welfare function: society may recognise that a moderately well-
off person would be happier if they were to receive some increase in their income,
while at the same time choosing to accord exclusive priority to the interests of the
least-well off.224
224 This raises, of course, the questions of who determines society’s preferences, and in what sense
an individual is happier if they were to receive an income increment which their society would
rather had gone to someone else. Are their wishes in conflict with that of their society? Or are self-
serving and disinterested preferences meaningfully separable, such that they would be happier
with the increment than without, but would prefer it to go elsewhere?
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This discussion also ignores the existence of any other rights that an individual
may have to utility increments (or to the property and actions that provide them)
aside from those which result from their relative utility level. Yet most societies
are plainly not organised in such a fashion, and other rights, such as those to
property and free action, are also recognised. In Figure 11.2, and all subsequent
analyses, I conservatively assume that utilities are additive, i.e. I assume a
utilitarian social welfare function. However, as I proposed in Chapter 2, I will
refer to the importance of rights (other than those deriving from an individual’s
relative utility) in several places below, since I find them to be a helpful way of
reconciling moral intuition and observed behaviour. For now, it suffices to note
that the above analysis is neutral with respect to the rights, of local residents and
others, to the utility gains and losses resulting from implementing or not
implementing the project.
Inter-temporal aggregation and net present value
Since the CVs are now corrected to represent their presumed social value (under
conservative assumptions), it is as legitimate to sum them over time, as it is within
years, if a zero rate of pure time preference is assumed. In Chapter 2 I argued that
the only proper basis for a pure rate of time preference was the probability of
exogenous catastrophic change, either the risk of extinction of humankind, or
unforeseen technological change which renders project effects obsolete. Both of
these are hard to quantify, and while the former component must be strictly
positive, though hopefully very low, the latter could take either sign: events may
come to pass which render the project’s effects (avoided non-human species’
extinctions) more (rather than less) valuable than foreseen (Price 1993). For
simplicity, I therefore take the pure rate of time preference to be zero. Calculated
on this basis, the net present value (NPV) of the project presented in Figure 11.2
is -377,903 x106 $U. Of course, the opportunity cost of capital cannot be ignored.
However, as argued in chapter 2, it is best dealt with when considering
compensation, which I do below.
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III. The effect of CV correction: a further example
The problem of relying on conventional CBAs based on the sum of CVs is vividly
illustrated by the following example.
Reviewing over 300 case studies of nature conservation, Balmford et al. (2002)
found just five studies which met their criteria of completeness. Drawing on these
studies, Balmford et al. compared the net present values of conserving
substantially unaltered wild nature with those of conversion or significant
degradation. They found a large variation in benefit cost ratios of conservation,
from 1.16 to 3.79 (mean=2.43 s.e.=0.56), with the two terrestrial examples
noticeably lower (mean = 1.19, Table 11.1).
Table 11.1. Benefit cost ratios of conserving wild nature, from Balmford et al. (2002).
Ecosystem (Country) and
Study
Conservation NPV Conversion NPV Benefit:Cost Ratio
Coral Reefs (Philippines)
White et al. (2000)
$3300 $870 3.79
Mangroves (Thailand)
Sathirathai (1998)
$60,400 $16,700 3.62
Wetlands (Canada)
van Vuuren and Roy (1993)
$8800 $3700 2.38
Tropical Forest (Cameroon)
Yaron (2001)
$2570 $2110 1.21
Tropical Forest (Malaysia)
Kumari (1994)
$13,000 $11,200 1.16
Mean +/- Std error 2.43 +/- 0.56
All five studies calculated their net present values using the conventional sum-of-
uncorrected-CVs. Unfortunately, none of the case studies provide sufficient
information about the distribution of costs and benefits to determine how
correcting CVs for unequal marginal utilities of income, or assuming non-
utilitarian social welfare functions, would affect the results. However, Yaron
(1999), provides more detail about the Cameroonian example cited by Balmford
et al. (Yaron 2001). Using the information given in this report, it is possible to
carry out a very rough-and-ready adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility
of income.
The case considered by Yaron (1999, 2001) is the conversion of natural forest to
small scale agriculture versus its management for sustainable forestry. The
benefits considered include private benefits of production under the two systems,
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as well as social benefits. The later included those accruing at the local or national
level (e.g. flood prevention and non-timber forest products) and the global level
(carbon sequestration and option, bequest and existence values of biodiversity).
Methods
Yaron (1999) provides a breakdown according to two stakeholder groups
(Cameroon and international) of the net benefits (CVs) from conservation and
conversion of natural forest in Cameroon (Table 11.2). Mean incomes of these
two groups are taken from UNDP (2004). Conservatively, taking the elasticity of
marginal utility of income to be unity (as per HM Treasury 2003), I calculated
corrected-CVs for each group, measured in dollar’s-worth of utility to the richest
group (international).225
Table 11.2. Net benefits of conservation (through sustainable forestry) and conversion (to
small scale agriculture) from Yaron (1999), and mean per capita incomes from UNDP
(2004).
Net benefits (present value)
($US)
Stakeholder group
Conversion Conservation
Mean income per
capita
Cameroon 677 91 2,000
International 252 913 7,804
Total Net Present
Value
929 1,004
Total benefit cost ratio 1 1.21
Notes: data taken from Table 5 of Yaron (1999:35), and UNDP (2004). Sterling values converted
to dollars using £1=$0.6. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
Results
The results are dramatic: because the costs of conservation are borne principally
by the poor in Cameroon, while the benefits accrue globally, adjusting for the
diminishing marginal utility of income changes the benefit cost ratio from 1.21:1
in favour of conservation, to 2.28:1 in favour of conversion (Table 11.3, Figure
11.3).
225 Because the breakdown of costs and benefits provided by Yaron (1999) did not give per capita
costs, I weighted costs and benefits using the relative marginal utility of income at the average
income level (as per Pearce et al. 2006), rather than weighting intra-marginal costs using intra-
marginal weights, as in equation 11.2 above.
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Table 11.3. Net benefits of conversion and conservation, adjusted for the diminishing
marginal utility of income.
Net benefits (present value)
(US$’s-worth of utility to richest group)
Stakeholder group
Conversion Conservation
Correction factor for
marginal utility of
income
Cameroon 2,640 353 3.9
International 252 913 1
Total Net Present
Value
2,893 1,267
Benefit cost ratio 2.28 1
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Uncorrected CVs Corrected CVs
N
P
V
in
$
Forest Retention (Sustainable Timber Harvesting)
Deforestation (Small Scale Farming)
Figure 11.3. The effect of using corrected-CVs on a CBA of nature conservation, based
on data from Yaron (1999) and UNDP (2004) using a conservative estimate of the
elasticity of the marginal utility of income (unity).
Discussion
Of course, the analysis carried out above is very crude, and other considerations,
or appropriate compensation mechanisms, could easily make the net present value
of conservation positive again. Nonetheless, it serves to illustrate an important
point: the effect of moving away from conventional CBAs is large compared with
the benefit cost ratios found by Balmford et al. (2002), and could easily reverse
their conclusions. Benefit-cost ratios are not objective measures, like metres or
tonnes, but rather they are social constructs, dependent on value judgments for
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their meaning. They cannot therefore be used in the way that Balmford et al.
(2002) have used them, to argue decisively for the desirability of conservation.226
IV. The biological urgency and social desirability of
conservation
In chapter 10, I noted the link between the urgency of conservation (initial and
projected deforestation rates) and the magnitude of local opportunity costs as a
proportion of local incomes. I concluded that as conservation action appeared
more urgent, so its ethical implications became more serious. This is well
illustrated in Figure 11.4, which plots the annual sum-of-corrected CVs
(calculated as for figure 11.2) for two initial deforestation rates (0.3% and 2.5%
year-1), holding constant all other factors (economic growth, η, etc). The sum-of-
corrected CVs are considerably more negative if initial deforestation rates are high
(2.5% year-1) than if they are low (0.3% year-1). The true net economic costs of
conservation are far higher under the high deforestation rate scenario, than under
the low deforestation rate scenario. Thus, without effective compensation (see
section V, below) the true value of conservation is likely to be inversely
proportional to its biological urgency. Given the difficulty of ensuring full
compensation (see Section V), this result calls into question the strategy of
prioritising conservation efforts in those areas deemed to be most at risk (e.g.
Myers et al. 2000), a point which has been made by some conservationists, who
seek to reduce conflict between the creation of protected areas and humans (e.g.
Balmford et al. 2000). However, a more novel implication of this analysis is that,
since the welfare cost implied by a dollar of opportunity cost will be larger, once
corrected for the marginal utility of income, if born by a low-income person than
by a high income person (Equation 11.1), and since dollar opportunity costs are
likely to be higher when incomes are higher (Chapter 10), the strategy in
conservation planning of minimising the dollar value of opportunity costs (e.g.
Naidoo et al. 2006) by concentrating efforts in the developing world (Balmford et
226 Balmford et al. (2002) do make reference to compensation in their discussion, but nowhere do
they discuss whether the value of conservation, and therefore their results, might depend on it.
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al. 2000) will be counter-productive, unless effective compensation is ensured. I
turn to this possibility below.
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Figure 11.4. Sum-of-corrected-Compensating Variations (CVs) for the project for
alternative deforestation scenarios: high initial deforestation rates (2.5% year-1, black)
and low (0.3% year-1, grey). Corrected-CVs are calculated as per Figure 11.2. Values are
corrected to constant utility units $U, worth $1 of utility to someone with the mean OECD
income in 2005, )1($2005
OECD
tU  , using elasticity of marginal utility of income=1. Results are
shown assuming pessimistic economic growth in Madagascar (-0.1% y-1 convergence),
2.5% initial deforestation rate, income elasticity of existence values=1; but are
qualitatively unchanged by varying the values of these parameters across a reasonable
range (0.3-2.5% initial deforestation rate, -0.01% to 2% annual convergence rate, 0.8-1.2
income elasticity of existence values).
V. Compensation
Compensating project losers at the expense of project winners has the potential to
turn the value of conservation strongly positive. However, it is worth emphasising
here that this is only true if compensation is actually implemented, and is
sufficiently effective and efficient. Although some conservationists acknowledge
the desirability of compensation (e.g. Balmford and Whitten 2003), others argue
that it is unnecessary (Collar 2003), and the issue is entirely ignored in much of
the literature on conservation strategy and economics (e.g. Pimm et al. 2001,
Balmford et al. 2002, Naidoo et al. 2006), where the Kaldor-Hicks potential
compensation paradigm reigns unchallenged. The analysis so far has
demonstrated the very substantial importance of not aggregating CVs according to
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the Kaldor-Hicks criteria. This section demonstrates the importance of paying
proper attention to the empirical realities of compensation.
The neglect of compensation in economic analyses of conservation is surprising,
given that the conservation literature is replete with examples of the failure of
conservation projects to adequately and efficiently compensate for local
opportunity costs (Peters 1998, Ferraro 2001, Wells et al. 1990). Where
compensation is assumed in economic analyses, thereby reducing local
opportunity costs, the authors rely on simplistic assumptions about the true cost of
effective compensation. For example, despite noting that development projects in
Africa have a 50% failure rate (World Bank 1993), Kremen et al. (2000) assume a
100% success rate for the compensation mechanism considered by their CBA,
which would leave local people better off than before restrictions were imposed
on their forest use. As I show below, if such assumptions turn out to be false, the
true welfare value of the project will be changed enormously.
If we consider compensation as a transfer of money (which may purchase goods
and services, and therefore enhance utility) from those who benefit from the
project to those who lose from it, two important parameters will be the efficiency
of the transfer and the completeness of the compensation. The first concerns the
costs of transferring money (or anything else which increases welfare) from
winners to losers: the ‘leakiness’ of Okun’s leaky bucket (Okun 1975). The
second concerns how complete the compensation of losses is. Projects that
succeed in compensating 100% of local costs, with 100% efficiency, will simply
increase local CVs to zero, and reduce international CVs by the same dollar costs.
If a compensation program is implemented to transfer money from those who bear
net costs as a result of the project (in my study this is the communities local to the
forest frontier 227 , ‘local’), and those who benefit (‘global’), then post-
compensation CVs for the local communities are given by:
Equation 11.4 pensationwithoutcomlocal
sationwithcompen
local CVCCV  )1(
227 Fokontanys bordering the forest: see Chpater 7.
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where C is the completeness of compensation, as a proportion of opportunity
costs. The full costs of compensation, which are born by the global beneficiaries
are given by:
Equation 11.4 ECVCPoncompensatiofts pensationwithoutcomlocallocal /))((cos 
where P is size of the population negatively affected by the project and E is the
efficiency of compensation, such that for every dollar deducted from a beneficiary
of the project, E dollars actually reach those who have lost as a result of the
project. In the analysis below, I assume that the costs of compensation are shared
amongst the global beneficiaries (OECD, ASIA, rest of Madagascar, etc) in
proportion to their aggregate benefits from the project, i.e. that beneficiary CVs
are reduced by a constant percentage, equal to the total costs of compensation
divided by the total global benefits from the conservation achieved by the project.
For the present, compensation is assumed to take place within each year, such that
there is no delay between raising compensation funds from beneficiaries and
distributing them to those bearing costs, though I return to this below.
For simplicity, I also assume that the costs of transferring income from
beneficiaries to losers are deadweight costs, such as hiring project staff in a
competitive labour market. I also ignore the possibility that compensation
mechanisms may be misdirected at either end. For example, the costs may be
raised from the wrong people, e.g. rich country residents who did not benefit from
the project (which is likely if funds were raised through general taxation, as in the
Global Environment Facility, Menzel 2005). In addition, compensation might be
inaccurately disbursed, and paid to those who did not actually suffer any costs
from the conservation project (e.g. Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007). Both of these
cases are quite likely, in which case this portion of the compensation program
would represent a simple transfer of income from rich to poor countries (not
necessarily richer to poorer people, for example if it is appropriated by rich people
in the poor country), with associated deadweight costs. The effect of such
inaccuracies on the project’s value will depend on the rights-weightings applied to
these transfers in the CBA. If we assume that people have a greater claim to their
own income than to benefits resulting from the project, and further that such
claims outweigh the effect of the changing marginal utility of income as it is
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transferred from rich to poor, then such inaccuracies in raising and distributing
compensation will tend to reduce the value of the conservation project, in addition
to any deadweight costs of the transfer.
Complete compensation
Because of the relative magnitudes of dollar costs and benefits, if compensation is
complete (i.e. C=100%, 0sationwithcompenlocalCV ), net benefits may be positive, even
with quite low compensation efficiencies. For example, the NPV of the project is
positive with compensation efficiencies of around 13% or greater (Figure 11.5,
assuming parameter values as per Figure 11.2). I know of no estimates of the
efficiency of compensation achieved by conservation projects, although Peters
(1998) reported that, of the funds allocated in the US to support the Ranomafana
National Park Project, just 2% was allocated to projects aimed at increasing local
incomes as compensation for the project. This is not an estimate of compensation
efficiency (the project had other objectives, and income-raising projects may have
raised incomes by more (or less) than the money spent on them), but Peters’
account provides a good description of the overhead costs of many internationally
funded conservation and development projects.
Incomplete compensation
The effect of reduced completeness of compensation (C<100%), however, is
dramatic and non-linear. If the completeness of compensation is reduced to 85%,
compensation efficiency must be 100% for the project to break even (NPV=0, see
Figure 11.5). With C=85% or lower, the NPV of conservation is negative, even
with complete efficiency. If completeness falls below 85%, it becomes impossible
for the project to break-even. At C=80%, even compensation efficiencies of
>1000% (i.e. for every dollar deduction from a beneficiary of the project ten
dollars reach those who have benefited from the project) are not sufficient to
ensure that the project breaks even.
This reflects the very high marginal utility of income in the local communities.
Note that in calculating the whole-project completeness of compensation figure of
85%, I assume that compensation coverage is even, i.e. that all local residents are
compensated for exactly 85% of their costs. If compensation is spread less evenly,
the project value would decline further, since the value of a dollar of
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uncompensated losses rises as losses increase as a proportion of income. Again, I
reiterate that the correction applied to CVs and the social welfare function used to
aggregate CVs are both conservative.
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Figure 11.5. The effect of compensation efficiency (E) and completeness (C) on the value
of the conservation project. Sum-of-corrected-Compensating Variations (CVs) are plotted
shown for three different combinations of C and E. Net present values (NPVs) are also
calculated as described in section II, above. Corrected-CVs are calculated as per Figure
11.2. Values are corrected to constant utility units $U, worth $1 of utility to someone with
the mean OECD income in 2005, )1($2005
OECD
tU  , using elasticity of marginal utility of
income=1. Results are shown assuming pessimistic economic growth in Madagascar (-
0.1% y-1 convergence), 2.5% initial deforestation rate, income elasticity of existence
values=1; but are qualitatively unchanged by varying the values of these parameters
across a reasonable range (0.3-2.5% initial deforestation rate, -0.01% to 2% annual
convergence rate, 0.8-1.2 income elasticity of existence values).
This analysis demonstrates the effect of assuming that compensation is completely
and costlessly achieved by the project when, in fact, that may not be the case. Of
course, the completeness of any compensation project will be extremely hard to
measure either ex ante or ex post, for the simple reason that opportunity costs are
difficult to measure, as described in Chapter 10. This raises questions about how
we can ensure that conservation is carried out such that it does make “economic
sense” (i.e. is socially desirable).
Irreversible welfare losses due to delayed action
Proponents of action on environmental issues, such as climate change and
biodiversity loss, often refer to the possibility that irreversible changes will occur
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if action is not taken (e.g. Arrow 1995). For example, the conservation benefits of
protecting the Ranomafana-Andringitra corridor (hereafter “the corridor”) arise
from preventing species extinctions, which (with current technologies) are
irreversible, and habitat loss, the reversal of which is difficult (Hardwick et al.
2004), if not impossible. Such non-reversible changes pose a challenge to
conventional economics, in which changes are traditionally assumed to be
marginal and reversible (Dasgupta 2008). Non-reversibility in natural systems
leads some to invoke the precautionary principle, arguing for immediate and
decisive action, even before the likely implications of inaction are clear (e.g.
Pimm et al. 2001).
However, it is perhaps not so well recognised that irreversible welfare losses can
occur in the near-term, as well as in the distant future, and as a result of
environmental action, rather than inaction.228 One example, which is relevant to
the case study, is when protected areas are created before compensatory projects
have succeeded in raising local incomes. This scenario may be quite common
since, given adequate funding, it is relatively quick to deploy guards to protect the
forest against encroachment, while compensatory projects may take longer to
achieve real increases in local incomes. For example, Hockley &
Razafindralambo (2006) found that while sharing ecotourism revenues might
eventually be sufficient to compensate for local opportunity costs in the corridor,
even if optimistic projections of tourist numbers are used, it would take several
decades for full compensation to be achieved. Durbin & Ratrimoarisaona (1996)
document how past projections of ecotourism numbers in Madagascar have been
over-optimistic. Alternatively, protected areas may use rural development projects
to compensate local people but, as acknowledged by Kremen et al. (2000), such
projects have a high failure rate (World Bank 1993).
Now, once a compensation project is up and running, it might be possible to
‘back-date’ compensation, ensuring that lifetime opportunity costs as a result of
the project are reduced to zero. However, dead people cannot be compensated,
and anyone dying between the start of the conservation restrictions and the start of
the compensation project, will have suffered uncompensatable (i.e. irreversible)
228 I owe this insight to Landsburg (1995).
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welfare losses. In figure 11.6, I estimate the irreversible welfare losses due to a
ten-year delay in commencing compensatory projects after conservation
restrictions have been implemented in the corridor. I take the annual mortality rate
in the local communities to be 1.3% per annum, which is the figure for
Madagascar as a whole (WHO 2008), and assume that, once the compensatory
project has started, compensation is backdated for all surviving residents. I also
assume that opportunity costs and income levels are not related to age and
mortality risk, which probably underestimates irreversible losses (see e.g.
Hardenbergh 1993, Harper 2002). By way of comparison, I also plot global
aggregate welfare losses due to species extinctions which would occur if
protection was delayed by 10 years (2015, instead of 2005). Panel A of the figure
presents the results taking η (the elasticity of marginal utility of income) to be 1,
and Panel B uses η =2, the lower end of values suggested by Dasgupta (2007c). In
the former, conservative, case irreversible local welfare losses are small relative to
global losses. However in the second case, as η rises to 2, they become very high.
Once again, I have used a purely utilitarian social welfare function to aggregate
and compare losses, which is probably conservative.229 I also assume that welfare
losses from past species extinctions are not reduced with the passing of time, by
adaptation or technological progress.230
Thus, responding to a perceived conservation emergency by hastily implementing
protected areas, without paying proper attention to compensatory mechanisms, is
quite likely to result in very significant and irreversible near-term welfare losses.
This is likely to be a common issue when evaluating the merits of precipitous
action at the expense of those who are relatively poor in the present generation.
This is not to say that acting in a precautionary manner can never be justified, but
229 I have ignored bequest values in this analysis, and therefore the possibility that an ancestor’s
welfare losses can be compensated by raising the incomes of their descendents. However, I see no
reason why bequest values can only operate forwards in time, and, whereas the descendents may
be aware of and saddened by the treatment of their ancestors, their ancestors may be unaware of
the treatment accorded to their descendents.
230 In fact, there is good evidence that the effects on welfare of negative and positive shocks (e.g.
limb amputations and lottery wins) is reduced substantially over time through adaptation (see
Adler & Posner 2008 on injuries, Gardner & Oswald (2007) and Kuhn et al. (unpublished) on
lotteries). Whether these assessments can be extrapolated to species extinctions is unclear.
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merely to highlight the fact that irreversibility is not a purely environmental
phenomenon.
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Figure 11.6. Irreversible welfare losses due to a ten-year delay in the implementation of conservation project (dotted line) and a ten-year delay in
starting complete compensation (solid line). Two scenarios are presented: a conservative value (unity) for the elasticity of marginal utility of
income, η, (Panel A); a high value for η (2) (Panel B). In both panels, initial deforestation rate = 2.5%; Malagasy economic convergence = -0.1%;
and survival income =0; and a utilitarian social welfare function is assumed.
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VI. The price of rights
One of Sen’s three “foundational principles” of CBA was additive accounting:
“benefits and costs are defined, ultimately, in the same space” (Sen 2001:102).
This is true whether CBAs measure benefits and costs in monetary- or utility-
based numeraires. However, I have argued in Chapter 2 and again above, for the
incorporation of rights into CBA. How can rights be measured in the same space
as utility? I propose that rights can be valued, in terms of the social welfare
opportunity cost.
For example, the analyses above have assumed that each individual has an equal
right to the utility lost or gained as a result of the project, i.e. local people have
just as much right to convert the forest as OECD residents have to expect species
to be conserved. In that case, all costs and benefits are weighted at unity, and
decisions are based solely on maximising the (utilitarian) sum of utility gains.
However, suppose that we contrast this situation with one in which local people,
regardless of their low income status, have no moral right to clear the forest,
which is, after all, the legal situation. In this case, the opportunity costs to local
people from conservation would be zero-weighted in the analysis (while benefits
from non-use values resulting from successful conservation are weighted at unity).
In the former case, where society insists on the forest-use rights of local people,
social welfare is maximised by paying (at minimum) complete compensation to
the local people. However, even with 100% efficiency, this reduces social welfare
compared with the case where local costs are zero-weighted by 5,998 x 106 $U
(NPV= 43,490 x 106 $U versus 49,488 x 106 $U), which can be thought of as
representing society’s willingness to pay for recognising local rights. If society
continues to insist on these rights, as compensation efficiency drops to, say, 50%,
social welfare gain over the period considered (2005-2105) decreases to 37,492 x
106 $U, representing a willingness to pay of 11,996 x 106 $U to protect these rights.
Note that abrogating rights does not actually increase the sum of human
happiness, it merely redistributes it from those performing morally indefensible
activities (e.g. clearing forest), and whose happiness is not considered, to those
who are not. Such a ‘moral calculus’ is implicit when governments, such as
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Madagascar’s, outlaw the clearing of forest without compensation (often
encouraged by international conservation NGOs).
VII. Conclusions
It is highly likely that with realistic values for the elasticity of marginal utility of
income, any conservation project in developing countries which does not succeed
in completely and efficiently compensating local opportunity costs will have a net
negative effect on social welfare. Social welfare effects are likely to be worst
where conservation appears to be most urgent, from a biological perspective. The
effect of the project on social welfare is highly dependent on the efficiency and
completeness of compensation, which may be very difficult to ensure and
impossible to measure. Thus, unless very considerable attention is paid to
compensation mechanisms, ensuring that they are fully functioning prior to
instituting restrictions on local resource use, it is very difficult to make any
meaningful case for conservation.
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12. Discussion
I. Key findings
Part I introduced the importance of global environmental issues which present a
formidable challenge to the decision-making capabilities of human society. I then
review cost-benefit analysis (CBA) as a tool with which to analyse these issues,
and reach decisions about the desirability of action. The most important points
made in Part I were (i) that CBA cannot be both ethically neutral and decisive and
(ii) that conventional CBA is so simplified (particularly with respect to inter-
personal aggregation) that when applied to complex issues its results can be
misleading or meaningless. Therefore, in CBAs of global environmental issues
analysts must roll back the simplifying assumptions which underlie conventional
CBA. This observation, which is not novel (Price 1993, Spash 2007b) but is
perhaps under-appreciated, has motivated the work in the subsequent chapters.
One of the most important simplifying assumptions of conventional CBA is that
the income levels of all populations everywhere always increase over time in an
exponential manner, and with a common rate. Or, alternatively, that the market
interest rate available everywhere (and at which all consumption gains may be
invested) is constant through time and space (Price 1993). This is the departure
point for Part II, which asks what we can know about future income growth.
In Chapter 3, I looked at what the historical data, if extrapolated forwards, might
tell us about future income trends. In doing so, I explored the controversy
surrounding the most important long-range income projections, those of the
IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES, Nakicenovic & Swart
2000). The results of this analysis (which I deliberately limited in scope to the
terms of the original debate 231 ) are mixed. I found the SRES to be broadly
consistent with historical growth in the OECD region, while being somewhat
more pessimistic about growth in Asia, and rather more optimistic about growth
231 Castles & Henderson (2003a,b), Nakicenovic et al. (2003) and Grübler et al. (2004).
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in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, than the historical data suggest.232
Overall, the evidence suggested that the evolution of income levels over time is
poorly represented by exponential functions, rather variable over time and space,
and quite likely to be flat or negative in some places and periods. I therefore
concluded by arguing for the use in CBA of income growth projections that are
explicitly related to, but not constrained by, the historical evidence, and which
incorporate both subjective and statistical probabilities, rather than taking the form
of discrete scenarios to which no relative probabilities are attached. That this will
be more onerous than current practices, (which discount future costs and benefits
assuming uniform, exponential growth) is not in doubt but with modern
computational capabilities can be achieved.
Chapters 4 and 5 addressed a question often posed by ecological economists in
respect of CBAs (e.g. Spash 2007b), and economic policy in general (Czech
2002): can income growth can continue in the future as it has in the past, without
hitting the buffers of environmental constraints? In other words, can the economic
scale of human society continue to increase, without its environmental scale
exceeding bio-physical limits? Having reviewed the literature on this question, I
focussed on the evidence provided by a commonly used pair of proxies for the
economic and environmental scale of human society: GDP and Ecological
Footprint (Wackernagel & Rees 1995). I demonstrated in Chapter 4 that previous
analyses of this issue (e.g. Dietz et al. 2007) contain several flaws, the most
notable of which is that they focus on the consumption effects of economic
prosperity (which are easily attributable to the country of origin), ignoring the
technological progress which also accompanies it, and which is harder to attribute
to its country of origin. In section VI of chapter 4, I demonstrated the quantitative
effect of this limitation in previous analyses (e.g. Dietz et al. 2007).
Having argued that the true sample size of any study which did not attribute
technological effects to their country of origin was effectively one (the world), I
proposed that in the absence of detailed data on technological overspills233, one
might as well analyse a single time-series for the world as a whole. This I did in
232 The former communist world was not considered for lack of pre-1990 data.
233 For example by tracking “marker” innovations, or patent citations.
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Chapter 5, finding evidence consistent with complete decoupling of per capita
environmental scale from economic scale at the margin (i.e. economic growth
does not increase environmental scale) and some evidence consistent with intra-
marginal decoupling (economic growth reduces environmental scale). This
finding suggests, in contrast to previous studies (e.g. Rosa et al. 2004), the
possibility of an environmental Kuznets curve.
Finally, Chapter 6 concluded Part II by bringing together the income growth
projections developed in Chapter 3, with the models linking economic and
environmental growth from Chapter 5, and published population projections (Lutz
et al. 2001), to project global Ecological Footprint, over the coming century. The
results indicate that if intra-marginal decoupling were to be achieved, the extent to
which the environmental scale of human society exceeds the biological capacity
of the earth (“overshoot”) could decline swiftly, turning negative by around 2020.
If, on the other hand, only marginal decoupling was achieved in the future,
overshoot would continue to rise, and would remain positive throughout the
century, driven not by growth in income but in population. Thus, an important
conclusion of Part II is that, while we cannot be certain whether future increases
in income levels will take place without environmental catastrophe (Arrow 1995),
there is no evidence from this analysis that they must necessarily be the cause of
that catastrophe, and some evidence that they may help to avert it by enabling
investments in technological progress to be made. However, I emphasise again
that these results provide no grounds for complacency, and no support to those
who argue that political action on environmental issues is unnecessary since
technological progress (narrowly defined as the products of R&D labs) will save
the world. My reason is that technology is defined in my analyses (and in most
economic analyses) to include policies and individual preferences, as well as
patentable inventions. On the basis of these analyses, I concluded that the
economic projections developed in chapter 3 (and refined in chapter 6) are
environmentally plausible, and retained them for Part III of the thesis (with
caveats about the need for improved environmental policies firmly in mind).
Part III focussed on a specific case study – the conservation of biodiversity
through protection of the Ranomafana-Andringitra forest corridor in south-eastern
Madagascar. The purpose of this case-study was to provide a real-life illustration
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of the problems of conventional CBA, noted in chapter 2. Although only partial
(several costs and benefits were excluded from the analysis), it nevertheless
illustrated important aspects of the economics of biodiversity conservation.
Biodiversity conservation and the case study of the Ranomafana-Andringitra
forest corridor, were introduced in chapter 7. In chapter 8, I developed explicit
projections of the counterfactual, i.e. what would happen to forest cover in the
corridor were it not protected. One of the most important conclusions of the
chapter is that great uncertainty exists about what would happen if action was not
taken (a feature of many environmental issues - Grübler & Nakicenovic 2001),
and that this uncertainty is partly linked to variables, such as income growth in
Madagascar, which play important roles elsewhere in the analysis. This
underlined the importance of ensuring that CBAs are internally consistent (Price
1993), a point which recurred in Chapters 9 and 10. I found evidence for a
positive relationship between income level and urbanisation, and between rural
population size and forest cover. Although the relationship is descriptive, and not
necessarily causal, I assumed for subsequent chapters that forest cover in the
absence of conservation would be driven by rural population size, and hence by
income level.
Chapter 9 continued the work of specifying the counter-factual, reviewing and
applying evidence linking forest cover with species extinctions. Here again,
uncertainties persist, for example over the ecological suitability of regrowing
forest for forest-dependent species, and the time lag between habitat loss and
extinctions. However, in my opinion, these uncertainties are small relative to the
great uncertainty over the true economic value of avoiding extinctions, which I
also reviewed in this chapter. Nevertheless, I linked values obtained through
contingent valuation to predicted extinctions, in order to estimate the non-use
value of protecting the Ranomafana-Andringitra forest corridor. This valuation
can only be taken as illustrative but I am not aware of any similar studies which
explicitly analyse all the links in this chain: from economic growth, through
urbanisation to forest cover, and hence species extinctions and non-use values.
This analysis illustrates the point that the benefits of conservation action are
highly uncertain, and linked to the severity of habitat loss and species extinctions
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in the counter-factual, which are in turn linked to income and population. The
implication of this became clear in the following chapter.
Chapter 10 examined local opportunity costs of conservation, reviewing the
difficulties associated with estimating them, and the uncertainties surrounding
them. Against this background, the main conclusion of the chapter was that,
whatever the uncertainties, there are good reasons to expect opportunity costs (as
a proportion of incomes) to be directly and positively linked to the biological
urgency, and hence the global non-use benefits of conservation, which drive much
of conservation policy. This means that, the greater the apparent urgency of
conservation, the more ethically serious an undertaking it is.
Chapter 11 concluded part III, by comparing the local costs and global benefits of
conservation. Although the net-benefits of conservation are large and positive
when evaluated using the Kaldor-Hicks potential compensation criteria, I showed
them to be very negative once costs and benefits have been corrected for the
diminishing marginal utility of income. As a consequence, my analysis
demonstrated that the economic case for conservation made by others (e.g.
Balmford et al. 2002) rests on an assumption of complete and efficient
compensation, the plausibility of which has received inadequate empirical
attention in conservation. If compensation is absent, delayed, or incomplete, it is
very likely that conservation will be detrimental to human welfare. Since
achieving full compensation in the developing country context may be difficult,
because of very imperfect information about opportunity costs, the present
strategy of prioritising conservation efforts towards the developing world may be
misguided.
II. Limitations
The question explored in this thesis: “How should we decide what to do about
global environment issues?” is both deep and broad. The complexity of the issue
means that it cannot be completely resolved, and in exploring one aspect of the
question, six other, equally interesting and apparently essential, lines of enquiry
rear up to divert one’s attention. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that my
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ambitions for the preceding chapters have not been completed. I list below a
selection of this unfinished business.
Chapter 2 outlined a generalised CBA framework, which was partially enacted in
Chapter 11. However, much remains to be explored, and it would be interesting to
investigate further the value of different approaches to aggregation, in terms of
their ability to communicate information to decision-makers.
Chapter 3 demonstrated the statistical and subjective uncertainty associated with
projecting variables such as income into the future. The same uncertainty is
associated with projections of urbanisation (Chapter 7), deforestation (Chapter 8),
extinctions (Chapter 9) and local opportunity costs (Chapter 10). Ideally, a CBA
should incorporate this uncertainty (which, given the many interactions, is as
likely to compound itself as to cancel out) into the final results. It is striking that
rigorous estimates of confidence in the final results of CBAs are rare (Tol 2005),
and I would have liked to have taken a more rigorous approach to this here.
Similarly, I was struck by the rarity of ex post assessments of CBAs.234 Although
it is too early to assess the accuracy of any projections made in this CBA, it would
be interesting to revisit earlier CBAs of proposed nature conservation projects.
Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated the importance of incorporating technological
progress into analyses of the environmental impacts of economic growth, but did
nothing to investigate the source of this progress. This issue has been explored in
analyses of other environmental impacts, e.g. pollution (Stern 2004) but not, to
my knowledge, for such a broad-based measure as Ecological Footprint. The lack
of such an analysis greatly limits the conclusions which can be drawn from the
global time series analysis presented in Chapter 5.
The value of biodiversity, and avoided extinctions remains, in my view, almost
completely unknown (see also Price unpubl.), and Chapter 9 made numerous,
rather unsubstantiated assumptions in an effort to produce an illustrative and
plausible projection of values. Similarly estimating local opportunity costs of
234 A search for Topic=(("cost-benefit analys*" or "benefit-cost analys*") AND (ex post)) on Web
of Science (June 2008) yielded just 24 records. Scrutiny of abstracts and papers showed just three
involved the comparison of ex post with ex ante CBAs (Boardman et al. 1994, Aubert 1999,
Lunney 2001).
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conservation in the poorest countries (where land markets are almost non-existent)
remains an enormous challenge. Chapter 10 identified many of the problems, but
was less successful in solving them. The biggest problems are probably those of
accounting for intra-marginal changes, and in projecting costs and benefits
through time.
Chapter 11 highlighted the importance of explicitly accounting for the costs and
limitations of compensation mechanisms when assessing conservation projects in
developing countries. The design of such projects presents enormous challenges in
developing countries where de facto and traditional property rights often remain
unofficial, and this is an issue which I would have liked to explore more (Hockley
& Andriamarovololona 2007 provides further discussion of this).
There is, no doubt, much that I have omitted. Oscar Wilde reportedly said “I’m
not young enough to know everything”, and writing this thesis has certainly aged
me.
III. Cost-benefit analysis for global environmental issues
This thesis has demonstrated some of the complexity of CBA when applied to
global environmental issues. Yet this complexity is inherent in the issues, not the
methods used to analyse them. If a single decision must be reached on behalf of
society a great deal of information must be weighed and aggregated or else
ignored. This presents decision-makers with a weighty burden, which cost-benefit
analysis may be able to lighten.
Unfortunately, conventional approaches to CBA produce results which are
difficult to interpret and are justifiably controversial. There is a danger that they
may lead decision makers to over- or under-weight factors excluded from the
analysis, and so for CBA to do more harm than good. Despite the caveats that
may dutifully be attached to it, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that CBA
pretends to a decisiveness it cannot deliver. It seems to me that Kaldor’s (1939)
goal, of a fully objective economics delivering important advice to decision-
makers, is unattainable in the complex context of global environmental issues. If
stripped down to its objective core, in which inter-personal utility comparisons are
impossible, the scope of economics would occupy only a fraction of the territory it
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presently claims. However, I do not believe that economists should retreat from
the policy arena – they have much to offer. Instead, they must subordinate
themselves to society. Their job should be to provide a framework for decision
making, in which all ethical viewpoints can be represented. The objective of this
framework should be to isolate and clarify controversies, whether empirical or
normative, not to assume them away. It is not possible for an economist to
conduct a CBA in isolation, except as a purely exploratory exercise.
It seems to me that only in such a subordinate role can economists achieve
Keynes’ (1931[1991]) ambition, “to get themselves thought of as humble,
competent people on a level with dentists”. Economics is not inherently unethical
or misanthropic: the problem is not with economics per se, but with its
oversimplification. The devil is in the lack of detail and this thesis has been an
exploration of this detail.
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A. A review of the SRES
controversy
I. Castles and Henderson’s critique
The most important of Castles and Henderson’s criticisms can be summarised as
follows.1
1) The IPCC scenarios projected GDPMER for the most part. This is the wrong
metric to use: GDPPPP should be used instead.
2) By using GDPMER, they have overstated the 1990 gap in per capita income
between rich and poor countries. The SRES also assumes an over-optimistic rate
of convergence of poor countries on rich countries. Over-estimating the gap, and
then overestimating the speed at which the gap is closed, produces growth rates
for developing countries which exceed those historically seen, or which can
plausibly be expected. As evidence for this, they made selective comparisons of
growth rates in per capita GDPMER from the SRES projections with per capita
GDPPPP from the historical past.
3) Those GDPPPP projections that the SRES does include alongside GDPMER (from
the MESSAGE group of models), are not true PPP projections.
4) Throughout their critique Castles and Henderson argue that the SRES has not
encompassed the lower bound of emissions, since it has not encompassed the
lower bound of growth. To this end, they focus particularly on the scenario with
the lowest emissions (B1), when making comparisons with the historical data.
II. The SRES team’s reply
The SRES team responded to Castles and Henderson’s critique thus.
1) First, the SRES reflected the wider scenario literature, and data availability, in
predominantly using GDPMER, and was innovative in including any GDPPPP
1 Other criticisms, while perhaps valid, concern the process and personnel of the IPCC, and do not
directly concern this thesis except to note that Castles and Henderson allege that the IPCC has drawn,
however unintentionally, on the expertise of too narrow a professional milieu, with little input from
economists, economic historians and national statisticians.
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projections at all. In any case, they argued, GDPMER is the preferred measure for
emissions scenarios (since commodities like oil are traded internationally), and
for measuring growth in income, though GDPPPP is the best measure of static
welfare.
2) Castles and Henderson’s comparisons of projected GDPMER growth rates with
historically observed GDPPPP growth rates does not compare like with like.
Assuming a steady relationship between GDPMER and GDPPPP, for poor
countries which are converging on the reference economy (the USA), growth
rates will be higher for GDPMER than for GDPPPP. 2 When Castles and
Henderson’s comparison is repeated using growth rates from the GDPPPP
projections, or with GDPMER growth rates from the past, they show that the
projected developing country growth rates are broadly in line with historical
experiences of countries like the US and Japan.
3) The allegations that the GDPPPP projections are false is unfounded, since the
projections display exactly the properties which would be expected of such
projections: namely that the difference between the GDPPPP and GDPMER series
is largest for the poorest regions, and declines as these countries converge on the
OECD region.
4) Castles and Henderson are guilty of selection bias, in selecting the B1 scenario
for most of their comparisons of developing country growth rates. This scenario
shows the 2nd highest developing country growth rates of all scenarios. Castles
and Henderson confuse high-emissions with high-growth, and assume that the
low-emission scenario would show even lower emissions if its growth rates were
reduced. In fact, they demonstrate that re-running the B1 scenario with lower
developing region growth rates actually results in higher emissions. This is due
to the lower capital turnover and slower adoption of new technologies, which
results from lower growth. The B1 scenario owes its low-emissions to optimistic
assumptions about technological progress, rather than low-growth.
2 This is because the MER growth rate captures increases in the income level due to both genuine growth,
and to a reduction in the degree to which the income level is underestimated by MER measures. As
countries approach the income level of the reference economy, MER and PPP series will tend to converge
(for the reference economy they are identical).
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As regards 4), the fact that Castles and Henderson confused low-emissions with low-
growth is surprising, given their strident critique of the SRES team for, they alleged,
doing just that – assuming that more growth means more emissions. Whether or not the
IPCC has stated that belief elsewhere, it was clearly not assumed in the SRES scenarios.
The SRES team were correct to highlight Castles and Henderson’s selectivity, and the
historical plausibility of the SRES economic projections is dealt with in the main body
of the chapter. I deal comprehensively with 3) in Appendix B. Below I examine the first
two points.
III. The suitability of PPP or market exchange rates
What should be projected, GDPMER, GDPPPP or both? The SRES team noted that they
were constrained by their terms of reference to review the literature rather than carry out
new analyses. If the literature on the relationship between emissions and GDP has
predominantly used GDPMER, there was, they argued, little they could do except follow
suit. However the SRES team also offered two reasons for preferring GDPMER, over
GDPPPP in general, regardless of the limitations imposed by the terms of reference of the
SRES. Neither is well-founded.
A. Growth vs static comparisons
Nakicenovic et al. argue that while GDPPPP is the best measure for “(static) comparisons
of economic welfare (income and consumption) across different world regions and
countries”, GDPMER is “the preferred measure for GDP growth”. This is spurious: what
then is the preferred measure for growth in welfare?
B. Elaborate statistical constructs
The SRES team argue for the use of MER, on the grounds that it is “a directly
observable economic variable, as opposed to PPP, which is an elaborate statistical
construct”.
This is false on two counts. First, all GDP series measured in constant prices (regardless
of the currency) are elaborate statistical constructs, and the conversion of GDP in
current prices to GDP in constant prices (i.e. taking account of inflation), for a given
country, is no simpler, and indeed is directly analogous to, the conversion of GDP in
national currencies to GDP in a single currency across nations using PPP exchange
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rates. Thus, at best, MER is a less elaborate construct than PPP, but elaborate
nonetheless. Second, Ryten (2004) argues that true market exchange rates are not
directly observable, requiring elaborate statistical constructs to be employed to derive a
true MER figure: i.e. one which measured the income of citizens relative to the prices of
imported, rather than all goods.3 Ryten also makes the important point that:
“it is better to use an elaborate construct that attempts to deal with the right
question than a simpler one that answers accurately the wrong concerns”
Similarly, the considerable problems associated with calculating PPPs are no excuse. As
Ryten (2004) says: “The only viable alternative to the use of inadequate PPP-based
estimates is better PPP-based estimates.”
C. Projecting Emissions
However, when considering whether GDPMER or GDPPPP should be projected, another
question must first be answered – what are we projecting income for? If the answer is
that we project income in order to estimate the welfare of citizens in the future, there is
no doubt that GDPPPP should be used. This measures the purchasing power of their
income, in terms of the prices they actually face.
However, the aim of the SRES scenarios was not solely (or even predominantly) to
project welfare, but rather to project emissions: income projections were combined with
a model of the relationship between income and emissions, to give an emissions
projection. Just because GDPPPP is the best proxy for welfare, it does not follow that it
will be the best predictor of emissions, a point that the SRES team failed to make
strongly enough, and Castles and Henderson and Ryten (2004) failed to grasp. Had this
distinction been more clearly drawn by either side, the debate may have been more
constructive and illuminating.
Since GDPPPP is the best volume measure of economic activity in a country, it may be
hypothesised that it will be the best predictor of emissions. However, the SRES team
3 Interestingly, however, Lequiller and Blades (2007) say: “Although PPPs are more suitable than
exchange rates ... they are a statistical construct rather than a precise measure”. This comment relates only
to the method of conversion into national currencies, so does not affect the first point made here.
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argue that since most emissions producing fuels are traded goods, GDPMER will give a
better indication of the capacity of a nation to purchase and burn these fuels.
In a sense, then, the choice of which metric to use in order to project emissions is surely
an empirical question, and the opposing views could be tested using appropriate data.
Economic activity has a statistical relationship with emissions: not all units of GDP
produce the same quantity of emissions. Thus, our understanding of the relationship
between the two boils down, in essence, to a panel regression of observed emissions on
observed GDP (with other independent variables that would presumably be the same for
both GDPMER and GDPPPP regressions). The question then becomes: which of the two
GDP measures best predicts emissions? In other words, which measure is the best proxy
for the (unknowable) variable of interest: the level of emission-producing economic
activity? Of course, theory should allow those familiar with emissions to predict which
will be best, but based on the debate between Castles and Henderson and the IPCC,
there appear to be arguments in support of both metrics. It is intriguing that neither side
of the debate cited any empirical evidence when discussing this question. This suggests
that no study has yet determined which of the two metrics best predict emissions in the
historical data. van Vuuren and Alfsen (2004) present data which suggests that that both
GDPPPP and GDPMER appear to have a fairly tight relationship with emissions, although
their analysis is restricted to a cross sectional analysis from a single year, and they do
not report any measures of goodness of fit. This is an issue that merits further
investigation.
The irony in this is that if, as Castles and Henderson appear to believe, MER and PPP
are linked by a strong and stable Penn effect (see Appendix B), they should be perfectly
co-correlated, and therefore equally good predictors of emissions (as we will see, they
are not).
Combining PPP and MER
Ryten (2004) is extremely sceptical of the value of predicting both GDPPPP and
GDPMER:
“For reasons which I do not fully understand, the authors believe that if
PPPs have deficiencies and rely on questionable assumptions, the
information they provide would be improved if used in conjunction with
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MERs. The mechanism that would make it possible for the irrelevant to
assist the infirm is not specified”
However, it is clear that Ryten is still thinking in terms of GDP as a measure of
economic activity, or income, rather than as a predictor of emissions. It is possible that
MER could carry some information not captured by PPP, which would improve the
prediction of emissions. Of course this would not be true if the two were perfectly co-
correlated.
IV. The effect of using GDPMER
A. Will MER bias growth rates upwards?
Castles and Henderson allege that the use of MER, combined with the assumption that
poor countries will converge on rich countries, leads to exaggerated growth rates (and
therefore exaggerated emissions). Clearly, ceteris paribus, over-optimistic convergence
rates will lead to over-optimistic growth rates. However, the supposed role of GDPMER
in the over-estimation of growth rates is a perfect red herring.
Assume first that MER and PPP are related through a strong and stable Penn effect. In a
situation where poor countries are converging on the reference economy (the USA),
their rate of growth measured by GDPMER will be higher than when measured by
GDPPPP. It makes no sense to speak of ‘growth rates’ without first précising whether
one means growth in GDPMER or GDPPPP, and it makes no sense to compare projected
MER growth rates with historical PPP rates as Castles and Henderson do.4 There is no
reason whatsoever why the use of GDPMER should impart an upward bias on the rate of
growth in GDPMER!
B. Will MER bias emissions upwards?
Leaving aside for now the question of whether the GDPMER growth and convergence
rates were high compared to the appropriate historical data. Would the use of growth
4 Nakicenovic et al. compare GDPMER and GDPPPP with Celsius and Fahrenheit. This is not a good
analogy, since the latter pair are linked by a known and constant mathematical relationship, whereas the
former are, at best, linked through an imperfectly understood, and noisy, statistical relationship. They are
closer to the truth when they refer to the comparison of “apples and oranges”.
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rates measured in GDPMER, which are higher (for poor regions) than those measured in
GDPPPP, lead to an over-estimation of emissions?
There are two ways to answer this question. The first, adopted by Grübler et al. 2004 in
their response, was to re-run the scenario in question (B1) with lower growth rates, and
compare the results. They found (as Nakicenovic et al. 2003 had predicted) that in fact
decreasing growth rates would increase emissions. This is due to the lower capital
turnover and slower adoption of new technologies. The B1 scenario owes its low-
emissions to optimistic assumptions about technological progress, rather than low-
growth5.
The second response is to note that this again is a red herring. As described above,
emissions projections result from combining projections of income, with a model
linking income to emissions. That model is parameterised based on statistical analyses
of past emissions and income. Clearly, the same form of GDP must be used in deriving
the statistical relationship as is projected. If the changes are made consistently
throughout the model, switching from MER to PPP will produce little or no effect, as
demonstrated by Holtsmark and Alfsen (2004) and Tol (2006), who comments:
“The sensitivity to the exchange rate is purely due to imperfect data,
imperfect statistical analysis of data, a crude spatial resolution, and
imperfect models.”
It is not clear how McKibbin et al. 2004 obtained their result that using GDPMER would
overestimate emissions by 40%, but it is possible that they simply adjusted growth rates
without fully re-parameterising their model.
5 The assumption by Castles and Henderson that higher income necessarily leads to higher emissions is
inexplicable given their fierce condemnation of the SRES report for apparently assuming just that. As
they themselves say, since technology both determines the relationship between income and emissions,
and is itself dependent on income, the relationship between income and emissions over time is
indeterminate. However, it does appear that there are inconsistencies in the IPCCs message – while the
SRES scenarios as a whole treat the relationship between income growth and emissions as indeterminate,
other sections of the IPCC have called for restraint of growth in order to curb emissions.
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B. Are the SRES projections of
PPP-based GDP valid? A review and
analysis of the Penn effect
One of the main criticisms Castles and Henderson (2003a) made of the SRES was that it
did not project GDP at purchasing power parities (GDPPPP) but rather at market
exchange rates (GDPMER). When Nakicenovic et al. (2003) pointed out the PPP-based
projections produced by the MESSAGE group, Castles and Henderson (2003b)
responded stating that these were not sound, since they did not display the properties
they expected. This claim was denied by Grübler et al. (2004) and the SRES team
robustly defended the projections. The purpose of this Appendix is to examine these
conflicting claims and then to carry out an empirical investigation of the relationship
between the projections of GDPPPP and GDPMER in the SRES projections: the Penn
effect (Asea & Corden 1994).
I begin by presenting a brief introduction to purchasing power parities, their relationship
to market exchange rates and the Penn effect in Section I. I then review the criticisms
made by Castles and Henderson (2003b) of the PPP-based projections in the SRES, and
the response of the SRES team (Grübler et al. 2004) in Section II. In Section III I
introduce the empirical analysis used to investigate the Penn effect in the historical data
and in the SRES projections. Section IV presents and discusses the results of this
analysis, and Section V summarises and concludes.
I. Purchasing power parities and the Penn effect
“The Penn effect is an important phenomenon of actual history but not an
inevitable fact of life. It can quantitatively vary and, in different times and
places, trace to quite different process, as we shall see.” (Samuelson 1994,
p206).
In order to compare income levels across countries, per capita GDP measured in each
national currency must be converted to a common currency (usually the US dollar).
There are two principal exchange rates used, market exchange rates (MER) and
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Purchasing Power Parity rates (PPP). PPP exchange rates account for the fact that price
levels differ between countries: in order to produce a true volume measure of GDP, and
to represent the spending power of income in a country, this should ideally be accounted
for.6 Thus, the difference between GDPMER and GDPPPP for a given country is due to the
country’s price level relative to the reference economy, usually the USA. Countries with
low prices will have a higher GDP when using PPP than MER.
Since the work of Bela Balassa (1964) and Paul Samuelson (1964) it has been a widely
acknowledged ‘stylised fact’ of economics that poor countries generally have lower
price levels than rich countries (Bergin et al. 2006), a phenomenon that has become
known as the Penn effect.7 Thus, converting GDP from national currencies to dollars
using market exchange rates tends to underestimate income and production in poor
countries, since prices are lower in those countries. The choice of exchange rates (PPP
or MER) can make a substantial difference to poor countries’ GDP: PPP-based
estimates for the poorest countries can be 3-4 times larger than those based on MER.
The model proposed independently by Balassa and Samuelson in 1964 showed that
differences in productivity between traded and non-traded sectors might explain the
Penn effect. High income countries are more technologically advanced, and therefore
have higher productivity levels, than low-income countries. However, they argued that
the technological advantage was greater in the traded sector than the non-traded sector.
Through the law of one price, all countries would benefit from price reductions in the
traded sector, but the effects of lower productivity in the non-traded sector would be felt
only within the high-income country. This, combined with wage differentials between
countries would mean that overall price levels would differ between countries – the
Penn effect (see Asea & Corden 1994 for an overview). However, this is only one
possible explanation, as the quote from Samuelson above shows.
In the next Section, I examine the claims made about the SRES GDPPPP projections by
the critics, and for the most part I discuss them in the context of a constant and strong
6 The process is directly analogous to accounting for different price levels through time (inflation) to
produce GDP in constant prices, and faces all of the same problems and complexities relating to the
inconsistency of consumption baskets through time and space.
7 It has also been called the “Penn effect” after the Penn World Tables produced by the Center for
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania. These
tables have been used in most analyses of the issue.
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Penn effect. In subsequent Sections, I empirically examine the reality of a dynamic
Penn effect.
II. Castles and Henderson’s critique and the SRES response
“It is true that the MESSAGE scenarios, prepared by the International
Institute of Advanced Systems Analysis (IIASA), all show what are
described as PPP-based figures for GDP, alongside those that are identified
as MER based. However, it is not explained how these PPP-based series are
derived, nor is it clear what economic meaning can be given to them. What
is clear is that they do not, as is claimed for them, represent changes in GDP
for any of the four regions that are distinguished or for the world as a
whole.” Castles and Henderson (2003b: 422).
Castles and Henderson claim that the GDPPPP series reported by the MESSAGE group
of projections cannot be considered sound, because they do not display the properties
they expect. They make three statements about the properties that they believe a true
GDPPPP series would display, when compared to the corresponding GDPMER series,
which I evaluate below.
First, they argue that:
“...it is when poor and rich countries are brought together in a single
grouping, and in particular when growth is estimated (or projected) for the
world as a whole, that the divergence between MER-based and PPP-based
measures of output growth will be greatest. For groups of countries with
broadly similar levels of GDP per head, whether rich or poor, the two
measures will diverge much less: they may well be close, though they will
virtually never be identical”
This is not necessarily the case. Castles and Henderson appear to be ignoring the effect
of convergence of poor countries on the rich, ironic given that this is one of their
principal bugbears. In a world where poor countries are converging on rich countries,
and if we assume the Penn effect holds, then the greatest divergence between PPP and
MER will be expected for the region whose countries differ most in income level from
the reference economy and not from each other. In the case of the SRES projections,
this is the ASIA and ALM regions, followed by the REF region, while the OECD
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region, which includes the USA and countries of similar income levels, would be
expected to show the smallest difference between GDPPPP and GDPMER growth rates,
and this is in fact the case.
Castles and Henderson go on to say:
“The proportionate changes shown in this series for the ‘OECD 90’ group of
countries are identical with those for the MER-based series, which they
would not be if they were genuine measures of GDP; for the developing
regions, the divergences between the two series are impossibly great; and
for the world as a whole the divergences are intermediate”
And
“Looking at specific figures makes it clear that, whatever the MESSAGE
PPP series may reflect, it is not an alternative measure of the growth of
GDP. Over the period 2000-30, for example, the GDP of the ‘ASIA’ region
is shown in the B1 MESSAGE scenario as increasing in MER terms by a
factor of 5.6, whereas for the PPP series the figure is 3. Such a gap could not
possibly have arisen from differences in weighting which are the only true
source of divergence between the two measures of GDP growth. The
MESSAGE GDP series expressed in PPP terms is not such a measure - it is
mislabelled.”
This criticism is difficult to evaluate except empirically (which I do below). For the
OECD90 as a whole the PPP series would be expected to be very similar to the MER
series, since price levels across the OECD region are similar to those of the USA,
whereas the ALM and ASIA regions will show the greatest divergence8.
One would expect the ratio of GDP2030:GDP2000 to be larger for MER series than for
PPP series if the developing country in question is converging on the US, as they are in
these scenarios. The two series will converge as the income level (and therefore price
level) of the region converges on that of the reference economy. Thus, GDPMER will
grow faster than GDPPPP, for a developing economy which is converging on the US.
8 Castles and Henderson’s claim is surprising and appears to be inconsistent with the rest of their critique.
Elsewhere they tell us that MER will exaggerate developing country growth rates, compared to PPP, if
convergence is assumed.
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The question is therefore whether the differences in growth rates are too large – and
Castles and Henderson provide no analysis showing this, they merely assert it to be true.
It also depends on assuming a strong and stable Penn effect. If the Penn effect were to
disappear, the two series would quickly converge.
The contentions of Castles and Henderson are unhelpfully vague, given their strident
claims that the GDPMER series will exaggerate developing region growth rates for a
given level of convergence. As I argued in Appendix 1, it won’t exaggerate the ‘growth
rate’ as such, since growth rates are specific to the metric chosen (GDPPPP or GDPMER)
but GDPMER will grow faster9. The question is whether it is growing excessively fast,
compared to the PPP scenarios.
The SRES team seem to have understood the Penn effect, and cite empirical research
demonstrating its existence:
The disparities between PPP and MER measures are very high especially for
the developing regions of the world. Figure 1 shows that these disparities
decrease with development so that they are significantly lower by mid
century and slowly converge toward the end of the century. This is
consistent both with the economic theory (Voeller, 1981) and with inter-
country comparisons (de la Esconsura, 2000; Kravis et al., 1978). The insert
in the figure highlights these differences between the two measures during
the next three decades across the scenarios. Nakicenovic et al. (2003, p191).
This is, broadly speaking, correct, though I investigate below whether the PPP series do
in fact behave as expected. Note, however, that they make no reference to any change in
the relationship between GDPPPP, GDPMER and the price level, instead justifying
convergence in the two series by reference to “economic development”, which is rather
vague.
Ryten (2004) disputes this claim of expected convergence between PPP and MER.
However, he refers to whether we should expect a single country’s GDPPPP to be closer
9 This is because the GDPMER growth rate captures genuine increases in the income level as well as a
reduction in the degree to which the income level is underestimated by MER measures. As countries
approach the income level of the reference economy, MER and PPP series will tend to converge (for the
reference economy they are identical).
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to its GDPMER, and states that because of increasing currency instability, this will not be
the case. Yet the SRES team, in proposing a convergence in GDPPPP and GDPMER are
speaking on the average, i.e. that the consistent differences between GDPMER and
GDPPPP will disappear over time, not that all differences will disappear. In regionally
aggregated data such as that projected by the SRES, one would expend currency
fluctuations to cancel out, and therefore that a region with the same average income as
the reference economy would not show any difference between GDPMER and GDPPPP.
Castles and Henderson, in making their criticisms, appear to have assumed a strong and
stable Penn effect into the future. In the next two sections, I examine this empirically.
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III. Empirical investigation of the Penn effect through time
A. Introduction
The Penn effect is defined by Bergin et al. (2006, p2044) as the existence of “a positive
and statistically significant slope estimate β” when regressing the price level of country
i (relative to the USA) on its relative income (converted using PPP):
Equation B.1 )ln()ln(
USA
i
USA
i
Y
Y
P
P
 
Where P is price level and Y is income per capita.
Thus, if the Penn effect exists in the data, countries with low income levels relative to
the USA will have low relative prices levels, as explained above.
Bergin et al. (2006) estimate the BS (after Balassa-Samuelson) coefficient β, in each
year, from 1950-1998 (Figure B.1), using data from the Penn World Table, and show
that the strength of the Penn effect has increased consistently over the period studied,
the BS coefficient becoming significant at the 95% level in the late 1950s.
Figure B.1. The BS coefficient (solid line) and 95% confidence intervals (dotted lines) 1950-
1998. Using a constant sample of 53 countries starting in 1950, from Penn World Table version
6. Reproduced from Bergin et al. (2006, Figure 2b, p2046).
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B. Data and Methods
The analysis presented in this Appendix follows Bergin et al.’s (2006) method, with one
exception. Because the SRES projections are presented aggregated into four regions, I
calculated P and Y relative to the OECD, rather than the USA10:
Equation B.2 )ln()ln(
OECD
i
OECD
i
Y
Y
P
P
 
As I demonstrate below, this does not substantially affect the results, but does mean that
the absolute values for β may not be directly comparable to those estimated by Bergin et
al. (2006).
I proceed as follows. I begin by repeating Bergin et al.’s analysis on data from the latest
Penn World Table (Version 6.2, hereafter PWT, Heston et al. 2006) using Equation B.2,
to demonstrate that the results are qualitatively unchanged by using price levels and
incomes relative to the OECD average. I also present additional results illustrating the
explanatory power of the Penn effect during the period, the effect of broadening the
sample of countries, and extend the analysis to 2003 to explore the recent trend. For this
and subsequent analyses I use three samples of the data, each containing the maximum
set of countries for which information is available, starting in 1952, 1970 and 1993
respectively (see Appendix C). Both Chain and Laspeyres GDP series were used, but
gave almost identical results, those for the Chain series are presented. Although data
were not aggregated to regions, analyses were carried out with and without countries
from the REF region, to allow direct comparison with the second analysis, below.
Second, I repeat the analysis using data aggregated into the four regions used in the
SRES. I demonstrate that the results are robust to this aggregation.
Finally, I carry out the same analysis for the SRES projections. Note that some
scenarios did not differ in their economic projections, therefore only the following
scenarios were analysed (the duplicates are given in brackets: A1, A1T (=A1G=A1C),
A2, B1 (=B1T), B1High, B2.
10 However, the base-country used by the IPCC for GDP calculations was the USA, and therefore Y is
measured US dollars, and P is relative to the USA (USA=100).
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Regressions were run as linear models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
in R (R Development Core Team 2007) using the lm function.
To determine the support that the inclusion of the )ln(
OECD
i
Y
Y term receives from the
data, I calculated the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) score of the model shown in
Equation B.3 as well as a model containing only the intercept term (Equation B.4):
Equation B.3 )ln()ln(
OECD
i
OECD
i
Y
Y
P
P
 
Equation B.4 )ln(
OECD
i
P
P
The AIC score is equal to twice the log-likelihood of the model, plus a ‘penalty’ equal
the number of parameters multiplied by two. Lower AICs scores therefore indicate
stronger support from the data and relative AIC scores can be used to select
parsimonious models from an a priori defined set of economically appropriate models
(Burnham & Anderson 2002). Adjusted R-squared were calculated to estimate the % of
the variance explained by the model.
Note that all of these analyses use data from countries with varying data quality. It
would be useful to repeat them taking account of data quality, i.e. by eliminating poor
quality data, using the scores in PWT table A column 11. See also Hill (2007) for a
discussion of the quality of PPP exchange rates. Note also that, following Bergin et al, I
have not weighted countries (e.g. by population) nor have I distinguished between
countries with free floating interest rates, and those who, for example, peg their
currency to the dollar, e.g. China.
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IV. Results and Discussion
A. The stability of the Penn effect in the historical country-level data
Figure B.2 shows estimates of the BS coefficient for each year from 1952 – 2003. As in
Figure B.1 above, the data show a relatively weak Penn Effect until the mid-eighties,
when it strengthened considerably, before levelling off in the late nineties. The size of
the BS coefficient is also similar, ranging between about one and five. Thus, the change
to using income and price levels relative to the OECD has not affected the results11.
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Figure B.2. Evolution of the estimated BS coefficient, beta (1952-2003).
Figure B.3 shows ΔAIC for the slope and intercept model compared to the intercept
only model. By convention, models which differ by 10 or more from the best supported
model (ΔAIC >2) are considered to lack any support from the data (Burnham &
Anderson 2002), those 2 or less may be considered to have substantial support. This
demonstrates that, for the period prior to the 1960s, estimates of price level given
income should be made using both models (averaged using Akaike weights), further
reducing the size of the Penn effect. In addition, Figure B.3 shows the evolution of the
11 The small differences that exist between the two sets of results probably result from the slightly
different sample and dataset. However, since Bergin et al. do not list the countries in their sample, and the
PWT version 6 is no longer available, this cannot be verified.
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adjusted R2. This demonstrates that only since the mid-eighties has the Penn effect
explained more than 50% of the variance in price level, for this relatively narrow
sample of countries.
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Figure B.3. Evolution of ΔAIC and adjusted R2 of the slope and intercept model compared to the
intercept only model (1952-2003).
Bergin et al. do not present evidence on the effect of broadening the sample of countries
in any given year, and their analysis, like this one, used only a relatively small sample
of countries, largely excluding Asia and Eastern Europe / former USSR.
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Figure B.4 shows that if the sample of countries is broadened to 150 countries (1970-
2003 series), the Penn effect weakens considerably. Throughout the 1990s this broader
sample of countries shows BS coefficients which are only 50-70% of that shown by the
narrower sample, with the Penn effect often explaining 30-40 percentage points less of
the variation in price level. In 1990, when most of the modelling teams for the SRES
had begun, the Penn effect explained just 30% of the variation. Broadening the sample
still further, to include most of the countries in the REF region (1993-2003) makes little
difference to the estimate of the beta, but reduces the adjusted R2 by around another ten
percentage points (Figure B.).
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Figure B.5. Effect on the Penn Effect of broadening the sample of countries (and therefore
reducing the number of years for which data is available).
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Figure B.6. Effect on the adjusted R2 of broadening the sample of countries (and therefore
reducing the number of years for which data is available).
Because of a lack of data, the ‘stylised fact’ of the Penn effect has until recently been
derived from short time series and or relatively narrow, unrepresentative, samples of
Appendix B
B-14
countries12. Recent improvements in the data available allow a more expansive view and
demonstrate that the Penn effect is far from stable over time13. Nor is it an iron rule of
accounting that can be blindly applied: the model assuming the Penn effect currently
explains just 40% of variance in price level on a global scale, and appears to be
weakening in its explanatory power. The results suggest that the Penn effect may be
relatively strong within groups of countries that are more or less similar in certain
characteristics, thus, we might speak of a conditional Penn effect. Further investigation
of the characteristics determining the strength of the effect over time or between groups
of countries is warranted but outside the scope of this section14.
B. Estimating the BS coefficient from the aggregated data
The year-by-year analysis above was repeated for the historical data after it had been
aggregated into the SRES regions. Figure B.7 compares estimates of beta 1952-2003
from the aggregated data with those from the country level data. The aggregated
measure shows a similar trend to that derived from the country level data. Thus, it
appears that regionally aggregated data provides a reasonably unbiased estimator of
beta, over the historical period, when compared with country level data.
12 The inclusion or otherwise of a country in the PWT is not random: in particular, the PWT has poor
coverage of communist / post communist countries prior to 1993.
13 Note, however, that this was acknowledged by Samuelson in 1994.
14 It would be interesting to analyse trends in the Penn effect accounting first for fixed exchange rates, and
then looking at trade liberalisation / trade volumes, in particular exports and imports as a % of GDP. The
PWT includes a variable OPENK – which is Imports + Exports as % of GDP. Ceteris paribus, an increase
in OPENK should weaken the Penn effect. Cross-sectionally, residuals from the Penn model should be
correlated with OPENK: i.e., countries with above (below) average relative income level and above
(below) average price level (i.e. those which tend to increase beta), should have below average OPENK.
i.e the sign of the correlation between OPENK and the residual should change either side of the mean of
relative income.
Appendix B
B-15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Year
B
et
a
regionally aggregated data
country data
Figure B.7. BS coefficient estimated from regionally aggregated data and country level data
(with 95% confidence intervals). For the regionally aggregated data, each data point was
weighted by the number of countries in the region.
C. SRES Projections
Figure B.8 and Figure B.9 plot estimated values of the BS coefficient for the SRES
MESSAGE scenarios (with and without REF countries respectively), together with
estimates from the country-level historical data (1952-2003). In all scenarios other than
A2, beta declines steadily from 1990, though always remaining broadly within the
historically observed range, implying a gradual weakening of the Penn Effect. The A2
scenario maintains beta at roughly 1990 levels, until almost the end of the century,
before declining sharply. No scenarios foresee a significant increase in the strength of
the Penn effect.
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Figure B.8. Estimates of beta from the SRES MESSAGE scenarios (including REF countries),
compared to those from the historical data (with 95% confidence intervals).
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Figure B.9. Estimates of beta from the SRES MESSAGE scenarios (excluding REF countries),
compared to those from the historical data (with 95% confidence intervals).
Discussion
Section II highlighted the vague nature of the Castles and Henderson’s criticisms of the
SRES GDPPPP projections, and their assumption of a strong and stable Penn effect. It is
harder to determine whether the SRES team assume a strong and stable effect in their
response, since it is difficult to differentiate between convergence in price levels due to
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convergence in income levels (which would be consistent with the Penn effect) and
convergence for some other reason, such as globalisation (see below), and their use of
the term “economic development” is sufficiently vague to encompass both possibilities.
As Samuelson (1994) stated, and Bergin et al. (2006) empirically demonstrated, the
Penn effect has not been stable over time. Therefore, the zero-order comparisons
implied by the Castles and Henderson critique are overly simplistic: there is no reason
why projections should assume a strong and stable Penn effect lasting long into the
future, with BS coefficients fixed at 1990 levels. Furthermore, the BS coefficients
derived from the SRES projections lie within the range seen historically, at least as far
as it is possible to tell from the aggregated data provided by the SRES. The Castles and
Henderson critique is therefore shown to be overly simplistic.
However, finding fault with the critique does not automatically vindicate the SRES. I
have shown that while the level of BS coefficients displayed by the SRES projections
are historically reasonable, the projections do assume a very particular evolution of the
Penn effect over time, and it is to these trends which I now turn.
A. The theory and future evolution of the Penn effect
The causes of the Penn effect are poorly understood (Samuelson 1994, Bergin et al.
2006) and therefore the likely future trends are especially difficult to determine. The
textbook Penn model did not in fact ‘explain’ the Penn effect, but rather propose a
means by which it might come about: a difference in productivity between traded and
non-traded sectors (Bergin et al. 2006). The Penn model did not explain how such
differences might arise, nor make any predictions about their stability.
Bergin et al. (2006) propose a mechanism by which such differences may arise and be
sustained, by hypothesising that sectors or companies which show large productivity
increases may be disproportionately likely to become traded:
“In particular, while standard [Balassa-Samuelson] theory must assume that
productivity gains are concentrated by coincidence in the existing traded
goods sector, our model accounts for how productivity gains in the
production of particular goods can in turn lead to those goods becoming
traded endogenously.” Bergin et al. (2006, p2043)
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Productivity increases in the services sector, previously assumed to be untraded, have
led some to conclude that the Penn effect will weaken (Bergin et al. 2006, p2060).
However, Bergin et al. note that services are increasingly being traded, in a ‘flatter’
world (see Friedman 2005 for discussion of this process)15. Now, ceteris paribus, a
tendency for high productivity sectors or agents to become traded would act to
strengthen the Penn effect, and increase beta. However, if parallel improvements in
technology and free trade lead to a general increase in the proportion of the
consumption basket which is traded, this would act to reduce the weight given to non-
traded goods, weakening the Penn effect.
Bergin et al’s model cannot therefore lead to an ever increasing, or even stable Penn
effect unless there is a similar tendency on the part of low-productivity sectors to cease
to be traded at an equal rate, and this seems unlikely given the pace of technological and
institutional developments tending to increase cross-border trade in nearly all sectors.
Interestingly, Bergin and Glick (2007) show that international price dispersion (a
necessary but not sufficient condition for the Penn effect) fell from 1990-1997, before
rising. The trend was found to be correlated with oil prices – increasing oil prices reduce
trade, increasing price dispersion. The trend in price dispersion mirrors the trend in the
Penn effect, for the 1952-2003 sample, though not the wider samples. This would imply
that the strength of the Penn effect in this group of countries at least, was driven by
trade volume, rather than by productivity differentials. If ever-increasing globalisation is
assumed, the Penn effect is likely to weaken regardless of what happens to productivity
differentials, since all sectors will become heavily traded.
Therefore, there are two main forces that can act to produce the Penn effect, each is
necessary but not sufficient without the other. First, the pattern of global trade must be
such that a significant proportion of the consumption basket remains untraded. Second,
productivity gains must be concentrated in the traded sector. Bergin et al. (2006)
propose one mechanism by which this latter process could occur, but do not deal
explicitly with the effect of an apparently general increase in the proportion of the
consumption basket which is traded.
15 Bergin et al. do acknowledge that the increased trade in services probably results from improved
telecommunications as well as productivity increases.
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The above discussion serves to show that the Penn effect is not stable over time, and is
poorly understood. It is therefore highly uncertain how it will change in the future. It
also demonstrates that the Penn effect cannot be considered independently of the
scenarios themselves. One of the factors which distinguish the scenarios is the degree of
globalisation that is assumed (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000). If this is a primary
determinant of the Penn effect, one would not expect all scenarios to assume the same
BS coefficients, and the BS coefficient must be determined endogenously16. Indeed,
scenario A2 is characterised by lower trade flows than A1 (Nakicenovic & Swart 2000),
which would imply a potentially stronger Penn effect17, which appears to be the case.
However, the B2 scenario is also supposed to represent a less globalised future, yet
shows the lowest BS coefficients. This could of course be due to an assumption that
productivity differences would be spread evenly across sectors, in this scenario.
Thus, the trends in BS coefficient displayed by the SRES projections appear to be
reasonable, though representing strong assumptions about certain economic processes
like trade and productivity growth across sectors. Given the lack of clarity surrounding
the SRES scenarios, it is impossible to know whether these trends represent deliberate
and carefully calculated projections, or are merely artefacts. They do not explicitly
mention trade flows increasing or productivity improvement differentials declining in
their response to Castles and Henderson.
If we look more closely at the GDPMER and GDPPPP series for individual regions, for
example for the B1 scenario, they show some interesting properties (Figure B.10). For
the three developing regions, the Penn effect apparently disappears as each one
converges on the 1990 OECD income level, not the contemporary OECD income level.
Furthermore, for the OECD region, the GDPPPP and GDPMER series appear to diverge,
with the GDPPPP series below that of the GDPMER. These properties are consistent with
the SRES team having determined the relationship between GDPPPP and GDPMER based
on the income level of a region at any given time relative to the US income level in
1990, rather than the contemporaneous US income level. If this is the case, they are
16 If it is in fact necessary to project both MER and PPP, as the SRES team contend (Nakicenovic et al.
2003) and Castles and Henderson (2003a, b) and Ryten (2004) deny.
17 This still requires the assumption of productivity gains concentrated in the traded sector.
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flawed. However, there may be other reasonable explanations as to why the Penn effect
is assumed to disappear from developing countries at a certain level of economic
development, yet still persist and in fact strengthen in the rich countries.
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Figure B.10. GDPMER (bold lines) and GDPPPP (pale lines) projections compared for the B1
scenario.
V. Conclusions and implications
This appendix has shown the Castles and Henderson critique to be simplistic and
historically naïve. It also shows that the SRES projections display reasonable (though
particular) trends in the BS coefficient, which may be consistent with the individual
characteristics of the scenarios. The SRES team themselves have robustly defended the
GDPPPP projections as valid (Grübler et al. 2004) and it therefore seems reasonable to
evaluate these projections in this chapter. However, it is not entirely clear how the
GDPPPP projections have been derived and this raises some suspicions as to whether the
GDPPPP projections genuinely represent the assumptions of the SRES team, i.e. whether
the trends in the BS coefficient are reasonable, but derive from inappropriate and
unintentional assumptions 18 . This highlights the need for greater clarity in the
18 It might therefore be appropriate to repeat the analyses in the main body of the chapter for GDPMER
projections, and possibly for a new GDPPPP projections based on the GDPMER projections and using the
BS coefficients estimated from the between region analyses of the SRES scenarios. It is unlikely that this
would qualitatively change the results, however. For example, for the B1 scenario above, it would have
the effect of slightly increasing the GDPPPP growth rate of the OECD region, in order for the GDPPPP and
GDPMER series to converge rather than diverge.
Appendix B
B-21
presentation of future income projections that project both GDPMER and GDPPPP, and for
greater historical awareness from those who would criticise them.
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C. Sampling the Pen World Table
data
The Penn World Table (PWT) runs from 1950 to 2004. However, coverage (of all
variables except population19) is incomplete for some countries (Figure C.1). The first
point to note is that data is unavailable prior to 1990 for most of the countries making
up the REF region (<20% by population), and this region is therefore excluded in all of
the analyses. Data is also missing for very many countries outside the OECD90 region
for 2004, and thus all 2004 data is discarded. Note that there is a substantial jump in
coverage of Asia in 1952 and smaller jumps in 1960 and 1972, and small jumps for
ALM in 1952 1955, 1960 and 1970. Coverage of the OECD90 region is good in all
years (>85%), with small improvements in 1952 and 1970.
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Figure C.1. Regional Coverage of the Penn World Table 6.2 The percentage of each SRES
region’s total population for which income and price level data is available from the Penn
World Table 6.2 NB Total population is based on figures from the PWT, and therefore doesn’t
include any countries that are entirely missing from the Penn Table.
19 The population estimates come from the US Census Bureau. Because these represent the best guess of
the true population figure, they may differ from official population statistics published by country
governments and collated by the UN.
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I took samples starting in 1952, 1960 and 1970. Each contains data aggregated from a
consistent set of countries but series starting later include more countries. There is an
obvious advantage to using a longer sample period, as long as this is representative of
the period as a whole. For the OECD, Figure C.2 below shows clearly that the longest
sample (1952-1990) shows identical trends to those of later samples where they overlap.
For the developing regions, coverage is poorer in 1952, and the time series differ more
(Figure C.3 and Figure C.4). Dividing through by a factor to equalise to 1990 income
levels, however, shows that for ALM at least, the longest time series is representative of
later series, showing the same trend and differing only in relative income level (Figure
C.5). For ASIA, the same is broadly true although there appears to be some advantage
to using the 1960-1990 sample which shows more similar rates of convergence with the
more complete series starting in 1970 than does the 1952-1990 sample (Figure C.6). For
all subsequent analysis I use the full 1952-1990 sample.
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
22,000
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Year
G
D
P
(P
P
P
)
1952-1990
1960-1990
1970-1990
Figure C.2. Three samples of OECD income data.
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Figure C.3. Three samples of data for income (relative to OECD) for the ALM region.
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Figure C.4. Three samples of data for income (relative to OECD) for the ASIA region.
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Figure C.5. Three samples of data for income (relative to OECD) for the ALM region with the
1952-1990 and 1960-1990 data divided by a factor to equalise 1990 level with 1970-1990
sample.
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Figure C.6. Three samples of data for income (relative to OECD) for the ASIA region with the
1952-1990 and 1960-1990 data divided by a factor to equalise 1990 level with 1970-1990
sample.
